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{
"case_id": "CS14",
"chunk_index": 0,
"section": "general_information",
"location": "Simbach am Inn, Bavaria",
"country": "Germany",
"country_normalized": "Germany",
"continent": "Europe",
"admin_area": "Bavaria",
"source": "Pipeline Ver2 — Simbach am Inn Household Relocation",
"source_links": [
{
"title": "Wolff, C., Bade, F., & Kraan, C. M. (2026). Insights From Managed Retreat Projects in Europe. Earth's Future, 14(3). https://doi.org/10.1029/2025ef007012",
"doi": "10.1029/2025ef007012",
"url": "https://doi.org/10.1029/2025ef007012"
},
{
"title": "Schürr, A., Elbel, J., Hieronimi, A., Auer, I., Coenen, M., & Böse-O'Reilly, S. (2023). Mental health in adolescents after experiencing a flood event in Bavaria, Germany—A qualitative interview study. Frontiers in Public Health, 11. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpubh.2023.1210072",
"doi": "10.3389/fpubh.2023.1210072",
"url": "https://doi.org/10.3389/fpubh.2023.1210072"
}
],
"text": "Case study: Simbach am Inn Household Relocation (Simbach am Inn, Bavaria, Germany)\nSection: General Information\n\n---\n\n### Is there any evidence of a proactive or reactive trigger in the MR decision process? (Reactive/Proactive)\n\n**Answer:** Primarily Reactive, with pre-existing flood-risk management frameworks that provided institutional context.\n\n**Narrative:** The managed retreat in Simbach am Inn was triggered reactively by the catastrophic flood event of June 1, 2016. The flood caused five fatalities, made approximately 1,000 people homeless, destroyed or severely damaged numerous buildings, and inundated approximately 1.7 km² of the town [Mayr et al., 2020; Rimböck et al., 2018]. The relocation process began immediately after the June 2016 flood, and Mayr et al. (2020) characterize this as occurring in a post-disaster \"window of opportunity,\" with the WMA (Water Management Agency) contacting affected property owners only days after the event.\n\nNo pre-event relocation strategy for Simbach is described in the sources, although broader flood-risk management frameworks already existed. The Bavarian Action Program 2020plus had articulated an integrated flood risk management framework prior to the event [Mayr et al., 2020], and because the Simbach torrent was a developed third-order waterbody, the Bavarian State shared responsibility for maintenance and flood-protection works [Mayr et al., 2020]. The new flood-defense design incorporated a 15% climate-change adaptation factor, which was standard Bavarian practice introduced in 2004 [Mayr et al., 2020]. These represent pre-existing technical and regulatory frameworks, not proactive planning for the specific relocation.\n\nWolff et al. (2026) describe Simbach as a reactive case in which authorities quickly proposed relocation measures after the flood, with the emotional impact of the disaster fostering community support and highlighting the importance of timing in community acceptance.\n\n**Category selected:** Primarily **Reactive**. Pre-existing flood-risk management frameworks and technical standards provided institutional context, but the specific relocation decisions were clearly reactive with no pre-event planned relocation strategy for Simbach.\n\n---\n\n### Date, Number of Households Affected, Number of Population Affected, Total Funding\n\n**Answer:**\n- **Date of flood event:** June 1, 2016\n- **Date of relocation:** 2016–2018 (planning and implementation period)\n- **Households relocated:** 11 households [Mayr et al., 2020; Wolff et al., 2026]\n- **Population affected (town):** Simbach am Inn has approximately 9,800 inhabitants [Schürr et al., 2023]; approximately 1,000 people were made homeless by the event [Mayr et al., 2020]\n- **People evacuated during the flood event:** At least 670 [Schürr et al., 2023] — this is an event-response figure, not a managed retreat outcome\n- **Total funding:** No precise total funding figure for the Simbach-specific MR intervention is reported in the reviewed sources. From 1965 to 2013, 32 million euros were invested in dismantling developed areas in inundation land across Bavaria more broadly [Mayr et al., 2020]. The Bavarian State funded buyouts and demolition; EU subsidiarity funding supported reconstruction [Mayr et al., 2020]. In Simbach, the local municipality did not contribute to the relocation buyout costs [Mayr et al., 2020].\n\n**Uncertainty:** Exact total funding figures for the Simbach-specific MR intervention are not reported in the reviewed sources.\n\n---\n\n### What is the occurrence of the hazard(s) considered in the MR decision process? (Single Hazard/Multiple Hazards)\n\n**Answer:** Single Hazard (extreme riverine/torrential flooding).