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{
"case_id": "CS13",
"chunk_index": 0,
"section": "general_information",
"location": "Soldiers Grove, Wisconsin",
"country": "USA",
"country_normalized": "United States",
"continent": "North America",
"admin_area": "Wisconsin",
"source": "Pipeline Ver2 β Soldiers Grove Floodplain Relocation",
"source_links": [
{
"title": "Pinter, N., & Rees, J. C. (2021). Assessing managed flood retreat and community relocation in the Midwest USA. Natural Hazards, 107(1), 497-518. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11069-021-04592-1",
"doi": "10.1007/s11069-021-04592-1",
"url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s11069-021-04592-1"
},
{
"title": "Pinter, N. (2021). The lost history of managed retreat and community relocation in the United States. Elementa: Science of the Anthropocene, 9(1). https://doi.org/10.1525/elementa.2021.00036",
"doi": "10.1525/elementa.2021.00036",
"url": "https://doi.org/10.1525/elementa.2021.00036"
}
],
"text": "Case study: Soldiers Grove Floodplain Relocation (Soldiers Grove, Wisconsin, USA)\nSection: GENERAL INFORMATION\n\n---\n\n### Is there any evidence of a proactive or reactive trigger in the MR decision process? (Reactive/Proactive)\n\n**Answer:** Both Reactive and Proactive elements are present, with the process evolving from a reactive trigger into a sustained proactive planning effort.\n\n**Narrative:** The Soldiers Grove case is frequently cited in the literature as an example of proactive planning, but the evidence shows a more nuanced trajectory. Reactive elements were clearly present: the village had suffered eight or more major floods along the Kickapoo River, and the July 1978 flood badly damaged the downtown and helped mobilize federal and state funding [David & Mayer, 1984; Pinter, 2021]. The business district had been inundated by nine major floods since 1907 [David & Mayer, 1984].\n\nHowever, the retreat decision itself was substantially proactive. As early as 1976 β two years before the 1978 flood β the village board had passed a resolution to seek aid for relocating the downtown, a new site had been identified and purchased [David & Mayer, 1984], and planning had begun. In 1974, the village had already obtained levee cost estimates from the Army Corps of Engineers and was weighing alternatives [David & Mayer, 1984]. As Pinter (2021) notes, by the time the 1978 flood hit, \"Soldiers Grove had committed itself to relocation and had detailed plans already on the shelf.\" The 1978 flood accelerated and enabled the project externally, but it did not create the planning decision.\n\nThe rejection of the Army Corps of Engineers' levee proposal β on the grounds that costs were three times the value of property protected, maintenance costs would equal the village's entire property tax revenue, and the levees would not lift floodplain zoning restrictions β further illustrates that the decision was driven by long-term strategic thinking, not only disaster response [David & Mayer, 1984; Pinter, 2021].\n\n**Coding rationale:** Both \"Reactive\" and \"Proactive\" apply. The external funding and political mobilization were reactive to the 1978 flood event; the planning decision and community vision were proactive, pre-dating the triggering flood.\n\n---\n\n### Date, Number of Households Affected, Number of Population Affected, Total Funding\n\n**Date:** Planning commenced ca. 1974β1976; the 1978 Kickapoo River flood was the triggering event for external funding; construction at the relocation site began in fall 1979 and the project continued through the early 1980s [David & Mayer, 1984; Pinter, 2021].\n\n**Number of households/structures affected:** Depending on the counting scheme, sources report different totals. Pinter (2021, Table 3) identifies the Soldiers Grove relocation as a partial relocation: the fire station, 2 other municipal facilities, 24 homes, and virtually the entire business district (approximately 36 commercial/business structures) were relocated. An additional 12 residences at the margins of the floodplain were elevated or flood-proofed. David & Mayer (1984) report that 64 total entities (households and businesses) were affected by the floodway vacation decision, with four municipal offices, about thirty commercial structures, two groups of upper-story apartments, and nine houses vacated in the floodway. Of the 24 households: 9 moved into existing structures in Soldiers Grove, 3 moved to new housing in the village, and 6 moved to other nearby towns. Three business owners went out of business; most others relocated within Soldiers Grove [David & Mayer, 1984].