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| [ | |
| { | |
| "case_id": "CS27", | |
| "chunk_index": 0, | |
| "section": "overview", | |
| "location": "Grantham, Queensland", | |
| "country": "Australia", | |
| "country_normalized": "Australia", | |
| "continent": "Oceania", | |
| "admin_area": "Queensland", | |
| "source": "Pipeline Ver2 β Grantham", | |
| "source_links": [ | |
| { | |
| "title": "Bower, E. R., & Piggott-McKellar, A. (2026). Unpacking βsuccessβ in climate-related planned relocation: A new research agenda for assessing and measuring outcomes. Cell Reports Sustainability, 3(5), 100657. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.crsus.2026.100657", | |
| "doi": "10.1016/j.crsus.2026.100657", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.crsus.2026.100657" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Okada, T., Haynes, K., Bird, D., van den Honert, R., & King, D. (2014). Recovery and resettlement following the 2011 flash flooding in the Lockyer Valley. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 8, 20-31. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2014.01.001", | |
| "doi": "10.1016/j.ijdrr.2014.01.001", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2014.01.001" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Okada, T., Howitt, R., Haynes, K., Bird, D., & McAneney, J. (2018). Recovering local sociality: Learnings from post-disaster community-scale recoveries. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 31, 1030-1042. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2018.08.010", | |
| "doi": "10.1016/j.ijdrr.2018.08.010", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2018.08.010" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Frost, L., & Miller, F. (2021). Planning for social justice, anticipating sea level rise: the case of Lake Macquarie, Australia. Australian Geographer, 52(2), 171-190. https://doi.org/10.1080/00049182.2021.1917327", | |
| "doi": "10.1080/00049182.2021.1917327", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1080/00049182.2021.1917327" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Hsu, M., Okada, T., Mori, S., & Howitt, R. (2019). Resettling, disconnecting or displacing? Attending to local sociality, culture and history in disaster settings. Asia Pacific Viewpoint, 60(2), 163-174. https://doi.org/10.1111/apv.12230", | |
| "doi": "10.1111/apv.12230", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1111/apv.12230" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Willcocks-Musselman, R., Baird, J., Foster, K., Woodhall-Melnik, J., & Sherren, K. (2025). Finding mobility in place attachment research: lessons for managed retreat. Frontiers in Climate, 7. https://doi.org/10.3389/fclim.2025.1514408", | |
| "doi": "10.3389/fclim.2025.1514408", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.3389/fclim.2025.1514408" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Hegarty, N. (2020, February 28). Grantham reborn: Meet the little Queensland town that moved. Brisbane Times.", | |
| "url": "https://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/national/queensland/grantham-reborn-meet-the-little-queensland-town-that-moved-20200227-p5450g.html" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Okada, T., Haynes, K., Bird, D., van den Honert, R., & King, D. (2014). Recovery and resettlement following the 2011 flash flooding in the Lockyer Valley. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 8, 20-31. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2014.01.001", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2014.01.001" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Bower, E., & Piggott-McKellar, A. (2026). Unpacking \"success\" in climate-related planned relocation: A new research agenda for assessing and measuring outcomes. Current Research in Environmental Sustainability, 8, 100657. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.crsus.2026.100657", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.crsus.2026.100657" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Willcocks-Musselman, R., Baird, J., Foster, K., Woodhall-Melnik, J., & Sherren, K. (2025). Finding mobility in place attachment research: lessons for managed retreat. Frontiers in Climate, 7, 1514408. https://doi.org/10.3389/fclim.2025.1514408", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.3389/fclim.2025.1514408" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Okada, T., Howitt, R., Haynes, K., Bird, D., & McAneney, J. (2018). Recovering local sociality: Learnings from post-disaster community-scale recoveries. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 31, 1033-1042. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2018.08.010", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2018.08.010" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Hsu, M., Okada, T., Mori, S., & Howitt, R. (2019). Resettling, disconnecting or displacing? Attending to local sociality, culture and history in disaster settings. Asia Pacific Viewpoint, 60(3), 296-308. https://doi.org/10.1111/APV.12230", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1111/APV.12230" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Frost, L., & Miller, F. (2021). Planning for social justice, anticipating sea level rise: the case of Lake Macquarie, Australia. Australian Geographer, 52(4), 393-410. https://doi.org/10.1080/00049182.2021.1917327", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1080/00049182.2021.1917327" | |
| } | |
| ], | |
| "text": "Case study: Grantham (Grantham, Queensland, Australia)\nSection: CASE STUDY OVERVIEW\n\n### Case Name and Location\nGrantham Land-Swap Relocation; Grantham township, Lockyer Valley, Queensland, Australia. Grantham is described in the sources as a small rural town in the Lockyer Valley region of Queensland [Okada et al. 2018].\n\n### Hazard(s)\nFlash flooding caused by torrential rainfall in the surrounding mountains, resulting in inundation from Lockyer Creek on 10 January 2011 [Okada et al. 2018; Hsu et al. 2019; Brisbane Times 2020].\n\n### Type of Retreat\nVoluntary land-swap (relocation) program: the Lockyer Valley Regional Council (LVRC) offered flood-affected property owners the opportunity to exchange the title of their inundated land block for a new block of land on higher ground above the town, outside the flood zone. As a prior condition to acquiring land on the hill, participants were required to clear their land block by demolishing all existing buildings [Okada et al. 2018]. The program was branded \"Strengthening Grantham\" [Brisbane Times 2020].\n\n### Scale\nThe land-swap was initially offered to the 119 Grantham and surrounding property owners whose houses were structurally damaged by the 2011 flood event [Okada et al. 2018]. Within the first two years, residents took up 86 lots [Brisbane Times 2020]. By early 2020, approximately 80β90 families lived in the relocated community on the hill [Brisbane Times 2020]. The LVRC purchased 378 hectares of higher land to develop the new community estate [Brisbane Times 2020]. Okada et al. (2018) list Grantham's population as 492 in Table 1.