Anna Zhou
Add deterministic geographic metadata queries
31a06e1
Raw History Blame Contribute Delete
31.6 kB
[
{
"case_id": "CS17",
"chunk_index": 0,
"section": "general_information",
"location": "San Martin Region",
"country": "Peru",
"country_normalized": "Peru",
"continent": "South America",
"admin_area": "",
"source": "Pipeline Ver2 — San Martin Planned Relocation",
"source_links": [
{
"title": "Bergmann, J. (2021). Planned relocation in Peru: Advancing from well-meant legislation to good practice. Journal of Environmental Studies and Sciences, 11, 365-375. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13412-021-00699-w",
"doi": "10.1007/s13412-021-00699-w",
"url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s13412-021-00699-w"
},
{
"title": "French, A., Mechler, R., Arestegui, M., MacClune, K., & Cisneros, A. (2020). Root causes of recurrent catastrophe: The political ecology of El Nino-related disasters in Peru. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 47, 101539. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2020.101539",
"doi": "10.1016/j.ijdrr.2020.101539",
"url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2020.101539"
}
],
"text": "Case study: San Martin Planned Relocation (San Martin Region, Peru)\nSection: GENERAL INFORMATION\n\n---\n\n### Is there any evidence of a proactive or reactive trigger in the MR decision process? (Reactive/Proactive)\n\n**Answer:** **Reactive** (primary). Some proactive elements are present in the legislative framing and community risk appraisal, but the decision trigger for both communities was flood damage.\n\n**Narrative:** V1/V3's original relocation request in 1999 followed major flood events in 1963 and 1999 — a reactive pattern triggered after damage had occurred. Similarly, V2/V4's formal request in 2015 followed major floods in 1977 and 2015 (Bergmann 2021, p. 367). Both decisions were thus primarily reactive in terms of the immediate trigger: \"major floods in undated V2 in 1977 and 2015\" and V1 \"suffered from single, large floods in 1963 and in 1999\" (Bergmann 2021, p. 367).\n\nHowever, community motivation was not purely retrospective. Bergmann (2021) notes that \"risk appraisal, fear and uncertainty, deprivations, and children's future prospects drove their decisions\" (p. 367), indicating forward-looking motivations alongside disaster-triggered concerns. Peru's broader DRM framework (French et al. 2020) has shifted toward prospective measures including relocation, but national DRM practice has historically remained reactive (French et al. 2020, p. 30). Law No. 29869 (2012) frames relocation as a prospective risk-reduction tool, but the immediate decision trigger in both cases was flood damage.\n\n**Coding:** **Reactive** is the primary code. The legislative framework introduces a proactive dimension, but the codebook directs coding based on the decision trigger, which was reactive in both cases.\n\n---\n\n### Date, Number of households affected, Number of population affected, Total funding\n\n**Answer:**\n- **Dates:** V1/V3 relocation request: 1999; physical relocation completed: 2014; status as of research: still lacking final legal approvals (2019). V2/V4 relocation request: 2015; declared uninhabitable: 2017; no completed relocation as of 2019.\n- **Number of households:** Not explicitly provided in household counts in the reviewed sources.\n- **Number of population affected:** Approximately 850 people across both communities — approximately 150 (V1/V3) and approximately 700 (V2/V4) (Bergmann 2021, p. 366).\n- **Total funding:** No specific budget figures are provided in the reviewed sources for either relocation. The regional government promised funds for land acquisition for V2/V4 in 2015 but had not delivered as of 2019, \"allegedly due to changing functionaries and priorities\" (Bergmann 2021, p. 368). V1/V3 received no state housing reconstruction support and relied primarily on its own resources and a private land swap (Bergmann 2021, pp. 368–369).\n\n**Uncertainty:** Exact household counts and any formal budget allocations for these specific relocations are not documented in the reviewed sources.\n\n---\n\n### What is the occurrence of the hazard(s) considered in the MR decision process? (Single Hazard/Multiple Hazards)\n\n**Answer:** **Multiple Hazards.