\n\n**Population affected:** The village population at the time of the 1978 flood was approximately 530 [Greer & Brokopp Binder, 2017; David & Mayer, 1984]. By 1980 (Census), the population had grown to 616 [David & Mayer, 1984]. Pinter & Rees (2021, Table 4) list a pre-relocation population of 514 and a recent population of 623, indicating post-relocation population growth consistent with the project helping retain residents; the reviewed sources do not directly measure tax-base outcomes.\n\n**Total Funding:** Pinter (2021, Table 3) provides the most complete funding breakdown, totalling approximately $6,575,131 in late-1970sβearly-1980s dollars, equivalent to approximately $27.4 million in 2020 dollars. Major sources included: U.S. HUD ($3,168,100); U.S. Department of Interior/LAWCON ($646,147); U.S. Economic Development Administration ($500,000); U.S. Community Services Administration ($40,000); Wisconsin Governor's Discretionary Fund ($167,684); Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources ($42,000); Wisconsin Department of Local Affairs & Development ($13,200); Wisconsin State Planning Office ($2,700); Regional Planning Commission ($4,000); local business owners ($3,300); and village borrowing through the Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) loans totalling approximately $1,988,000 [Pinter, 2021]. David & Mayer (1984) also reference CDBG/HUD, LAWCON, and EDA as the main federal sources, and note that CETA ($25,000) and a \"701\" planning grant ($4,000) contributed additional funds. The overall project cost for the public components of the relocation was approximately $4.1 million (1980 dollars) for relocation costs alone, with common costs adding approximately $2.9 million more [David & Mayer, 1984, Tables 2β3].\n\n---\n\n### What is the occurrence of the hazard(s) considered in the MR decision process? (Single Hazard/Multiple Hazards)\n\n**Answer:** Single Hazard β Riverine Flooding.\n\n**Narrative:** All sources consistently identify riverine flooding from the Kickapoo River as the sole hazard driving the retreat decision. The Kickapoo River's 10-, 100-, and 500-year floodplain delineations were all close together due to the hilly topography and the town's location in a low-lying oxbow [David & Mayer, 1984]. The business district had been inundated by nine major floods since 1907 [David & Mayer, 1984; Pinter & Rees, 2021]. The reviewed sources focus on riverine flooding as the driving hazard; no other hazards (e.g., wildfire, landslide, coastal erosion) are discussed in relation to the Soldiers Grove decision.\n\n---\n\n### What is the origin of the hazards considered in the MR decision process? (Technological Hazard/Natural Hazard)\n\n**Answer:** Natural Hazard.\n\n**Narrative:** The flooding resulted from natural riverine processes along the Kickapoo River. There is a reference to a proposed dam upstream (the La Farge dam) which, had it been built, would have been a structural intervention, and the cancellation of the dam project in 1977 removed a potential flood control measure [David & Mayer, 1984; Pinter, 2021]. However, the flood hazard itself is natural. The sources do not frame this as a technological or climate-change-driven hazard, though the broader managed retreat literature uses this case within climate adaptation frameworks.\n\n---\n\n### Was this hazard considered in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Riverine/Pluvial Flooding. β\n\n**Narrative:** All sources confirm the hazard was riverine flooding from the Kickapoo River. No coastal flooding, erosion, wildfire, earthquake, tsunami, hurricane, or other hazard types are discussed in relation to the Soldiers Grove decision.\n\n---\n\n### What was the geographic scale of the MR project? (Individual homes), (A few streets), (Neighbourhood), (Entire community), (Sub-watershed), (Watershed region)\n\n**Answer:** Neighbourhood / Partial Community (the floodway-located downtown business district plus approximately 24 residential units, constituting roughly half of the town's developed area).\n\n**Narrative:** Soldiers Grove is classified as a \"partial relocation\" across multiple reviewed sources [Pinter & Rees, 2021; Pinter, 2021], as distinct from \"wholesale\" town relocations such as Valmeyer or Rhineland. The relocation targeted a roughly 20-acre floodway area containing most of the downtown business district and some residences: four municipal offices, about thirty commercial structures, two groups of upper-story apartments, and nine houses [David & Mayer, 1984]. Approximately 12 additional residential properties in the flood fringe were elevated rather than relocated. The relocation site occupied approximately 190 acres purchased south of the original downtown [David & Mayer, 1984; Pinter, 2021].