Anna Zhou
Add deterministic geographic metadata queries
31a06e1
Raw History Blame Contribute Delete
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[
{
"case_id": "CS47",
"chunk_index": 0,
"section": "overview",
"location": "Ilha do Cardoso, São Paulo",
"country": "Brazil",
"country_normalized": "Brazil",
"continent": "South America",
"admin_area": "São Paulo",
"source": "Pipeline Ver2 — Ilha do Cardoso",
"source_links": [
{
"title": "Gini, G., Mendonça Cardoso, T., & Pires Ramos, E. (2020). When the two seas met: Preventive and self-managed relocation of the Nova Enseada community in Brazil. Forced Migration Review, 64, 35-38.",
"url": "https://www.fmreview.org/issue64/gini-mendoncacardoso-piresramos/"
},
{
"title": "Gini, G. (2025). Mobile kinship: Exploring more-than-human entanglements in the context of climate-related planned relocation. Environment and Planning E: Nature and Space. https://doi.org/10.1177/25148486251363741",
"doi": "10.1177/25148486251363741",
"url": "https://doi.org/10.1177/25148486251363741",
"pdf_url": "https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/25148486251363741"
},
{
"title": "Gini, G., Cardoso, T. M., & Ramos, E. P. (2021). Voices of Enseada da Baleia: Emotions and feelings in a preventive and self-managed relocation. In Climate Change, Disasters and People on the Move. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003141457-16",
"doi": "10.4324/9781003141457-16",
"url": "https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003141457-16"
},
{
"title": "Yamaoka, J. G., Cardoso, T. M., Denardin, V. F., & Alves, A. R. (2019). A comunidade caiçara da Enseada da Baleia e a sua luta pelo território - Cananéia (SP). Guaju, 5(1).",
"url": "https://revistas.ufpr.br/guaju/article/view/66211"
},
{
"title": "Yamaoka, J. G., Cardoso, T. M., & Gini, G. (2021). Sobrevivendo ao Capitaloceno: O caso da comunidade caiçara da Enseada da Baleia, Cananéia/SP. Diálogos Socioambientais, 4(11), 32-35.",
"url": "https://periodicos.ufabc.edu.br/index.php/dialogossocioambientais/issue/view/38"
}
],
"text": "Case study: Ilha do Cardoso (Ilha do Cardoso, São Paulo, Brazil)\nSection: CASE STUDY OVERVIEW\n\n**Case Name and Location:** Relocation of the Enseada da Baleia Caiçara Community, Cardoso Island (Ilha do Cardoso), Cananéia, São Paulo State, Brazil. Global South.\n\n**Hazard(s):** Progressive coastal erosion of a sand spit, intensified by strong and frequent tidal surges, a cyclone (August 2016), and a severe tidal undertow (October 2016). Climate change is identified across multiple sources as amplifying the frequency and severity of these events. Contributing factors include long-term coastal dynamics and the community's exposed location on a narrow sand spit separating the Ararapira Channel from the Atlantic Ocean. Note: Yamaoka et al. (2021) references the artificial Varadouro Canal (inaugurated 1955) as increasing water flow in the Ararapira Channel and making the spit more fragile for stronger storms; however, this detail is verifiable primarily from that source and should be treated with that attribution.\n\n**Type of Retreat:** Community-led, self-organized relocation within the same conservation area (Parque Estadual da Ilha do Cardoso — PEIC). The community relocated to Casa Preta, the new site of Nova Enseada, approximately five kilometres north on the island. No formal buyout, government-financed acquisition, or property compensation was involved. The community organized and largely financed the relocation itself through collective labour (mutirões), fundraising, and community networks, with no state financial assistance (Gini et al., 2020; Gini, 2025).\n\n**Scale:** The community comprised nine interrelated families (Gini, Mobile Kinship, 2025) and roughly 30 people from various families (Gini, 2025). Yamaoka et al. (2019) describes the community as eleven families. The relocation was geographically confined within a single island.\n\n**Key Actors:** The community itself, organized primarily through the Associação de Moradores da Enseada da Baleia (AMEB, formalized November 2015 according to Yamaoka et al. 2019) and the Grupo de Mulheres Artesãs da Enseada da Baleia (MAE, Women's Artisan Group). The State Public Defender's Office (Defensoria Pública do Estado de São Paulo), the State Prosecutor's Office (Ministério Público do Estado de São Paulo — MPE-SP), and the State Secretary of the Environment (Secretaria do Meio Ambiente — SMA) played key legal and institutional roles in securing authorization. NUPAUB-USP (Research Support Center for Human Populations in Brazilian Wetlands, University of São Paulo) researchers provided a technical assessment validating the new site. The Instituto Florestal (managing the PEIC) and the Fundação Florestal initially resisted the community's preferred relocation site and ultimately acted as the authorizing body. No state financial assistance was provided (Gini et al., 2020).\n\n**Timeline:**\n- 1845: Enseada da Baleia established; artisanal fishing and fish drying as main activities (Gini, Mobile Kinship, 2025).\n- 1962: Cardoso Island declared a State Park (PEIC), creating conservation restrictions affecting Caiçara communities.