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| [ | |
| { | |
| "case_id": "CS41", | |
| "chunk_index": 0, | |
| "section": "overview", | |
| "location": "Charlotte, North Carolina", | |
| "country": "United States", | |
| "country_normalized": "United States", | |
| "continent": "North America", | |
| "admin_area": "North Carolina", | |
| "source": "Pipeline Ver2 β Charlotte", | |
| "source_links": [ | |
| { | |
| "title": "Shi, L., Fisher, A., Brenner, R. M., Greiner-Safi, A., Shepard, C., & Vanucchi, J. (2022). Equitable buyouts? Learning from state, county, and local floodplain management programs. Climatic Change, 174(3-4). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-022-03453-5", | |
| "doi": "10.1007/s10584-022-03453-5", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-022-03453-5" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Cardwell, J. (2023). Community perceptions of a floodplain buyout program in Charlotte, North Carolina. Natural Hazards, 115(3), 2141-2160. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11069-022-05631-1", | |
| "doi": "10.1007/s11069-022-05631-1", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s11069-022-05631-1" | |
| } | |
| ], | |
| "text": "Case study: Charlotte (Charlotte, North Carolina, United States)\nSection: CASE STUDY OVERVIEW\n\n**Case Name and Location:** Charlotte-Mecklenburg County Floodplain Buyout Program, Charlotte, Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, United States.\n\n**Hazard(s):** Riverine and pluvial (urban) flooding. Mecklenburg County sits within the Catawba River Basin, with a network of urban creeks and lakes that flash flood regularly, particularly during hurricane season. Shi et al. (2022) note that Climate Central (2015) estimated heavy downpours in Charlotte increased by 86% since 1950, indicating climate change may be exacerbating flooding risk. The flooding is driven by the county's hydrological character combined with historical land-use decisions including stream channelization and floodplain development.\n\n**Type of Retreat:** Voluntary individual property buyout program. Acquired properties are demolished and converted to permanent open space. The program operates through three sub-mechanisms: (1) FEMA Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) buyouts; (2) locally funded, risk-based buyouts; and (3) \"Quick Buys\" using reserve funds for immediate post-disaster acquisition. Leaseback arrangements are also used on a case-by-case basis.\n\n**Scale:** As reported by Spidalieri et al. (2020), the program had purchased more than 400 flood-prone homes and businesses and enabled over 700 families and businesses to relocate, creating approximately 185 acres of open space. Cardwell (2021) confirms over 450 properties acquired and demolished. More than 5,000 individual properties are located within Mecklenburg County's regulated floodplain (Spidalieri et al. 2020).\n\n**Key Actors:** Charlotte-Mecklenburg Storm Water Services (CMSS) β a joint county-municipal stormwater utility β is the primary implementing body. Federal funding is provided through FEMA's HMGP. The Mecklenburg Board of County Commissioners allocates \"rainy day\" Quick Buy reserve funds. At specific sites, non-profit partners such as the Charlotte Public Tree Fund have supported post-buyout ecological restoration (Cardwell 2021). Community organizations and neighborhood associations have shaped post-buyout land use at some sites, with notably variable outcomes.\n\n**Timeline:** Program initiated in 1999, following two devastating 100-year flood events in the 1990s causing over $60 million in property damage (Shi et al. 2022; Spidalieri et al. 2020). Key milestones:\n- 1999: Program established; FEMA HMGP buyouts begin.\n- 2003: Quick Buy mechanism introduced (Spidalieri et al. 2020).\n- 2008: Leaseback arrangements introduced (Spidalieri et al. 2020).\n- 2012βpresent: Local Risk-Based Buyouts funded through local stormwater fee (Spidalieri et al. 2020).\n- As of 2019: Program invests approximately $4 million annually; total program investment exceeds $67 million (Spidalieri et al. 2020).\n- Content current as of early 2020 (Spidalieri et al. 2020); program ongoing.