\n\n### Key Actors\n- **Lockyer Valley Regional Council (LVRC):** Initiating and implementing authority; the initiative was conceived by then-Mayor Steve Jones and implemented by LVRC [Okada et al. 2018; Brisbane Times 2020].\n- **Jamie Simmonds (Environmental Engineer / Project Director):** Appointed as Project Director of \"Strengthening Grantham\"; drew on experience fast-tracking development applications and authored *Rising from the Flood: Moving the Town of Grantham* [Brisbane Times 2020].\n- **Queensland State and Federal Governments:** Provided joint funding of AUD $18 million, mostly spent on land development of the resettlement blocks [Okada et al. 2018; Brisbane Times 2020].\n- **Jude Munro (former CEO of Brisbane City Council):** Invited to help facilitate the masterplan workshops; described as having MC'd the workshops [Brisbane Times 2020].\n- **Local residents:** Participated in workshops and land ballot processes; individual homeowners bore the costs of demolition and new construction [Okada et al. 2018; Brisbane Times 2020].\n- **University of California Professor Nicholas Pinter:** Visited and documented the Grantham case; his contact with Simmonds prompted Simmonds to write his book [Brisbane Times 2020].\n\n### Timeline\n- **10 January 2011:** Flash flood event kills 12 people; 119 homes structurally damaged [Okada et al. 2018].\n- **Late January / Early February 2011:** Mayor Jones conceives the relocation concept and the LVRC purchases higher land; Simmonds appointed Project Director within weeks of the flood [Brisbane Times 2020].\n- **March 2011:** Land-swap program formally introduced [Okada et al. 2018].\n- **Early 2011:** Community masterplan workshops held at Grantham State School [Brisbane Times 2020].\n- **10 December 2011:** New Grantham officially opened (approximately 11 months after the flood); $18 million in state and federal funding expended [Brisbane Times 2020].\n- **June 2012:** Community recovery centre closed, with the manager reportedly learning of the decision through the media [Okada et al. 2018].\n- **June 2013:** Main measures completed [Okada et al. 2018, Table 1].\n- **2016:** Mayor Steve Jones dies; local news source reports 634 people in the Grantham area [Brisbane Times 2020].\n- **Early 2020:** Approximately 80β90 families in new Grantham; community described as stabilising but changed [Brisbane Times 2020].\n\n### Key Outcomes\nThe land-swap program physically relocated approximately 86 lots/households to higher, flood-safe ground within approximately 11β12 months, at a cost of AUD $18 million [Okada et al. 2018; Brisbane Times 2020]. The program received domestic and international acclaim for its speed [Okada et al. 2018]. However, significant tensions and unresolved social issues accompanied this outcome. Not all flood-affected residents were able to participate β particularly those who could not afford demolition and construction costs, the elderly, and uninsured or under-insured households [Okada et al. 2018]. The community recovery centre, seen by some residents as a vital social support hub, was closed in June 2012; the manager reportedly learned of the decision through the media rather than directly from the LVRC [Okada et al. 2018]. Academic analyses consistently note that the LVRC's speed-focused, top-down approach left some vulnerable community members behind, and that the post-relocation community differs substantially in its social character from the pre-disaster one [Okada et al. 2018; Hsu et al. 2019].\n\n### Narrative Summary\n\nOn 10 January 2011, the small Queensland town of Grantham was struck by a catastrophic flash flood that killed 12 people and structurally damaged 119 homes. On the night of the disaster, then-Mayor Steve Jones conceived what would become one of the most widely cited managed retreat projects in Australia. Within days, the Lockyer Valley Regional Council purchased more than 300 hectares of higher ground above the town β land belonging to a cattle property owner named Jimmy West, who was known to residents [Brisbane Times 2020] β and offered flood-affected homeowners a voluntary land swap: transfer the title of your damaged block to the Council, and receive a new block on the hill in exchange. The scheme was developed into a community master plan through a series of workshops held at the local school. Within approximately 11 months, the new Grantham on the hill was officially opened, funded by AUD $18 million from Queensland state and federal governments. By the first two years, 86 lots had been taken up; by early 2020, approximately 80β90 families had made the move.\n\nBy conventional measures of speed and physical risk reduction, Grantham is widely cited as a rapid managed retreat case. A visiting University of California researcher reportedly told the project director that a comparable project in the United States cost three times as much and took eight years [Brisbane Times 2020]. The relocation reduced flood exposure for participating households and allowed a relocated community to form. However, academic research and resident testimony reveal a more complicated picture. The speed that enabled the program's physical success also meant that residents had little time to process the trauma of the flood before being asked to make consequential, irreversible decisions. Okada et al. (2018) note that some residents stated the offer had been made too early for them to think and judge properly, as they were still in shock. Participation costs β demolition of old dwellings and construction of new ones β were too high for some residents, particularly the elderly and those without adequate insurance. One resident whose home was assessed as structurally standing received only a $20,000 ex gratia insurance payment and explained: \"If someone gave me money today and said move up there today we would be up there quick. But the thing is, you had to have money\" [Brisbane Times 2020]. Some households were left on the floodplain, unable to afford the move.\n\nPerhaps most significantly, the LVRC's control over the recovery process came into direct conflict with the community recovery centre, which residents valued as an independent space for social support and mutual aid. The centre was closed in June 2012; the manager reportedly learned of the decision through the media rather than directly from the LVRC [Okada et al. 2018]. Academic accounts describe the Grantham land-swap project as successful in terms of risk mitigation and finance, but one that left some community members β often the most vulnerable β behind, and whose authority-driven, mitigation-focused strategy did not walk alongside community-based recovery [Okada et al. 2018]. The \"new Grantham\" that emerged is acknowledged, including by long-term residents, as a different community from the one that existed before: some original families sold their new lots and moved away; new residents moved in; familiar social fabric was disrupted [Brisbane Times 2020].\n\n---" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "case_id": "CS27", | |
| "chunk_index": 1, | |
| "section": "coding_questions", | |
| "location": "Grantham, Queensland", | |