\n\n**Coding rationale:** \"Neighbourhood\" is the most appropriate scale, as the relocation covered the entire commercial district and adjacent residences β a defined geographic zone β but not the entire incorporated village. \"A few streets\" would understate the scope; \"Entire community\" would overstate it. Some sources characterize this as a partial community relocation.\n\n---\n\n### Who or what was retreated? (Individuals), (Groups/Neighbourhoods), (Communities), (Critical infrastructure), (Hazard protection structures), (Industrial assets)\n\n**Answer:** Groups/Neighbourhoods; Critical Infrastructure (municipal buildings, fire station).\n\n**Narrative:** The retreat involved the coordinated relocation of the entire downtown business district as a group, including commercial businesses, the fire station, municipal offices, and residential households within the floodway. The relocation was planned and implemented collectively, with the village acting as developer of the new site [David & Mayer, 1984]. Pinter (2021) emphasizes the goal of relocating the flood-prone approximately half of the town to land off the floodplain. Individual households also made independent decisions about whether to relocate within the village or to leave. Critical infrastructure β including the fire station and municipal facilities β was also explicitly relocated to the new site [David & Mayer, 1984; Pinter, 2021].\n\n---\n\n### Other Notes\n\nThe Soldiers Grove case is widely cited in the managed retreat literature as historically significant for several reasons: (1) it was one of the first U.S. cases in which a community rejected a Corps of Engineers levee proposal and chose land-use relocation instead; (2) it pioneered energy-efficient (\"solar village\") design in the new downtown; (3) it demonstrated that the costs of relocation and levee protection are comparable; and (4) it is classified as a \"partial\" rather than \"wholesale\" relocation, as not all of the community relocated [David & Mayer, 1984; Pinter, 2021; Pinter & Rees, 2021; Greer & Brokopp Binder, 2017]. A follow-up door-to-door survey conducted by Tobin (1992) approximately 10 years after the flood found that residents were generally unhappy with the move, and 70% felt the advantages of the move did not outweigh the negative outcomes, citing destruction of community sense and reduced access to social services [Greer & Brokopp Binder, 2017].\n\n---"
},
{
"case_id": "CS13",
"chunk_index": 1,
"section": "institutional_environment",
"location": "Soldiers Grove, Wisconsin",
"country": "USA",
"country_normalized": "United States",
"continent": "North America",
"admin_area": "Wisconsin",
"source": "Pipeline Ver2 β Soldiers Grove Floodplain Relocation",
"source_links": [
{
"title": "Pinter, N., & Rees, J. C. (2021). Assessing managed flood retreat and community relocation in the Midwest USA. Natural Hazards, 107(1), 497-518. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11069-021-04592-1",
"doi": "10.1007/s11069-021-04592-1",
"url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s11069-021-04592-1"
},
{
"title": "Pinter, N. (2021). The lost history of managed retreat and community relocation in the United States. Elementa: Science of the Anthropocene, 9(1). https://doi.org/10.1525/elementa.2021.00036",
"doi": "10.1525/elementa.2021.00036",
"url": "https://doi.org/10.1525/elementa.2021.00036"
}
],
"text": "Case study: Soldiers Grove Floodplain Relocation (Soldiers Grove, Wisconsin, USA)\nSection: INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT\n\n---\n\n### What is the focus or scope of the MR project? (Individual buyout/retreat), (Community buyout/retreat), (Leasebacks, easements and buffers), (Other acquisition tools), (Managed realignment of infrastructure)\n\n**Answer:** Community buyout/retreat.\n\n**Narrative:** The Soldiers Grove project was a coordinated community-level retreat of the downtown business district as a whole, rather than a series of individual buyouts. The village government acted as the implementing agency, acquired the new site collectively, extended utilities, developed infrastructure, and managed the transition of the entire commercial district [David & Mayer, 1984; Pinter, 2021]. The village used a Tax Incremental Finance (TIF) district designation to subsidize development of the relocation site. The village also zoned the relocation site as a Planned Unit Development, selling to private businesses only the land on which their buildings actually stand, while retaining public ownership of common areas [David & Mayer, 1984].