\n- 1990s: Erosion becomes critical; community constructs a sea wall (Gini et al., 2020).\n- 2008: State Prosecutor launches investigation into the erosion situation (Gini et al., 2020).\n- 2010: Death of community patriarch Malaquias; community enters a crisis period (Gini et al., 2020; Yamaoka et al., 2019).\n- 2011: Legal opinion from the State Secretary of Environment (SMA) denies the community the right to relocate within the island (Yamaoka et al., 2021; Yamaoka et al., 2019).\n- 2013: Forestry Foundation establishes a working group to monitor the erosion; State Public Defender begins participating at community request (Gini et al., 2020).\n- February 2015: Accident involving a tourist vessel destroys five structures on the lagoon side; community engages the Public Defender's Office, leading to the establishment of Administrative Proceeding 07/15; AMEB formalized (Yamaoka et al., 2019).\n- 2015–2016: Erosion accelerates, sand spit narrows from 22 m to 12 m (Gini et al., 2020).\n- August 2016: A cyclone strikes, reducing the sand spit from 12 metres to 2 metres in a single night (Gini, 2025; Gini, Mobile Kinship, 2025).\n- October 2016: A very strong tidal undertow further reduces the spit to a critical width of two metres, making the community's situation untenable and triggering urgent relocation planning (Gini et al., 2020).\n- Late 2016: NUPAUB-USP completes technical assessment of Casa Preta. Community holds collective meeting (13 November 2016) and formally selects the site. Authorization obtained from park authorities after intervention by the Public Defender's Office, Prosecutor's Office, and SMA (Gini et al., 2020; Yamaoka et al., 2019).\n- 2017: Deforestation/clearing licence obtained; community moves to Nova Enseada, completing relocation in June 2017. Matriarch Erci passes away before she can occupy her new house (Gini, 2025; Gini et al., 2020).\n- August 2018: The remaining sand spit is flooded and Cardoso Island physically divides into two parts, ending the old settlement site (Gini, 2025; Gini et al., 2020; Gini, Mobile Kinship, 2025; Yamaoka et al., 2021).\n- 2019: Communities request amendment to MMA Normative Instruction No. 15 (2005) governing manjuba fishing, due to fish population shifts caused by increased salinity following the island's division (Gini, Mobile Kinship, 2025).\n- As of 2023–2025 (research period): Community living at Nova Enseada; ongoing environmental and regulatory challenges; MMA fishing regulation not yet updated; no state financial redress received.\n\n**Key Outcomes:** The community successfully relocated collectively within the island, maintaining cultural continuity, traditional practices, and community cohesion. The relocation was self-organized and self-financed through mutirões, fundraising events, donations, and community networks, with no state financial assistance (Gini et al., 2020; Gini, 2025). By August 2018, the remaining sand spit had flooded and the old settlement site was no longer habitable (Gini et al., 2020). Key remaining challenges include: ongoing coastal erosion at the new site, restrictive conservation regulations constraining traditional livelihoods, outdated fishing regulations that had not been updated despite climate-driven changes in fish habitat (as of the end of 2023), and threats from state-backed privatisation of park management (Gini et al., 2020; Gini, Mobile Kinship, 2025).\n\n**Narrative Summary:**\n\nThe Enseada da Baleia community is a small Caiçara fishing community that had lived for generations on a sand spit of Cardoso Island on the southeastern coast of Brazil, with records suggesting settlement since 1845. Their livelihoods — artisanal fishing (especially of the manjuba/sardine), fish drying, small-scale agriculture, crafts, and community tourism — were intimately tied to their specific coastal location. Over decades, progressive coastal erosion steadily consumed the sand strip on which the community lived. Despite making repeated requests to park authorities (Instituto Florestal) for preventive relocation assistance within the island, the community was consistently refused — including through a formal 2011 legal opinion from the State Secretary of Environment — on the grounds that the area's status as a strict conservation unit (proteção integral) prohibited new settlement areas within it.\n\nAfter a cyclone in August 2016 reduced their habitable land to just two metres overnight, and a subsequent tidal undertow in October 2016 further threatened to submerge them entirely, the community had no choice but to act urgently. With no state financial or logistical support — and against the preferred options offered by park management (integration into another community or transfer to a nearby city) — the community fought through legal channels, with the help of the Public Defender's Office, the Prosecutor's Office, and the State Secretary of the Environment, to secure the right to relocate to a site of their own choosing within the island: Casa Preta, a place known from the memories of their late matriarch Erci, who had lived and fished there in her youth. The community organized its own relocation through mutirões (collective labour), fundraising events, a crowdfunding campaign, and networks of friends and allies, taking up residence at Nova Enseada in June 2017.