\n\n**Key Outcomes:** Over 400β450 flood-prone properties acquired and demolished; approximately 185 acres converted to open space including community gardens, ecological preserves, and planned greenway corridors (Spidalieri et al. 2020; Cardwell 2021). Spidalieri et al. (2020) report the county estimates it has avoided approximately $25 million in property damage and prevented $300 million in future losses (reported as county estimates, not independently verified in the reviewed sources). Spidalieri et al. (2020) report approximately 85% participation among property owners in priority flood-risk reduction areas. However, significant equity concerns persist: renters were displaced without compensation; socially vulnerable communities received less post-buyout land use investment; the program had not adopted explicit social equity goals or social vulnerability metrics at the time studied (Shi et al. 2022); and greenway implementation has been inequitable, prioritizing wealthier areas (Cardwell 2021).\n\n---\n\n**Narrative Summary**\n\nIn 1999, following two devastating 100-year flood events in the 1990s that caused over $60 million in property damage, Charlotte-Mecklenburg Storm Water Services (CMSS) launched a voluntary floodplain buyout program. According to Shi et al. (2022), the flooding prompted 30 to 40 exasperated residents to show up to a county commissioner's meeting with mops and buckets, demanding better stormwater protection. The program purchases flood-prone properties at their pre-disaster fair-market value, demolishes all structures, and converts the land permanently to open space. As of the time of the Spidalieri et al. (2020) report, CMSS had purchased more than 400 flood-prone homes and businesses and enabled over 700 families and businesses to relocate, creating approximately 185 acres of open space. The program combines FEMA HMGP funds with local stormwater-fee and county reserve funding, which allows acquisitions outside strict FEMA disaster timing and eligibility limits, enabling CMSS to buy out properties proactively and in non-disaster contexts (Shi et al. 2022; Spidalieri et al. 2020).\n\nDespite its widely recognized effectiveness in reducing flood risk β a finding consistent across all interview respondents in Cardwell (2021) β the program has been critiqued for inequitable outcomes. Renters, present in significant numbers in several buyout areas including the former Cavalier and Doral Apartment Complexes, received no compensation when property owners accepted buyouts, resulting in displacement from affordable housing (Cardwell 2021). For lower-income homeowners, the financial pressure of flood-damaged property and the difficulty of refusing an offer effectively limited genuine voluntary choice, in contrast to wealthier homeowners who had the financial resources to decline (Cardwell 2021). Shi et al. (2022) confirm that the program had not adopted explicit social equity goals or social vulnerability metrics at the time studied.\n\nPost-buyout land use outcomes have varied markedly by neighborhood. Communities with strong social capital and political connections β notably Country Club Heights β successfully shaped vacant land into valued community assets such as the Country Club Heights Community Garden. By contrast, socially vulnerable communities such as Hidden Valley were left with poorly maintained or underutilized ecological sites that failed to deliver promised benefits (Cardwell 2021). CMSS does not track where buyout households relocate, and greenway funding has been inequitably distributed, prioritizing wealthier areas of the city (Cardwell 2021). The program offers important lessons about institutional continuity, dedicated local funding, and multi-criteria prioritization as enablers of effective managed retreat, while also illustrating persistent tensions between a program's flood-risk mandate and broader housing equity obligations.\n\n---" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "case_id": "CS41", | |
| "chunk_index": 1, | |
| "section": "coding_questions", | |
| "location": "Charlotte, North Carolina", | |
| "country": "United States", | |
| "country_normalized": "United States", | |
| "continent": "North America", | |
| "admin_area": "North Carolina", | |
| "source": "Pipeline Ver2 β Charlotte", | |
| "source_links": [ | |
| { | |
| "title": "Shi, L., Fisher, A., Brenner, R. M., Greiner-Safi, A., Shepard, C., & Vanucchi, J. (2022). Equitable buyouts? Learning from state, county, and local floodplain management programs. Climatic Change, 174(3-4). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-022-03453-5", | |
