Download data/extracted/CS9.json from UWaterlooRFR/UWaterlooManagedRetreat: direct link, hf CLI and curl.
- Browser
- Download file 35.2 kB
-
https://huggingface.co/spaces/UWaterlooRFR/UWaterlooManagedRetreat/resolve/main/data/extracted/CS9.json
- Command line
-
hf download hf://spaces/UWaterlooRFR/UWaterlooManagedRetreat/data/extracted/CS9.json
-
curl -L -o CS9.json https://huggingface.co/spaces/UWaterlooRFR/UWaterlooManagedRetreat/resolve/main/data/extracted/CS9.json
35.2 kB
| [ | |
| { | |
| "case_id": "CS9", | |
| "chunk_index": 0, | |
| "section": "overview", | |
| "location": "Grand Forks, North Dakota", | |
| "country": "USA", | |
| "country_normalized": "United States", | |
| "continent": "North America", | |
| "admin_area": "North Dakota", | |
| "source": "Pipeline Ver2 β Grand Forks Floodplain Buyout", | |
| "source_links": [ | |
| { | |
| "title": "Siders, A. R. (2019). Social justice implications of US managed retreat buyout programs. Climatic Change, 152, 239-257. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-018-2272-5", | |
| "doi": "10.1007/s10584-018-2272-5", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-018-2272-5" | |
| } | |
| ], | |
| "text": "Case study: Grand Forks Floodplain Buyout (Grand Forks, North Dakota, USA)\nSection: CASE STUDY OVERVIEW\n\n**Case Name and Location:** Grand Forks Flood Buyout and Recovery Program, Grand Forks, North Dakota, United States. Grand Forks is located on the western bank of the north-flowing Red River, adjacent to its sister city East Grand Forks, Minnesota [Parry et al. 2020, p. 31].\n\n**Hazard(s):** Riverine flooding from the Red River, with a concurrent cascading electrical fire in the historic business district triggered when floodwaters prevented fire truck access.\n\n**Type of Retreat:** Large-scale voluntary property acquisition and recovery program, funded primarily through federal HMGP and CDBG-DR grants and paired with downtown redevelopment and replacement housing efforts. Over 800 residential and commercial properties were acquired, demolished, and the land converted to permanent open space. A parallel component involved constructing replacement housing for displaced residents and a downtown revitalization effort.\n\n**Scale:** The 1997 Red River flood caused the evacuation of roughly 60,000 residents from Grand Forks and East Grand Forks combined. Grand Forks subsequently purchased over 800 residential and commercial properties across multiple neighbourhoods along the Red River corridor β one of the largest buyout programs in U.S. history at the time.\n\n**Key Actors:** City of Grand Forks; FEMA (HMGP funding); U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (CDBG-DR funding); State of North Dakota (reduced federal cost-share rate); U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (flood protection planning); Grand Forks Homes (non-profit housing developer for replacement housing); Fannie Mae's Housing Impact Fund (replacement housing financing); mayors of Grand Forks and East Grand Forks (political champions who lobbied Congress and President Clinton).\n\n**Timeline:** Triggering flood event: April 1997. Federal disaster declaration and initiation of buyout program: 1997. Buyout acquisitions and demolitions completed approximately 1997β1999. Replacement housing construction: approximately 1998β1999. Riverfront greenway and infrastructure realignment: completed by the early 2000s. By 2018, Grand Forks' population had grown to 70,770 [Parry et al. 2020, p. 35]. The case is post-retreat and is referenced in the academic literature as a completed, if contested, program.\n\n**Key Outcomes:** Acquired riverfront land was converted into approximately 20 miles of paved multi-purpose trails, two golf courses, boat ramps, campgrounds, ice skating rinks, basketball and tennis courts, softball, soccer, and football fields, and more β a celebrated greenway and floodplain buffer [Parry et al. 2020, p. 32]. Critical infrastructure (water treatment plant electrical systems) was relocated above the 1997 flood level, and a new elementary school was built above base-flood elevation; new building codes were implemented before allowing downtown rebuilding. By 2018, Grand Forks city officials reported the downtown was \"stronger than it was before the flood\" [Parry et al. 2020, p. 35]. However, the program generated significant controversy: residents filed a class-action lawsuit alleging bullying and unfair pricing; duplication-of-benefits rules reduced net payments; the city ultimately used eminent domain for some properties along the dike line; and replacement housing was unaffordable and poorly located, with only 12 of 180 homes selling in the first two years. The city's jobs market has remained \"relatively flat over the last two decades, in contrast to neighbouring cities that continue to grow\" [Parry et al. 2020, pp. 35β36].