\n\n**Narrative:** The hazard driving the managed retreat was a single extreme flood event on the Simbach torrent on June 1, 2016. The event involved heavy rainfall (183.5 mm of precipitation in the catchment), failure of a road embankment (Schulstraße culvert/dam), and dyke breach, which together resulted in peak discharge estimated at 280 m³/s — far exceeding the 100-year design flood of 60 m³/s [Rimböck et al., 2018; Mayr et al., 2020]. Although structural failures amplified the event, these are considered part of the same flood hazard cascade. No evidence of separate, independent hazard types (e.g., coastal flooding, wildfire, earthquake) was found.\n\n**Category selected:** **Single Hazard** (extreme riverine/torrential flooding, with cascading structural failures as part of the same event).\n\n---\n\n### What is the origin of the hazards considered in the MR decision process? (Technological Hazard/Natural Hazard)\n\n**Answer:** Natural Hazard, with contributing anthropogenic/structural factors.\n\n**Narrative:** The primary hazard is natural — extreme rainfall and resulting flash flooding of the Simbach torrent. Rimböck et al. (2018) describe the rainfall as having a return period exceeding 100 years, with specific meteorological and hydrological conditions (cell movement downstream, concentrated rainfall, agricultural surface runoff) as key drivers. The failure of structural measures (a road dam/culvert and a dyke) amplified the event. Media discussion raised agricultural land use and runoff as possible contributing factors, but the event was primarily a natural flood [Rimböck et al., 2018]. The climate change context is acknowledged: Bavarian construction standards incorporate a 15% climate change adaptation factor [Mayr et al., 2020].\n\n**Category selected:** **Natural Hazard**, with contributing structural and land-use factors and acknowledged climate change context.\n\n---\n\n### Was this hazard considered in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Riverine/torrential flooding triggered by extreme rainfall.\n\n**Narrative:** The Simbach torrent is classified as a surface water of third order under the German river classification system, with torrent-specific characteristics. The flooding was driven by extreme rainfall causing sudden and extreme flash flooding of the urban channel, combined with structural failures [Rimböck et al., 2018; Mayr et al., 2020]. Sources consistently describe this as riverine/torrential flooding.\n\n**Category selected:** **Riverine/Pluvial Flooding** (specifically flash/torrential urban flooding). No evidence of coastal, lake, wildfire, volcano, landslide, earthquake, tsunami, or hurricane hazards.\n\n---\n\n### What was the geographic scale of the MR project? (Individual homes, A few streets, Neighbourhood, Entire community, Sub-watershed, Watershed region)\n\n**Answer:** Individual Homes in a localized riverbank corridor.\n\n**Narrative:** The managed retreat involved the acquisition and demolition of 11 individual households located near the riverbank in the town center, plus the purchase of additional land slots [Mayr et al., 2020]. This constitutes a small-scale, targeted intervention affecting specific properties along the Simbach torrent channel, not a neighbourhood-wide or community-wide relocation. The affected properties were concentrated along a corridor defined by the new flood defense scheme requirements.\n\n**Category selected:** **Individual Homes** in a localized riverbank corridor. Not a neighbourhood or community-scale retreat.\n\n---\n\n### Who or what was retreated? (Individuals, Groups/Neighbourhoods, Communities, Critical infrastructure, Hazard protection structures, Industrial assets)\n\n**Answer:** Homeowners/households, with some adjacent land parcels also acquired.\n\n**Narrative:** Eleven households (homeowners) were purchased from willing sellers and relocated. Additional land slots adjacent to the properties were also acquired. The retreat was not a group or community relocation — households were approached individually, and decisions were made on a household-by-household basis [Mayr et al., 2020].\n\n**Category selected:** **Individuals/Homeowners** (households). No evidence of community, critical infrastructure, or industrial asset retreat as part of the MR program.\n\n---\n\n### Other Notes\n\nThe Simbach case is notable as a small-scale, post-disaster managed retreat embedded within a larger structural flood protection scheme. The relocation of 11 households was not an end in itself but was necessitated by the spatial requirements of the improved flood defense infrastructure. A secondary goal emerged in the local community: the redesign of the vacated riverine area as a public green/recreational space. This multi-objective framing (risk reduction + recreational amenity) is a distinctive feature of the case [Mayr et al., 2020].\n\n---"
},
{
"case_id": "CS14",
"chunk_index": 1,
"section": "institutional_environment",
"location": "Simbach am Inn, Bavaria",
"country": "Germany",
"country_normalized": "Germany",
"continent": "Europe",
"admin_area": "Bavaria",
"source": "Pipeline Ver2 — Simbach am Inn Household Relocation",
"source_links": [
{