| "doi": "10.1007/s10584-022-03453-5", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-022-03453-5" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Cardwell, J. (2023). Community perceptions of a floodplain buyout program in Charlotte, North Carolina. Natural Hazards, 115(3), 2141-2160. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11069-022-05631-1", | |
| "doi": "10.1007/s11069-022-05631-1", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s11069-022-05631-1" | |
| } | |
| ], | |
| "text": "Case study: Charlotte (Charlotte, North Carolina, United States)\nSection: CODING QUESTIONS\n\n---\n\n### Is there any evidence of a proactive or reactive trigger in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Both Reactive and Proactive.\n\n**Narrative:** The program was established reactively, founded in 1999 following two devastating 100-year flood events in the 1990s that caused over $60 million in property damage and prompted strong public pressure for county action, including residents appearing at county commissioner meetings with mops and buckets (Shi et al. 2022; Spidalieri et al. 2020).\n\nThe program subsequently evolved in a notably proactive direction. As Shi et al. (2022) explain, CMSS grew frustrated with FEMA's post-disaster model β local floods were often not large enough to trigger federal disaster declarations, most flooded properties did not meet FEMA eligibility criteria, and buyout times were so long that residents opted to rebuild. In response, CMSS established a local stormwater fee (2012βpresent) to fund risk-based buyouts independent of disaster declarations (Spidalieri et al. 2020). Shi et al. (2022) explicitly note that \"all five programs proactively buy out properties based on established plans rather than solely reactive, post-disaster efforts.\" CMSS also uses a Flood Risk Assessment and Risk Reduction Plan to score, rank, and prioritize properties (Spidalieri et al. 2020).\n\nAt the household level, however, Cardwell (2021) documents that \"the majority of houses in Charlotte were acquired after a major flood event where there was significant flood damage to the property,\" consistent with a reactive pattern. The Quick Buy mechanism (2003βpresent) also captures properties reactively in the immediate aftermath of a flood, before substantial repairs are made (Spidalieri et al. 2020).\n\n**Categories selected:** Both **Reactive** (founding context; Quick Buy mechanism; majority of household-level decisions post-disaster) and **Proactive** (program's evolved model with local stormwater-fee-funded, risk-based, non-disaster-triggered buyouts).\n\n---\n\n### Date, Number of Households Affected, Number of Population Affected, Total Funding\n\n**Direct Answer:**\n- **Program start date:** 1999 (Cardwell 2021; Spidalieri et al. 2020).\n- **Number of properties acquired:** Over 450 (Cardwell 2021); more than 400 (Spidalieri et al. 2020; Shi et al. 2022). The slight variation reflects different data download dates across studies.\n- **Families and businesses relocated:** Over 700 (Spidalieri et al. 2020; Spidalieri et al. 2020 executive summary). This figure is reported by Spidalieri et al. (2020) and may include both residential and commercial relocations.\n- **Properties in regulated floodplain:** Over 5,000 (Spidalieri et al. 2020).\n- **Total program investment:** More than $67 million (Spidalieri et al. 2020).\n- **Annual investment:** Approximately $4 million as of 2019 (Spidalieri et al. 2020; Shi et al. 2022).\n- **Open space created:** Approximately 185 acres (Spidalieri et al. 2020).\n- **Individual population affected:** Not directly stated in sources; sources report properties and households, not total individuals.\n\n**Note on sources:** The 700 families/businesses figure and the $67 million total investment come from Spidalieri et al. (2020). Cardwell (2021) provides the \"over 450 properties\" figure based on a geodatabase downloaded in September 2018. These are consistent but reflect different snapshot dates.\n\n---\n\n### What is the occurrence of the hazard(s) considered in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Single Hazard.\n\n**Narrative:** All three sources consistently identify flooding (riverine and pluvial) as the single hazard driving the buyout program. Shi et al. (2022) describe \"urban creeks and lakes that flash flood regularly during hurricane season.\" Spidalieri et al. (2020) describe the program as responding to \"repetitive loss structures\" in Mecklenburg County's floodplain. Cardwell (2021) focuses exclusively on floodplain flooding risk. No second distinct hazard type is mentioned in any source.