\n\n---\n\n**Narrative Summary**\n\nIn April 1997, the Red River crested at 54 feet β 26 feet above flood stage β following an exceptionally severe winter of record cold, eight blizzards, and over 100 inches of snowfall across the Red River Valley [Parry et al. 2020, pp. 30β31]. Nearly all of Grand Forks' roughly 60,000 residents (across both Grand Forks and East Grand Forks) were evacuated. Floodwaters submerged or partially submerged close to 300 homes in Grand Forks, triggered a cascading electrical fire that destroyed eleven historic buildings in the business district when flooded roads prevented fire truck access, and damaged 70% of the city's schools [Parry et al. 2020, p. 31]. Total damage was estimated at $3.5 billion [Parry et al. 2020, p. 31]. The disaster was compounded by the fact that many residents lacked flood insurance, having been advised by agents that it was unnecessary based on the National Weather Service's forecast of a 49-foot crest β well below the actual 54-foot event [Parry et al. 2020, pp. 31β32].\n\nIn the aftermath, the mayors of Grand Forks and East Grand Forks lobbied Congress and President Clinton directly for recovery funding. The city received approximately $171 million in HUD CDBG-DR funding and an additional $13 million in FEMA HMGP funding, with North Dakota also receiving a reduced federal cost-share rate [Parry et al. 2020, p. 32]. Grand Forks used this funding to purchase over 800 residential and commercial properties. River-side properties were demolished and the land converted into an approximately 20-mile riverfront greenway. Critical infrastructure was rebuilt or relocated above the 1997 flood level, new building codes were implemented, and a new elementary school was constructed above base flood elevation [Parry et al. 2020, pp. 32β35].\n\nDespite being widely referenced as a successful managed retreat, the program was deeply contentious. Buyout managers had preconceived notions about which areas would be acquired but did not communicate this openly to residents [Parry et al. 2020, p. 33]. Federal duplication-of-benefits rules reduced net payments for those who had already received non-profit or insurance assistance. Residents filed a class-action lawsuit alleging bullying and unfair pricing, and the city ultimately resorted to eminent domain for some properties along the dike line [Parry et al. 2020, pp. 33β34; Siders 2019, pp. 249β250]. The replacement housing program β 180 homes built on the undeveloped west edge of the city, priced from $105,000 to $147,000 despite replacing homes valued at $50,000β$80,000 β largely failed to attract displaced residents, with only 12 of 180 homes selling by February 1999 [Parry et al. 2020, p. 35]. The case is frequently cited in the academic literature as an example of buyout program transparency and social equity concerns [Siders 2019, p. 244].\n\n---" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "case_id": "CS9", | |
| "chunk_index": 1, | |
| "section": "coding_questions", | |
| "location": "Grand Forks, North Dakota", | |
| "country": "USA", | |
| "country_normalized": "United States", | |
| "continent": "North America", | |
| "admin_area": "North Dakota", | |
| "source": "Pipeline Ver2 β Grand Forks Floodplain Buyout", | |
| "source_links": [ | |
| { | |
| "title": "Siders, A. R. (2019). Social justice implications of US managed retreat buyout programs. Climatic Change, 152, 239-257. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-018-2272-5", | |
| "doi": "10.1007/s10584-018-2272-5", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-018-2272-5" | |
| } | |
| ], | |
