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{
"case_id": "CS5",
"chunk_index": 0,
"section": "overview",
"location": "Matata, Bay of Plenty",
"country": "New Zealand",
"country_normalized": "New Zealand",
"continent": "Oceania",
"admin_area": "Bay of Plenty",
"source": "Pipeline Ver2 — Matata Managed Retreat",
"source_links": [
{
"title": "Hanna, C., White, I., & Glavovic, B. (2017). Managed retreat in New Zealand: Revealing the terminology, approaches and direction of local planning instruments. Resilience to Nature's Challenges, University of Waikato.",
"url": "https://resiliencechallenge.nz/wp-content/uploads/Hanna-C.-White-I.-Glavovic-B.-2017-Managed-retreat-in-New-Zealand-r.pdf"
},
{
"title": "Hanna, C., White, I., & Glavovic, B. (2018). Managed retreat governance: Insights from Matata, New Zealand. University of Waikato.",
"url": "https://researchcommons.waikato.ac.nz/entities/publication/b17ae692-be76-4438-b646-c1c4b07f49dc"
},
{
"title": "Hanna, C., White, I., & Glavovic, B. (2020). The uncertainty contagion: Revealing the interrelated, cascading uncertainties of managed retreat. Sustainability, 12(2), 736. https://doi.org/10.3390/su12020736",
"doi": "10.3390/su12020736",
"url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/su12020736"
},
{
"title": "Hanna, C., White, I., & Glavovic, B. (2021). Managed retreats by whom and how? Identifying and delineating governance modalities. Climate Risk Management, 31, 100278. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.crm.2021.100278",
"doi": "10.1016/j.crm.2021.100278",
"url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.crm.2021.100278"
}
],
"text": "Case study: Matata Managed Retreat (Matata, Bay of Plenty, New Zealand)\nSection: CASE STUDY OVERVIEW\n\n**Case name and location:** Awatarariki Fanhead Voluntary Managed Retreat, Matatā, Bay of Plenty, North Island, New Zealand.\n\n**Hazard(s):** Debris flow / landslide, triggered by extreme rainfall in the Awatarariki stream catchment. The managed retreat decision was driven specifically by this debris flow risk. Separately, Matatā as a community is exposed to a broader range of natural hazards — including earthquakes, landslides, floods, coastal erosion and inundation, and far-sourced hazards such as tsunami and volcanic eruption from the Taupō Volcanic Zone — but these broader hazards did not drive the specific managed retreat decision at Awatarariki fanhead [2].\n\n**Type of retreat:** Voluntary property buyout (land acquisition package) offered to individual property owners in the high-risk zone (HRZ), developed using general competency powers under the Local Government Act 2002 s12(2)(a) rather than the Public Works Act 1981. The buyout was supported by two regulatory plan changes: a District Plan Change proposed to rezone the land from Residential to Coastal Protection Zone; and a Regional Plan Change (Bay of Plenty Regional Natural Resources Plan, Plan Change 17) proposed to extinguish existing use rights in the HRZ [2, 3].\n\n**Scale:** The Awatarariki fanhead area contained 45 properties (sections and developed sites), 34 in private ownership, with 16 homes permanently occupied and 18 vacant sections [2]. Matatā's total population was approximately 645 (2013 census); however, the retreat targeted the fanhead properties specifically, not the whole town [2].\n\n**Key actors:** Whakatāne District Council (WDC) — primary implementation body; Bay of Plenty Regional Council (BOPRC) — regional regulatory authority; Central Government (Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management and other agencies) — funding contributor; Tonkin and Taylor (T&T) — specialist engineering consultants; Stimpson & Co. — workshop facilitators; The Property Group Ltd — land acquisition advisors; GNS Science — technical risk research; affected property owners; iwi (Ngāti Rangitihi, Ngāti Awa, Ngāti Tūwharetoa ki Kawerau, and the Mataatua District Māori Council) [2].\n\n**Timeline:** The triggering debris flow occurred in May 2005. Engineering mitigation was pursued from 2005; by December 2012, WDC concluded no viable engineering solutions remained, after which managed retreat was developed over several years. A Consensus Development Group (CDG) was convened March–May 2015. Preliminary buyout offers were made in December 2016. Plan Change 17 was publicly notified in June 2018. Regional and central government agreed to co-fund the buyout in 2019 [2, 3]. The process spans at least 14 years (2005–2019).\n\n**Key outcomes:** By February 2017, 23 landowners had provided registrations of interest: 21 in support of continuing, 2 declining, and 11 non-responses [2]. In 2019, regional and central government agreed to co-fund the buyout through a tripartite model (central government, BOPRC, and WDC each contributing approximately one-third) [3]. Regulatory plan changes were publicly notified and progressed. The case contributed to policy learning on collaborative funding models and risk-based approaches to managed retreat in New Zealand, and the Department of Internal Affairs worked with WDC staff to develop a managed retreat affordability principles framework [2]. The case is also a cautionary example: the protracted timeline, cascading institutional uncertainties, erosion of community trust, and significant and ongoing trauma to residents are extensively documented [2, 3].