\n\n**Category selected:** Single Hazard.\n\n---\n\n### What is the origin of the hazards considered in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Natural Hazard, with climate change noted as a contextual exacerbator.\n\n**Narrative:** The primary driver is riverine and pluvial flooding β a natural hazard. Shi et al. (2022) note that \"climate change has increased heavy downpours in Charlotte, the county's largest city, by 86% since 1950 (Climate Central 2015)\" as cited contextual background, and state that \"climate change-exacerbated flooding has renewed interest in property buyouts.\" The hazard is natural in origin; the program was not triggered by a technological accident or industrial event. Climate change is treated in the sources as an exacerbating factor, not the sole cause, of flooding risk.\n\n**Category selected:** Natural Hazard. Climate change is noted as a contextual exacerbator but is not the standalone driver in the program's founding narrative.\n\n---\n\n### Was this hazard considered in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Riverine/Pluvial Flooding.\n\n**Narrative:** The program explicitly targets properties in the regulated floodplain subject to riverine and pluvial flash flooding. Spidalieri et al. (2020) describe the county's network of \"urban creeks and lakes that flash flood regularly.\" Cardwell (2021) and Shi et al. (2022) also focus exclusively on floodplain flooding. The program addresses inland riverine and pluvial flooding rather than coastal inundation; no coastal flooding hazard is discussed in any source.\n\n**Category selected:** Riverine/Pluvial Flooding.\n\n---\n\n### What was the geographic scale of the MR project?\n\n**Answer:** Individual Homes and Neighbourhood.\n\n**Narrative:** The program operates primarily at the individual property (parcel) level: CMSS identifies, appraises, and acquires individual flood-prone properties through voluntary sales (Spidalieri et al. 2020). However, CMSS prioritizes and groups properties into clusters, with acquisition strategies designed to aggregate buyouts within neighborhoods to restore floodplain functions over larger contiguous areas. The orphan property program specifically incentivizes the last homeowners in a high-risk neighborhood to sell so the entire site can be restored (Spidalieri et al. 2020). Cardwell (2021) identifies 13 cluster sites studied at the neighborhood level. Spidalieri et al. (2020) note that \"CMSS works with community members to design and realize a vision for each large-scale bought-out area once all homes are purchased and demolished.\"\n\n**Categories selected:** Individual Homes (operational unit of acquisition) and Neighbourhood (strategic clustering and aggregation target).\n\n---\n\n### Who or what was retreated?\n\n**Answer:** Individuals (homeowners and, indirectly, renters and some commercial operators).\n\n**Narrative:** The program retreats individual residents and businesses from flood-prone properties. Spidalieri et al. (2020) state the program enabled \"over 700 families and businesses to relocate.\" The program focuses on residential properties, with the primary targets being homeowners. Renters were affected β often displaced β when landlords accepted buyouts, but renters were not formal participants in the buyout process and received no direct compensation (Cardwell 2021). Some commercial properties were also acquired (Spidalieri et al. 2020 refers to \"homes and businesses\"). No evidence of retreat of critical infrastructure or industrial assets in the reviewed sources.\n\n**Category selected:** Individuals (and Groups/Neighbourhoods to a secondary degree, given neighborhood-level clustering strategy).\n\n---\n\n### Other notes (General Information)\n\nThe program specifically addresses \"repetitive loss structures\" β properties that have flooded multiple times (Spidalieri et al. 2020). The Quick Buy mechanism captures properties immediately following flood events before substantial repairs are made, preventing the cycle of damage and rebuild (Spidalieri et al. 2020). The program addresses inland riverine and pluvial flooding; no coastal or sea-level-rise hazard context is discussed in the sources.\n\n---" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "case_id": "CS41", | |
| "chunk_index": 2, | |
| "section": "institutional_environment", | |
| "location": "Charlotte, North Carolina", | |