| "text": "Case study: Grand Forks Floodplain Buyout (Grand Forks, North Dakota, USA)\nSection: CODING QUESTIONS\n\n---\n\n### Is there any evidence of a proactive or reactive trigger in the MR decision process? (Reactive/Proactive)\n\n**Answer:** Reactive.\n\n**Narrative:** The buyout program was triggered entirely by the April 1997 Red River flood disaster. There was no pre-disaster acquisition strategy, no managed retreat plan, and no proactive anticipatory framework in place. The federal disaster declaration that followed the flood unlocked HMGP and CDBG-DR funding and initiated the program [Case Study Notes, p. 1].\n\nDespite a long history of spring flooding from the Red River, Grand Forks had not established any pre-disaster property acquisition program. Many residents did not carry flood insurance because agents had advised it was unnecessary based on National Weather Service forecasts, illustrating the complete absence of anticipatory managed retreat planning prior to 1997 [Parry et al. 2020, pp. 31β32]. Parry et al. recommend that localities adopt short-, medium-, and long-term planning horizons β a framework Grand Forks had not adopted prior to the flood [Parry et al. 2020, p. 42].\n\n**Coding justification:** The codebook defines Reactive as \"after a hazard has caused damage, as a response to loss.\" This case clearly fits that definition. There is no evidence of any proactive element in the pre-disaster period.\n\n---\n\n### Date, Number of Households Affected, Number of Population Affected, Total Funding\n\n**Answer:**\n- **Date:** Flood event April 1997; buyout program initiated 1997, acquisitions and demolitions completed approximately 1997β1999.\n- **Households/properties affected:** Over 800 residential and commercial properties purchased [Parry et al. 2020, p. 32; Siders 2019, p. 242; Nelson et al. 2020, p. 7].\n- **Population affected:** Roughly 60,000 residents evacuated from Grand Forks and East Grand Forks [Parry et al. 2020, p. 31].\n- **Total funding:** Approximately $171 million in HUD CDBG-DR funds + $13 million in FEMA HMGP funds + $7.75 million from Fannie Mae's Housing Impact Fund for replacement housing = approximately $191.75 million in documented funding [Parry et al. 2020, pp. 32, 35].\n\n**Note:** The $171 million CDBG-DR figure represents the total allocation to Grand Forks. Of this, approximately 10β15% was directed to projects in or near downtown revitalization [Parry et al. 2020, p. 32]. North Dakota received a reduced federal cost-share rate, lowering the state match burden [Parry et al. 2020, p. 32]. The precise amount directed specifically to property acquisition is not disaggregated in the reviewed sources. Sources note that the extraordinary level of federal funding was partly attributable to a lack of competing major disasters at the time [Parry et al. 2020, p. 44].\n\n---\n\n### What is the occurrence of the hazard(s) considered in the MR decision process? (Single Hazard/Multiple Hazards)\n\n**Answer:** Multiple Hazards.\n\n**Narrative:** The 1997 event involved multiple concurrent hazards. Riverine flooding was the primary and central driver. However, floodwaters simultaneously triggered an electrical short circuit that caused a fire in the historic business district; fire trucks could not reach the fire due to flooded roads, resulting in the destruction of eleven historical buildings [Parry et al. 2020, p. 31; Case Study Notes, p. 1]. Seventy percent of Grand Forks' schools were also damaged [Parry et al. 2020, p. 31].\n\nThe fire is best understood as a cascading hazard triggered by the flood. This is consistent with the codebook's definition of Multiple Hazards, which includes \"cascading hazards, where one hazard triggers or amplifies another, occurring concurrently within the same event.\"\n\n**Coding justification:** While the buyout decision was driven by riverine flooding, the concurrent cascading fire constitutes a compound/cascading hazard within the same event, making the Multiple Hazards code applicable.\n\n---\n\n### What is the origin of the hazards considered in the MR decision process? (Technological Hazard/Natural Hazard)\n\n**Answer:** Natural Hazard.\n\n**Narrative:** The primary hazard was a natural riverine flood caused by extreme natural winter conditions: record cold temperatures, eight blizzards, and over 100 inches of cumulative snowfall during 1996β1997 [Parry et al. 2020, pp. 30β31]. The sources attribute the flood to these extreme natural meteorological and hydrological conditions, not to climate change or technological failure.\n\nThe cascading fire, while involving built infrastructure (an electrical short circuit), arose as a direct consequence of the flood event rather than as an independent technological hazard in the codebook sense (e.g., an industrial accident, dam collapse, or oil spill). The predominant and driving origin is natural.