\n\nThe relocation has been described in the literature as both a successful act of community resistance and a case of profound climate injustice (Gini et al., 2020; Gini, 2025). The community demonstrated remarkable solidarity and agency in overcoming institutional abandonment. At the same time, the state's failure to provide legal recognition, financial support, or adaptive governance left the community highly vulnerable throughout the process. Post-relocation, the community continues to face ongoing erosion at the new site, regulatory constraints on fishing (including fishing regulations that had not been updated to account for the relocation of manjuba fish populations as of end of 2023), and threats from conservation privatisation policies — all without adequate institutional support. The case is notable for the central leadership role of women (organized through MAE and AMEB), for the community's explicit assertion of self-determination, and for the integration of ancestral knowledge and non-human relationships (particularly with fish) into the relocation decision and adaptation process (Gini, 2025; Gini, Mobile Kinship, 2025).\n\n---"
},
{
"case_id": "CS47",
"chunk_index": 1,
"section": "coding_questions",
"location": "Ilha do Cardoso, São Paulo",
"country": "Brazil",
"country_normalized": "Brazil",
"continent": "South America",
"admin_area": "São Paulo",
"source": "Pipeline Ver2 — Ilha do Cardoso",
"source_links": [
{
"title": "Gini, G., Mendonça Cardoso, T., & Pires Ramos, E. (2020). When the two seas met: Preventive and self-managed relocation of the Nova Enseada community in Brazil. Forced Migration Review, 64, 35-38.",
"url": "https://www.fmreview.org/issue64/gini-mendoncacardoso-piresramos/"
},
{
"title": "Gini, G. (2025). Mobile kinship: Exploring more-than-human entanglements in the context of climate-related planned relocation. Environment and Planning E: Nature and Space. https://doi.org/10.1177/25148486251363741",
"doi": "10.1177/25148486251363741",
"url": "https://doi.org/10.1177/25148486251363741",
"pdf_url": "https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/25148486251363741"
},
{
"title": "Gini, G., Cardoso, T. M., & Ramos, E. P. (2021). Voices of Enseada da Baleia: Emotions and feelings in a preventive and self-managed relocation. In Climate Change, Disasters and People on the Move. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003141457-16",
"doi": "10.4324/9781003141457-16",
"url": "https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003141457-16"
},
{
"title": "Yamaoka, J. G., Cardoso, T. M., Denardin, V. F., & Alves, A. R. (2019). A comunidade caiçara da Enseada da Baleia e a sua luta pelo território - Cananéia (SP). Guaju, 5(1).",
"url": "https://revistas.ufpr.br/guaju/article/view/66211"
},
{
"title": "Yamaoka, J. G., Cardoso, T. M., & Gini, G. (2021). Sobrevivendo ao Capitaloceno: O caso da comunidade caiçara da Enseada da Baleia, Cananéia/SP. Diálogos Socioambientais, 4(11), 32-35.",
"url": "https://periodicos.ufabc.edu.br/index.php/dialogossocioambientais/issue/view/38"
}
],
"text": "Case study: Ilha do Cardoso (Ilha do Cardoso, São Paulo, Brazil)\nSection: CODING QUESTIONS\n\n---\n\n### Is there any evidence of a proactive or reactive trigger in the MR decision process? (Reactive/Proactive)\n\n**Answer:** **Reactive** — with a note that the community made sustained, proactive attempts to plan preventive relocation that were blocked by state authorities.\n\n**Narrative:** The community recognized the erosion hazard for decades and repeatedly requested preventive relocation assistance from park authorities beginning in the 1990s, and continuing through participation in the Forestry Foundation working group from 2013. In this sense, there were clear proactive impulses within the community. However, the authorities consistently refused these requests. As explicitly described in Gini et al. (2020): \"Between 2015 and 2016 the erosion process accelerated… In October 2016, a very strong tidal undertow reduced the strip to a width of two metres, and it was this situation that urged the community to begin the process of relocation. The total rupture of the strip would leave the community submerged in a matter of hours. Leaving was the only option.\" The relocation was therefore ultimately triggered under acute existential crisis conditions, making it reactive in character. The community's proactive planning was effectively suppressed by institutional inaction and legal barriers.\n\n**Category Selected:** **Reactive** (with important note: community attempted proactive planning across multiple years; this was blocked by state authorities, forcing a reactive response under crisis conditions).\n\n---\n\n### Date, Number of households affected, Number of population affected, Total funding\n\n**Date:** Relocation completed June 2017. Triggered by the August 2016 cyclone and the October 2016 tidal undertow event. The old site was fully flooded and the island divided in August 2018 (Gini et al., 2020; Gini, Mobile Kinship, 2025; Yamaoka et al., 2021).\n\n**Households:** Gini (Mobile Kinship, 2025) states the community is \"made up of nine interrelated families.