\n\n---\n\n### Narrative Summary\n\nIn May 2005, a severe rainstorm triggered catastrophic debris flows in the Awatarariki stream catchment near the small coastal township of Matatā in the Bay of Plenty, New Zealand. Rocks up to seven metres in diameter were transported at 15–30 km/hr, releasing an estimated 300,000+ cubic metres of rock, wood debris, silt, and slurry onto fanhead properties [2]. The debris flow destroyed 27 homes and damaged a further 87 properties [3]. No lives were lost, although risk assessment modelling later estimated that a repeat event of the same scale could cause five fatalities [2].\n\nIn the immediate aftermath, both the community and WDC focused on recovery and selected a debris dam engineering solution. Over the following seven years, engineering designs were repeatedly revised as peer reviews raised concerns about the unprecedented scale, viability, and mounting costs — eventually estimated at $5–7 million or more. By December 2012, WDC concluded no viable engineering solutions remained, after which managed retreat was developed over several further years [2]. Between 2013 and 2016, risk assessments confirmed an intolerable level of loss-of-life risk; a CDG was formed and conducted four full-day workshops considering eight options; cost-benefit and multi-criteria analyses were conducted; and a voluntary acquisition package was developed. The preferred option (Option 2) was costed at between $12.2 million and $14.2 million to acquire 75–100% of the 16 properties with dwellings, the 18 vacant sections, and to cover reserve development costs [2]. Preliminary indicative buyout offers based on current market value were made in December 2016. In parallel, WDC and BOPRC progressed plan changes, creating a perception among many residents that the buyout was not truly voluntary and contributing to mistrust [2, 3]. Residents reported sustained trauma, stress, financial anxiety, and a sense of being trapped. Some residents reported ongoing trauma 13–14 years after the original event; one participant stated they had post-traumatic stress disorder [3]. Funding was agreed in 2019 through a tripartite co-funding model [3].\n\nThe Matatā case is instructive at multiple levels. It demonstrates the long-term human costs of short-term post-disaster decision-making, the institutional gaps in New Zealand's managed retreat governance framework, the challenges of implementing voluntary retreat without national policy guidance and confirmed funding, and the cascading nature of uncertainties — technical, financial, legal, political, and social — that compound and reinforce each other. Māori cultural concerns were also significant: the Awatarariki fanhead contains a historically significant burial ground (urupā) whose disturbance had been opposed by local iwi before original development was permitted. The case contributed to New Zealand policy learning on managed retreat and prompted development of national managed retreat affordability principles [2].\n\n---"
},
{
"case_id": "CS5",
"chunk_index": 1,
"section": "coding_questions",
"location": "Matata, Bay of Plenty",
"country": "New Zealand",
"country_normalized": "New Zealand",
"continent": "Oceania",
"admin_area": "Bay of Plenty",
"source": "Pipeline Ver2 — Matata Managed Retreat",
"source_links": [
{
"title": "Hanna, C., White, I., & Glavovic, B. (2017). Managed retreat in New Zealand: Revealing the terminology, approaches and direction of local planning instruments. Resilience to Nature's Challenges, University of Waikato.",
"url": "https://resiliencechallenge.nz/wp-content/uploads/Hanna-C.-White-I.-Glavovic-B.-2017-Managed-retreat-in-New-Zealand-r.pdf"
},
{
"title": "Hanna, C., White, I., & Glavovic, B. (2018). Managed retreat governance: Insights from Matata, New Zealand. University of Waikato.",
"url": "https://researchcommons.waikato.ac.nz/entities/publication/b17ae692-be76-4438-b646-c1c4b07f49dc"
},
{
"title": "Hanna, C., White, I., & Glavovic, B. (2020). The uncertainty contagion: Revealing the interrelated, cascading uncertainties of managed retreat. Sustainability, 12(2), 736. https://doi.org/10.3390/su12020736",
"doi": "10.3390/su12020736",
"url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/su12020736"
},
{
"title": "Hanna, C., White, I., & Glavovic, B. (2021). Managed retreats by whom and how? Identifying and delineating governance modalities. Climate Risk Management, 31, 100278. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.crm.2021.100278",
"doi": "10.1016/j.crm.2021.100278",
"url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.crm.2021.100278"
}
],