| "country": "Australia", | |
| "country_normalized": "Australia", | |
| "continent": "Oceania", | |
| "admin_area": "Queensland", | |
| "source": "Pipeline Ver2 β Grantham", | |
| "source_links": [ | |
| { | |
| "title": "Bower, E. R., & Piggott-McKellar, A. (2026). Unpacking βsuccessβ in climate-related planned relocation: A new research agenda for assessing and measuring outcomes. Cell Reports Sustainability, 3(5), 100657. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.crsus.2026.100657", | |
| "doi": "10.1016/j.crsus.2026.100657", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.crsus.2026.100657" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Okada, T., Haynes, K., Bird, D., van den Honert, R., & King, D. (2014). Recovery and resettlement following the 2011 flash flooding in the Lockyer Valley. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 8, 20-31. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2014.01.001", | |
| "doi": "10.1016/j.ijdrr.2014.01.001", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2014.01.001" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Okada, T., Howitt, R., Haynes, K., Bird, D., & McAneney, J. (2018). Recovering local sociality: Learnings from post-disaster community-scale recoveries. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 31, 1030-1042. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2018.08.010", | |
| "doi": "10.1016/j.ijdrr.2018.08.010", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2018.08.010" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Frost, L., & Miller, F. (2021). Planning for social justice, anticipating sea level rise: the case of Lake Macquarie, Australia. Australian Geographer, 52(2), 171-190. https://doi.org/10.1080/00049182.2021.1917327", | |
| "doi": "10.1080/00049182.2021.1917327", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1080/00049182.2021.1917327" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Hsu, M., Okada, T., Mori, S., & Howitt, R. (2019). Resettling, disconnecting or displacing? Attending to local sociality, culture and history in disaster settings. Asia Pacific Viewpoint, 60(2), 163-174. https://doi.org/10.1111/apv.12230", | |
| "doi": "10.1111/apv.12230", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1111/apv.12230" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Willcocks-Musselman, R., Baird, J., Foster, K., Woodhall-Melnik, J., & Sherren, K. (2025). Finding mobility in place attachment research: lessons for managed retreat. Frontiers in Climate, 7. https://doi.org/10.3389/fclim.2025.1514408", | |
| "doi": "10.3389/fclim.2025.1514408", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.3389/fclim.2025.1514408" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Hegarty, N. (2020, February 28). Grantham reborn: Meet the little Queensland town that moved. Brisbane Times.", | |
| "url": "https://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/national/queensland/grantham-reborn-meet-the-little-queensland-town-that-moved-20200227-p5450g.html" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Okada, T., Haynes, K., Bird, D., van den Honert, R., & King, D. (2014). Recovery and resettlement following the 2011 flash flooding in the Lockyer Valley. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 8, 20-31. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2014.01.001", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2014.01.001" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Bower, E., & Piggott-McKellar, A. (2026). Unpacking \"success\" in climate-related planned relocation: A new research agenda for assessing and measuring outcomes. Current Research in Environmental Sustainability, 8, 100657. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.crsus.2026.100657", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.crsus.2026.100657" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Willcocks-Musselman, R., Baird, J., Foster, K., Woodhall-Melnik, J., & Sherren, K. (2025). Finding mobility in place attachment research: lessons for managed retreat. Frontiers in Climate, 7, 1514408. https://doi.org/10.3389/fclim.2025.1514408", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.3389/fclim.2025.1514408" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Okada, T., Howitt, R., Haynes, K., Bird, D., & McAneney, J. (2018). Recovering local sociality: Learnings from post-disaster community-scale recoveries. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 31, 1033-1042. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2018.08.010", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2018.08.010" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Hsu, M., Okada, T., Mori, S., & Howitt, R. (2019). Resettling, disconnecting or displacing? Attending to local sociality, culture and history in disaster settings. Asia Pacific Viewpoint, 60(3), 296-308. https://doi.org/10.1111/APV.12230", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1111/APV.12230" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Frost, L., & Miller, F. (2021). Planning for social justice, anticipating sea level rise: the case of Lake Macquarie, Australia. Australian Geographer, 52(4), 393-410. https://doi.org/10.1080/00049182.2021.1917327", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1080/00049182.2021.1917327" | |
| } | |
| ], | |
| "text": "Case study: Grantham (Grantham, Queensland, Australia)\nSection: CODING QUESTIONS\n\n---\n\n### Q1: Is there any evidence of a proactive or reactive trigger in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Reactive.\n\n**Narrative:** The managed retreat decision was made directly in response to the catastrophic flash flood of 10 January 2011. There is no evidence in any of the reviewed sources that the relocation was planned before the disaster. Multiple sources confirm that the idea emerged on or immediately after the night of the flood itself. The Brisbane Times (2020) reports Mayor Jones saying \"it's gone. It's gone\" on the night of the disaster, and that the concept of moving to higher ground emerged from conversations immediately following the event. Simmonds is quoted: \"The idea to relocate the town was born the day after the flood. It was a logical idea, given what had happened\" [Brisbane Times 2020]. Okada et al. (2018) confirm the land-swap program was introduced by March 2011, two months following the flood event. Hsu et al. (2019) similarly describe the hastily deployed programme as driven by the LVRC's specific vision of recovery following the disaster.\n\nThere is no evidence of pre-existing managed retreat planning, hazard mapping that informed anticipated relocation, or proactive policy discussions prior to the flood. By contrast, the Japanese case of Koizumi discussed in the same comparative papers employed a Group Relocation Policy that was already available prior to the 2011 disaster [Okada et al. 2018; Hsu et al. 2019] β explicitly contrasting with Grantham's reactive character.\n\n**Selected category:** Reactive.