\n\nIndividual buyouts were also a component: the village offered fair market value to property owners for their floodway structures, with replacement supplement payments where applicable. However, the organizing logic was collective/community-scale, not individual-household-scale.\n\n**Note on coding:** \"Managed realignment of infrastructure\" has been removed from this case's scope coding. Per the codebook, that code applies to the relocation of infrastructure *only*, without the movement of people. Soldiers Grove involved the relocation of both people and infrastructure as part of a community retreat, which is appropriately captured by \"Community buyout/retreat.\" The movement of the fire station and municipal offices was part of the broader community relocation, not a standalone infrastructure realignment.\n\n---\n\n### What legal constraints or requirements were identified during the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Relevant regulations/acts; Land acquisition; Home acquisition; Title(s) transfer; Retreat land development; Land rezoning; Compliance & enforcement.\n\n**Narrative:**\n\n- **Relevant regulations/acts:** Wisconsin floodplain zoning laws played a critical enabling role. State floodplain zoning effectively barred substantial renovation of floodway properties after major damage, by limiting spending on renovation to no more than 50% of their value [David & Mayer, 1984]. This regulation weakened the levee/rebuild-in-place option after the 1978 flood, as the rehabilitation necessary to make the business district viable would have been legally restricted in the absence of levee authorization to lift the zoning restrictions. As David & Mayer (1984) note, the proposed levees would not have lifted the state-mandated floodplain zoning restrictions, making substantial renovation of the old downtown site legally impossible under the levee alternative.\n\n- **Land acquisition:** The village board passed a resolution in 1976 to seek relocation aid and subsequently purchased approximately 190 acres for the new business district site [David & Mayer, 1984; Pinter, 2021]. The acquisition process involved multiple funding streams and extensive negotiations.\n\n- **Home/property acquisition:** The village acted as pass-through agent to purchase floodway properties from owners at fair market value, with additional replacement supplements [David & Mayer, 1984].\n\n- **Title(s) transfer:** Properties vacated in the floodway were acquired by the village; land at the new site was sold by the village to businesses (only the footprint of each building, not common areas) [David & Mayer, 1984].\n\n- **Land rezoning:** The new relocation site was zoned as a Planned Unit Development (PUD), with the village retaining public control and ownership of common areas including parking, walkways, and landscaped areas [David & Mayer, 1984].\n\n- **Retreat land development:** Vacated floodway buildings were demolished, and the land was landscaped and converted to a riverside park [David & Mayer, 1984]. Replacement supplements paid to owners were legally capped at $15,000 for residences and $50,000 for businesses under Wisconsin Statutes Chapter 32 β a general statutory limit applicable to this case [David & Mayer, 1984].\n\n- **Compliance & enforcement:** Wisconsin floodplain zoning was enforced, effectively preventing substantial renovation of flood-damaged structures in the floodway after the 1978 event, reinforcing the relocation decision.\n\n- **Note on litigation:** No litigation is mentioned in the reviewed Soldiers Grove sources in relation to the relocation itself [David & Mayer, 1984; Pinter, 2021].\n\n---\n\n### What were the funding sources for the MR project? (Local/Municipal only), (Provincial/State only), (Federal only), (Multiple funders), etc.\n\n**Answer:** Multiple Funders β Federal, State/Provincial, Local/Municipal, and private investment.\n\n**Narrative:** Funding was assembled from a wide variety of sources over several years, requiring \"laborious applications and negotiations\" with each source having its own accountability procedures [David & Mayer, 1984]. Key sources identified across reviewed sources:\n\n- **Federal:** HUD (Secretary's Discretionary Funds and Community Development Block Grants for small cities) = $3,168,100 (per Pinter, 2021) / listed as $3,406,905 in David & Mayer (1984, Table 4) reflecting different aggregations; U.S. Department of Interior/LAWCON (parks) = $646,147; U.S. Economic Development Administration = $500,000; U.S. Community Services Administration = $40,000; CETA (planning staff) = $25,000; \"701\" planning grant = $4,000; Argonne National Laboratory (energy use studies, not charged to project) [Pinter, 2021; David & Mayer, 1984].