"title": "Wolff, C., Bade, F., & Kraan, C. M. (2026). Insights From Managed Retreat Projects in Europe. Earth's Future, 14(3). https://doi.org/10.1029/2025ef007012",
"doi": "10.1029/2025ef007012",
"url": "https://doi.org/10.1029/2025ef007012"
},
{
"title": "Schürr, A., Elbel, J., Hieronimi, A., Auer, I., Coenen, M., & Böse-O'Reilly, S. (2023). Mental health in adolescents after experiencing a flood event in Bavaria, Germany—A qualitative interview study. Frontiers in Public Health, 11. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpubh.2023.1210072",
"doi": "10.3389/fpubh.2023.1210072",
"url": "https://doi.org/10.3389/fpubh.2023.1210072"
}
],
"text": "Case study: Simbach am Inn Household Relocation (Simbach am Inn, Bavaria, Germany)\nSection: Institutional Environment\n\n---\n\n### What is the focus or scope of the MR project? (Individual buyout/retreat, Community buyout/retreat, Leasebacks, easements and buffers, Other acquisition tools, Managed realignment of infrastructure)\n\n**Answer:** Individual buyout/retreat, closely linked to managed realignment of infrastructure (flood defense reconstruction).\n\n**Narrative:** The MR program was structured as individual property buyouts from willing sellers. The WMA (Water Management Agency Deggendorf) negotiated with each affected property owner separately, offering compensation based on pre-damage market value assessed by an independent appraiser [Mayr et al., 2020]. The buyouts were legally voluntary — relocation by law takes place on a voluntary basis in Bavaria — though for some owners no practical option to rebuild in place remained, given that rebuilding was precluded in the acquisition zone.\n\nThe buyout was directly tied to the managed realignment of flood defense infrastructure — specifically, the expansion of the torrent's cross-section, relocation of dykes, and construction of new walls and protective structures to achieve a 1:100 flood protection standard [Mayr et al., 2020].\n\n**Category selected:** **Individual buyout/retreat** and **Managed realignment of infrastructure** (the two are inseparable in this case).\n\n---\n\n### What legal constraints or requirements were identified during the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Relevant regulations/acts, legal authority over retreat, home acquisition, land acquisition, title(s) transfer, retreat land development.\n\n**Narrative:** The legal framework governing the Simbach relocation is detailed in Mayr et al. (2020):\n\n- **Federal Water Act 2009 (Wasserhaushaltsgesetz, WHG):** The primary national water management act. Section §72–78 deals with flood risk alleviation, including risk assessment, hazard maps, and management plans. It also provides legal tools such as expropriation, though this was not used in Simbach. Pre-emptive purchase rights are assigned to responsible authorities for areas needed for mitigation measures.\n- **Bavarian Federal Water Act 2010 (BayWG):** Implements the federal act at state level; defines responsibilities for flood protection construction, funding, and maintenance. Because the Simbach is a developed torrent partly in the city center, the Bavarian State shared responsibility for maintenance and flood-protection works [Mayr et al., 2020].\n- **German Spatial Planning Act (ROG) 2008 and Bavarian equivalents:** Require inundation areas to be kept free from buildings; regional plans are legally binding on municipalities.\n- **German Building Code 2017 (BauGB):** Requires municipalities to integrate inundation areas into land-use plans; legal restrictions in flood zones can affect building activities.\n- **EU Floods Directive (2007/60/EC):** Requires hazard and risk mapping and prescribes stakeholder involvement in flood risk management.\n- **Legal authority:** The WMA Deggendorf held the main planning responsibility. The Bavarian State was the project carrier. Expropriation was a legal option but was deliberately avoided; all purchases were voluntary [Mayr et al., 2020].\n- **Compensation:** Under standard Bavarian procedures, the government pays compensation of 65% of property value; in Simbach, compensation was based on pre-damage market value assessed by an independent state-appointed appraiser — described as a mean between the post-damage value and reconstruction value [Mayr et al., 2020].\n\n**Uncertainty:** No evidence of litigation in this case. No evidence of formal rezoning being applied to the vacated lands beyond planning designations already established under existing water management law.\n\n**Categories selected:** **Legal authority over retreat**, **Relevant regulations/acts** (WHG, BayWG, ROG, BauGB, EU Floods Directive), **Home acquisition**, **Land acquisition**, **Title(s) transfer**, **Retreat land development** (redesign as recreational area).\n\n---\n\n### What were the funding sources for the MR project? (Multiple funders)\n\n**Answer:** Multiple funders — primarily Bavarian State (provincial/state level), with European Union subsidiarity fund support for reconstruction.