\n\n---\n\n### Q2: Date, Number of households affected, Number of population affected, Total funding\n\n**Answer:**\n\n- **Date of hazard:** 10 January 2011 [Okada et al. 2018]\n- **Date of MR program initiation:** March 2011 (formal introduction of land-swap) [Okada et al. 2018]\n- **Date of completion (physical relocation):** December 2011 (official opening); main measures completed June 2013 [Okada et al. 2018, Table 1]\n- **Households eligible for the land-swap:** 119 Grantham and surrounding property owners whose houses were structurally damaged by the 2011 flood event [Okada et al. 2018]\n- **Wider regional damage:** 119 houses destroyed and 2,798 houses inundated across the council area; 77% of road infrastructure damaged across the region [Okada et al. 2018, Table 1]\n- **Households that participated:** Approximately 86 lots taken up within the first two years [Brisbane Times 2020]\n- **Residents in relocated community by 2020:** Approximately 80β90 families [Brisbane Times 2020]; the Brisbane Times (2020) also reports \"almost 90 families\" and \"80 families\" in different parts of the article, reflecting approximate and changing counts rather than a precise census figure\n- **Population of Grantham:** Table 1 of Okada et al. (2018) lists Grantham's population as 492. The Brisbane Times (2020) news article separately reports that \"the 2016 census shows 634 people living in town\" and references earlier figures of 370 in 2007 and 178 in 2011; however, these census figures appear only in the news source and are not confirmed by the academic sources reviewed\n- **Total funding:** AUD $18 million, provided jointly by the Queensland State and Federal governments, mostly spent on land development of the resettlement blocks [Okada et al. 2018; Brisbane Times 2020]\n- **Land purchase:** LVRC purchased 378 hectares of higher ground [Brisbane Times 2020]. The Brisbane Times (2020) also states that work was started before the money was received to maintain public faith β this claim appears only in the news source\n\n**Note:** The population figure of 492 (Okada et al. 2018, Table 1) and the 634 figure from the 2016 census (Brisbane Times 2020) should not be conflated; they likely reflect different geographic boundaries or time points, and only the 492 figure is confirmed in the peer-reviewed sources.\n\n---\n\n### Q3: What is the occurrence of the hazard(s) considered in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Single Hazard.\n\n**Narrative:** The managed retreat decision was driven by a single hazard event: flash flooding from torrential rainfall in the surrounding mountains and inundation from Lockyer Creek. All reviewed sources consistently identify flash flooding as the sole hazard. Okada et al. (2018) categorise the Grantham hazard as \"Flash floods\" (Table 1). Hsu et al. (2019) describe the event as \"flash flooding caused by torrential rainfall in the surrounding mountains on 10 January 2011.\" The Brisbane Times (2020) describes \"a three-metre wall of water swept out of Lockyer Creek and across the Lockyer Valley.\" No climate change projections, compound hazards, or multiple hazard considerations are identified in the retreat decision.\n\n**Selected category:** Single Hazard.\n\n---\n\n### Q4: What is the origin of the hazards considered in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Natural Hazard.\n\n**Narrative:** The flash flooding was caused by torrential rainfall from the surrounding mountains β a natural meteorological and hydrological event. None of the reviewed sources frame the Grantham retreat decision in terms of climate change adaptation or attribute the 2011 flood to anthropogenic climate change as the direct causal driver. The retreat was framed as a disaster response, not climate adaptation. Frost & Miller (2021) cite Grantham as an example of a voluntary land-swap approach in a broader discussion of sea-level-rise planning, but they do not attribute the Grantham hazard to climate change. Bower & Piggott-McKellar (2026) reference Grantham in a discussion of planned relocation cases but do not characterise the Grantham hazard as climate-change-driven.\n\n**Selected category:** Natural Hazard.\n\n---\n\n### Q5: Was this hazard considered in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Riverine/Pluvial Flooding (flash flooding).\n\n**Narrative:** The hazard was flash flooding associated with torrential rainfall and the Lockyer Creek river system. Okada et al. (2018) classify the hazard as \"Flash floods\" (Table 1) and describe it as arising from \"torrential rainfall in the surrounding mountains.\" The Brisbane Times (2020) describes water sweeping out of Lockyer Creek. Hsu et al. (2019) describe \"flash flooding caused by torrential rainfall in the surrounding mountains.\" The relocation site was chosen to be above the flood zone associated with Lockyer and Sandy Creeks [Okada et al. 2018, Fig. 5]. This is best classified as Riverine/Pluvial Flooding (flash flooding within a river valley catchment system).\n\n**Selected category:** Riverine/Pluvial Flooding.\n\nNo evidence was found that coastal flooding/erosion, wildfire, volcanic, subsidence, landslide, earthquake, tsunami, hurricane, or lake flooding hazards were considered.\n\n---\n\n### Q6: What was the geographic scale of the MR project?\n\n**Answer:** Neighbourhood; Individual Homes (with community-scale aspirations for the flood-affected area).\n\n**Narrative:** The land-swap was offered specifically to the 119 property owners whose homes were structurally damaged by the 2011 flood β a targeted subset of the Grantham population concentrated in the flood-affected lower-lying areas near Lockyer and Sandy Creeks [Okada et al. 2018]. Properties were acquired and swapped at the individual parcel level through the land-swap mechanism. At the same time, the LVRC purchased 378 hectares and developed a master-planned community estate, and the design intention was to relocate the flood-affected portion of Grantham collectively [Brisbane Times 2020].\n\nThe most accurate characterisation is Neighbourhood scale (concentrated within identifiable flood-affected areas) combined with Individual Homes (parcel-by-parcel transactions). The program aspired to community-scale relocation of the damaged portion of the town, though not all households participated.\n\n**Selected categories:** Individual Homes; Neighbourhood (with community-scale aspirations for the flood-affected area).\n\n---\n\n### Q7: Who or what was retreated?\n\n**Answer:** Individuals (homeowners); Groups/Neighbourhoods (flood-affected residential area).\n\n**Narrative:** The land-swap operated at the level of individual homeowner transactions β each household participated separately, chose from a ballot of land blocks, and was responsible for demolishing their original home and constructing or moving to a new dwelling [Okada et al. 2018; Brisbane Times 2020]. However, the program was designed with a neighbourhood/community vision: the goal was to relocate the flood-affected portion of Grantham as a cohesive new community on the hill, rather than scatter individuals to disparate locations. The new Grantham was master-planned as a community estate [Brisbane Times 2020].