\n- **State (Wisconsin):** Governor's Discretionary Fund = $167,684; DNR = $42,000; Department of Local Affairs & Development = $13,200; State Planning Office = $2,700; University Extension = $15,900 [Pinter, 2021; David & Mayer, 1984].\n- **Local:** Village borrowing via FmHA loans (multiple tranches 1979β1983) = $1,988,000; village general funds = approximately $111,392 [Pinter, 2021; David & Mayer, 1984].\n- **Private:** Uncompensated private investment by businesses and residents building above the legal compensation maximum = $675,802 [David & Mayer, 1984].\n- **Federal loans (SBA):** Disaster recovery loans to individual businesses after the 1978 flood [David & Mayer, 1984].\n\nThe TIF district was used as an additional local financing mechanism, subsidizing site development costs and passing savings to businesses purchasing lots [David & Mayer, 1984].\n\n**Coding:** Multiple Funders β Federal, State, Local/Municipal, Individual (private investment).\n\n---\n\n### What was considered to maintain (or improve) the tax base in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Redevelopment of retreat lands; New housing for BO recipients (within-village relocation); Assisting BO recipients to find housing in community.\n\n**Narrative:** The village explicitly used the TIF district to maintain and improve its economic base [David & Mayer, 1984]. The goal of keeping businesses in the village β rather than seeing them close or relocate to other towns β was a central community objective. Most businesses did relocate within Soldiers Grove; David & Mayer (1984) note that most compensatory payments were used in the village, so the community \"captured\" the benefits. The village also aimed to retain residents: of the 24 households, the majority relocated within Soldiers Grove (either to existing or new structures) [David & Mayer, 1984].\n\nPopulation increased after relocation β from approximately 530 at the time of the 1978 flood to 616 at the 1980 Census [David & Mayer, 1984], and subsequently to 623 per Pinter & Rees (2021, Table 4) β which is consistent with the project helping retain residents, although the reviewed sources do not directly measure tax-base outcomes.\n\nVacated floodway land was converted to park space, which, while not a direct tax revenue source, contributed to community amenity [David & Mayer, 1984].\n\nPinter (2021) notes that the difficulty of transitioning businesses from the old town to the new site is \"a persistent flaw in all recent U.S. relocations.\" However, in Soldiers Grove, David & Mayer (1984) report that while three business owners went out of business and eight more either had not made firm relocation plans or were expected to leave town, all but four of the other twenty-five businesses relocated within Soldiers Grove, and those four were in nearby towns.\n\n---\n\n### What level/type of compensation mechanisms were considered in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Market value; Additional incentives, bonuses and top-ups; Free supports and services.\n\n**Narrative:**\n\n- **Market value:** Property owners in the floodway were offered the fair market value of their buildings. However, David & Mayer (1984) note the difficulty of establishing fair market value for floodway buildings given there were no comparable non-flooded properties, since virtually the entire business district was in the floodway. Values were estimated using appraisal techniques based on construction costs for comparable structures.\n\n- **Additional incentives/top-ups:** A \"replacement supplement\" was provided to bridge the gap between fair market value (the dilapidated structure's value) and the cost of obtaining a comparable structure outside the floodplain [David & Mayer, 1984]. These supplements were legally capped at $15,000 for residences and $50,000 for businesses under Wisconsin Statutes Chapter 32 β a general statutory limit applied in this case [David & Mayer, 1984]. For residential properties, the total relocation cost included $85,284 in fair market value + $92,282 in replacement supplement. For commercial properties: $1,048,404 fair market value + $1,394,972 in replacement supplements + $639,352 in uncompensated improvements by owners [David & Mayer, 1984, Table 5].\n\n- **Free supports and services:** Moving and legal costs were included in the acquisition payments [David & Mayer, 1984].\n\n- **Solar design requirements and individual incentives:** The village required all new buildings at the relocation site to be thermally efficient and heated with at least 50% solar energy. One business owner also obtained 1980 state rebates and federal tax credits for using innovative solar heating and energy conservation designs in the new building [David & Mayer, 1984]. This reflects design requirements and individual financing rather than a general village energy-grant program.\n\n- **Note:** SBA disaster recovery loans were also available to businesses after the 1978 flood, providing low-interest financing for equipment replacement [David & Mayer, 1984]. Some business owners voluntarily invested additional funds beyond the legal compensation maximum to improve their new premises.\n\n---"