\n\n**Coding justification:** The codebook defines Natural Hazard as, e.g., \"earthquakes (when they naturally occur).\" Riverine flooding from extreme snowmelt and winter weather is a natural hazard. The secondary fire, while involving built infrastructure, was triggered by and is inseparable from the natural flood event. There is no evidence in the sources that climate change was identified as a driver of the 1997 event; sources attribute it to exceptional but naturally occurring weather conditions.\n\n---\n\n### Was this hazard considered in the MR decision process? (specify type)\n\n**Answer:** Riverine/Pluvial Flooding.\n\n**Narrative:** Riverine flooding from the Red River was the central driver of the managed retreat decision. The buyout program targeted river-side floodplain properties, and acquired land was converted into an approximately 20-mile riverfront greenway serving as a natural floodplain buffer between the levee system and the Red River [Parry et al. 2020, pp. 32β33; Case Study Notes, p. 2]. The flood resulted from extreme spring snowmelt conditions characteristic of the Red River Valley's spring flooding pattern.\n\n**Other hazards not coded separately:** The cascading fire destroyed buildings during the flood event but was not a separate driver of the managed retreat decision and does not appear to have independently influenced property acquisition targeting.\n\n---\n\n### What was the geographic scale of the MR project? (Individual Homes / A Few Streets / Neighbourhood / Entire Community / Sub-Watershed / Watershed Region)\n\n**Answer:** Community (in terms of scope of impact) and Sub-Watershed.\n\n**Narrative:** The buyout affected over 800 properties across multiple neighbourhoods along the Red River corridor, including riverfront residential areas and portions of the commercial district [Parry et al. 2020, p. 32; Case Study Notes, p. 2; Siders 2019, Table 2]. The greenway extends along approximately 20 miles of the Red River corridor, reflecting a sub-watershed scale of land use transformation.\n\n**Coding note (per audit):** The auditor correctly noted that \"city-wide\" is an overstatement, as the acquisition did not cover all of Grand Forks but rather multiple neighbourhoods along the river corridor. The \"Entire Community\" code is retained with the caveat that it reflects the city-wide scope of impact (evacuation, governance, infrastructure) rather than city-wide acquisition. \"Sub-watershed\" is also applicable given the 20-mile riverfront corridor treatment. If the coding scheme requires a single selection, Sub-Watershed with a note about the community-level impact is preferred.\n\n---\n\n### Who or What Was Retreated? (Individuals / Groups/Neighbourhoods / Communities / Critical Infrastructure / Hazard Protection Structures / Industrial Assets)\n\n**Answer:** Individuals, Groups/Neighbourhoods, and Critical Infrastructure.\n\n**Narrative:**\n- **Individuals:** Residential and commercial property owners were individually bought out across the affected areas [Parry et al. 2020, p. 32].\n- **Groups/Neighbourhoods:** Properties spanned multiple riverfront neighbourhoods, constituting neighbourhood-scale retreat from the floodplain [Parry et al. 2020, p. 32; Case Study Notes, p. 2].\n- **Critical Infrastructure:** The city relocated water treatment plant electrical transformers and panels above the 1997 flood level, moved air compressors and records to upper floors of the plant, built metal flood shields for doors and windows, and purchased land to the west of town for a future water treatment plant [Parry et al. 2020, p. 34]. Additionally, a new elementary school was built above base-flood elevation β this was new construction at a safer location rather than relocation of an existing building, and the sources do not specifically describe it as a relocation of an existing school structure [Parry et al. 2020, p. 35].\n\n**Coding note (per audit):** The school is best described as new construction above base-flood elevation, not necessarily relocation of an existing structure. The water treatment infrastructure adjustments represent the clearest example of critical infrastructure realignment. The wording distinguishes \"relocated or rebuilt above the 1997 flood level\" to avoid implying all infrastructure was moved from one site to another.\n\n---" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "case_id": "CS9", | |
| "chunk_index": 2, | |
| "section": "institutional_environment", | |
| "location": "Grand Forks, North Dakota", | |