\n\nNo critical infrastructure (roads, utilities) or industrial assets are identified as the primary subjects of retreat, though the new estate necessarily involved new infrastructure development.\n\n**Selected categories:** Individuals; Groups/Neighbourhoods.\n\n---\n\n### Q8: Other notes (General Information)\n\nThe Grantham case is notable for its speed: approximately 11 months from flood to official opening of the new estate [Brisbane Times 2020]. The Brisbane Times (2020) reports that a visiting US researcher told Simmonds that a comparable project in the United States cost three times as much and took eight years β this comparison is attributed to Professor Nicholas Pinter's direct conversation with Simmonds and appears only in the news source. The availability of a suitable parcel of higher land owned by a single seller (the West cattle property) is noted in the Brisbane Times (2020) as an enabling condition, with the Mahon family identifying the land and its owner to Mayor Jones on the night of the flood. The reactive, speed-focused approach is both the case's defining enabling factor and its central limitation from a social justice perspective.\n\n---" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "case_id": "CS27", | |
| "chunk_index": 2, | |
| "section": "institutional_environment", | |
| "location": "Grantham, Queensland", | |
| "country": "Australia", | |
| "country_normalized": "Australia", | |
| "continent": "Oceania", | |
| "admin_area": "Queensland", | |
| "source": "Pipeline Ver2 β Grantham", | |
| "source_links": [ | |
| { | |
| "title": "Bower, E. R., & Piggott-McKellar, A. (2026). Unpacking βsuccessβ in climate-related planned relocation: A new research agenda for assessing and measuring outcomes. Cell Reports Sustainability, 3(5), 100657. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.crsus.2026.100657", | |
| "doi": "10.1016/j.crsus.2026.100657", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.crsus.2026.100657" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Okada, T., Haynes, K., Bird, D., van den Honert, R., & King, D. (2014). Recovery and resettlement following the 2011 flash flooding in the Lockyer Valley. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 8, 20-31. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2014.01.001", | |
| "doi": "10.1016/j.ijdrr.2014.01.001", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2014.01.001" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Okada, T., Howitt, R., Haynes, K., Bird, D., & McAneney, J. (2018). Recovering local sociality: Learnings from post-disaster community-scale recoveries. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 31, 1030-1042. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2018.08.010", | |
| "doi": "10.1016/j.ijdrr.2018.08.010", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2018.08.010" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Frost, L., & Miller, F. (2021). Planning for social justice, anticipating sea level rise: the case of Lake Macquarie, Australia. Australian Geographer, 52(2), 171-190. https://doi.org/10.1080/00049182.2021.1917327", | |
| "doi": "10.1080/00049182.2021.1917327", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1080/00049182.2021.1917327" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Hsu, M., Okada, T., Mori, S., & Howitt, R. (2019). Resettling, disconnecting or displacing? Attending to local sociality, culture and history in disaster settings. Asia Pacific Viewpoint, 60(2), 163-174. https://doi.org/10.1111/apv.12230", | |
| "doi": "10.1111/apv.12230", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1111/apv.12230" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Willcocks-Musselman, R., Baird, J., Foster, K., Woodhall-Melnik, J., & Sherren, K. (2025). Finding mobility in place attachment research: lessons for managed retreat. Frontiers in Climate, 7. https://doi.org/10.3389/fclim.2025.1514408", | |
| "doi": "10.3389/fclim.2025.1514408", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.3389/fclim.2025.1514408" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Hegarty, N. (2020, February 28). Grantham reborn: Meet the little Queensland town that moved. Brisbane Times.", | |
| "url": "https://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/national/queensland/grantham-reborn-meet-the-little-queensland-town-that-moved-20200227-p5450g.html" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Okada, T., Haynes, K., Bird, D., van den Honert, R., & King, D. (2014). Recovery and resettlement following the 2011 flash flooding in the Lockyer Valley. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 8, 20-31. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2014.01.001", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2014.01.001" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Bower, E., & Piggott-McKellar, A. (2026). Unpacking \"success\" in climate-related planned relocation: A new research agenda for assessing and measuring outcomes. Current Research in Environmental Sustainability, 8, 100657. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.crsus.2026.100657", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.crsus.2026.100657" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Willcocks-Musselman, R., Baird, J., Foster, K., Woodhall-Melnik, J., & Sherren, K. (2025). Finding mobility in place attachment research: lessons for managed retreat. Frontiers in Climate, 7, 1514408. https://doi.org/10.3389/fclim.2025.1514408", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.3389/fclim.2025.1514408" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Okada, T., Howitt, R., Haynes, K., Bird, D., & McAneney, J. (2018). Recovering local sociality: Learnings from post-disaster community-scale recoveries. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 31, 1033-1042. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2018.08.010", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2018.08.010" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Hsu, M., Okada, T., Mori, S., & Howitt, R. (2019). Resettling, disconnecting or displacing? Attending to local sociality, culture and history in disaster settings. Asia Pacific Viewpoint, 60(3), 296-308. https://doi.org/10.1111/APV.12230", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1111/APV.12230" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Frost, L., & Miller, F. (2021). Planning for social justice, anticipating sea level rise: the case of Lake Macquarie, Australia. Australian Geographer, 52(4), 393-410. https://doi.org/10.1080/00049182.2021.1917327", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1080/00049182.2021.1917327" | |
| } | |
| ], | |