| "country": "United States", | |
| "country_normalized": "United States", | |
| "continent": "North America", | |
| "admin_area": "North Carolina", | |
| "source": "Pipeline Ver2 β Charlotte", | |
| "source_links": [ | |
| { | |
| "title": "Shi, L., Fisher, A., Brenner, R. M., Greiner-Safi, A., Shepard, C., & Vanucchi, J. (2022). Equitable buyouts? Learning from state, county, and local floodplain management programs. Climatic Change, 174(3-4). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-022-03453-5", | |
| "doi": "10.1007/s10584-022-03453-5", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-022-03453-5" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Cardwell, J. (2023). Community perceptions of a floodplain buyout program in Charlotte, North Carolina. Natural Hazards, 115(3), 2141-2160. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11069-022-05631-1", | |
| "doi": "10.1007/s11069-022-05631-1", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s11069-022-05631-1" | |
| } | |
| ], | |
| "text": "Case study: Charlotte (Charlotte, North Carolina, United States)\nSection: INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT\n\n---\n\n### What is the focus or scope of the MR project?\n\n**Answer:** Individual buyout/retreat (primary); Leasebacks, easements and buffers (secondary).\n\n**Narrative:** The core mechanism is individual property acquisition through voluntary buyouts (Spidalieri et al. 2020; Cardwell 2021; Shi et al. 2022). Properties are acquired one at a time through negotiated sales at pre-disaster fair-market value.\n\nCMSS has also implemented leaseback arrangements β specifically triple net leasebacks and orphan parcel leasebacks β as supplementary tools (Spidalieri et al. 2020). Spidalieri et al. (2020) note that CMSS has implemented leasebacks since 2008, and as of 2019 approximately a dozen have been used (around one per year). These are used to manage timing, reduce holdouts, support elderly or financially constrained owners, and reduce property maintenance costs.\n\nPost-buyout, acquired lands are deed-restricted as permanent open space, preventing future development β a functional restriction analogous to an easement in effect (Spidalieri et al. 2020; Shi et al. 2022).\n\n**Categories selected:** Individual buyout/retreat (primary); Leasebacks, easements and buffers (secondary, for leaseback tool). Deed restrictions function as a form of open-space constraint, though the sources do not explicitly label them as \"easements.\"\n\n---\n\n### What legal constraints or requirements were identified during the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Relevant regulations/acts; Home acquisition; Land acquisition; Title(s) transfer; Retreat land development; Compliance & enforcement.\n\n**Narrative:**\n\n- **Relevant regulations/acts:** FEMA's HMGP rules govern eligibility, cost-benefit analysis, and permanent deed-restriction requirements for federally funded buyouts (Spidalieri et al. 2020; Shi et al. 2022). The program is described as requiring properties to \"meet eligibility and priority criteria set by the federal and/or state governments\" (Spidalieri et al. 2020).\n\n- **Home acquisition:** Properties are acquired voluntarily; eminent domain is explicitly not used (Spidalieri et al. 2020). FEMA's HMGP requires voluntary participation. The program uses appraisals to determine pre-disaster fair-market value (Cardwell 2021).\n\n- **Land acquisition:** CMSS operates three distinct legal funding and acquisition pathways: FEMA grants, local stormwater-fee-funded buyouts, and Quick Buys (Spidalieri et al. 2020). Local risk-based buyouts fund properties that do not meet federal grant criteria.\n\n- **Title(s) transfer:** Upon completion, title transfers to CMSS/Mecklenburg County. Properties are then deed-restricted as permanent open space (Spidalieri et al. 2020).\n\n- **Retreat land development:** FEMA requirements govern allowable post-buyout uses (open space only; no development). Local uses such as community gardens, greenway trails, and ecological preserves are planned and implemented at the local level (Spidalieri et al. 2020; Cardwell 2021). In certain circumstances, after buyouts within a given area are completed, streets and utilities may also be removed or left unmaintained to further restore the floodplain (Spidalieri et al. 2020).