| "country": "USA", | |
| "country_normalized": "United States", | |
| "continent": "North America", | |
| "admin_area": "North Dakota", | |
| "source": "Pipeline Ver2 β Grand Forks Floodplain Buyout", | |
| "source_links": [ | |
| { | |
| "title": "Siders, A. R. (2019). Social justice implications of US managed retreat buyout programs. Climatic Change, 152, 239-257. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-018-2272-5", | |
| "doi": "10.1007/s10584-018-2272-5", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-018-2272-5" | |
| } | |
| ], | |
| "text": "Case study: Grand Forks Floodplain Buyout (Grand Forks, North Dakota, USA)\nSection: INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT\n\n---\n\n### What is the focus or scope of the MR project? (Individual Buyout/Retreat / Community Buyout/Retreat / Leasebacks, Easements and Buffers / Other Acquisition Tools / Managed Realignment of Infrastructure)\n\n**Answer:** Community Buyout/Retreat and Managed Realignment of Infrastructure.\n\n**Narrative:** The program operated primarily as a community-scale voluntary property acquisition β one of the largest buyout programs in U.S. history at the time β using federal HMGP and CDBG-DR funds [Siders 2019, p. 242; Parry et al. 2020, p. 32; Nelson et al. 2020, p. 7]. Properties were demolished and land converted into permanent open space (the riverfront greenway). This reflects a community-level buyout rather than isolated individual acquisitions.\n\nAdditionally, critical infrastructure was physically relocated or rebuilt above the 1997 flood level β water treatment plant components were moved, a new elementary school was built at higher elevation, and the city purchased land for a future water treatment plant [Parry et al. 2020, pp. 34β35] β constituting managed realignment of infrastructure.\n\nThe partnership with Grand Forks Homes and CDBG-DR funding for replacement housing further reinforces the community-scale framing, as does the parallel downtown revitalization effort [Parry et al. 2020, pp. 32, 35].\n\n---\n\n### What legal constraints or requirements were identified during the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Litigation, Relevant Regulations/Acts, Home Acquisition, Land Acquisition, Title(s) Transfer, Land Rezoning, Compliance & Enforcement, and Other (eminent domain; duplication of benefits).\n\n**Narrative:**\n\n- **Relevant Regulations/Acts:** The buyout was governed by the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (HMGP), the Housing and Community Development Act (CDBG-DR), and the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970 (URA). Acquired floodplain properties were deed-restricted for open space in perpetuity under 44 C.F.R. Part 80 [Siders 2019, p. 242; Parry et al. 2020, p. 33].\n\n- **Home Acquisition / Land Acquisition:** Federal HMGP and CDBG-DR programs established the legal processes for voluntary property acquisition. HMGP required pre-disaster fair market value offers and voluntary participation [Siders 2019, p. 244; Parry et al. 2020, p. 33].\n\n- **Title(s) Transfer:** The city had to obtain clear title for each property, complicated by the fact that both city hall and the county register of deeds office were damaged by flooding, requiring the city to engage a private title company [Parry et al. 2020, p. 33].\n\n- **Litigation:** Residents filed a class-action lawsuit claiming city officials were \"bullying residents into selling their homes for unfair prices.\" The lawsuit was dismissed in Fargo District Court [Parry et al. 2020, pp. 33β34; Siders 2019, pp. 249β250].\n\n- **Land Rezoning / Deed Restrictions:** Acquired floodplain properties were deed-restricted for open space in perpetuity; new building codes were implemented before allowing rebuilding in the downtown area [Parry et al. 2020, pp. 33β35].\n\n- **Compliance & Enforcement:** \"Under enormous pressure to make exceptions to local floodplain ordinances, city officials instead held firm and enforced local regulations that required building back with special measures to reduce future losses\" [Parry et al. 2020, p. 34].\n\n- **Other (Eminent Domain):** Although HMGP and CDBG-DR prohibit the use of eminent domain in voluntary acquisitions, Grand Forks ultimately resorted to eminent domain for some properties along the dike placement line. This is legally significant: federal voluntary program funds cannot cover eminent domain costs, and residents who were subject to eminent domain gained additional legal protections under the URA [Siders 2019, pp. 249β250; Parry et al. 2020, pp. 33β34].