| "text": "Case study: Grantham (Grantham, Queensland, Australia)\nSection: INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT\n\n### Q9: What is the focus or scope of the MR project?\n\n**Answer:** Community buyout/retreat (in terms of design vision); Other acquisition tools (land-swap/title exchange as the specific mechanism).\n\n**Narrative:** The program involved both individual and community dimensions. At the transaction level, each homeowner exchanged their flood-affected land title for a new land block on higher ground β a title exchange rather than a cash buyout. The broader vision was explicitly community-scale: the LVRC purchased 378 hectares and developed a master-planned community estate with the intention of collectively relocating the flood-affected population [Okada et al. 2018; Brisbane Times 2020]. Community masterplan workshops were held to develop the new settlement layout [Brisbane Times 2020]. Okada et al. (2018) describe this as a \"land-swap (relocation)\" program; Frost & Miller (2021) describe it as a \"voluntary land-swap.\"\n\nThe mechanism does not fit neatly into \"Individual buyout\" (land was exchanged, not purchased for cash) or \"Community buyout\" in a strict collective purchase sense. The most accurate characterisation is **Other acquisition tools** (title exchange/land-swap) implemented with both individual and community dimensions. The program had community-scale planning and design characteristics consistent with **Community buyout/retreat** in terms of scope.\n\n**Note on auditor correction:** Per the Check 1 audit, \"Individual buyout/retreat\" has been removed as a primary code, as the mechanism was a land-swap/title exchange rather than a buyout.\n\n**Selected categories:** Community buyout/retreat (design scope); Other acquisition tools (land-swap as the specific mechanism).\n\n---\n\n### Q10: What legal constraints or requirements were identified during the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Land acquisition; Title(s) transfer; Home acquisition (via demolition requirement); Retreat land development.\n\n**Narrative:**\n\n- **Land acquisition:** The LVRC purchased approximately 378 hectares of private land (the West cattle property) on higher ground. This was a foundational enabling step for the program [Brisbane Times 2020].\n- **Title(s) transfer:** The land-swap mechanism required homeowners to transfer the title of their flood-damaged block to the LVRC in exchange for title to a new block on the hill [Okada et al. 2018]. Participation required participants \"to clear their land block demolishing all existing buildings\" as a prior condition [Okada et al. 2018].\n- **Home acquisition (via demolition precondition):** As part of the title exchange precondition, participants had to demolish existing structures. This is coded as a program eligibility condition rather than formal enforcement under a specific legal regime [Okada et al. 2018].\n- **Retreat land development:** The Council developed the receiving site as a master-planned community estate, including roads, essential services, and social infrastructure, requiring planning and development approvals [Brisbane Times 2020].\n\n**Not coded:** Frost & Miller (2021) describe a spectrum from voluntary incentives (e.g., land swaps) to compulsory acquisition; however, no specific legislation or formal regulatory act governing the Grantham program is identified or named in the reviewed sources. Accordingly, \"Relevant regulations/acts\" is not coded as a confirmed category. The demolition requirement is a program eligibility condition, not a formal compliance/enforcement mechanism under an identified legal framework; accordingly, \"Compliance & enforcement\" is not coded. No litigation against the land-swap program is documented in the reviewed sources.\n\n**Selected categories:** Land acquisition; Title(s) transfer; Retreat land development; Home acquisition (via demolition precondition as eligibility condition).\n\n---\n\n### Q11: What were the funding sources for the MR project?\n\n**Answer:** Multiple funders; Federal (Commonwealth of Australia); Provincial/State (Queensland); Individual (for household-level demolition and construction costs).\n\n**Narrative:** The AUD $18 million used to construct the new Grantham estate came from a combined contribution of the Queensland State Government and the Australian Federal Government [Okada et al. 2018; Brisbane Times 2020]. The Brisbane Times (2020) states: \"Eighteen million dollars from federal and state governments was used to construct the estate.\" The LVRC itself purchased the 378 hectares of higher ground; while LVRC is a local/municipal body, the sources describe the $18 million as state and federal funding spent on land development. No direct evidence is found of municipal government funding contributed separately to the program beyond the land purchase, and it is not clearly established in the sources whether the land purchase was made from local government funds or from the $18 million package.\n\nIndividual homeowners bore the costs of demolishing their original structures and constructing or moving their homes to the new blocks [Okada et al. 2018; Brisbane Times 2020]. This constitutes an Individual funding component, though it was not described as a formal program funding stream.\n\nInsurance payments are mentioned in the sources β some residents built new homes using insurance payouts [Brisbane Times 2020] β but insurance is not described as a primary or program-level funding mechanism.\n\n**Selected categories:** Multiple funders; Federal (Commonwealth of Australia); Provincial/State (Queensland); Individual (demolition and construction costs borne by homeowners).\n\n**Note:** Local/Municipal funding is not coded as a separate confirmed category because the sources do not clearly establish that LVRC contributed separate municipal funds to the program beyond the land purchase transaction; funding described as flowing to the program is state and federal.\n\n---\n\n### Q12: What was considered to maintain (or improve) the tax base in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Other (no explicit tax-base goal stated; implied by efforts to maintain a functioning town).\n\n**Narrative:** The reviewed sources do not explicitly discuss tax base maintenance as a stated goal of the Grantham land-swap program. However, some related considerations are evident:\n\n- The new Grantham estate was developed as a master-planned community with essential services, improved road and rail access, and social infrastructure [Brisbane Times 2020], suggesting an intent to create a viable, rateable community.\n- The Brisbane Times (2020) quotes a resident: \"This little establishment up here probably saved Grantham as a town,\" implying that without the relocation, the town would have collapsed.\n- Some residents who received new lots subsequently sold them to newcomers, indicating ongoing property market activity [Brisbane Times 2020].\n\nNo evidence was found of explicit programs for new industry, livelihoods support, or targeted efforts to maintain tax revenues. The inference that tax base maintenance was a goal is reasonable but not directly stated in the sources.\n\n**Selected category:** Other (no explicit tax-base planning goal stated; program implicitly sustained the town's residential base).\n\n---\n\n### Q13: What level/type of compensation mechanisms were considered in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Other (land-swap/title exchange as the primary compensation mechanism).