\n\n- **Compliance & enforcement:** Orphan parcel leaseback lessees are subject to periodic inspections by CMSS to ensure compliance with lease terms and, for federally funded properties, FEMA requirements (Spidalieri et al. 2020). Triple net leasebacks include \"triggers\" that can terminate the lease (e.g., a major flooding event or death of the homeowner). Leases are not transferable and do not allow substantial improvements or acceptance of government repair funds (Spidalieri et al. 2020).\n\n**Note on land rezoning:** No source explicitly describes formal land rezoning as part of the program process. Deed restrictions to open space are the primary land-use control mechanism described. This category is therefore not selected.\n\n**No evidence of litigation** arising from the buyout program in the reviewed sources.\n\n**Categories selected:** Relevant regulations/acts; Home acquisition; Land acquisition; Title(s) transfer; Retreat land development; Compliance & enforcement.\n\n---\n\n### What were the funding sources for the MR project?\n\n**Answer:** Multiple funders β Federal (FEMA HMGP) and Local/Municipal (stormwater utility fee, county reserve funds).\n\n**Narrative:** The program relies on three funding streams (Spidalieri et al. 2020):\n1. **FEMA HMGP grants** β federal funding; local governments provide a 25% match (Cardwell 2021; Shi et al. 2022). CMSS has used FEMA grants less frequently since the program's founding as more local buyouts are completed and fewer properties meet federal eligibility criteria (Spidalieri et al. 2020).\n2. **Local stormwater utility fee** β a fee that generates most of the approximately $4 million annual budget for non-FEMA-eligible, risk-based buyouts (Shi et al. 2022; Spidalieri et al. 2020). Charlotte and Austin \"raise funds through a stormwater utility tax on impervious surface\" (Shi et al. 2022).\n3. **Mecklenburg Board of County Commissioners \"rainy day\" funds** β used for Quick Buys immediately after flood events (Spidalieri et al. 2020).\n\nAs of 2019, most buyouts are funded completely by local government funds (Spidalieri et al. 2020). Total program investment exceeds $67 million (Spidalieri et al. 2020). Leaseback arrangements also generate some rental income (in-kind or monetary), partially offsetting property maintenance costs (Spidalieri et al. 2020).\n\n**Categories selected:** Multiple funders β Federal (FEMA HMGP) and Local/Municipal (stormwater utility fee and county reserve funds).\n\n---\n\n### What was considered to maintain (or improve) the tax base in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Limited evidence. Some indirect reference to encouraging resilient redevelopment elsewhere in the county.\n\n**Narrative:** The sources do not explicitly identify tax base maintenance as a stated goal of the CMSS program. Shi et al. (2022) note that \"local tax rolls may be permanently reduced when valuable real estate is removed from the city's building stock\" as a general concern about buyout programs, but do not identify specific CMSS measures to address this. Spidalieri et al. (2020) note the program \"encouraged the development of newer, more resilient buildings in less vulnerable locations within Mecklenburg County\" β implying an indirect expectation that displaced households' economic contributions relocate within the county. Post-buyout land uses (community gardens, greenways, ecological preserves) are described as community assets, not as explicit tax-base maintenance strategies.\n\n**Category with limited evidence:** Redevelopment of retreat lands β partial and implicit only (community amenities created on vacated land). No evidence for new industry, new housing for buyout recipients as a tax-base strategy, or explicit livelihood supports for this purpose.\n\n---\n\n### What level/type of compensation mechanisms were considered in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Market value; Free supports and services (demolition).\n\n**Narrative:**\n- **Market value:** Homeowners are offered the pre-disaster fair-market value of their home β \"calculated as if the house hadn't sustained flood damage\" (Cardwell 2021). This was described as the \"tipping point\" for many homeowners. Under FEMA's HMGP, \"homeowners receive funding equal to their home's pre-disaster fair-market value\" (Shi et al. 2022).\n- **Free supports and services:** All structures are demolished at CMSS's expense upon acquisition (Spidalieri et al. 2020). In some circumstances, streets and utilities may also be removed (Spidalieri et al. 2020).