\n\n**Narrative:** The State of Bavaria was the project carrier and primary funder. The Bavarian State Ministry for the Environment and Consumer Protection (STMUV) had overall financial management of investments. The WMA Deggendorf was responsible for planning and construction on behalf of the state. The Bavarian State funded buyouts and demolition; EU subsidiarity funding supported reconstruction [Mayr et al., 2020]. In Simbach, the local municipality did not contribute to the relocation buyout costs [Mayr et al., 2020].\n\nA policy change in July 2019 in Bavarian governmental financial damage funding made state funding unavailable where damage is insurable by natural hazard insurance [Mayr et al., 2020]. This is broader Bavarian context, not specific to the Simbach MR process.\n\n**Category selected:** **Multiple funders** — specifically **Provincial/State** (Bavarian State as primary funder for buyouts and demolition) and **International aid** (EU subsidiarity fund supporting reconstruction). Local/municipal contribution to relocation costs: none confirmed [Mayr et al., 2020].\n\n---\n\n### What was considered to maintain (or improve) the tax base in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Redevelopment of retreat lands (as recreational green space).\n\n**Narrative:** The vacated land along the Simbach was redesigned as a public green/recreational area in the city center [Mayr et al., 2020]. Wolff et al. (2026) note that combining technical flood defense with landscape and urban planning in Simbach resulted in multifunctional spaces that serve as recreational hubs for the community. This was initiated by municipal actors as a secondary goal alongside flood risk reduction. However, the reviewed sources do not explicitly discuss tax base maintenance as a stated objective; the redevelopment is framed primarily as a community amenity and flood risk benefit.\n\n**Category selected:** **Redevelopment of retreat lands** (as recreational area). No direct evidence for new industry, new housing for buyout recipients, livelihood supports, or explicit tax base preservation strategies as stated MR goals.\n\n---\n\n### What level/type of compensation mechanisms were considered in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Market value (pre-damage), with state coverage of demolition costs.\n\n**Narrative:** Compensation in Simbach was calculated based on the pre-damage market value of the properties, described as \"a 'mean' between the actual value after the flood damage and the reconstruction value, money that is needed to reconstruct the building as it was before damage\" [Mayr et al., 2020, Interview 5, 2018]. The appraisal was conducted by a public, independent, state-appointed appraiser [Mayr et al., 2020].\n\nDemolition costs were covered by the state, and compensation was based on pre-damage market value. The article also notes that under standard Bavarian practice, land may remain with the owner [Mayr et al., 2020]; however, some land slots were also purchased as part of the acquisition process. One interviewee reported that approximately half of flood victims accepted the buyout offer immediately upon presentation [Mayr et al., 2020, Interview 5, 2018]. No time limit was set for final decisions.\n\nThe reviewed sources do not describe additional bonuses, moving-cost reimbursements, or other financial incentives beyond the appraisal-based compensation in Simbach. The WMA's real estate department provided personalized communication and negotiation support.\n\n**Category selected:** **Market value** (pre-damage market value, assessed by independent appraiser) and **Free supports and services** (demolition costs covered by state). No evidence of post-disaster value, tax value, or additional financial incentives beyond the appraisal-based compensation.\n\n---"
},
{
"case_id": "CS14",
"chunk_index": 2,
"section": "planning_processes",
"location": "Simbach am Inn, Bavaria",
"country": "Germany",
"country_normalized": "Germany",
"continent": "Europe",
"admin_area": "Bavaria",
"source": "Pipeline Ver2 — Simbach am Inn Household Relocation",
"source_links": [
{
"title": "Wolff, C., Bade, F., & Kraan, C. M. (2026). Insights From Managed Retreat Projects in Europe. Earth's Future, 14(3). https://doi.org/10.1029/2025ef007012",
"doi": "10.1029/2025ef007012",
"url": "https://doi.org/10.1029/2025ef007012"
},
{
"title": "Schürr, A., Elbel, J., Hieronimi, A., Auer, I., Coenen, M., & Böse-O'Reilly, S. (2023). Mental health in adolescents after experiencing a flood event in Bavaria, Germany—A qualitative interview study. Frontiers in Public Health, 11. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpubh.2023.1210072",
"doi": "10.3389/fpubh.2023.1210072",
"url": "https://doi.org/10.3389/fpubh.2023.1210072"
}
],