"text": "Case study: Matata Managed Retreat (Matata, Bay of Plenty, New Zealand)\nSection: CODING QUESTIONS\n\n---\n\n### Is there any evidence of a proactive or reactive trigger in the MR decision process? (Reactive/Proactive)\n\n**Answer:** Reactive.\n\n**Narrative:** The managed retreat process in Matatā was initiated directly in response to the May 2005 debris flow disaster, which destroyed 27 homes and damaged 87 more [3]. The decision to pursue managed retreat was not made immediately after the event — WDC initially pursued engineering solutions — but the entire trajectory of events was triggered by the disaster. Sources consistently describe managed retreat as a last resort arrived at after engineering options were ruled out. Hanna et al. (2018) state explicitly: \"In this case, overcoming this dependency and arriving at managed retreat was not enabled by a specific action or tool, but the fact that there were no other options left, it was a last resort\" [2]. Hanna (2020) similarly notes that managed retreat \"became necessary as other options were ruled out\" [3].\n\nThere is no evidence that managed retreat was proactively planned before the disaster or as part of any anticipatory hazard management strategy. Hanna et al. (2018) note in hindsight that \"immediate post-disaster retreat would have been more efficient and effective and less harmful to the long-term resilience of the community,\" but this did not occur [2]. Hanna et al. (2017) confirm that proactive managed retreat remains rare across New Zealand, with Matatā being an example of reactive, post-disaster retreat [1].\n\n**Category selected:** Reactive. Proactive is not applicable.\n\n---\n\n### Date, Number of households affected, Number of population affected, Total funding\n\n**Answer:**\n\n- **Date of triggering event:** May 2005 (debris flow) [2, 3].\n- **Key dates in retreat process:** December 2012 — WDC confirms no viable engineering solutions remain; March–May 2015 — CDG workshops; December 2016 — preliminary buyout offers made; June 2018 — Plan Change 17 publicly notified; 2019 — regional and central government agree to co-fund the buyout [2, 3].\n- **Number of properties/households affected:** The fanhead area contained 45 properties (sections and developed sites), 34 in private ownership. The preferred buyout option (Option 2) was costed to acquire 75–100% of the 16 properties with dwellings and the 18 vacant sections [2].\n- **Number of population affected:** Matatā's total population was approximately 645 (2013 census) [2]. The retreat targeted the fanhead properties specifically; the number of people directly affected by the buyout is not specified beyond the 16 permanently occupied dwellings.\n- **Total funding:** Option 2 was costed between $12.2 million and $14.2 million to acquire 75–100% of the identified properties and cover reserve development costs [2]. A tripartite funding model was proposed and agreed in principle, with central government, BOPRC, and WDC each contributing approximately one-third [2, 3]. Final confirmed funding amounts are not specified in the reviewed sources; the $12.2–14.2 million figure is the indicative business case estimate from 2017. Prior to the managed retreat phase, the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management provided a grant of $2.890 million and WDC approved a budget of $3.558 million for the failed engineering phase [2].\n\n**Uncertainty:** The final confirmed total funding amount for the buyout is not provided in the reviewed sources.\n\n---\n\n### What is the occurrence of the hazard(s) considered in the MR decision process? (Single Hazard/Multiple Hazards)\n\n**Answer:** Single Hazard (for the purpose of the managed retreat decision).\n\n**Narrative:** The managed retreat decision was specifically and exclusively driven by the debris flow / landslide risk on the Awatarariki fanhead, assessed as posing an intolerable level of loss-of-life risk [2, 3]. The Quantitative Landslide Risk Assessment concluded intolerable risk from future debris flows specifically [2]. Plan Change 17 and the District Plan Change were both designed to address this specific hazard.\n\nMatatā is described as being exposed to \"a range of natural hazards including earthquakes, landslides, debris flows, floods, coastal erosion and inundation, with far-sourced hazards including tsunami and volcanic eruption from the Taupō Volcanic Zone\" [2], but these broader hazards are contextual only and did not drive the specific managed retreat decision.\n\n**Category selected:** Single Hazard (debris flow/landslide, for the MR decision process). The broader multiple-hazard context is noted but is not the basis for the retreat.\n\n---\n\n### What is the origin of the hazards considered in the MR decision process? (Technological Hazard/Natural Hazard)\n\n**Answer:** Natural Hazard.\n\n**Narrative:** The 2005 debris flow was triggered by a natural geophysical process — extreme rainfall in the Awatarariki catchment causing severe flooding and a major debris flow [2]. Sources consistently describe the event as a natural hazard [1, 2, 3]. There is no evidence of a technological or human-caused origin for the hazard itself. While land development on the fanhead increased exposure, the hazard origin is natural.\n\n**Category selected:** Natural Hazard.\n\n---\n\n### Was this hazard considered in the MR decision process? (Coastal Flooding/Erosion), (Riverine/Pluvial Flooding), (Lake Flooding/Erosion), (Wildfire), (Volcano), (Land Subsidence), (Landslide/Debris Flow), (Earthquake), (Tsunami), (Hurricane), (Other)\n\n**Answer:** Landslide/Debris Flow.