\n\n**What is not provided:** FEMA's HMGP does not fund relocation assistance, financial counseling, or real estate services (Shi et al. 2022). The sources do not indicate that CMSS independently funds these services for buyout participants. This is explicitly contrasted with Austin's program, which models benefits after the federal Uniform Relocation Assistance Act (Shi et al. 2022). No direct financial top-ups, relocation bonuses, or bridging payments to buyout participants are documented for CMSS. Renters receive no compensation mechanism (Cardwell 2021; Shi et al. 2022).\n\n**Note on leasebacks as compensation:** Leaseback arrangements allow continued residence for a period post-sale, which provides practical benefit to participants. However, this is a program management tool rather than a direct compensation payment. Accordingly, \"Additional incentives, bonuses and top-ups\" is not selected as a category for this program based on the available evidence.\n\n**Categories selected:** Market value; Free supports and services (demolition and, in some cases, infrastructure removal).\n\n---" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "case_id": "CS41", | |
| "chunk_index": 3, | |
| "section": "planning_processes", | |
| "location": "Charlotte, North Carolina", | |
| "country": "United States", | |
| "country_normalized": "United States", | |
| "continent": "North America", | |
| "admin_area": "North Carolina", | |
| "source": "Pipeline Ver2 β Charlotte", | |
| "source_links": [ | |
| { | |
| "title": "Shi, L., Fisher, A., Brenner, R. M., Greiner-Safi, A., Shepard, C., & Vanucchi, J. (2022). Equitable buyouts? Learning from state, county, and local floodplain management programs. Climatic Change, 174(3-4). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-022-03453-5", | |
| "doi": "10.1007/s10584-022-03453-5", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-022-03453-5" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Cardwell, J. (2023). Community perceptions of a floodplain buyout program in Charlotte, North Carolina. Natural Hazards, 115(3), 2141-2160. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11069-022-05631-1", | |
| "doi": "10.1007/s11069-022-05631-1", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s11069-022-05631-1" | |
| } | |
| ], | |
| "text": "Case study: Charlotte (Charlotte, North Carolina, United States)\nSection: PLANNING PROCESSES\n\n---\n\n### What is the time horizon considered in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Pre-retreat planning; Immediate risks (1β5 years); Anticipated future risks (10β100 years); Post-retreat follow-up.\n\n**Narrative:**\n- **Pre-retreat planning:** CMSS uses a Flood Risk Assessment and Risk Reduction Plan to score, rank, and prioritize properties for acquisition (Spidalieri et al. 2020; Shi et al. 2022). This constitutes explicit pre-retreat planning independent of disaster events.\n- **Immediate risks (1β5 years):** The Quick Buy mechanism responds within days to weeks of a flood event (Spidalieri et al. 2020), addressing immediate risks from a just-occurred event.\n- **Anticipated future risks (10β100 years):** CMSS estimates avoided future losses of $300 million (Spidalieri et al. 2020), and Shi et al. (2022) reference climate change projections for future rainfall increases. The locally funded buyout stream explicitly targets future risk reduction.\n- **Post-retreat follow-up:** Spidalieri et al. (2020) describe CMSS working with communities to design post-buyout uses and maintaining properties (directly or via orphan parcel leasebacks). However, Cardwell (2021) documents significant failures of post-retreat follow-up engagement at several sites, particularly socially vulnerable communities such as Hidden Valley, where promised uses were not delivered and maintenance deteriorated.\n\n**Categories selected:** Pre-retreat planning; Immediate risks (1β5 years) (Quick Buy mechanism); Anticipated future risks (10β100 years) (proactive, data-driven prioritization; avoided future loss estimates); Post-retreat follow-up (acknowledged as an objective, but documented by Cardwell 2021 as unevenly and sometimes poorly achieved).\n\n---\n\n### What planning elements were considered in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Top-down; Participatory/collaborative (variably, site-specific); Cost-benefit analysis (CBA); Multi-criteria decision analysis (elements of); Coordination with other sectors and jurisdictions (limited); Degree of transparency; Multi-stage retreat; Adaptive management.