**\n\n**Narrative:** While riverine flooding is the primary and most damaging hazard cited in both cases — with close to 100% of interviewees mentioning floods (Bergmann 2021, Fig. 4) — a range of additional hazards were documented. Bergmann (2021, Fig. 4) shows that interviewees also mentioned weather-related diseases affecting humans, pests and diseases affecting animals or crops, temperature changes, rainfall changes, strong winds, declining crop productivity or pastures, and droughts. The legal basis for relocation was primarily the flood risk, but the communities faced multiple overlapping climate-related hazards.\n\n---\n\n### What is the origin of the hazards considered in the MR decision process? (Technological Hazard/Natural Hazard)\n\n**Answer:** **Natural Hazard.**\n\n**Narrative:** The hazards are entirely natural — riverine flooding, climate variability, and associated phenomena. Bergmann (2021, p. 365) notes that \"extreme floods have already increased\" in the Peruvian Amazon \"and are projected to rise further due to climate change.\" French et al. (2020) provide broader context on the ENSO system and El Niño-related flooding as natural hydro-meteorological phenomena, with a climate change dimension. No technological hazards are discussed in the reviewed sources. Per the codebook, \"Natural hazard\" is the applicable code; the climate change intensification dimension is noted here in text but does not constitute a separate origin code under the codebook structure.\n\n---\n\n### Was this hazard considered in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** **Riverine/Pluvial Flooding** (primary). **Other** (weather-related disease, crop pests, rainfall changes, droughts, strong winds, declining productivity — secondary, mentioned by interviewees).\n\n**Narrative:** Riverine flooding from adjacent rivers is the explicitly identified primary hazard driving both relocation decisions. Major flood events (1963 and 1999 for V1/V3; 1977 and 2015 for V2/V4) were the triggering events for relocation requests (Bergmann 2021, p. 367). The state's uninhabitability declarations were primarily based on flood risk. Peru's broader DRM framework documented by French et al. (2020) is also primarily focused on hydro-meteorological hazards. The additional hazards mentioned by interviewees (Fig. 4 in Bergmann 2021) were part of the broader context but were not the primary basis for formal relocation declarations.\n\n---\n\n### What was the geographic scale of the MR project? (Individual homes, A few streets, Neighbourhood, Entire community, Sub-watershed, Watershed region)\n\n**Answer:** **Entire community** (for both villages).\n\n**Narrative:** Both relocations were framed as whole-community relocations. V1/V3 (approximately 150 people) relocated collectively. V2/V4 (approximately 700 people) sought collective relocation to a site approximately one kilometer away near a planned road (Bergmann 2021, p. 370). Bergmann (2021) consistently frames these as community-level processes, and Peru's relocation regulation (Decreto Supremo No. 115-2013-PCM) is designed for collective population relocation from high-risk zones. Neither case involved selective individual household buyouts.\n\n---\n\n### Who or what was retreated? (Individuals, Groups/Neighbourhoods, Communities, Critical infrastructure, Hazard protection structures, Industrial assets)\n\n**Answer:** **Communities.**\n\n**Narrative:** Both cases involved the collective relocation of entire rural communities. Bergmann (2021, 2024) consistently refers to community-level decision-making and relocation processes. There is no evidence in the reviewed sources of individual household buyouts, infrastructure relocation, or industrial asset relocation. Law No. 29869 is specifically designed for collective population relocation (Bergmann 2021, p. 366).\n\n---\n\n### Other notes (General Information)\n\nThe two communities are anonymized in the sources: as V1 (mestizo, approximately 150 people) and V2 (indígena, approximately 700 people) in Bergmann (2021), and as V3 and V4 respectively in Bergmann (2024). Both are located in the San Martín department of the Peruvian Amazon. Bergmann (2021, p. 366) notes that community members self-identify as mestizos and indígenas respectively, and that intersectional factors — including gender, ethnicity, poverty, and low education — heighten vulnerabilities. More than 60% of people in both districts have only primary education or less, and around 15% cannot read or write; approximately 80% of households cook with wood (Bergmann 2021, p. 366).\n\n---"
},
{
"case_id": "CS17",
"chunk_index": 1,
"section": "institutional_environment",
"location": "San Martin Region",