\" Yamaoka et al. (2019) refers to \"onze famílias\" (eleven families) in the context of describing the relocation of those families from 2017. These two figures come from different sources and likely reflect slightly different counting methods or time periods. Both figures are noted here without asserting consistency.\n\n**Population:** Approximately 30 people from various families (Gini, 2025: \"semi-structured interviews with most of the members of Enseada, consisting of 30 people from various families\").\n\n**Total funding:** No formal government funding was provided (Gini et al., 2020). The community self-financed through: (a) mutirões — collective labour for construction; (b) community networks — fundraising through events (at least eight events/campaigns between December 2016 and October 2017, according to Yamaoka et al. 2019: music festivals, photography exhibitions, community dinners); (c) crowdfunding via the Benfeitoria platform, with a target of R$15,000 within 60 days in December 2016, achieved successfully (Yamaoka et al., 2019); (d) donations from friends, supporters, and solidarity networks. Yamaoka et al. (2019) estimates these external activities mobilized approximately 10–20% of the total amount needed for construction of Nova Enseada, with the remainder provided through community labour and in-kind contributions. The total monetary amount is not precisely stated in any of the reviewed sources.\n\n---\n\n### What is the occurrence of the hazard(s) considered in the MR decision process? (Single Hazard/Multiple Hazards)\n\n**Answer:** **Multiple Hazards**\n\n**Narrative:** The relocation was driven by a combination of: (1) chronic, progressive coastal erosion of the sand spit over decades; (2) periodic acute storm surges and tidal events that accelerated erosion between 2015 and 2016; (3) a cyclone (August 2016) that caused a single catastrophic land loss event (12 metres of sand strip in a single night); and (4) a very strong tidal undertow (October 2016) that reduced the remaining strip to two metres (Gini et al., 2020; Gini, 2025). These constitute both slow-onset and acute hazards operating simultaneously and cumulatively. Post-relocation flooding events (e.g., the April 2020 high tide described in Gini 2025) also indicate ongoing hazard exposure at the new site. Yamaoka et al. (2021) additionally references the role of the Varadouro Canal in eroding the lagoon face and making the spit fragile for stronger storms.\n\n---\n\n### What is the origin of the hazards considered in the MR decision process? (Technological Hazard/Natural Hazard)\n\n**Answer:** **Climate change** and **Natural hazard** (primary). Possibly **Technological hazard** (secondary — the Varadouro Canal is cited by Yamaoka et al. 2021 as increasing water flow in the Ararapira Channel and making the spit more fragile, but this source is to be noted as distinct from the core two sources).\n\n**Narrative:** The primary drivers are natural coastal and hydrological processes, amplified by climate change. Gini et al. (2020) explicitly frames the relocation as a \"case of climate injustice\" and notes the role of \"an ever more unpredictable sea.\" Gini (2025) frames the case as a \"climate-related planned relocation.\" The community members themselves attribute worsening conditions to climate change: \"the argument of 'climate change' gained strength locally\" after the October 2016 event (Yamaoka et al., 2021). Yamaoka et al. (2021) additionally attributes a secondary role to the artificial Varadouro Canal (inaugurated 1955) in accelerating erosion on the lagoon side. This technological/anthropogenic contribution is noted here but should not be weighted equally with the climate-driven natural hazard factors, which are more directly and consistently evidenced across the supplied sources.\n\n**Categories selected:** **Climate change** and **Natural hazard** as primary codes. **Technological hazard** flagged as a secondary possibility based on Yamaoka et al. (2021); not verifiable from Gini (2025) or Gini et al. (2020) alone.\n\n---\n\n### Was this hazard considered in the MR decision process? (Coastal Flooding/Erosion), (Riverine/Pluvial Flooding), (Lake Flooding/Erosion), (Wildfire), (Volcano), (Land Subsidence), (Landslide/Debris Flow), (Earthquake), (Tsunami), (Hurricane), (Other)\n\n**Answer:** **Coastal Flooding/Erosion** (primary); **Hurricane** (contributing — the August 2016 cyclone, per codebook definition which includes tropical storms, cyclones, and related storm surges).\n\n**Narrative:** The dominant hazard is coastal erosion of the sand spit combined with flooding/inundation resulting from tidal surges and undertow events. The August 2016 cyclone is the principal acute trigger event. Gini (2025) describes \"On 16 August 2016, a cyclone hit the shores of the island… On the night of the cyclone, 12 m of land were lost.\" The October 2016 tidal undertow is a further acute event. By August 2018, the remaining sand spit was flooded and the island physically divided (Gini, Mobile Kinship, 2025; Gini et al., 2020). Only coastal erosion, coastal flooding/undertow, and cyclone are evidenced in the supplied sources as drivers of the relocation decision. No evidence of riverine/pluvial flooding, wildfire, volcano, landslide, earthquake, tsunami, lake flooding, or land subsidence as drivers.