\n\n**Narrative:** All sources confirm the primary and only hazard driving the managed retreat decision was debris flow on the Awatarariki fanhead [1, 2, 3]. Hanna et al. (2018) describe the 2005 event: \"The 2005 debris flow in the Awatarariki stream was catalysed by a significant amount of rainfall in the catchment resulting in severe flooding and a major debris flow\" [2]. The Quantitative Landslide Risk Assessment was specifically commissioned to assess debris flow risk and concluded an intolerable level of loss-of-life risk [2]. Plan Change 17 specifically addresses natural hazard risk on the fanhead from this hazard type.\n\nWhile coastal erosion, coastal inundation, and other hazards are mentioned as part of Matatā's broader multi-hazard context [2], these were not part of the managed retreat decision process for the Awatarariki fanhead.\n\n**Category selected:** Landslide/Debris Flow only.\n\n---\n\n### What was the geographic scale of the MR project? (Individual homes), (A few streets), (Neighbourhood), (Entire community), (Sub-watershed), (Watershed region)\n\n**Answer:** Neighbourhood and Individual Homes.\n\n**Narrative:** The retreat affected a specific sub-area of Matatā — the Awatarariki fanhead, described as \"located towards the western end of the township\" — comprising 45 properties (34 in private ownership, 16 occupied dwellings, 18 vacant sections) [2]. This is clearly a sub-community or neighbourhood-scale area, not the entire community of Matatā (population ~645). The acquisition strategy operated at the individual property level, with offers made at individual meetings based on independent property valuations [2]. Both Neighbourhood (the Awatarariki fanhead area) and Individual Homes (parcel-by-parcel property acquisition) are therefore applicable.\n\n**Categories selected:** Neighbourhood (Awatarariki fanhead sub-area of Matatā) and Individual Homes (individual property acquisition offers).\n\n---\n\n### Who or what was retreated? (Individuals), (Groups/Neighbourhoods), (Communities), (Critical infrastructure), (Hazard protection structures), (Industrial assets)\n\n**Answer:** Individuals and Groups/Neighbourhoods.\n\n**Narrative:** The retreat targeted individual property owners and residents on the fanhead. Preliminary offers were made to individual property owners at individual meetings, and registrations of interest were collected individually [2]. However, the overall strategy sought retreat of a defined neighbourhood cluster — the entire Awatarariki fanhead HRZ — rather than scattered individuals across the wider community. The CDG process and plan changes were designed to achieve collective retreat of this neighbourhood [2, 3]. Critical infrastructure, hazard protection structures, and industrial assets are not identified as subjects of retreat in the reviewed sources.\n\n**Categories selected:** Individuals and Groups/Neighbourhoods.\n\n---\n\n### Other notes (General Information)\n\nMatatā's socioeconomic status is low — a deprivation index of 9 out of 10, with unemployment at 13.7%, almost double the national average — and 60% of residents identify as Māori [2]. These characteristics are relevant to equity and cultural dimensions discussed in subsequent sections. The extraordinary duration of the process (at least 14 years from triggering event to funding agreement) was itself a significant and documented source of harm to the community [2, 3].\n\n---"
},
{
"case_id": "CS5",
"chunk_index": 2,
"section": "institutional_environment",
"location": "Matata, Bay of Plenty",
"country": "New Zealand",
"country_normalized": "New Zealand",
"continent": "Oceania",
"admin_area": "Bay of Plenty",
"source": "Pipeline Ver2 — Matata Managed Retreat",
"source_links": [
{
"title": "Hanna, C., White, I., & Glavovic, B. (2017). Managed retreat in New Zealand: Revealing the terminology, approaches and direction of local planning instruments. Resilience to Nature's Challenges, University of Waikato.",
"url": "https://resiliencechallenge.nz/wp-content/uploads/Hanna-C.-White-I.-Glavovic-B.-2017-Managed-retreat-in-New-Zealand-r.pdf"
},
{
"title": "Hanna, C., White, I., & Glavovic, B. (2018). Managed retreat governance: Insights from Matata, New Zealand. University of Waikato.",
"url": "https://researchcommons.waikato.ac.nz/entities/publication/b17ae692-be76-4438-b646-c1c4b07f49dc"
},
{
"title": "Hanna, C., White, I., & Glavovic, B. (2020). The uncertainty contagion: Revealing the interrelated, cascading uncertainties of managed retreat. Sustainability, 12(2), 736. https://doi.org/10.3390/su12020736",
"doi": "10.3390/su12020736",
"url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/su12020736"
},
{
"title": "Hanna, C., White, I., & Glavovic, B. (2021). Managed retreats by whom and how? Identifying and delineating governance modalities. Climate Risk Management, 31, 100278. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.crm.2021.100278",
"doi": "10.1016/j.crm.2021.100278",
"url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.crm.2021.100278"
}
],