\n\n- **Other (Duplication of Benefits):** Federal duplication-of-benefits rules deducted prior non-profit or insurance assistance from buyout payments, reducing net compensation and generating significant resident resentment [Parry et al. 2020, p. 33; Nelson et al. 2020, p. 13].\n\n---\n\n### What were the funding sources for the MR project?\n\n**Answer:** Multiple Funders β Federal (FEMA HMGP, HUD CDBG-DR), State (North Dakota reduced cost-share), and Lenders (Fannie Mae Housing Impact Fund).\n\n**Narrative:**\n- **Federal:** Approximately $171 million in HUD CDBG-DR funding; approximately $13 million in FEMA HMGP funding [Parry et al. 2020, p. 32].\n- **State:** North Dakota received a reduced federal cost-share rate, lowering the state match burden below the standard requirement [Parry et al. 2020, p. 32].\n- **Lenders:** $7.75 million from Fannie Mae's Housing Impact Fund was used to support replacement housing construction [Parry et al. 2020, p. 35]. The CDBG-DR funds and tax-exempt bonds were also used to finance the replacement housing program [Nelson et al. 2020, p. 17].\n\nThe sources note that the exceptional level of federal funding was partly attributable to a lack of competing major disasters at the time: \"The amount of recovery money delivered to [Grand Forks] exceeded expectations because there were few other disasters or wars during that time\" [Parry et al. 2020, p. 44]. This raises replicability concerns. No evidence of NGO or insurance funding for the buyout itself is found in the reviewed sources.\n\n---\n\n### What was considered to maintain (or improve) the tax base in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** New Housing for BO Recipients, Assisting BO Recipients to Find Housing in Community, and Redevelopment of Retreat Lands.\n\n**Narrative:**\n\n- **New Housing for BO Recipients:** HUD CDBG-DR funding came with the condition that the city commit to building a \"corporate centre\" to encourage reinvestment and help rebuild the city's tax base [Parry et al. 2020, p. 32]. The city contracted with Grand Forks Homes, a non-profit housing organization, to construct 180 replacement homes [Parry et al. 2020, p. 35; Nelson et al. 2020, p. 17].\n\n- **Assisting BO Recipients to Find Housing in Community:** The city explicitly attempted to keep displaced residents within Grand Forks through the replacement housing program and downtown revitalization, recognizing the risk to the tax base of residents relocating elsewhere.\n\n- **Redevelopment of Retreat Lands:** Approximately 10β15% of CDBG-DR funds were directed to downtown projects and revitalization, and HUD required commitment to building a corporate centre [Parry et al. 2020, p. 32].\n\n**Contradictory evidence:** The replacement housing program was aspirational but only partially successful. Homes were priced from $105,000 to $147,000 despite replacing homes valued at $50,000β$80,000. The location was perceived as negative β remote from employment, schools, and shopping, and lacking mature trees. Only 12 of 180 homes sold by February 1999; prices were later reduced by an average of $17,500 and the properties eventually sold, but displaced residents still had to \"bridge the gap\" between their buyout payment and the cost of a new home [Parry et al. 2020, p. 35; Nelson et al. 2020, p. 17].\n\n---\n\n### What level/type of compensation mechanisms were considered in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Market Value (Pre-Disaster) and Free Supports and Services.\n\n**Narrative:**\n\n- **Market Value (Pre-Disaster):** HMGP required offers at pre-disaster fair market value. The city used local assessors to set property values in an attempt to maintain citizen trust [Parry et al. 2020, p. 33; Siders 2019, p. 242]. CDBG-DR funding may allow either pre- or post-disaster FMV; the sources indicate pre-disaster FMV was used [Siders 2019, p. 242].\n\n- **Free Supports and Services:** CDBG-DR funds covered demolition costs. Relocation assistance, emergency childcare, and supplemental employment programs were provided during recovery [Nelson et al. 2020, pp. 13β14].\n\n**Contradictory evidence:** Duplication-of-benefits rules effectively reduced compensation below pre-disaster FMV for residents who had already received non-profit assistance or insurance payments. This generated strong resentment and a sense among residents that they were being financially penalised for having sought help [Parry et al. 2020, pp. 33β34; Nelson et al. 2020, p. 13]. There is no evidence in the reviewed sources of Additional Incentives, Bonuses, or Top-up payments being offered; the duplication-of-benefits rules operated in the opposite direction.\n\n---" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "case_id": "CS9", | |