"country": "Peru",
"country_normalized": "Peru",
"continent": "South America",
"admin_area": "",
"source": "Pipeline Ver2 — San Martin Planned Relocation",
"source_links": [
{
"title": "Bergmann, J. (2021). Planned relocation in Peru: Advancing from well-meant legislation to good practice. Journal of Environmental Studies and Sciences, 11, 365-375. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13412-021-00699-w",
"doi": "10.1007/s13412-021-00699-w",
"url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s13412-021-00699-w"
},
{
"title": "French, A., Mechler, R., Arestegui, M., MacClune, K., & Cisneros, A. (2020). Root causes of recurrent catastrophe: The political ecology of El Nino-related disasters in Peru. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 47, 101539. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2020.101539",
"doi": "10.1016/j.ijdrr.2020.101539",
"url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2020.101539"
}
],
"text": "Case study: San Martin Planned Relocation (San Martin Region, Peru)\nSection: INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT\n\n---\n\n### What is the focus or scope of the MR project? (Individual buyout/retreat, Community buyout/retreat, Leasebacks, easements and buffers, Other acquisition tools, Managed realignment of infrastructure)\n\n**Answer:** **Community buyout/retreat.**\n\n**Narrative:** Both cases involve collective community relocation, not individual property buyouts. Law No. 29869 (2012) and its regulatory decree (Decreto Supremo No. 115-2013-PCM) are explicitly designed for \"reasentamiento poblacional\" (population resettlement) of communities from zones of \"very high, unmitigable risk\" (Bergmann 2021, pp. 366–367). Bergmann (2021) consistently frames these as community-level processes with collective decision-making. There is no evidence of individual property acquisition programs or market-based buyout mechanisms in these cases. In V1/V3, land was ultimately acquired through a territory swap with a private agribusiness — a non-formal arrangement not contemplated by the standard legal framework (Bergmann 2021, p. 369).\n\n---\n\n### What legal constraints or requirements were identified during the MR decision process? Are there any legal frameworks or regulations that guide the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** **Relevant regulations/acts; Legal authority over retreat; Land acquisition; Title(s) transfer; Land rezoning; Compliance & enforcement; Other (participation rights, ministerial approval requirements).**\n\n**Narrative:**\n\n- **Relevant regulations/acts:** Law No. 29869 (2012) on population resettlement from areas of \"very high, unmitigable risk\"; Law No. 30645 (2017) modifying it; and Decreto Supremo No. 115-2013-PCM as the regulatory decree (Bergmann 2021, pp. 365–366). French et al. (2020, p. 22) also reference Law No. 29869, noting that \"since its passage, however, the law has seen little implementation.\" The regulation covers most phases of the relocation cycle: planning, participation, transfer, livelihood restoration, monitoring, and evaluation (Bergmann 2021, Fig. 1).\n\n- **Legal authority over retreat:** Responsibilities are divided across multiple levels. Local and regional governments are responsible for preparing relocation plans; CENEPRED and INDECI have technical oversight; the Ministry of Housing manages land-use approvals (Bergmann 2021, p. 368). V1/V3's case illustrates that the central government had not issued the required final ministerial resolution years after physical relocation had occurred (Bergmann 2021, p. 368).\n\n- **Land acquisition:** A major legal and practical obstacle. The law permits expropriation with compensation at \"real costs,\" but regional authorities declined to apply this tool even when a private landowner allegedly inflated prices for V2/V4's prospective site. Bergmann (2021, p. 369) notes that the government \"fail[ed] to exploit all legal options, such as using charges from natural resource exploitation and mining.\" The state did not provide land for V1/V3, which ultimately had to negotiate a private territory swap.\n\n- **Title(s) transfer:** Property titles at V1/V3's new site could not be issued without a final ministerial resolution approving the relocation and a land-use reclassification from rural to urban — neither of which had occurred as of 2019 (Bergmann 2021, p. 368). This blocked access to social housing programs and other state benefits.