"text": "Case study: Simbach am Inn Household Relocation (Simbach am Inn, Bavaria, Germany)\nSection: Planning Processes\n\n---\n\n### What is the time horizon considered in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Pre-retreat planning, Immediate risks (1–5 years), and post-retreat follow-up.\n\n**Narrative:** The planning process began immediately after the June 2016 flood event. The WMA contacted property owners within days of the disaster, and planning for the improved flood defense scheme and associated property acquisition began promptly. The overall planning and implementation process took more than two years (approximately 2016–2018) [Mayr et al., 2020; Wolff et al., 2026].\n\nThe risk addressed was immediate — existing structures in the zone were severely damaged and at demonstrable risk from future floods. The new flood defense scheme was designed to protect against a 1:100 flood event, incorporating a 15% climate change adaptation factor as standard Bavarian practice [Mayr et al., 2020].\n\nSome post-retreat follow-up is evidenced by: the Red Cross providing psychological support for up to two years after the event; ongoing community engagement through assemblies and workshops; and academic study by Mayr et al. (2020) itself serving as post-event evaluation. Schürr et al. (2023) followed up with adolescents six years after the flood, documenting ongoing mental health effects.\n\n**Category selected:** **Pre-retreat planning**, **Immediate risks (1–5 years)**, and **Post-retreat follow-up** (psychosocial support, academic evaluation). The 15% climate change adaptation factor in flood-defense design standards addresses anticipated future conditions [Mayr et al., 2020].\n\n---\n\n### What planning elements were considered in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Top-down, multi-sectoral, coordination with other sectors and jurisdictions, single-stage retreat, degree of transparency, participatory/collaborative (limited; consultative only), adaptive management.\n\n**Narrative:**\n\n- **Top-down:** The planning process was \"largely organized in a top-down manner\" — the WMA designed and approved the risk mitigation strategy and compensation scheme; the Bavarian State made main decisions [Mayr et al., 2020].\n- **Multi-sectoral:** Multiple disciplines and actors were involved: water management, landscape planning, urban planning, insurance, real estate, civil protection, and academic expertise (BOKU Vienna) [Mayr et al., 2020].\n- **Coordination with other sectors and jurisdictions:** Collaboration across Bavarian state, federal district, WMA, LfU (Bavarian Environment Agency), municipal level, and academic partners [Mayr et al., 2020].\n- **Single-stage retreat:** 11 households were addressed through one planning/implementation cycle, not phased over time.\n- **Degree of transparency:** Explicitly emphasized — planning could not be elaborated \"behind closed doors\"; documents were made available online; citizen assemblies were held [Mayr et al., 2020].\n- **Participatory/collaborative (limited; consultative only):** Five citizen assemblies, expert workshops on specific policy fields, and individual meetings were held. However, public participation was restricted — citizens could give feedback only after the draft flood alleviation scheme was elaborated; participative co-development of technical concepts with citizens was not possible [Mayr et al., 2020].\n- **Adaptive management:** The area demand for structural measures was enlarged during the ongoing planning process based on recalculations; technical concepts were adapted accordingly [Mayr et al., 2020].\n\n**Categories selected:** **Top-down**, **Multi-sectoral**, **Coordination with other sectors and jurisdictions**, **Single-stage retreat** (single relocation cycle), **Degree of transparency**, **Participatory/collaborative** (limited; consultative only), **Adaptive management**. Not coded: CBA (no formal cost-benefit analysis described in sources — the buyout was driven by spatial necessity for defense works, not documented economic optimization), MCDA, Public-private partnerships, Bureaucracy reduction, Multi-stage retreat.\n\n---\n\n### What decision support tools were used in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Hazard maps & models, housing assessment, process guidance, CC projection models (limited).\n\n**Narrative:**\n\n- **Hazard maps & models:** The WMA used hydrological and hydraulic modeling (1D and 2D simulations) to determine discharge volumes, inundation areas, and structural requirements. BOKU Vienna conducted the detailed event documentation and analysis [Rimböck et al., 2018; Mayr et al., 2020]. EU Floods Directive requirements for hazard and risk maps were pre-existing.\n- **Housing assessment:** An independent state-appointed appraiser assessed the value of each damaged property as the basis for compensation [Mayr et al., 2020].\n- **Process guidance:** The Bavarian Action Program 2020plus provided an overarching integrated flood risk management framework. A handbook for decision-makers on private relocation from flood risk areas (Seebauer et al., 2018) is cited as a relevant resource [Mayr et al., 2020].