},
{
"case_id": "CS13",
"chunk_index": 2,
"section": "planning_processes",
"location": "Soldiers Grove, Wisconsin",
"country": "USA",
"country_normalized": "United States",
"continent": "North America",
"admin_area": "Wisconsin",
"source": "Pipeline Ver2 β Soldiers Grove Floodplain Relocation",
"source_links": [
{
"title": "Pinter, N., & Rees, J. C. (2021). Assessing managed flood retreat and community relocation in the Midwest USA. Natural Hazards, 107(1), 497-518. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11069-021-04592-1",
"doi": "10.1007/s11069-021-04592-1",
"url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s11069-021-04592-1"
},
{
"title": "Pinter, N. (2021). The lost history of managed retreat and community relocation in the United States. Elementa: Science of the Anthropocene, 9(1). https://doi.org/10.1525/elementa.2021.00036",
"doi": "10.1525/elementa.2021.00036",
"url": "https://doi.org/10.1525/elementa.2021.00036"
}
],
"text": "Case study: Soldiers Grove Floodplain Relocation (Soldiers Grove, Wisconsin, USA)\nSection: PLANNING PROCESSES\n\n---\n\n### What is the time horizon considered in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Pre-retreat planning; Immediate risks (1β5 years); Anticipated future risks (10β100 years); Post-retreat follow-up (limited).\n\n**Narrative:**\n\n- **Pre-retreat planning:** Extensive. The village board passed a relocation resolution in 1976 and purchased the new site before the 1978 flood [David & Mayer, 1984]. Cost comparisons between levees and relocation were conducted (the core analysis in David & Mayer, 1984). Plans were on the shelf before the triggering flood event [Pinter, 2021].\n\n- **Immediate risks (1β5 years):** The 1978 flood created urgent conditions. Funding was mobilized through presidential disaster declarations, a Kickapoo Valley Presidential Task Force, and federal/state negotiations [David & Mayer, 1984].\n\n- **Anticipated future risks (10β100 years):** The cost comparison explicitly considered the 100-year flood protection standard and 100-year maintenance costs for levees versus relocation. Residents were concerned about the cost of levee maintenance \"over their estimated 100-year life\" and about continued deterioration if flooding persisted [David & Mayer, 1984]. The village's concern about residual risk from floods exceeding the 100-year standard under levees was a key argument for relocation [David & Mayer, 1984].\n\n- **Post-retreat follow-up:** Post-relocation outcomes are documented in Pinter & Rees (2021) and Pinter (2021) through population and real-estate trend analyses. Tobin (1992) (cited in Greer & Brokopp Binder, 2017) conducted a door-to-door survey approximately 10 years after the flood. However, formal post-retreat monitoring or follow-up programs as part of the MR process itself are not described in the reviewed sources.\n\n---\n\n### What planning elements were considered in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Cost-benefit analysis (CBA); Top-down (state/federal policy framework); Bottom-up (community-led decision); Multi-sectoral; Coordination with other sectors and jurisdictions; Multi-stage retreat (phased implementation); Participatory/collaborative.\n\n**Narrative:**\n\n- **Cost-benefit analysis:** David & Mayer (1984) present a detailed comparative cost analysis of levee protection versus relocation, including net present value calculations of levee construction, maintenance, and pump replacement costs versus relocation, compensation, and site development costs. This economic analysis was central to the decision-making process.\n\n- **Bottom-up:** The village board and community leadership initiated and drove the relocation decision. The village actively lobbied state and federal representatives rather than simply accepting federal direction [David & Mayer, 1984; Pinter, 2021]. Senators Proxmire and Nelson were mobilized through community advocacy. Pinter (2021) quotes a resident articulating the community's philosophical rejection of the levee option.