"text": "Case study: Matata Managed Retreat (Matata, Bay of Plenty, New Zealand)\nSection: INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT\n\n---\n\n### What is the focus or scope of the MR project? (Individual buyout/retreat), (Community buyout/retreat), (Leasebacks, easements and buffers), (Other acquisition tools), (Managed realignment of infrastructure)\n\n**Answer:** Individual buyout/retreat, with elements of Community buyout/retreat.\n\n**Narrative:** The primary mechanism was a voluntary individual property acquisition package. WDC adopted an Acquisition Strategy developed by The Property Group Ltd reflecting key principles of land acquisition under the Public Works Act 1981, offering indicative prices to each of the 34 property owners in the HRZ at individual meetings [2]. The strategy was developed using general competency powers under the LGA s12(2)(a) rather than the PWA, as WDC received legal advice that the PWA could not be used for managed retreat and subsequent reserve conversion [3].\n\nThe strategy also had community-scale dimensions: the CDG process was collective; the plan changes applied to the entire fanhead zone; and the strategy aimed at achieving near-complete retreat of a defined neighbourhood. Hanna et al. (2017) note that \"the voluntary retreat package has been offered to property owners on a one-time basis\" for the entire zone [1]. The goal was whole-neighbourhood clearance. Both categories are therefore warranted.\n\nThere is no evidence of leasebacks, easements, buffers, or managed realignment of infrastructure as mechanisms in this case.\n\n**Categories selected:** Individual buyout/retreat (primary mechanism) and Community buyout/retreat (intended collective outcome and neighbourhood-scale regulatory approach).\n\n---\n\n### What legal constraints or requirements were identified during the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Legal authority over retreat, Relevant regulations/acts, Home acquisition, Land acquisition, Title(s) transfer, Land rezoning, Compliance & enforcement, Litigation (potential/threatened), Other.\n\n**Narrative:** This case is defined by its legal complexity. Key legal issues identified across the sources include:\n\n**Legal authority over retreat:** A central barrier was the jurisdictional mismatch between territorial authorities (WDC, responsible for land use but lacking power to extinguish existing use rights) and regional councils (BOPRC, which held power to extinguish existing use rights under s20A RMA but was politically reluctant to exercise it) [2, 3]. Participant 2 states: \"in terms of an area that's already developed, the tools are pretty weak, they are incredibly weak\" [2].\n\n**Relevant regulations/acts:** Multiple pieces of legislation are implicated: the Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA, including ss 20A, 30, 31, 62, 85, and 33 regarding transfer of functions); Local Government Act 2002 (s12(2)(a) general competency powers, used by WDC to develop the buyout outside the statutory regime) [3]; Public Works Act 1981 (WDC received legal advice the PWA could not be used for managed retreat and subsequent reserve conversion, though the Resource Legislation Amendment Act 2017 s85(3A)(a)(ii) suggests otherwise) [3]; Building Act 2004 (Determination 11912 in 2006 created difficulties by enabling rebuilding on the fanhead; Determination 2016/034 later supported declining building consents) [2]; New Zealand Coastal Policy Statement 2010 [1]; Bay of Plenty Regional Policy Statement incorporating Change 2 (July 2016), introducing a risk-based approach [2].\n\n**Home and land acquisition:** The acquisition package was developed using LGA general competency powers rather than the PWA [3]. Independent property valuations were used to set indicative offers at current market value without recognition of the hazard [2].\n\n**Title(s) transfer:** Implied in the acquisition process; vacated land was to be converted to Coastal Reserve/Coastal Protection Zone status [2].\n\n**Land rezoning:** A District Plan Change was proposed to rezone the land from Residential to Coastal Protection Zone; BOPRC's proposed Plan Change 17 to the Bay of Plenty Regional Natural Resources Plan introduced new objectives and policies and a rule prohibiting residential activities in the HRZ after 31 March 2021 [2].\n\n**Compliance and enforcement:** Significant uncertainty existed regarding enforcement if voluntary retreat was unsuccessful. Participant 5 states: \"nobody's got any appetite to be sending in bulldozers with protesters lying on the road... 'How do you expect me to get these people out?'\" [2, 3]. The timing of regulatory measures relative to the voluntary buyout was a major governance challenge [2].\n\n**Litigation (potential/threatened):** Residents threatened civil disobedience, and it was anticipated that case law arising from Bay of Plenty Regional Plan Change 17 would determine the legality of extinguishing existing use rights under s85 RMA [2]. The Supreme Court decision in Quake Outcasts v The Minister for Canterbury Earthquake Recovery [2015] NZSC 27 — which held that offers made under conditions where residents had \"no realistic alternative\" were not truly voluntary — was referenced as directly relevant to the Matatā situation [2].\n\n**Other:** Building Act Determination 11912 (2006) presented a significant institutional constraint by enabling rebuilding on the fanhead under assumptions of mitigation that did not eventuate, creating path dependencies and complicating later managed retreat [2]. WDC's use of LGA general competency powers as an alternative legal vehicle for the buyout is also notable [3].