| "chunk_index": 3, | |
| "section": "planning_processes", | |
| "location": "Grand Forks, North Dakota", | |
| "country": "USA", | |
| "country_normalized": "United States", | |
| "continent": "North America", | |
| "admin_area": "North Dakota", | |
| "source": "Pipeline Ver2 β Grand Forks Floodplain Buyout", | |
| "source_links": [ | |
| { | |
| "title": "Siders, A. R. (2019). Social justice implications of US managed retreat buyout programs. Climatic Change, 152, 239-257. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-018-2272-5", | |
| "doi": "10.1007/s10584-018-2272-5", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-018-2272-5" | |
| } | |
| ], | |
| "text": "Case study: Grand Forks Floodplain Buyout (Grand Forks, North Dakota, USA)\nSection: PLANNING PROCESSES\n\n---\n\n### What is the time horizon considered in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Immediate Risks (1β5 Years) and Post-Retreat Follow-Up.\n\n**Narrative:**\n\n- **Immediate Risks (1β5 Years):** The buyout program addressed the immediate aftermath of the 1997 flood, with acquisitions and demolitions occurring within approximately 1β2 years of the disaster event.\n\n- **Post-Retreat Follow-Up:** Following the flood, the city implemented new building codes requiring flood-resilient construction before permitting downtown rebuilding, relocated water treatment infrastructure above the 1997 flood level, purchased land for a future water treatment plant, and built a new elementary school above base-flood elevation [Parry et al. 2020, pp. 34β35]. These constitute post-retreat follow-up planning for both immediate and longer-term risk reduction.\n\n**Coding note (per audit):** \"Pre-Retreat Planning\" is not coded as present because the evidence is clear that no pre-disaster acquisition strategy or managed retreat plan existed β the sources document its absence as a criticism of the program, not its presence. Parry et al. note the absence of prior planning, including inadequate flood insurance uptake despite known risk, as prolonging and complicating recovery [Parry et al. 2020, p. 42]. While the greenway and infrastructure realignment implicitly address longer-term risk reduction, there is no evidence that explicit long-term or climate-change-informed time horizons (10β100 years) were formally incorporated into program planning. \"Anticipated Future Risks\" is therefore not coded.\n\n---\n\n### What planning elements were considered in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA), Top-Down, Multi-Sectoral, and Degree of Transparency (attempted but contested).\n\n**Narrative:**\n\n- **CBA:** Federal HMGP eligibility required a cost-benefit analysis. FEMA's CBA methodology determined project eligibility [Siders 2019, p. 242; Parry et al. 2020, p. 33].\n\n- **Top-Down:** Planning was initiated and led by federal agencies (FEMA, HUD) and the City of Grand Forks. Community input was limited and largely reactive. Buyout managers had \"preconceived notions that certain areas were going to be bought out\" without communicating this to residents [Parry et al. 2020, p. 33; Siders 2019, p. 244].\n\n- **Multi-Sectoral:** The city coordinated across FEMA, HUD, the State of North Dakota, USACE, non-profit housing providers, and private developers to plan buyouts, replacement housing, and downtown revitalization simultaneously [Parry et al. 2020, pp. 32β35].\n\n- **Degree of Transparency (limited/contested):** The city held more frequent city council meetings on flood control and established a public information office [Parry et al. 2020, p. 36]. However, transparency was widely criticised. Siders found that officials described buyout decisions as resulting from objective CBA, \"but this rhetoric masks subjective value decisions\" [Siders 2019, p. 244]. The dike placement line was moved several times under political pressure [Parry et al. 2020, pp. 33β34].