Spaces:
Sleeping
Sleeping
Download data/extracted/CS7.json from annasbeef/RFR-Knowledge-Platform: direct link, hf CLI and curl.
- Browser
- Download file 38.7 kB
-
https://huggingface.co/spaces/annasbeef/RFR-Knowledge-Platform/resolve/main/data/extracted/CS7.json
- Command line
-
hf download hf://spaces/annasbeef/RFR-Knowledge-Platform/data/extracted/CS7.json
-
curl -L -o CS7.json https://huggingface.co/spaces/annasbeef/RFR-Knowledge-Platform/resolve/main/data/extracted/CS7.json
38.7 kB
| [ | |
| { | |
| "case_id": "CS7", | |
| "chunk_index": 0, | |
| "section": "overview", | |
| "location": "Hambantota", | |
| "country": "Sri Lanka", | |
| "country_normalized": "Sri Lanka", | |
| "continent": "Asia", | |
| "admin_area": "", | |
| "source": "Pipeline Ver2 — Hambantota Post-Tsunami Relocation", | |
| "source_links": [ | |
| { | |
| "title": "Duyne Barenstein, J. (2012). Post-tsunami relocation outcomes in Sri Lanka: Communities' perspectives in Ampara and Hambantota. In Post-disaster reconstruction and change: Communities' perspectives. CRC Press. https://doi.org/10.1201/b13027-12", | |
| "doi": "10.1201/b13027-12", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1201/b13027-12" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Manatunge, J. M. A., & Abeysinghe, U. (2017). Factors affecting the satisfaction of post-disaster resettlers in the long term: A case study on the resettlement sites of tsunami-affected communities in Sri Lanka. Journal of Asian Development, 3(1), 94-124.", | |
| "url": "https://www.macrothink.org/journal/index.php/jad/article/view/10604/0" | |
| } | |
| ], | |
| "text": "Case study: Hambantota Post-Tsunami Relocation (Hambantota, Sri Lanka)\nSection: CASE STUDY OVERVIEW\n\n### Case Name and Location\n\nPost-Tsunami Community Resettlement in Sri Lanka, with primary case material drawn from the Siribopura Resettlement Housing Program in Hambantota District, and supplementary coverage of resettlement sites in Ampara, Galle (Akmeemana), and Matara Districts. Sri Lanka, South Asia (Global South).\n\n### Hazard(s)\n\nThe primary hazard driving relocation was the Indian Ocean Tsunami of 26 December 2004, a catastrophic coastal event. The tsunami affected nearly 65% of Sri Lanka's coastline (about 1,000 km), killed over 30,000 people, and displaced more than 500,000 people [1, 2]. Destruction of housing was the largest single category of physical damage [2].\n\n### Type of Retreat\n\nThe retreat took the form of a mandatory, government-directed community resettlement away from a declared coastal buffer zone (initially 100–200 m, later revised to 55–100 m). Displaced households within the buffer zone were relocated to donor-built permanent housing in new inland settlement sites under a \"donor-driven\" model. An alternative \"Owner-Driven Reconstruction\" (ODR) program allowed households outside the buffer zone to rebuild in place with financial assistance.\n\n### Scale\n\nInitial estimates suggested approximately 50,000 families would need relocation; following policy revision after the November 2005 election, the no-building zone was reduced from 100–200 m to 55–100 m, lowering the estimated relocation requirement to approximately 30,000 households [1]. This translated to 29,830 housing units in relocated sites across affected districts [1]. By the middle of 2005, THRU had finalised plans to build 485 housing projects in 11 districts [2]. In Hambantota District, the Siribopura site accommodated 1,083 tsunami-affected households, along with others displaced for different reasons [3, 6]. Across the country, approximately 4,643 units were required in Hambantota's relocation sites (against a housing requirement of only 1,057 per initial TAFREN estimates), while Ampara required approximately 3,721 units [1].\n\n### Key Actors\n\n- **Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL)**: Set policy, declared buffer zones, established institutional mechanisms, and coordinated land acquisition and beneficiary selection through Divisional Secretariats.\n- **Task Force for Rebuilding the Nation (TAFREN)** and **Tsunami Housing Reconstruction Unit (THRU)**: Primary initial coordinating bodies, both dissolved in November 2005 [2].