\n\n**Categories selected:** Legal authority over retreat, Relevant regulations/acts, Home acquisition, Land acquisition, Title(s) transfer, Land rezoning, Compliance & enforcement, Litigation (potential/threatened), Other (Building Act determinations as constraint; LGA general competency as alternative vehicle).\n\n---\n\n### What were the funding sources for the MR project?\n\n**Answer:** Multiple funders — Federal/Central Government, Provincial/State (Regional Council — BOPRC), and Local/Municipal (WDC).\n\n**Narrative:** The proposed and ultimately agreed funding model was a tripartite arrangement: central government, BOPRC, and WDC each contributing approximately one-third of costs [2, 3]. In 2019, regional and central government agreed to co-fund the buyout [3]. This collaborative, multi-agency funding solution was developed at the local level.\n\nPrior to the managed retreat phase, the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management provided $2.890 million and WDC approved a budget of $3.558 million for the engineering phase — funds that proved to be sunk costs [2].\n\nWDC faced a \"chicken and egg\" problem: confirmed funding was an essential element of meaningful acquisition, but funding agencies required certainty around financial parameters before committing [2]. The absence of a nationally funded buyout programme or reserve fund was a significant barrier [2, 3].\n\n**Category selected:** Multiple funders — Local/Municipal (WDC), Provincial/State (BOPRC), Federal/Central Government. No evidence of NGO, international aid, insurance, or individual self-funding for the buyout.\n\n---\n\n### What was considered to maintain (or improve) the tax base in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Limited evidence. Some consideration of potential growth to the east of Matatā, but no explicit tax base maintenance strategy.\n\n**Narrative:** The sources do not explicitly discuss tax base maintenance as a planning objective. WDC \"undertook some research to determine the potential for future growth to the east of Matatā, and the impacts of intensification upon the town sewerage system\" [3]. This implies some consideration of where retreating residents might relocate within or near the community, which could indirectly support the local tax base. The proposed rezoning of the fanhead to Coastal Reserve/Coastal Protection Zone indicates the retreat lands would not be redeveloped for revenue-generating purposes. There is no evidence of new industry attraction, new housing programmes for buyout recipients, livelihoods supports, or other explicit tax base measures being considered in the reviewed sources.\n\n**Category selected:** Assisting BO recipients to find housing in community (very limited — some research into growth to east of Matatā). All other tax base categories: No evidence found in reviewed sources.\n\n**Uncertainty:** Tax base maintenance was not a prominent theme in the reviewed sources.\n\n---\n\n### What level/type of compensation mechanisms were considered in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Market value, Additional incentives/bonuses/top-ups.\n\n**Narrative:** The acquisition package was based on \"the current market value of their property without recognition of the hazard\" [2, 3] — a deliberate choice to offer pre-hazard market value rather than any post-disaster or post-risk-disclosure depreciated value. This approach was designed to be fair to owners while avoiding speculative buyers profiting; eligibility conditions were designed so that the buyout was \"discreet, based on specific criteria\" regarding whether owners knew of risks before purchasing [2].\n\nAdditional incentives included: a $1,200 legal fees contribution; a relocation subsidy of $2,500 for fanhead residents; and the potential for deferred settlement of up to three years for special circumstances [2]. These are monetary top-ups to the purchase offer and are best coded as Additional incentives/bonuses/top-ups rather than as free supports and services, consistent with the auditor's coding correction.\n\nWDC explicitly stated it had \"a moral obligation to compensate owners for their loss of property under voluntary retreat\" and that \"successful retreat entails financial incentive\" [2]. The compensation was not legally required — WDC chose to offer it as a moral and practical necessity [2].\n\nResidents expressed concern that indicative offers were insufficient for relocation, with Participant 16 noting: \"The indicative price they offered us might've seemed like a good price, but it would be about $80,000–$90,000 to shift our house... it would probably gobble up absolutely everything\" [3].\n\n**Categories selected:** Market value (primary basis); Additional incentives/bonuses/top-ups ($1,200 legal fees contribution, $2,500 relocation subsidy, deferred settlement option). Post-disaster value: not selected — the offer was explicitly based on pre-hazard market value. Free supports and services: not selected separately, as the legal fees contribution and relocation subsidy are monetary top-ups more accurately coded as Additional incentives/bonuses/top-ups.\n\n---"