\n- **CC projection models (limited):** A 15% climate change adaptation factor was incorporated into the new flood defense design as standard Bavarian practice since 2004 [Mayr et al., 2020]; this represents a simple additive design factor rather than full CC scenario modeling.\n\n**Categories selected:** **Hazard maps & models**, **Housing assessment**, **Process guidance**, **CC projection models** (limited, via design factor). No evidence of: formal CBA, MCDA, demographic projections, social vulnerability assessments, socioeconomic projections, or new site evaluation process.\n\n---\n\n### What planning measures were taken for receiving areas in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Limited evidence; household-level relocation with individuals finding housing independently.\n\n**Narrative:** The reviewed sources provide little information about specific planning measures for receiving areas. The relocation was at the household scale, and residents received financial compensation to enable independent relocation. No time limit was set for final decisions, and the process allowed for individual discourse [Mayr et al., 2020]. There is no evidence of the authorities identifying priority receiving areas, constructing new housing, assessing availability of existing housing in receiving areas, or evaluating social carrying capacity.\n\nThe case involved only 11 households, reducing the scale of receiving-area planning challenges. The compensation payment was intended to enable households to purchase or build elsewhere independently.\n\n**Categories selected:** **Individuals vs. neighbourhoods/communities** (individual household-level relocation). No evidence of: identifying priority areas, construction of new housing, availability of existing housing assessment, social carrying capacity assessment.\n\n**Note:** This is an area of limited evidence in the reviewed sources.\n\n---\n\n### What uses were planned for retreat lands?\n\n**Answer:** Multi-purpose use (recreational green space and flood defense), demolition/infrastructure removal, site design & restoration, planting/landscaping, recognition of retreat land benefits.\n\n**Narrative:** The vacated land along the Simbach was converted to a combination of:\n1. **Flood defense infrastructure:** New dykes, walls, and structural measures within the enlarged torrent cross-section [Mayr et al., 2020].\n2. **Public recreational green space:** A new recreational area in the city center was designed along the rehabilitated channel, with landscape planning and urban amenity features [Mayr et al., 2020].\n3. **Site design & restoration:** The design harmonized flood risk reduction requirements with urban/landscape planning goals [Mayr et al., 2020].\n4. **Demolition:** Buildings were demolished as part of the buyout process; deconstruction costs were covered by the state.\n\nWolff et al. (2026) describe Simbach as an example of \"combining technical flood defense with landscape and urban planning\" resulting in \"multifunctional spaces\" that \"serve as recreational hubs for the community.\"\n\nRegarding land ownership: compensation was based on pre-damage market value; the article notes that under standard Bavarian practice, land may remain with the owner, though additional land slots were also purchased by the state as part of the acquisition process [Mayr et al., 2020].\n\n**Categories selected:** **Multi-purpose use** (flood protection + recreation), **Demolition/infrastructure removal/asset retirement**, **Site design & restoration**, **Planting/landscaping** (landscape planning), **Natural use** (partial — green space), **Recognition of retreat land benefits** (recreational area framed as community benefit). **Ownership transfer** is noted with caution: some land acquisition by state occurred, while under standard Bavarian practice some land may remain with owners — the sources are not fully explicit on the final ownership of all parcels. No evidence of: community involvement in decision-making on land use, decontamination, commemoration, conservation land trust.\n\n---"
},
{
"case_id": "CS14",
"chunk_index": 3,
"section": "community_engagement",
"location": "Simbach am Inn, Bavaria",
"country": "Germany",
"country_normalized": "Germany",
"continent": "Europe",
"admin_area": "Bavaria",
"source": "Pipeline Ver2 — Simbach am Inn Household Relocation",
"source_links": [
{
"title": "Wolff, C., Bade, F., & Kraan, C. M. (2026). Insights From Managed Retreat Projects in Europe. Earth's Future, 14(3). https://doi.org/10.1029/2025ef007012",
"doi": "10.1029/2025ef007012",
"url": "https://doi.org/10.1029/2025ef007012"
},
{
"title": "Schürr, A., Elbel, J., Hieronimi, A., Auer, I., Coenen, M., & Böse-O'Reilly, S. (2023). Mental health in adolescents after experiencing a flood event in Bavaria, Germany—A qualitative interview study. Frontiers in Public Health, 11. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpubh.2023.1210072",
