k0880k commited on
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aaa809c
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1 Parent(s): 6eb9193

feat: stamp runtime genome at intake wall

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Files changed (1) hide show
  1. core/intake.py +44 -7
core/intake.py CHANGED
@@ -25,11 +25,27 @@ The one thing it does not do is judge whether content is *true*. A feed is an
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  untrusted input channel, and text arriving from one is written by strangers who
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  know a model may read it. That is what `trusted=False` is for — `polymesh`
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  marks what neighbours hand over for exactly the same reason.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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  """
 
29
  import hashlib
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  import json
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  import re
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  # Content shorter than this is a placeholder, not a signal. "a finding" is nine
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  # characters and was broadcast on its own, five times.
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  MIN_TEXT = 12
@@ -105,17 +121,23 @@ def judge(frequency, data, seen=None):
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  return False, "selling accounts or audiences"
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  if seen is not None and fingerprint(data) in seen:
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  return False, "already on %s" % frequency
 
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  return True, ""
109
 
110
 
111
  def untrusted(source_type, metadata=None):
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- """Whether a signal's text was written by somebody outside this mesh.
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- A hydrated feed is a stranger writing prose that a model will read, which is
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- the whole shape of an indirect prompt injection. Marking it does not make it
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- safe; it makes it *attributable*, which is the only defence that survives
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- the text being persuasive.
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  """
 
 
 
 
 
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  external = {"harvest", "hydrated", "external", "feed", "rss", "rss_cp",
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  "feed_hydrator", "nicoli_catalog", "adys_pump", "site_docs"}
121
  if (source_type or "") in external:
@@ -124,7 +146,7 @@ def untrusted(source_type, metadata=None):
124
 
125
 
126
  def demo():
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- """Self-check: the three refusals, and the two things that must get through."""
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  seen = set()
129
 
130
  ok, why = judge("hn_top", {"title": "Denmark Requires Oral Defenses"}, seen)
@@ -184,7 +206,22 @@ def demo():
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  assert untrusted("outreach", {"source_url": "https://x.example"})
185
  assert not untrusted("outreach") and not untrusted("parcel")
186
 
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- print("intake: ok — %d refusals modelled" % 3)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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189
 
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  if __name__ == "__main__":
 
25
  untrusted input channel, and text arriving from one is written by strangers who
26
  know a model may read it. That is what `trusted=False` is for — `polymesh`
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  marks what neighbours hand over for exactly the same reason.
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+
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+ Every accepted signal also leaves this wall carrying a runtime-genome *seed*.
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+ The seed is observation, not a reproduction claim: visible runtime families,
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+ manifests, services, capability names and requirement hints. A later runtime
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+ profiler can deepen that seed into a verified closure. Keeping this here means
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+ RSS, site hydration, Drive, MPort, outreach, agent broadcasts and every future
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+ producer inherit the same representation without each learning a new protocol.
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  """
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+ import contextvars
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  import hashlib
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  import json
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  import re
40
 
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+ from core import runtime_genome
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+
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+ # The registry calls judge(data) and then untrusted(source, metadata) synchronously
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+ # for every accepted signal. ContextVar carries that one payload across the two
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+ # halves without a global race between concurrent requests/tasks. It is cleared
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+ # as soon as metadata is stamped.
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+ _JUDGED_DATA = contextvars.ContextVar("signalmesh_intake_judged_data", default=None)
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+
49
  # Content shorter than this is a placeholder, not a signal. "a finding" is nine
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  # characters and was broadcast on its own, five times.
51
  MIN_TEXT = 12
 
121
  return False, "selling accounts or audiences"
122
  if seen is not None and fingerprint(data) in seen:
123
  return False, "already on %s" % frequency
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+ _JUDGED_DATA.set(data)
125
  return True, ""
126
 
127
 
128
  def untrusted(source_type, metadata=None):
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+ """Whether text came from outside the mesh; also stamp its runtime seed.
130
 
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+ SignalRegistry calls this immediately after `judge` for an accepted signal.
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+ Mutating the registry-owned metadata dict here is deliberate: this is the one
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+ universal intake seam shared by old and future producers. The genome helper
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+ copies only requirement/capability evidence and never credential values.
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  """
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+ data = _JUDGED_DATA.get()
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+ _JUDGED_DATA.set(None)
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+ if metadata is not None:
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+ metadata.update(runtime_genome.enrich_metadata(source_type, data, metadata))
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+
141
  external = {"harvest", "hydrated", "external", "feed", "rss", "rss_cp",
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  "feed_hydrator", "nicoli_catalog", "adys_pump", "site_docs"}
143
  if (source_type or "") in external:
 
146
 
147
 
148
  def demo():
149
+ """Self-check: refusals, trust attribution, and the universal runtime seed."""
150
  seen = set()
151
 
152
  ok, why = judge("hn_top", {"title": "Denmark Requires Oral Defenses"}, seen)
 
206
  assert untrusted("outreach", {"source_url": "https://x.example"})
207
  assert not untrusted("outreach") and not untrusted("parcel")
208
 
209
+ # Every accepted signal acquires the same runtime-genome envelope regardless
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+ # of producer. Values of secret environment variables are intentionally absent.
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+ payload = {"files": ["package.json", "src/index.ts"],
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+ "capabilities": ["document.convert"],
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+ "environment": {"API_KEY": "must-never-leave-owner", "PORT": "7860"}}
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+ meta = {"source_url": "https://example.test/app"}
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+ assert judge("runtime.demo", payload, set())[0]
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+ assert untrusted("external", meta)
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+ genome = meta["runtime_genome"]
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+ assert genome["schema"] == runtime_genome.SCHEMA
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+ assert "node" in genome["runtime_families"]
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+ assert "document.convert" in genome["capabilities"]
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+ assert set(genome["env_names"]) >= {"API_KEY", "PORT"}
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+ assert "must-never-leave-owner" not in json.dumps(genome)
223
+
224
+ print("intake: ok — %d refusals modelled + runtime genome stamped" % 3)
225
 
226
 
227
  if __name__ == "__main__":