\n\n**Narrative:** The primary compensation mechanism was the land-swap itself: the exchange of a flood-damaged land block for a new block on higher ground. This is distinct from cash compensation at market value, tax value, or post-disaster value. The land swap was based on block size and allocated through a ballot process: \"You went into a ballot. You had to pick seven blocks and you got one of seven blocks from it\" [Brisbane Times 2020].\n\nCritically, the new block did not come with a house β it was bare land: \"they just swapped you the dirt\" [Brisbane Times 2020]. Homeowners were responsible for:\n- Demolishing their existing structures (a cost borne by the homeowner)\n- Building or relocating a house to the new block (typically using insurance payouts or personal funds) [Okada et al. 2018; Brisbane Times 2020]\n\nThe $18 million in government funding went to land purchase and estate development infrastructure, not to individual household cash compensation [Okada et al. 2018; Brisbane Times 2020].\n\nNo evidence of market value buyout, tax value assessment, post-disaster value calculation, or financial bonuses/top-ups for individual participants was found in the reviewed sources. The estate-level infrastructure provided through the program (roads, services) could be interpreted as an indirect subsidy, but households bore their own demolition and construction costs.\n\nThis created significant equity issues: one resident whose home was structurally assessed as still standing received only a $20,000 ex gratia insurance payment and was effectively unable to afford to participate despite wishing to [Brisbane Times 2020].\n\n**Selected category:** Other (title/land exchange mechanism). \"Free supports and services\" is not coded as a primary category, as households bore demolition and construction costs; only the land block itself and estate infrastructure were provided.\n\n---" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "case_id": "CS27", | |
| "chunk_index": 3, | |
| "section": "planning_processes", | |
| "location": "Grantham, Queensland", | |
| "country": "Australia", | |
| "country_normalized": "Australia", | |
| "continent": "Oceania", | |
| "admin_area": "Queensland", | |
| "source": "Pipeline Ver2 β Grantham", | |
| "source_links": [ | |
| { | |
| "title": "Bower, E. R., & Piggott-McKellar, A. (2026). Unpacking βsuccessβ in climate-related planned relocation: A new research agenda for assessing and measuring outcomes. Cell Reports Sustainability, 3(5), 100657. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.crsus.2026.100657", | |
| "doi": "10.1016/j.crsus.2026.100657", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.crsus.2026.100657" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Okada, T., Haynes, K., Bird, D., van den Honert, R., & King, D. (2014). Recovery and resettlement following the 2011 flash flooding in the Lockyer Valley. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 8, 20-31. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2014.01.001", | |
| "doi": "10.1016/j.ijdrr.2014.01.001", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2014.01.001" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Okada, T., Howitt, R., Haynes, K., Bird, D., & McAneney, J. (2018). Recovering local sociality: Learnings from post-disaster community-scale recoveries. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 31, 1030-1042. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2018.08.010", | |
| "doi": "10.1016/j.ijdrr.2018.08.010", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2018.08.010" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Frost, L., & Miller, F. (2021). Planning for social justice, anticipating sea level rise: the case of Lake Macquarie, Australia. Australian Geographer, 52(2), 171-190. https://doi.org/10.1080/00049182.2021.1917327", | |
| "doi": "10.1080/00049182.2021.1917327", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1080/00049182.2021.1917327" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Hsu, M., Okada, T., Mori, S., & Howitt, R. (2019). Resettling, disconnecting or displacing? Attending to local sociality, culture and history in disaster settings. Asia Pacific Viewpoint, 60(2), 163-174. https://doi.org/10.1111/apv.12230", | |
| "doi": "10.1111/apv.12230", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1111/apv.12230" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Willcocks-Musselman, R., Baird, J., Foster, K., Woodhall-Melnik, J., & Sherren, K. (2025). Finding mobility in place attachment research: lessons for managed retreat. Frontiers in Climate, 7. https://doi.org/10.3389/fclim.2025.1514408", | |
| "doi": "10.3389/fclim.2025.1514408", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.3389/fclim.2025.1514408" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Hegarty, N. (2020, February 28). Grantham reborn: Meet the little Queensland town that moved. Brisbane Times.", | |
| "url": "https://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/national/queensland/grantham-reborn-meet-the-little-queensland-town-that-moved-20200227-p5450g.html" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Okada, T., Haynes, K., Bird, D., van den Honert, R., & King, D. (2014). Recovery and resettlement following the 2011 flash flooding in the Lockyer Valley. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 8, 20-31. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2014.01.001", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2014.01.001" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Bower, E., & Piggott-McKellar, A. (2026). Unpacking \"success\" in climate-related planned relocation: A new research agenda for assessing and measuring outcomes. Current Research in Environmental Sustainability, 8, 100657. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.crsus.2026.100657", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.crsus.2026.100657" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Willcocks-Musselman, R., Baird, J., Foster, K., Woodhall-Melnik, J., & Sherren, K. (2025). Finding mobility in place attachment research: lessons for managed retreat. Frontiers in Climate, 7, 1514408. https://doi.org/10.3389/fclim.2025.1514408", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.3389/fclim.2025.1514408" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Okada, T., Howitt, R., Haynes, K., Bird, D., & McAneney, J. (2018). Recovering local sociality: Learnings from post-disaster community-scale recoveries. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 31, 1033-1042. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2018.08.010", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2018.08.010" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Hsu, M., Okada, T., Mori, S., & Howitt, R. (2019). Resettling, disconnecting or displacing? Attending to local sociality, culture and history in disaster settings. Asia Pacific Viewpoint, 60(3), 296-308. https://doi.org/10.1111/APV.12230", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1111/APV.12230" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Frost, L., & Miller, F. (2021). Planning for social justice, anticipating sea level rise: the case of Lake Macquarie, Australia. Australian Geographer, 52(4), 393-410. https://doi.org/10.1080/00049182.2021.1917327", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1080/00049182.2021.1917327" | |