"doi": "10.3389/fpubh.2023.1210072",
"url": "https://doi.org/10.3389/fpubh.2023.1210072"
}
],
"text": "Case study: Simbach am Inn Household Relocation (Simbach am Inn, Bavaria, Germany)\nSection: Community Engagement\n\n---\n\n### What degree of choice was provided to affected people in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Voluntary with strong persuasion (incentives and practical constraints).\n\n**Narrative:** Legally, the relocation was voluntary — \"selling off the land and properties took place on a voluntary basis\" [Mayr et al., 2020, Interview 5, 2018]. Expropriation was a legal option but was deliberately not used. However, in practice, the degree of voluntary choice was constrained:\n- Most buildings were \"totally or nearly totally destroyed\" and could not be practically rebuilt [Mayr et al., 2020].\n- Rebuilding in the zone was precluded for some properties due to new flood defense scheme requirements.\n- The WMA communicated early — within days of the disaster — that certain properties would need to be vacated.\n- For some residents, \"no other option remained than moving away as rebuilding in the same zone was precluded\" [Mayr et al., 2020].\n\nOne interviewee reported that approximately half of flood victims accepted the offer immediately upon presentation [Mayr et al., 2020, Interview 5, 2018]. No time limit was set on decisions, providing some latitude. The emotional and physical state of disaster victims in the immediate aftermath also affected the decision context.\n\n**Category selected:** **Voluntary with strong persuasion (incentives and restrictions)** — framed and legally structured as voluntary, but practical options to remain were severely limited for most affected households.\n\n---\n\n### What land user groups were involved or considered in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Homeowners, Government.\n\n**Narrative:** The affected land users were homeowners — 11 households owning properties near the Simbach torrent. The government (Bavarian State/WMA) was the purchasing entity. No evidence of renters, commercial owners, leased land owners, NGOs, or Indigenous groups being involved or considered.\n\n**Categories selected:** **Homeowners**, **Government**.\n\n---\n\n### What actors participated in the governance structure of the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Government agencies (multiple levels), affected community, political champions (mayor), private sector as consultants (planners, appraisers, BOKU Vienna), funders (Bavarian State, EU), NGOs/CBOs (Red Cross, limited post-event support), academics/researchers.\n\n**Narrative:**\n\n- **Government agencies:** Bavarian State Ministry for the Environment (STMUV); Bavarian Environment Agency (LfU); Water Management Agency Deggendorf (WMA) — primary planning authority; District administration Rottal-Inn; Municipal government of Simbach [Mayr et al., 2020].\n- **Political champions:** The mayor of Simbach played a significant mediating role, providing residents with information and acting as a trust intermediary. \"Reliability and trust were assigned to public officials like the mayor, which was found helpful in terms of the positive outcome\" [Mayr et al., 2020]. Wolff et al. (2026) similarly note the mayor played a pivotal role in securing support.\n- **Affected community:** Residents were involved through citizen assemblies (five held), individual meetings, and direct negotiation with WMA employees. However, their role was primarily informational/consultative rather than decision-making [Mayr et al., 2020].\n- **Private sector (consultants):** Independent state-appointed appraisers; urban and landscape planners; water management engineers; BOKU Vienna scientists/academics [Mayr et al., 2020].\n- **Academics/researchers:** BOKU Vienna conducted the event documentation and analysis and contributed to the mitigation concept [Rimböck et al., 2018; Mayr et al., 2020].\n- **NGOs/CBOs (limited; post-event support):** The Red Cross provided psychological support for flood victims for up to two years after the event [Mayr et al., 2020]. Their role in MR governance specifically was limited.\n- **Insurance sector:** Insurance agencies were involved in the appraisal process [Mayr et al., 2020].\n\n**Categories selected:** **Funders** (Bavarian State, EU), **Affected community** (limited participatory/consultative role), **Political champions** (mayor), **Government agencies** (multiple levels), **Private sector (consultants)** (planners, appraisers), **Academics/researchers** (BOKU Vienna), **NGOs/CBOs** (Red Cross — limited, post-event support role). No evidence of: receiving communities engagement, general public beyond Simbach residents, First Nations/Indigenous communities, private sector from affected or receiving area as businesses.