\n\n- **Land rezoning:** Required but not completed for V1/V3. Bergmann (2021, p. 368) specifically notes that the absence of a land-use change \"from rural to urban\" was a prerequisite for property titles and access to social programs.\n\n- **Compliance & enforcement:** The law establishes participation rights and monitoring obligations, but Bergmann (2021, p. 368) documents that \"the implementation of their legally guaranteed participation rights has been insufficient.\" Relocatees were not informed about legally required dispute resolution mechanisms. The Ministry of Women and Vulnerable Populations (MIMP) had a legal mandate to protect relocatees but lacked adequate funding (Bergmann 2021, p. 371).\n\n- **Other:** The law's participation clause is conditional — \"when circumstances allow\" and \"with the necessary availability\" (Law No. 29869, Arts. 5, 6, 17, as translated by Bergmann 2021, footnote 7, p. 371) — creating legal ambiguity about enforceability. The exact threshold for \"unmitigable\" risk is noted as ambiguous by Bergmann (2021, p. 367) and Venkateswaran et al. (2017) as cited in Bergmann (2021).\n\nFrench et al. (2020, p. 22) provide complementary context on Law No. 29869, noting that \"the law has seen little implementation\" nationally and describing one case (Chosica) where residents resisted relocation orders.\n\n---\n\n### What were the funding sources for the MR project?\n\n**Answer:** **Individual** (community self-funding in practice for V1/V3); **Provincial/State** (promised but not delivered for V2/V4). No other funding sources are documented in the reviewed sources.\n\n**Narrative:** The legal framework envisages state funding at multiple levels. For V2/V4, the regional government promised funds for land acquisition in 2015 but had not delivered as of 2019, \"allegedly due to changing functionaries and priorities\" (Bergmann 2021, p. 368). National-level authorities were expected to provide ministerial approvals and reconstruction support but had not done so for V1/V3 as of 2019 (Bergmann 2021, p. 368).\n\nIn practice, V1/V3 funded their own relocation almost entirely through their own labor and resources. The enabling factors were a private territory swap with a local agribusiness and employment from a private canalization company: \"Without these two private entities, relocation and reconstruction would have failed\" (Bergmann 2021, p. 369). Bergmann (2021, p. 368) quotes a V1/V3 interviewee: \"All we have, what little we have, is thanks to ourselves\" (V1-3).\n\nThe reviewed sources do not document international aid, insurance, NGO, or lender funding for these specific relocations. French et al. (2020, p. 23) reference the national DRM budget program PP 068 (PREVAED), contingency funds, and charges from mining-sector profits (canon minero) as legally available mechanisms for relocation of at-risk populations, but these mechanisms are not documented in the reviewed sources as having been effectively accessed for either case.\n\n**Note on terminology:** Peru is a unitary state; references to \"national\" or \"central government\" and \"regional government\" (rather than \"federal\") are used throughout this memo to reflect the correct governance structure.\n\n---\n\n### What was considered to maintain (or improve) the tax base in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** **No evidence found in reviewed sources.**\n\n**Narrative:** Tax base considerations are not discussed in any of the reviewed sources in relation to these specific relocations. The communities are subsistence farming villages in remote rural areas of the Peruvian Amazon. No evidence of tax revenue planning, redevelopment of retreat lands for revenue generation, or related considerations is documented in Bergmann (2021), Bergmann (2024), or French et al. (2020) in relation to these two cases.\n\n---\n\n### What level/type of compensation mechanisms were considered in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** **Free supports and services** (legally promised but largely not delivered in practice).\n\n**Narrative:** Peru's relocation regulation (Decreto Supremo No. 115-2013-PCM) legally entitles relocatees to a range of supports including housing reconstruction assistance, access to social programs, and livelihood restoration (Bergmann 2021, Fig. 1). However, in practice these entitlements were not fulfilled. For V1/V3, \"promised support for reconstructing houses and improving infrastructure is pending\" as of the time of research (Bergmann 2021, p. 368). For V2/V4, the regional government promised funds for land acquisition but did not deliver (Bergmann 2021, p. 368). Many V2/V4 interviewees \"worried that even if they moved eventually, they would not receive promised access to social programs needed for reconstruction\" (Bergmann 2021, p. 368).