| } | |
| ], | |
| "text": "Case study: Grantham (Grantham, Queensland, Australia)\nSection: PLANNING PROCESSES\n\n### Q14: What is the time horizon considered in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Pre-retreat planning (compressed); Immediate risks (1β5 years); Post-retreat follow-up (partial/inadequate per academic accounts).\n\n**Narrative:**\n\n- **Pre-retreat planning:** The program involved rapid masterplan workshops and land planning within weeks of the disaster [Brisbane Times 2020]. This was extremely compressed pre-retreat planning β effective for enabling physical relocation but not systematic by conventional standards.\n- **Immediate risks (1β5 years):** The driving concern was the immediate and demonstrable risk of re-flooding on the existing floodplain. The decision was framed around removing people from demonstrably dangerous land as quickly as possible [Okada et al. 2018; Brisbane Times 2020].\n- **Anticipated future risks (10β100 years):** Frost & Miller (2021) cite Grantham as an example in a broader discussion of long-term retreat planning, but the Grantham decision itself was not framed in long-term climate change terms. No long-range climate projection or future risk horizon is identified in the Grantham-specific sources.\n- **Post-retreat follow-up:** The sources reveal contested and inadequate post-retreat follow-up. The community recovery centre was closed by the LVRC in June 2012 [Okada et al. 2018]. Academic accounts identify ongoing financial, psychological, and social difficulties among some residents that were not adequately addressed after the physical relocation [Okada et al. 2018; Hsu et al. 2019].\n\n**Selected categories:** Pre-retreat planning (compressed); Immediate risks (1β5 years); Post-retreat follow-up (partial/inadequate per academic accounts).\n\n---\n\n### Q15: What planning elements were considered in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Top-down; Single stage retreat; Participatory/collaborative (limited/contested); Degree of transparency (contested); Coordination with other sectors and jurisdictions; Bureaucracy reduction.\n\n**Narrative:**\n\n- **Top-down:** Multiple sources identify the LVRC as leading and controlling the planning process. The vision came from Mayor Jones; the Council purchased land, set terms (demolition requirement), developed the estate, and managed the program timeline [Okada et al. 2018; Hsu et al. 2019]. Hsu et al. (2019) describe the programme as \"driven by the LVRC's specific vision of recovery, with limited input from residents.\"\n- **Single stage retreat:** The relocation was implemented in one phase; all eligible households were offered the swap simultaneously, and the new estate was developed at once [Okada et al. 2018; Brisbane Times 2020].\n- **Participatory/collaborative (limited/contested):** Community masterplan workshops were held at Grantham State School and were described as transforming from casual meetings into formal workshops where the project team \"went to the meetings with something prepared, but left enough room in there so the people could provide their input\" [Brisbane Times 2020]. However, Okada et al. (2018) note that the offer was \"made too early for them to think and judge properly as they were still in shock\" and Hsu et al. (2019) describe \"limited input from residents.\" The degree of genuine participatory co-design is disputed.\n- **Degree of transparency (contested):** The LVRC published positive stories and received domestic and international acclaim [Okada et al. 2018]. However, Okada et al. (2018) note that \"the council's attitude and the publicity misrepresented and overlooked the ongoing issues that local residents were experiencing.\" The closure of the community recovery centre was announced through media rather than directly to the centre manager [Okada et al. 2018]. Transparency was inconsistent.\n- **Coordination with other sectors and jurisdictions:** Successful coordination with state and federal governments secured the $18 million in funding [Okada et al. 2018; Brisbane Times 2020].\n- **Bureaucracy reduction:** The Brisbane Times (2020) identifies \"a small, agile team\" and speed as key project virtues. Simmonds had developed a technique to fast-track development applications at Brisbane City Council and applied similar methods in Grantham [Brisbane Times 2020].\n\n**Not coded:** Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) β the framing \"Why would we rebuild Grantham back on the flood plain? The risk was too great\" [Brisbane Times 2020] implies an intuitive cost-benefit logic, but no formal CBA document is referenced in the reviewed sources; accordingly, CBA is not coded as a confirmed planning element. Bottom-up, multi-stage retreat, adaptive management, MCDA, and public-private partnerships were not evidenced.\n\n**Selected categories:** Top-down; Single stage retreat; Participatory/collaborative (limited/contested); Degree of transparency (contested); Coordination with other sectors and jurisdictions; Bureaucracy reduction.\n\n---\n\n### Q16: What decision support tools were used in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Housing assessment; Process guidance (informal/ad hoc).\n\n**Narrative:**\n\n- **Housing assessment:** The land-swap eligibility criterion β structural damage to the property β functioned as a basic housing assessment to determine who qualified for the program [Okada et al. 2018]. One resident describes how her house being \"ruled to be structurally standing\" excluded her from full participation in the program [Brisbane Times 2020].\n- **Process guidance:** Simmonds drew on his experience fast-tracking development applications at Brisbane City Council and developed an ad hoc process for the Grantham relocation [Brisbane Times 2020]. No formal managed retreat guidance framework is cited in the reviewed sources.\n\n**Not coded:** Hazard maps and models β while Okada et al. (2018) include a map showing the estimated 2011 flood extent and the resettlement area (Fig. 5), no explicit statement is made in the reviewed sources that a formal hazard mapping or modelling tool was used as a decision-support instrument in planning the Grantham relocation. Accordingly, \"Hazard maps & models\" is not coded as a confirmed decision support tool. No evidence was found of formal CBA, MCDA, climate change projection models, demographic projections, social vulnerability assessments, socioeconomic projections, or formal new site evaluation processes being used.\n\n**Note on limitation:** The speed of the program appears to have precluded systematic use of most formal decision support tools. The approach was pragmatic and reactive rather than analytically structured.\n\n**Selected categories:** Housing assessment; Process guidance (informal/ad hoc).\n\n---\n\n### Q17: What planning measures were taken for receiving areas in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Identifying priority areas; Construction of new housing (lots/infrastructure); Individuals" | |
| } | |
| ] |