\n\n---\n\n### What was the geographic scale of the MR project? (Individual homes), (A few streets), (Neighbourhood), (Entire community), (Sub-watershed), (Watershed region)\n\n**Answer:** **Entire Community**\n\n**Narrative:** All families (approximately 30 people) relocated collectively as a single unit to a new site approximately five kilometres north on the same island (Gini, Mobile Kinship, 2025; Gini et al., 2020). The relocation was explicitly planned and executed as a collective community movement. Gini et al. (2020) states: \"The community took up residence in the new location, called Nova Enseada, in June 2017.\" AMEB organized the land division collectively, prioritizing vulnerable households first (Gini et al., 2020). The geographic scope is the entirety of this small traditional community.\n\n---\n\n### Who or what was retreated? (Individuals), (Groups/Neighbourhoods), (Communities), (Critical infrastructure), (Hazard protection structures), (Industrial assets)\n\n**Answer:** **Communities**\n\n**Narrative:** The entire Caiçara community of Enseada da Baleia relocated as a collective unit, including people, household structures (rebuilt by hand through mutirões), shared community infrastructure (volleyball field, orchards, fish drying facilities — all rebuilt at Nova Enseada as documented in Gini 2025), and the social and institutional structures of the community (AMEB, MAE). This was a community-scale retreat, not individual property transactions. Wood from old houses was repurposed for floors in the new houses, materially linking old and new (Gini, 2025).\n\n---\n\n### Other notes (General Information)\n\nThe case is located in the **Global South** (Brazil). The Caiçara community is a traditional population descended from Indigenous, African, and European peoples (Gini, Mobile Kinship, 2025). Their traditional land and fishing rights are referenced across sources in relation to ILO Convention 169, ratified by Brazil through Decreto Legislativo 143/2002 (Yamaoka et al., 2019). The hazard was substantially shaped by the community's location within a strict conservation area (proteção integral), which severely constrained institutional options. The traditional territory is communal in nature — not individually owned or titled — and occupation rights are based on traditional use, recognized under the Park Management Plan (Yamaoka et al., 2019). This is a noted case in the Brazilian literature as the only known case of a traditional community being authorized to relocate within a strict protection conservation unit (UC of proteção integral) in São Paulo State, according to Diegues as cited in Yamaoka et al. (2019).\n\n---"
},
{
"case_id": "CS47",
"chunk_index": 2,
"section": "institutional_environment",
"location": "Ilha do Cardoso, São Paulo",
"country": "Brazil",
"country_normalized": "Brazil",
"continent": "South America",
"admin_area": "São Paulo",
"source": "Pipeline Ver2 — Ilha do Cardoso",
"source_links": [
{
"title": "Gini, G., Mendonça Cardoso, T., & Pires Ramos, E. (2020). When the two seas met: Preventive and self-managed relocation of the Nova Enseada community in Brazil. Forced Migration Review, 64, 35-38.",
"url": "https://www.fmreview.org/issue64/gini-mendoncacardoso-piresramos/"
},
{
"title": "Gini, G. (2025). Mobile kinship: Exploring more-than-human entanglements in the context of climate-related planned relocation. Environment and Planning E: Nature and Space. https://doi.org/10.1177/25148486251363741",
"doi": "10.1177/25148486251363741",
"url": "https://doi.org/10.1177/25148486251363741",
"pdf_url": "https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/25148486251363741"
},
{
"title": "Gini, G., Cardoso, T. M., & Ramos, E. P. (2021). Voices of Enseada da Baleia: Emotions and feelings in a preventive and self-managed relocation. In Climate Change, Disasters and People on the Move. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003141457-16",
"doi": "10.4324/9781003141457-16",
"url": "https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003141457-16"
},
{
"title": "Yamaoka, J. G., Cardoso, T. M., Denardin, V. F., & Alves, A. R. (2019). A comunidade caiçara da Enseada da Baleia e a sua luta pelo território - Cananéia (SP). Guaju, 5(1).",
"url": "https://revistas.ufpr.br/guaju/article/view/66211"
},
{
"title": "Yamaoka, J. G., Cardoso, T. M., & Gini, G. (2021). Sobrevivendo ao Capitaloceno: O caso da comunidade caiçara da Enseada da Baleia, Cananéia/SP. Diálogos Socioambientais, 4(11), 32-35.",
"url": "https://periodicos.ufabc.edu.br/index.php/dialogossocioambientais/issue/view/38"
}
],