\n\n- **Top-down:** Federal and state funding requirements, CDBG program rules, Wisconsin floodplain zoning statutes, and Army Corps of Engineers project authorization all shaped the planning environment [David & Mayer, 1984; Greer & Brokopp Binder, 2017].\n\n- **Multi-sectoral:** Funding and planning involved HUD, EDA, LAWCON (Department of Interior), CETA (employment), USDA/FmHA, SBA, state agencies (DNR, Governor's office, planning), the village government, local businesses, and individual residents [David & Mayer, 1984; Pinter, 2021].\n\n- **Coordination with other sectors and jurisdictions:** A dedicated Kickapoo Valley Presidential Task Force was formed, with key U.S. Senate committee chairs providing coordinating leadership [David & Mayer, 1984].\n\n- **Multi-stage retreat:** Implementation was phased over multiple years (construction began fall 1979 and continued through the early 1980s), with different structures and infrastructure components completed at different times [David & Mayer, 1984].\n\n- **Participatory/collaborative:** The village board and residents engaged in sustained lobbying and deliberation, and community development staff (Tom Hirsch) played a central role in mobilizing support and coordinating between agencies [David & Mayer, 1984].\n\n**Note on removed codes:** \"Adaptive management\" has been removed from the coding. While the planning team \"saw and took advantage of opportunities as they arose\" [David & Mayer, 1984], this does not amount to adaptive management as defined in the codebook β a flexible strategy adjusted over time based on monitoring and feedback. No explicit monitoring-feedback adjustment framework is described in the reviewed sources. \"Degree of transparency\" has also been removed: while the sources show advocacy and negotiation, the reviewed sources do not describe a structured transparency mechanism or clear, accessible communication of decision criteria to the affected community.\n\n---\n\n### What decision support tools were used in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** CBA; Hazard maps & models; Housing assessment.\n\n**Narrative:**\n\n- **CBA:** A detailed cost comparison between the levee alternative and the relocation alternative was conducted, constituting the analytical heart of David & Mayer (1984). This included federal levee cost estimates, local maintenance cost projections, fair market value assessments for floodway properties, relocation site development costs, and analysis of secondary economic benefits.\n\n- **Hazard maps & models:** Floodway and flood fringe delineations were used to define which properties were subject to acquisition [David & Mayer, 1984, Figures 1β3]. Army Corps of Engineers design memoranda provided flood frequency and damage estimates. Post-hoc flood-loss modeling using FEMA's Hazus software was conducted by Pinter & Rees (2021).\n\n- **Housing assessment:** Appraisal of existing floodway properties was conducted to establish fair market value. Standard appraisal techniques modified by flood damage conditions were used [David & Mayer, 1984].\n\n- **Note on process guidance:** David & Mayer (1984) explicitly note that \"Soldiers Grove followed no comprehensive planning manual.\" This represents the *absence* of formal process guidance as a decision support tool; the planning team \"saw and took advantage of opportunities as they arose.\" This is recorded as a limiting condition rather than a support tool.\n\n---\n\n### What planning measures were taken for receiving areas in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Identifying priority areas; Construction of new housing; Individuals vs. neighbourhoods/communities (neighbourhood-level receiving area planning).\n\n**Narrative:** The village government proactively identified and purchased approximately 190 acres for the new relocation site approximately 800 metres south of the original downtown, before the triggering flood [David & Mayer, 1984; Pinter, 2021]. The site was planned as a Planned Unit Development with designated commercial, residential, and common areas. New roads, sewers, water supply, power, telephone, cable TV, and fire protection capacity were constructed to serve the new site [David & Mayer, 1984].\n\nThe receiving area planning was explicitly oriented toward maintaining the community's commercial character. Businesses were offered lots at the new site, with common areas maintained by the village. The village also accepted that some residents and businesses would relocate to existing structures within Soldiers Grove rather than the new site, and some would move to nearby towns β all within the framework of community-level coordination.\n\nNo evidence of social carrying capacity assessment or demographic projections for the receiving area is found in the reviewed sources.