\n\n**Elements not evidenced:** No evidence of Adaptive Management, Bottom-Up, MCDA, Multi-Stage Retreat, meaningful Participatory/Collaborative planning, or formal Public-Private Partnerships in a governance sense (the replacement housing contract with Grand Forks Homes was instrumental rather than governance-oriented). No evidence of Bureaucracy Reduction measures.\n\n---\n\n### What decision support tools were used in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** CBA, Hazard Maps & Models, and Housing Assessment.\n\n**Narrative:**\n\n- **CBA:** FEMA's cost-benefit analysis methodology determined project eligibility for HMGP funding [Siders 2019, p. 242].\n\n- **Hazard Maps & Models:** Hazard mapping underpinned floodplain delineation and NFIP requirements. USACE evaluated flood protection alternatives including a proposed 23-mile diversion channel (ultimately rejected at a projected cost of $450 million) [Parry et al. 2020, p. 33]. The National Weather Service forecasts β which underestimated the flood at 49 feet versus the actual 54-foot crest β were central to pre-event risk communication and illustrate a critical failure of forecasting tools [Parry et al. 2020, pp. 31β32].\n\n- **Housing Assessment:** Local assessors conducted property appraisals to set pre-disaster fair market value for buyout offers [Parry et al. 2020, p. 33].\n\n**Not evidenced:** No evidence of climate change projection models, demographic projections, social vulnerability assessments, socioeconomic projections, formal new site evaluation processes, MCDA, or process guidance frameworks being used.\n\n---\n\n### What planning measures were taken for receiving areas in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Identifying Priority Areas and Construction of New Housing.\n\n**Narrative:**\n\n- **Identifying Priority Areas:** The city designated the undeveloped west edge of Grand Forks as the receiving area for replacement housing [Parry et al. 2020, p. 35; Nelson et al. 2020, p. 17].\n\n- **Construction of New Housing:** The city contracted with Grand Forks Homes to construct 180 replacement homes in two subdivisions. Financing was provided through CDBG-DR funds, tax-exempt bonds, and $7.75 million from Fannie Mae's Housing Impact Fund [Parry et al. 2020, p. 35; Nelson et al. 2020, p. 17].\n\n**Contradictory evidence (Poor Outcomes):** The receiving area was perceived negatively: remote from employment, schools, and shopping, and lacking mature trees. Replacement homes were priced from $105,000 to $147,000, replacing homes valued at $50,000β$80,000 β a gap of approximately $17,500β$50,000 above flood-damaged home values after prices were eventually reduced [Parry et al. 2020, p. 35; Nelson et al. 2020, p. 17]. Only 12 of 180 homes sold within the first two years; prices were later reduced by an average of $17,500 and the properties eventually sold, but displaced residents still had to bridge the gap [Parry et al. 2020, p. 35].\n\n**Not evidenced:** No evidence of assessment of availability of existing housing stock, formal social carrying capacity evaluation, or strategies for maintaining community cohesion in the receiving area. Nelson et al. note that for clustered relocation to be successful, \"the new housing must be of equivalent cost and quality to the original homes\" β a standard Grand Forks' program did not meet [Nelson et al. 2020, p. 17].\n\n---\n\n### What uses were planned for retreat lands?\n\n**Answer:** Natural Use, Multi-Purpose Use, Demolition/Infrastructure Removal, Site Design & Restoration, Planting/Landscaping, Ownership Transfer, Rezoning/Deed Restrictions, and Recognition of Retreat Land Benefits.\n\n**Narrative:**\n\n- **Demolition:** All acquired properties within the floodplain were demolished [Siders 2019, p. 242; Parry et al. 2020, p. 32].\n- **Natural Use / Multi-Purpose Use:** The approximately 20 miles of riverfront land were converted into a greenway serving as a natural floodplain buffer, incorporating paved multi-purpose trails, two golf courses, boat ramps, campgrounds, ice skating rinks, basketball and tennis courts, and softball, soccer, and football fields [Parry et al. 2020, p. 32].\n- **Site Design & Restoration / Planting/Landscaping:** The greenway involved deliberate landscape design and restoration of the riverfront corridor.\n- **Ownership Transfer:** Properties were transferred to public ownership [Siders 2019, p. 242].\n- **Rezoning/Deed Restrictions:** Acquired floodplain properties were deed-restricted for open space in perpetuity under 44 C.F.R. Part 80 [Siders 2019, p. 242; Parry et al. 2020, p. 33].\n- **Recognition of Retreat" | |
| } | |
| ] |