\n\n**Narrative:**\n- **Top-down:** CMSS, as a governmental utility, unilaterally scores, ranks, and prioritizes properties and determines where and when buyouts occur. County commissioners allocate Quick Buy funds. Federal FEMA rules set eligibility criteria (Spidalieri et al. 2020).\n- **Participatory/collaborative:** CMSS engages residents through peer-to-peer programs (past buyout participants share experiences), participatory budgeting exercises (\"monopoly money\" workshops), and public outreach (Shi et al. 2022). Community engagement quality varies significantly across sites: effective in Country Club Heights and Chantilly; absent or inadequate in Biddleville-Smallwood and Hidden Valley (Cardwell 2021).\n- **CBA:** Properties are prioritized partly based on cost-effectiveness, and FEMA's benefit-cost analysis is applied where federal funding is used (Spidalieri et al. 2020). Shi et al. (2022) note CMSS has broadened CBA criteria to include community-level benefits.\n- **MCDA (elements of):** CMSS uses \"a holistic scoring system that captures local risks, land use priorities, and vulnerabilities\" and considers community value (greenway connections, historic sites, civic centers) alongside cost-effectiveness (Shi et al. 2022). The sources describe elements consistent with MCDA, though no formal named MCDA framework is cited.\n- **Coordination with other sectors:** Shi et al. (2022) note that in Charlotte-Mecklenburg, CMSS \"had formed a coalition with watershed, recreation, stewardship, and flood monitoring groups, not housing and community development.\" Coordination with housing agencies is notably absent. The program does not coordinate with agencies responsible for affordable housing or receiving communities.\n- **Degree of transparency:** CMSS publishes a Flood Risk Assessment and Risk Reduction Community Guidebook (CMSS 2020) and offers an interactive flood risk mapping tool (Shi et al. 2022; Spidalieri et al. 2020). However, Cardwell (2021) documents that community members in some neighborhoods expressed confusion about who owned vacant land and what uses were permitted, suggesting transparency is uneven in practice.\n- **Multi-stage retreat:** The program is ongoing over 20+ years, with properties acquired in stages. The orphan property program encourages last holdouts to sell once adjacent properties are acquired, enabling phased neighborhood-scale restoration (Spidalieri et al. 2020).\n- **Adaptive management:** The program has evolved significantly over time, shifting from reliance primarily on FEMA grants (1999) to establishing a local stormwater fee for non-FEMA-eligible buyouts (2012) and adding leaseback tools (2008). Shi et al. (2022) describe this institutional learning as a key advantage of standing programs. Internally, CMSS recognized that its \"neighborhood change score\" could have exclusionary effects, prompting it to hire a facilitator to address distributive injustice (Shi et al. 2022).\n\n**Note:** \"Bottom-up\" is not selected as a primary category. While some neighborhoods successfully shaped outcomes through strong social capital (Country Club Heights), the program's decision-making authority remains with CMSS.\n\n**Categories selected:** Top-down; Participatory/collaborative (variable and site-specific); CBA; MCDA (elements of); Coordination with other sectors and jurisdictions (limited, primarily within environmental/watershed sector); Degree of transparency (published guidebook and mapping tool, though uneven in practice); Multi-stage retreat; Adaptive management.\n\n---\n\n### What decision support tools were used in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** CBA; MCDA (elements of); Hazard maps & models; Process guidance; Social vulnerability assessments (emerging/research-only in practice).\n\n**Narrative:**\n- **CBA:** FEMA's benefit-cost analysis methodology is applied for federally funded buyouts. CMSS has also diversified CBA criteria beyond property value to include community benefits (Shi et al. 2022; Spidalieri et al. 2020).\n- **MCDA (elements of):** CMSS uses a holistic scoring system incorporating multiple criteria β flood risk, cost-effectiveness, land use priorities, community value β when prioritizing properties (Shi et al. 2022; Spidalieri et al. 2020). No formally named MCDA model is cited in the sources.\n- **Hazard maps & models" | |
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