"text": "Case study: Ilha do Cardoso (Ilha do Cardoso, São Paulo, Brazil)\nSection: INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT\n\n### What is the focus or scope of the MR project? (Individual buyout/retreat), (Community buyout/retreat), (Leasebacks, easements and buffers), (Other acquisition tools), (Managed realignment of infrastructure)\n\n**Answer:** **Community buyout/retreat** — applying this code as the closest available category for collective relocation of a settlement through coordinated community engagement, with an important clarification that no buyout mechanism was involved.\n\n**Narrative:** No property purchase, buyout, or formal compensation mechanism was involved. The community held no individual land titles; they occupied traditional territory within a state conservation area. The relocation was entirely community-organized, collectively financed, and physically constructed by community members. This does not map precisely onto standard \"buyout\" logic; the community itself drove and financed the process without any government purchase of property. The code **Community buyout/retreat** is applied here in the codebook sense of \"collective relocation of a neighborhood or settlement through coordinated planning and community engagement,\" with the explicit note that this was a self-organized community relocation without any buyout mechanism, state financing, or property acquisition by government.\n\n**Alternative interpretation:** One might code this as **Other acquisition tools** given the absence of a buyout; however, the collective nature of the relocation most closely aligns with the community buyout/retreat description in the codebook.\n\n---\n\n### What legal constraints or requirements were identified during the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** **Legal authority over retreat**, **Relevant regulations/acts**, **Retreat land development**, **Compliance & enforcement**, **Litigation**\n\n**Narrative:**\n\n- **Legal authority over retreat:** The Instituto Florestal (managing the PEIC) initially claimed legal authority to deny intra-island relocation, asserting that the conservation unit's proteção integral status prohibited new settlement areas within it. A 2011 legal opinion from the SMA explicitly denied the community this right (Yamaoka et al., 2019; Yamaoka et al., 2021). Authorization was only obtained after sustained intervention by the Public Defender's Office, the Prosecutor's Office, and the State Secretary of the Environment (Gini et al., 2020; Yamaoka et al., 2019).\n\n- **Relevant regulations/acts:** The PEIC's status as a strict protection conservation unit under Brazilian environmental law was the primary legal barrier. The Park Management Plan (Plano de Manejo, 2002) recognized traditional communities, providing a partial enabling condition. ILO Convention 169 (ratified by Brazil through Decreto Legislativo 143/2002) was also invoked in relation to the community's assertion of rights to traditional territory (Yamaoka et al., 2019). MMA Normative Instruction No. 15 (16 June 2005) governing manjuba fishing areas became a post-relocation regulatory constraint when fish populations shifted following the 2018 island division (Gini, Mobile Kinship, 2025; Yamaoka et al., 2019).\n\n- **Retreat land development:** The park required mandatory reforestation of the vacated original site as a condition of authorization. Reconstruction at the new site could not exceed the original square meterage of prior structures, to be negotiated with park administrators (Gini et al., 2020; Gini, Mobile Kinship, 2025). The clearing/deforestation licence (licença para desmatamento) was obtained in 2017 (Yamaoka et al., 2019; Yamaoka et al., 2021).\n\n- **Compliance & enforcement:** Conservation regulations constrained fishing (MMA Normative Instruction 15/2005 on manjuba fishing areas), agricultural practices (roçado permits), and house construction. Enforcement by park rangers — including confiscation of fish and nets when fishing outside regulated areas — is documented (Gini, Mobile Kinship, 2025).\n\n- **Litigation:** AMEB, through the Public Defender's Office, filed an administrative proceeding (Procedimento Administrativo de Tutela Coletiva No. 07/15) in 2015 following the tourist vessel accident. A Civil Public Action (Ação Civil Pública) was subsequently filed against the owner of the vessel (Yamaoka et al., 2019). Administrative proceedings were also filed with multiple agencies including Fundação Florestal, CETESB, IBAMA, MPF, and MPE-SP (Yamaoka et al., 2019). The legal pathway through the Public Defender was described as essential to securing the right to relocate within the island (Gini, 2025; Toshio-Hayama and Mendonça-Cardoso, 2018 as cited in Gini, 2025).\n\n**Note on absent categories:** **Land acquisition** (in the formal sense of government purchasing land) did not occur. **Home acquisition** (government purchasing private homes) did not occur. **Title transfer** did not apply as no private title existed. The conservation unit designation was not changed; therefore **Land rezoning** is not coded.\n\n---\n\n### What were the funding sources for the MR project?\n\n**Answer:** **Individual** (community self-funding through collective labour and personal networks); **NGOs** (AMEB and partner civil society organizations as coordinating bodies for fundraising). No government funding at any level.\n\n**Narrative:** The state (municipal, state, or federal) provided no financial assistance. Gini et al. (2020) states explicitly: \"Despite receiving authorisation, there was no State financial assistance.