\n\nThere is no evidence of cash compensation at market, tax, or post-disaster valuation for either community. The law does envision expropriation of land at \"real costs\" (fair market value) as a tool for the state to acquire relocation sites, but this was not applied (Bergmann 2021, p. 369). V1/V3 effectively received a private territory swap — a non-monetary, in-kind arrangement outside the formal compensation framework. \"Additional incentives\" in the codebook sense are not documented as having been provided.\n\n---"
},
{
"case_id": "CS17",
"chunk_index": 2,
"section": "planning_processes",
"location": "San Martin Region",
"country": "Peru",
"country_normalized": "Peru",
"continent": "South America",
"admin_area": "",
"source": "Pipeline Ver2 — San Martin Planned Relocation",
"source_links": [
{
"title": "Bergmann, J. (2021). Planned relocation in Peru: Advancing from well-meant legislation to good practice. Journal of Environmental Studies and Sciences, 11, 365-375. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13412-021-00699-w",
"doi": "10.1007/s13412-021-00699-w",
"url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s13412-021-00699-w"
},
{
"title": "French, A., Mechler, R., Arestegui, M., MacClune, K., & Cisneros, A. (2020). Root causes of recurrent catastrophe: The political ecology of El Nino-related disasters in Peru. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 47, 101539. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2020.101539",
"doi": "10.1016/j.ijdrr.2020.101539",
"url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2020.101539"
}
],
"text": "Case study: San Martin Planned Relocation (San Martin Region, Peru)\nSection: PLANNING PROCESSES\n\n---\n\n### What is the time horizon considered in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** **Pre-retreat planning; Immediate risks (1–5 years); Anticipated future risks (10–100 years); Post-retreat follow-up** (legally required but weakly implemented in both cases).\n\n**Narrative:** The legislative framework contemplates pre-retreat planning activities (risk assessment, community participation, site evaluation, planning approvals) before relocation. Both communities faced immediate flood risks, particularly V2/V4 after being declared uninhabitable in 2017. Climate change projections for the Amazon — documented in Bergmann (2021, p. 365) — situate these relocations within a longer-term horizon of increasing flood extremes. Post-retreat follow-up was legally required under the regulation (monitoring, evaluation, livelihood restoration, data collection — see Bergmann 2021, Fig. 1) but was not implemented for either community as of 2019. The absence of post-retreat follow-up for V1/V3 is illustrated by the lack of property titles, housing support, and final legal approvals five years after physical relocation.\n\n---\n\n### What planning elements were considered in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** **Top-down; Bottom-up** (community-initiated but not sustained through formal processes); **Multi-sectoral** (in legal design); **Participatory/collaborative** (legally required but poorly implemented); **Degree of transparency** (limited).\n\n**Narrative:** The formal planning structure under Law No. 29869 is multi-sectoral, assigning roles to local and regional governments, CENEPRED, INDECI, the Ministry of Housing, and MIMP (Bergmann 2021, p. 367; French et al. 2020, p. 22). However, implementation was primarily top-down and centralized, with local authorities lacking technical capacity, resources, and political will (Bergmann 2021, p. 367). Community-initiated (bottom-up) relocation requests drove both cases, but communities were largely excluded from meaningful decision-making once formal processes were engaged. Bergmann (2021, p. 368) notes that village authorities \"said the implementation of their legally guaranteed participation rights has been insufficient\" and that communities \"lacked access to decision-makers and traveling regularly to the capital to make their case is prohibitively expensive.