},
{
"case_id": "CS5",
"chunk_index": 3,
"section": "planning_processes",
"location": "Matata, Bay of Plenty",
"country": "New Zealand",
"country_normalized": "New Zealand",
"continent": "Oceania",
"admin_area": "Bay of Plenty",
"source": "Pipeline Ver2 — Matata Managed Retreat",
"source_links": [
{
"title": "Hanna, C., White, I., & Glavovic, B. (2017). Managed retreat in New Zealand: Revealing the terminology, approaches and direction of local planning instruments. Resilience to Nature's Challenges, University of Waikato.",
"url": "https://resiliencechallenge.nz/wp-content/uploads/Hanna-C.-White-I.-Glavovic-B.-2017-Managed-retreat-in-New-Zealand-r.pdf"
},
{
"title": "Hanna, C., White, I., & Glavovic, B. (2018). Managed retreat governance: Insights from Matata, New Zealand. University of Waikato.",
"url": "https://researchcommons.waikato.ac.nz/entities/publication/b17ae692-be76-4438-b646-c1c4b07f49dc"
},
{
"title": "Hanna, C., White, I., & Glavovic, B. (2020). The uncertainty contagion: Revealing the interrelated, cascading uncertainties of managed retreat. Sustainability, 12(2), 736. https://doi.org/10.3390/su12020736",
"doi": "10.3390/su12020736",
"url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/su12020736"
},
{
"title": "Hanna, C., White, I., & Glavovic, B. (2021). Managed retreats by whom and how? Identifying and delineating governance modalities. Climate Risk Management, 31, 100278. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.crm.2021.100278",
"doi": "10.1016/j.crm.2021.100278",
"url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.crm.2021.100278"
}
],
"text": "Case study: Matata Managed Retreat (Matata, Bay of Plenty, New Zealand)\nSection: PLANNING PROCESSES\n\n---\n\n### What is the time horizon considered in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Pre-retreat planning, and Post-retreat follow-up (partial).\n\n**Narrative:** The process involved extensive pre-retreat planning from approximately 2013–2018, including risk assessment, CDG workshops, CBA/MCA analysis, business case development, acquisition strategy development, and plan change preparation [2, 3].\n\nThe Plan Change 17 rule prohibiting residential activities after 31 March 2021 establishes an implementation deadline, but this is best understood as a policy implementation trigger point rather than a hazard time horizon per se. The debris flow hazard was an existing, present risk — not a projected future risk over a defined time horizon. The managed retreat decision was framed around existing intolerable risk to life, not around a 1–5, 5–10, or 10–100 year projected risk horizon [2]. Accordingly, coding Immediate risks: 1–5 years based on the 2021 rule implementation window — as noted by the auditor — is not warranted as a risk horizon code; the 2021 date is an administrative deadline, not a risk emergence horizon.\n\nThe Bay of Plenty RPS and NZCPS reference 100-year planning timeframes for coastal hazards [1], but the specific Matatā retreat decision was not framed around a projected future risk within a particular time horizon.\n\nPost-retreat planning (future land use as Coastal Reserve, research into growth east of Matatā) was considered but not well-developed in the reviewed sources [3].\n\n**Categories selected:** Pre-retreat planning (extensive); Post-retreat follow-up (partial — some consideration of land use and receiving areas, but limited). Immediate risks: 1–5 years, Emerging risks: 5–10, and Anticipated future risks: 10–100 are not selected as primary risk horizon codes for this case; the hazard was an existing, present, and intolerable risk, not a projected future one.\n\n---\n\n### What planning elements were considered in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** CBA, MCDA, Top-down, Bottom-up (partial), Multi-sectoral, Multi-stage retreat, Degree of transparency, Coordination with other sectors and jurisdictions, Participatory/collaborative (partial).\n\n**Narrative:**\n\n**CBA and MCDA:** Four short-listed options were compared using both CBA and MCA, including net present value calculations and non-monetary benefits/dis-benefits assessment. This is explicitly confirmed: \"Cost benefit analysis (CBA) and multi-criteria analysis (MCA) were used to compare the shortlisted options\" [2]. The MCA recommended Option 2 as the preferred way forward [2].\n\n**Top-down:** The regulatory framework (plan changes, risk assessments, buyout parameters) was largely developed and driven by WDC and BOPRC, with central government providing direction and funding conditions [2, 3].\n\n**Bottom-up/Participatory:** The CDG process (March–May 2015) involved six landowners alongside council staff, councillors, regional council representatives, expert advisers, and facilitators, attending four full-day workshops considering eight options [2]. Individual meetings were held with property owners at the preliminary offer stage. Community engagement through \"drop in days and individual meetings\" was conducted for plan change consultations [2]. However, some community members felt the process was not genuinely participatory or voluntary, and WDC's change of uptake threshold from 90% to no threshold further eroded trust [3]. Both bottom-up and participatory elements were present but limited in effect.