\" Funding was obtained through: (1) mutirões — collective labour (free, mutual help); (2) community networks raising funds through donations and at least eight fundraising events between December 2016 and October 2017 (music festivals, photography exhibitions, community dinners — Yamaoka et al. 2019); (3) crowdfunding via the Benfeitoria platform, targeting R$15,000 within 60 days in December 2016, achieved successfully (Yamaoka et al., 2019); (4) donations from friends, tourists, and solidarity networks; (5) AMEB's own organizational resources. Yamaoka et al. (2019) estimates the external events and campaigns mobilized approximately 10–20% of the total amount needed.\n\n**Categories selected:** **Individual** (community members financing their own relocation through labour and personal networks) and **NGOs** (AMEB as the organizing civil society body and its partner organizations). No **Local/Municipal**, **Provincial/State**, or **Federal** funding was provided. **Insurance** and **Lenders** categories do not apply.\n\n---\n\n### What was considered to maintain (or improve) the tax base in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** **N/A** — No evidence found in reviewed sources.\n\n**Narrative:** This is a small traditional community within a state conservation park. Sources do not mention tax implications at any point. Tax base maintenance is not a recognizable concern in this context. The community's concerns centered on maintaining livelihoods (fishing, artisanal crafts, community tourism) and cultural continuity. All standard tax base categories are inapplicable.\n\n---\n\n### What level/type of compensation mechanisms were considered in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** **Other** — No formal compensation was provided or offered. The community received no financial compensation of any standard type.\n\n**Narrative:** The community received no financial compensation for displacement, loss of structures, or loss of their original territory. Sources describe the state's role as one of abandonment: members of Enseada saw the lack of financial aid as an attempt to \"kill without killing,\" because no one expected them to succeed in relocating (Gini, Mobile Kinship, 2025). The community was required to finance its own relocation entirely. The only quasi-compensatory element was the land concession (authorization to clear and occupy the new site), which itself came with onerous conditions (mandatory reforestation of the old site, building size restrictions). No **Market value**, **Tax value**, **Post-disaster value**, or **Additional incentives/bonuses** applied. State-provided **Free supports and services** (demolition, moving assistance, advisory services) were absent; all such activities were organized and paid for by the community itself. The code **Other** is applied here to capture the reality: no formal compensation framework was employed, and what minimal non-monetary facilitation occurred (the land concession authorization) was community-negotiated and conditioned, not a state-provided support.\n\n---"
},
{
"case_id": "CS47",
"chunk_index": 3,
"section": "planning_processes",
"location": "Ilha do Cardoso, São Paulo",
"country": "Brazil",
"country_normalized": "Brazil",
"continent": "South America",
"admin_area": "São Paulo",
"source": "Pipeline Ver2 — Ilha do Cardoso",
"source_links": [
{
"title": "Gini, G., Mendonça Cardoso, T., & Pires Ramos, E. (2020). When the two seas met: Preventive and self-managed relocation of the Nova Enseada community in Brazil. Forced Migration Review, 64, 35-38.",
"url": "https://www.fmreview.org/issue64/gini-mendoncacardoso-piresramos/"
},
{
"title": "Gini, G. (2025). Mobile kinship: Exploring more-than-human entanglements in the context of climate-related planned relocation. Environment and Planning E: Nature and Space. https://doi.org/10.1177/25148486251363741",
"doi": "10.1177/25148486251363741",
"url": "https://doi.org/10.1177/25148486251363741",
"pdf_url": "https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/25148486251363741"
},
{
"title": "Gini, G., Cardoso, T. M., & Ramos, E. P. (2021). Voices of Enseada da Baleia: Emotions and feelings in a preventive and self-managed relocation. In Climate Change, Disasters and People on the Move. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003141457-16",
"doi": "10.4324/9781003141457-16",
"url": "https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003141457-16"
},
{
"title": "Yamaoka, J. G., Cardoso, T. M., Denardin, V. F., & Alves, A. R. (2019). A comunidade caiçara da Enseada da Baleia e a sua luta pelo território - Cananéia (SP). Guaju, 5(1).",
"url": "https://revistas.ufpr.br/guaju/article/view/66211"
},
{
"title": "Yamaoka, J. G., Cardoso, T. M., & Gini, G. (2021). Sobrevivendo ao Capitaloceno: O caso da comunidade caiçara da Enseada da Baleia, Cananéia/SP. Diálogos Socioambientais, 4(11), 32-35.",
"url": "https://periodicos.ufabc.edu.br/index.php/dialogossocioambientais/issue/view/38"
}
],