\"\n\nTransparency was low: government promises were broken without explanation, and relocatees \"cited numerous grievances, complaints, and conflicts, but the state did not seem to fulfil its obligation to inform them about legally required resolution mechanisms\" (Bergmann 2021, p. 371). There is no evidence in the reviewed sources of adaptive management, cost-benefit analysis, or multi-criteria decision analysis being applied to these specific relocations.\n\n---\n\n### What decision support tools were used in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** **Hazard maps & models** (implied by formal risk zone declarations); **Process guidance** (legally prescribed by the regulation).\n\n**Narrative:** The legal basis for relocation requires a formal risk assessment declaring zones as \"very high, unmitigable risk,\" implying the use of hazard assessment tools. CENEPRED and INDECI produce hazard maps at national and regional levels (French et al. 2020, p. 21). Both V1/V3 and V2/V4 were formally declared zones of very high unmitigable risk, suggesting some form of hazard assessment was conducted (Bergmann 2021, p. 367). Peru's relocation regulation constitutes a form of process guidance (Bergmann 2021, Fig. 1). However, Bergmann (2021, p. 367) notes that \"the law's exact threshold of 'unmitigable' hazards remains ambiguous,\" suggesting that available decision tools were imprecise and inconsistently applied.\n\nThere is no documented use in the reviewed sources of CBA, MCDA, demographic projections, social vulnerability assessments, housing assessments, or formal new site evaluation processes for these specific cases.\n\n---\n\n### What planning measures were taken for receiving areas in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** **Identifying priority areas** (limited); **Individuals vs. neighbourhoods/communities** (community-level planning intended); **Construction of new housing** (legally required but not delivered by the state).\n\n**Narrative:** For V1/V3, a new site was identified adjacent to the existing location through the private land swap, closer to a road facilitating better market access (Bergmann 2021, p. 369–370). For V2/V4, an envisaged site approximately one kilometer away, near a planned road, was identified but not secured because the state failed to acquire land and the private owner \"allegedly inflated prices above market standards\" (Bergmann 2021, p. 369).\n\nBergmann (2021, p. 370) notes that relocation planners \"paid limited attention to people's lifestyles\" at the new site — \"the newly designated, smaller lots complicated traditional activities like raising free-range animals\" — indicating insufficient co-design of receiving areas. No state construction of new housing is documented for either case; V1/V3 rebuilt homes independently. Social carrying capacity assessments are not documented in the reviewed sources.\n\n---\n\n### What uses were planned for retreat lands?\n\n**Answer:** **Reducing/eliminating servicing** (documented for V2/V4 following the 2017 uninhabitability declaration).\n\n**Narrative:** After V2/V4's original site was declared uninhabitable in 2017, \"authorities stopped promised investments in education, health, sanitation, and water\" (Bergmann 2021, p. 368) — effectively eliminating servicing before relocation had occurred. Bergmann (2021, p. 368) notes that \"such service discontinuation often causes marginalization in relocations.\" Photographs in Bergmann (2021, Fig. 3) show \"decaying houses in abandoned site of V1,\" suggesting that V1/V3's original site was left to decay.\n\nThere is no evidence in the reviewed sources of formal rezoning, ecological restoration, demolition, site design, commemoration, conservation land trusts, or formal ownership transfer for either vacated site. **Demolition/infrastructure removal/asset retirement** is not coded because explicit evidence of deliberate clearing or removal is not established — what is documented is service discontinuation and apparent abandonment/decay, not formal managed decommissioning.\n\n---"
},
{
"case_id": "CS17",
"chunk_index": 3,
"section": "community_engagement",
"location": "San Martin Region",
"country": "Peru",
"country_normalized": "Peru",
"continent": "South America",
"admin_area": "",
"source": "Pipeline Ver2 — San Martin Planned Relocation",
"source_links": [
{
"title": "Bergmann, J. (2021). Planned relocation in Peru: Advancing from well-meant legislation to good practice. Journal of Environmental Studies and Sciences, 11, 365-375. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13412-021-00699-w",
"doi": "10.1007/s13412-021-00699-w",