\n\n---\n\n### What uses were planned for retreat lands?\n\n**Answer:** Natural use; Demolition/infrastructure removal; Planting/landscaping; Site design & restoration; Multi-purpose use; Rezoning; Reducing/eliminating servicing; Ownership transfer; Maintenance.\n\n**Narrative:** David & Mayer (1984) describe the vacated floodway as being razed and landscaped into a riverside park: \"Vacated buildings in the floodplain are being razed so that the corridor can be landscaped and turned into a riverside park.\" Federal LAWCON funds (Land and Water Conservation Fund) supported park development at the old business district site [David & Mayer, 1984; Pinter, 2021].\n\nThe village maintained public control of the vacated corridor. Common areas including parking, walkways, and landscaping were built through a community development program [David & Mayer, 1984]. Pinter & Rees (2021) confirm that for most relocation towns (including Soldiers Grove after the 1978 flood), renewed development on the floodplain was prevented. Soldiers Grove saw no new floodway development.\n\nSome residential properties in the flood fringe (rather than floodway) were elevated rather than removed, with floodproofing on fill [David & Mayer, 1984].\n\nFloodway properties were acquired by the village from private owners (ownership transfer), and utilities were not extended to the vacated floodway area (reducing/eliminating servicing). \"Conservation land trust\" is not mentioned specifically. \"Commemoration\" is not mentioned.\n\n---"
},
{
"case_id": "CS13",
"chunk_index": 3,
"section": "community_engagement",
"location": "Soldiers Grove, Wisconsin",
"country": "USA",
"country_normalized": "United States",
"continent": "North America",
"admin_area": "Wisconsin",
"source": "Pipeline Ver2 β Soldiers Grove Floodplain Relocation",
"source_links": [
{
"title": "Pinter, N., & Rees, J. C. (2021). Assessing managed flood retreat and community relocation in the Midwest USA. Natural Hazards, 107(1), 497-518. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11069-021-04592-1",
"doi": "10.1007/s11069-021-04592-1",
"url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s11069-021-04592-1"
},
{
"title": "Pinter, N. (2021). The lost history of managed retreat and community relocation in the United States. Elementa: Science of the Anthropocene, 9(1). https://doi.org/10.1525/elementa.2021.00036",
"doi": "10.1525/elementa.2021.00036",
"url": "https://doi.org/10.1525/elementa.2021.00036"
}
],
"text": "Case study: Soldiers Grove Floodplain Relocation (Soldiers Grove, Wisconsin, USA)\nSection: COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT\n\n---\n\n### What degree of choice was provided to affected people in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Voluntary with incentives or future restrictions.\n\n**Narrative:** All reviewed sources treat the Soldiers Grove relocation as voluntary in the sense that individual property owners were offered buyouts rather than subjected to forced acquisition. The requirement that buyout programs be voluntary β prohibiting eminent domain β is a baseline federal requirement discussed generally by Greer & Brokopp Binder (2017) in the context of U.S. buyout policy, though this general federal policy did not apply to Soldiers Grove through HMGP, as Soldiers Grove predates that program. Soldiers Grove's funding was primarily through HUD, FmHA, and other federal and state sources rather than HMGP [David & Mayer, 1984; Pinter, 2021].\n\nHowever, the choice was not entirely free. Wisconsin floodplain zoning laws effectively barred substantial renovation of floodway properties after major damage, which weakened the rebuild-in-place option [David & Mayer, 1984]. This regulatory constraint, combined with the financial incentives of replacement supplement payments and the community-wide decision to relocate, created a context of \"voluntary with incentives or future restrictions.\"\n\nThe community-level decision β made by the village board β to pursue relocation was itself a form of collective choice that shaped individual options. Pinter (2021) notes that the 1978 flood created urgent conditions in which most residents accepted the village's relocation framework.\n\n---\n\n### What land user groups were involved or considered in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Homeowners; Renters; Commercial; Government.\n\n**Narrative:** The affected population included both residential homeowners (24 households in the floodway, plus 12 in the flood fringe) and commercial property owners/business operators (approximately 25β33 businesses in the floodway) [David & Mayer,"
}
] |