\n\n**Multi-sectoral:** The process involved WDC, BOPRC, central government, specialist engineers (Tonkin & Taylor), risk assessors, legal advisors, financial advisors (The Property Group Ltd), workshop facilitators (Stimpson & Co.), iwi representatives, and the affected community [2, 3].\n\n**Multi-stage retreat:** The process was designed as multi-stage — voluntary acquisitions first, with regulatory plan changes as a backstop if uptake was insufficient [2, 3]. However, the two tracks ran in parallel rather than sequentially, creating governance and trust problems [2, 3].\n\n**Degree of transparency:** WDC attempted to be transparent. Participant 1 describes staff as having \"bent over backwards to do everything they can... in a very thorough and fair manner\" [2]. However, changes to uptake thresholds and the parallel regulatory track undermined perceived transparency. The decision to move from limited to public notification of Plan Change 17 was also transparency-relevant [2].\n\n**Coordination with other sectors and jurisdictions:** A central challenge and partial achievement of the case — coordination between WDC, BOPRC, and central government, as well as between planning, engineering, legal, financial, and community engagement functions [2, 3].\n\n**Adaptive management:** The process involved continuous revision — of engineering solutions, of policy approach, of uptake thresholds, of notification strategies. However, as the auditor notes, the sources describe iterative revision and policy learning but do not explicitly frame the Matatā case as adaptive management. This element is noted as implicit/uncertain rather than a primary code.\n\n**Categories selected:** CBA, MCDA, Top-down, Bottom-up (partial), Multi-sectoral, Multi-stage retreat, Degree of transparency, Coordination with other sectors and jurisdictions, Participatory/collaborative (partial). Adaptive management: not coded as primary; noted as implicit.\n\n---\n\n### What decision support tools were used in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** CBA, MCDA, Hazard maps and models, Process guidance (partial).\n\n**Narrative:**\n\n**CBA:** Explicitly used to compare four short-listed options, calculating net present values and costs [2].\n\n**MCDA:** Multi-criteria analysis was used alongside CBA; the MCA recommended Option 2 as the preferred way forward [2].\n\n**Hazard maps and models:** T&T's Quantitative Landslide Risk Assessment (QLRA) concluded intolerable loss-of-life risk [2]. Risk mapping was central to defining the HRZ. The BOP RPS established a risk matrix developed through community engagement [2].\n\n**Process guidance:** WDC worked with The Property Group Ltd to develop an acquisition strategy reflecting Public Works Act principles [2]. The Department of Internal Affairs was working with WDC to develop a \"managed retreat affordability principles framework\" [2]. However, the absence of national process guidance was itself a major barrier — \"learning by doing\" was the dominant mode [2, 3].\n\n**Social vulnerability assessments:** The sources acknowledge the socioeconomic context (deprivation index 9/10, high Māori population, unemployment) but no formal social vulnerability assessment tool is identified. Per the auditor's correction, this should not be coded as a decision support tool used in the process; it is contextual information only.\n\n**Housing assessment, CC projection models, demographic projections, socioeconomic projections, new site evaluation process:** No formal tools of these types are identified in the reviewed sources.\n\n**Categories selected:** CBA, MCDA, Hazard maps and models, Process guidance (partial). Social vulnerability assessments: not coded as a tool; contextual information only.\n\n---\n\n### What planning measures were taken for receiving areas in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Minimal. Some research into potential for growth east of Matatā, but no comprehensive receiving area planning.\n\n**Narrative:** WDC undertook some research into potential for future growth to the east of Matatā and the impacts of intensification on the town sewerage system [3], but this was not a developed receiving area plan. The \"managed retreat to where?\" question was largely left for individuals to manage: \"the question of 'managed retreat to where?' has been left for individuals to manage, and there are concerns regarding the impacts on social, cultural, and economic vulnerability\" [3].\n\nResidents expressed desire for land swap options and certainty about property options [3]. Participant 16 noted: \"The indicative price they offered us might've seemed like a good price, but it would be about $80,000–$90,000 to shift our house... first you've got to find a piece of land to put the house on... it would probably gobble up absolutely everything... land is the hardest thing to access\" [3]. This represents a significant gap in the retreat planning process.\n\n**Categories selected:** Individuals vs. neighbourhoods/communities (the approach defaulted to individual resettlement without coordinated neighbourhood planning); Availability of existing housing ("
}
] |