\n\n---\n\n### Who ultimately made decisions in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Government (primarily), with individual property owners retaining final decision on sale acceptance.\n\n**Narrative:** The core decisions — which properties to acquire, the extent of the acquisition zone, the compensation methodology, the design of the flood defense scheme — were made by the WMA Deggendorf and the Bavarian State, in a top-down planning structure. \"The planning process was largely organized in a top-down manner, such as design and approval of the local FRM strategy, compensation scheme, and payment\" [Mayr et al., 2020]. Individual property owners made the final decision on whether to accept the buyout offer, as the process was legally voluntary. However, practical options were severely constrained for most affected households.\n\n**Categories selected:** **Government** (primary decision-maker on planning, zoning, compensation design), **Property owners** (final decision on acceptance of buyout offer).\n\n---\n\n### Was this engagement approach explicitly incorporated into the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Community engagement (limited; consultative), transparency, ongoing updates, mapping (technical).\n\n**Narrative:**\n\n- **Community engagement:** Five citizen assemblies, expert workshops on specific policy fields, and individual meetings with WMA employees were held. \"Open doors at the city hall\" and weekly consultancy hours were available [Mayr et al., 2020]. Engagement of the affected community was consultative rather than participatory co-design.\n- **Transparency:** Explicitly emphasized — the process \"needed to be transparent\" and concepts could not be elaborated \"behind closed doors\"; planning documents were made available online [Mayr et al., 2020].\n- **Ongoing updates:** Residents were informed early and throughout the process; the planning process evolved over more than two years with ongoing communication.\n- **Mapping:** Technical hazard maps and hydraulic models were used; documents and presentations for the structural protection scheme were made available to the public online [Mayr et al., 2020].\n\n**Categories selected:** **Community engagement** (for the affected community), **Transparency**, **Ongoing updates**, **Mapping** (technical). No evidence of: formal interactive visualization tools, participatory mapping.\n\n---\n\n### What community resources supported the transition during the MR process?\n\n**Answer:** Homeowner buyout caseworker (WMA real estate staff), relocation assistance (financial compensation and demolition coverage), psychosocial supports (Red Cross).\n\n**Narrative:**\n\n- **Homeowner BO caseworker:** Employees of the WMA's real estate department served as the primary contact for property owners during the buyout process. They were \"supposed to have sufficient experience and social skills to propose offers to the residents\" and handled \"sensitive\" individual negotiations [Mayr et al., 2020].\n- **Relocation assistance:** Financial compensation (pre-damage market value) was the primary relocation support mechanism, enabling households to independently relocate. Demolition costs were covered by the state.\n- **Psychosocial supports:** The Red Cross provided psychological support and individual consultation for traumatized flood victims from directly after the event until approximately two years after [Mayr et al., 2020].\n\n**Categories selected:** **Homeowner BO caseworker** (WMA real estate staff), **Relocation assistance** (financial compensation and demolition coverage), **Community capacity building** (limited — through assemblies and information provision). No evidence of: temporary housing advisor, real estate hazard advisor, livelihood restoration support programs specific to the MR.\n\n---\n\n### What supports were provided to facilitate engagement during the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Case workers (WMA real estate staff), psychosocial supports (Red Cross), community engagement support for the affected community (citizen assemblies, WMA expert availability).\n\n**Narrative:**\n\n- **Psychosocial supports:** Red Cross provided psychological and individual consultation support for up to two years [Mayr et al., 2020]. Schürr et al. (2023) note that mental health care services were available but many adolescents were unaware of them or did not use them; care was described as \"chaotic\" by some interviewees.\n- **Case workers:** WMA real estate staff served as individual caseworkers for property negotiation, with experience and social skills for sensitive interactions [Mayr et al., 2020].\n- **Community engagement support for the affected community:** Citizen assemblies, expert availability, and open consultation hours at city hall provided forums for engagement [Mayr et al., 2020].\n\n**Categories selected:** **Psychosocial supports** (Red Cross), **Case workers** (WMA real estate staff), **Community engagement support** (for the affected community). No evidence"
}
] |