"url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s13412-021-00699-w"
},
{
"title": "French, A., Mechler, R., Arestegui, M., MacClune, K., & Cisneros, A. (2020). Root causes of recurrent catastrophe: The political ecology of El Nino-related disasters in Peru. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 47, 101539. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2020.101539",
"doi": "10.1016/j.ijdrr.2020.101539",
"url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2020.101539"
}
],
"text": "Case study: San Martin Planned Relocation (San Martin Region, Peru)\nSection: COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT\n\n---\n\n### What degree of choice was provided to affected people in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** **Voluntary with strong persuasion** (for V1/V3, which self-initiated and drove the process despite severe structural constraints). For V2/V4, the situation more closely approximates the Aspirations-Capabilities Framework's category of **forced immobility (entrapment)** — high aspiration to move, very low capability due to structural constraints — though the formal legal framing is voluntary.\n\n**Narrative:** Both communities self-initiated their relocation requests, suggesting a degree of voluntariness. However, Bergmann (2021, p. 367) emphasizes that \"risk appraisal, fear and uncertainty, deprivations, and children's future prospects drove their decisions\" — conditions that substantially constrain the meaning of \"voluntary.\" V1/V3 fought for 15 years before achieving relocation. V2/V4 was effectively unable to move independently due to extreme poverty: interviewees felt like \"going in circles, you are trapped\" (V2-3, cited in Bergmann 2021, p. 371). Bergmann (2024) explicitly applies the Aspirations-Capabilities Framework to characterize V2/V4 as in \"forced immobility (entrapment)\" — high aspiration to move, low capability due to structural constraints (Bergmann 2024, Table 2.2).\n\nLaw No. 29869's participation rights are conditional — \"when circumstances allow\" and \"with the necessary availability\" — weakening their force (Bergmann 2021, footnote 7). Neither community faced completely involuntary mandated relocation; the law frames participation as voluntary. However, the structural reality, especially for V2/V4, significantly limits the meaning of voluntariness.\n\n**Alternative interpretation:** One could code V2/V4's situation as \"Involuntary with some degree of opt out\" given the state's uninhabitability declaration in 2017, combined with continued trapped immobility due to poverty and government inaction. The codebook's \"Voluntary with strong persuasion\" better captures the formal framing, while the source material supports interpreting V2/V4's actual situation as closer to entrapment.\n\n---\n\n### What land user groups were involved or considered in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** **Homeowners** (community members as land users, though formal titles were absent at the new site); **Community/NGO** (community organizations driving the process); **First Nations/Indigenous** (V2/V4, indígena community); **Government.**\n\n**Narrative:** Both communities are smallholder farming communities whose members are effectively homeowners and land users, though formal property titles were lacking at the new site for V1/V3 as of 2019 (Bergmann 2021, p. 368). V2/V4 represents an Indigenous land user group with distinct cultural identity and collective land governance norms (Bergmann 2021, p. 366). Community organizations played a key role: V1/V3 staged demonstrations and organized collective labour; V2/V4 maintained mutual assistance systems (Bergmann 2021, pp. 369–370). Local and regional government entities were the responsible implementation bodies. No evidence of commercial renters or leased land arrangements is documented.\n\n---\n\n### What actors participated in the governance structure of the MR decision process? Is there evidence that they shaped the MR outcomes?\n\n**Answer:** **Funders** (regional government, promised but not delivered); **Affected community** (self-initiated, shaped outcomes through advocacy and direct action); **Government agencies** (CENEPRED, INDECI, MVCS, MIMP, regional and local governments); **Political champions** (a governor personally led initiation for V1/V3); **Private sector — affected area** (private agribusiness enabled relocation through land swap; private canalization company provided employment); **Academics/researchers"
}
]