"text": "Case study: Ilha do Cardoso (Ilha do Cardoso, São Paulo, Brazil)\nSection: PLANNING PROCESSES\n\n### What is the time horizon considered in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** **Pre-retreat planning** (limited, severely constrained by institutional barriers); **Immediate risks: 1–5 years** (primary operating horizon once crisis materialized in 2016); **Anticipated future risks: 10–100 years** (acknowledged informally); **Post-retreat follow-up** (ongoing community adaptation, without institutional support).\n\n**Narrative:**\n\n- **Pre-retreat planning:** The community attempted pre-retreat planning from the 1990s onward (sea wall construction, repeated requests to authorities, participation in the Forestry Foundation working group from 2013). NUPAUB-USP conducted a technical assessment of the proposed new site in late 2016 before the move (Gini et al., 2020; Yamaoka et al., 2019). However, formal pre-retreat planning was severely constrained by institutional refusal to authorize relocation.\n\n- **Immediate risks (1–5 years):** Once the 2016 events made the situation untenable, the community operated under extreme time pressure. The actual relocation was completed in approximately one year (October 2016 authorization process to June 2017 occupation — Gini et al., 2020).\n\n- **Anticipated future risks (10–100 years):** The community and researchers acknowledge ongoing erosion risks at the new site and the possibility of future relocation. Sofia's fear about a potential future relocation is explicitly articulated in Gini (2025): \"It scares me that this sandbar hasn't stopped and that it gets closer, keeps getting closer to us, and that in some time we will have to think about relocation again.\" This horizon is discussed informally but is not reflected in any formal planning framework.\n\n- **Post-retreat follow-up:** Community continues to address post-relocation adaptation challenges (fishing regulation updates, continued erosion, agricultural replanting through elevated containers). No institutional post-retreat follow-up or support program was established (Gini et al., 2020; Gini, 2025; Gini, Mobile Kinship, 2025).\n\n---\n\n### What planning elements were considered in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** **Bottom-up / community-led**; **Participatory/collaborative**; **Multi-sectoral** (coordination was largely forced by the community rather than proactively organized by the state); **Single-stage retreat**; **Degree of transparency** (within the community); **Adaptive management** (applied as an interpretive code for post-relocation adjustments, not as a formal program design).\n\n**Narrative:**\n\n- **Bottom-up/community-led:** The entire relocation was initiated, planned, and executed by the community itself. The community rejected both options offered by authorities. They selected their own relocation site, organized collective labour, arranged financing, and negotiated with authorities. This is explicitly described as autonomous and community-led: \"The relocation was community-led, not only in terms of the chosen location but also because the authorities offered little financial or logistical support\" (Gini, 2025).\n\n- **Participatory/collaborative:** Planning within the community was collective. AMEB organized community meetings. NUPAUB researchers confirmed the community's choice through participatory ethnomapping (Yamaoka et al., 2019). A community meeting on 13 November 2016 produced a collectively written letter identifying the benefits of Casa Preta (NUPAUB, 2016 as cited in Yamaoka et al., 2019).\n\n- **Multi-sectoral:** The process ultimately required coordination across legal institutions, conservation management, research institutions, and civil society — though this was driven by community advocacy rather than proactive government coordination (Gini et al., 2020).\n\n- **Single-stage retreat:** The community relocated as a single unit in one phase (2017) (Gini et al., 2020).\n\n- **Degree of transparency:** Within the community, the process was open and participatory. All families participated in construction and decision-making; AMEB's priority system for land allocation was transparent within the community (Gini et al., 2020).\n\n- **Adaptive management (interpretive):** Post-relocation, the community has adapted construction techniques (elevated orchards to avoid salt water inundation — Gini, 2025), fishing methods, and organizational structures. This reflects adaptive adjustment but not a formal adaptive management framework.\n\n- **Top-down planning was explicitly rejected** by the community, which refused state-offered options.\n\n- **No evidence of:** Formal CBA, MCDA, multi-stage planning, public-private partnerships, or bureaucracy reduction initiatives.\n\n---\n\n### What decision support tools were used in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** **Hazard maps & models** (participatory ethnomapping and NUPAUB geological/environmental assessment); **New site evaluation process** (NUPAUB-USP technical assessment of Casa Preta); **Process guidance** (limited, through legal-administrative proceedings).\n\n**Narrative:**\n\n- **Hazard maps & models:** NUPAUB-USP facilitated participatory ethnomapping using flip-chart drawings, identifying community activity zones, areas of flooding risk, and validating the proposed new site (Yamaoka et al., 2019; Gini et al., 2020). Men used territorial knowledge to identify flood-"
}
]