\n- **Reconstruction and Development Agency (RADA)**: Successor coordination body, created in November 2005 [1, 2].\n- **Urban Development Authority (UDA)**: Responsible for layout preparation, guidelines, and coordination of permanent housing sites.\n- **National Housing Development Authority (NHDA)**: Issued housing and planning guidelines.\n- **International and domestic donor agencies and NGOs**: Constructed housing under the donor-driven model (Suchi Foundation, Singapore Red Cross, Sajith Foundation, Suboda Foundation, Care International, and others) [6].\n- **Ports Authority of Sri Lanka**: Managed compensation for harbour development-related displacement in Hambantota, separate from the tsunami resettlement program [6].\n- **University of Moratuwa**: Conducted the 2006 Rapid Environmental Assessment (REA) of 409 housing sites [2].\n- **Affected communities**: Had limited and largely nominal involvement in planning; in practice, their preferences were often not reflected in final site allocations [1, 2, 5].\n\n### Timeline\n\n- **26 December 2004**: Tsunami strikes; government declares buffer zones (100–200 m).\n- **Early 2005**: TAFREN and THRU established; donor-driven reconstruction begins; buffer zone at 100–200 m.\n- **2005–2006**: Owner-driven reconstruction proceeds more rapidly and cost-effectively than donor-driven construction.\n- **November 2005**: TAFREN and THRU dissolved; RADA created as successor coordination agency [1, 2].\n- **After November 2005 election**: No-building zone revised from 100–200 m to 55–100 m, reducing estimated households requiring relocation to approximately 30,000 [1].\n- **2005–2008**: Donor-built housing units progressively completed and handed over (Hambantota ahead of schedule; Ampara severely delayed).\n- **2006**: University of Moratuwa REA of 409 sites conducted, though construction was already underway at most sites by that time [2].\n- **2007/2008**: Harbour development-induced resettlement in Hambantota; Ports Authority compensation program implemented for 454 households [6].\n- **2008–2009**: World Habitat Research Center (WHRC) study of relocation outcomes conducted in Ampara and Hambantota [1].\n- **2011**: Primary surveys in Siribopura and Hambantota for land market and success/failure analyses [3, 6].\n- **2016**: Household surveys conducted for long-term satisfaction study covering 12 sites in Galle, Matara, and Hambantota [2].\n- **Status**: Post-retreat; follow-up studies confirm persistent dissatisfaction and unresolved land tenure issues more than a decade after the event.\n\n### Key Outcomes\n\nOutcomes were mixed and varied significantly by district and site. Hambantota benefited from disproportionate donor interest and political attention, as it was the native district of Sri Lanka's president at the time of the tsunami [1]. This resulted in far more housing being built than was required by tsunami-affected households; many units were distributed to non-tsunami-affected households through political patronage [1]. Ampara's reconstruction was severely delayed and constrained by ethnic conflict and LTTE activity [1, 4].\n\nPhysical housing quality varied substantially by district and site: Hambantota houses were generally assessed as satisfactory, while Ampara included several sites with poor construction and inadequate infrastructure [1]. Across all three southern districts studied by Manatunge et al. [2], construction defects, inappropriate designs, poor ventilation, and inadequate infrastructure were common.\n\nLand tenure remained unresolved for the majority of resettlers for years after occupancy. In the Hambantota Siribopura sites, as of 2011, only 38 of the 1,083 tsunami-affected resettled households had received formal title deeds (free grants), while the majority possessed only informal letters from donor agencies [3]. This created informal land markets, barriers to credit, and ongoing tenure insecurity.\n\nLivelihood disruption was severe, particularly for fishing communities relocated far from the coast. Women's livelihoods were disproportionately disrupted [1]. Community participation in planning was limited to nominal or token processes at best, and was identified across multiple sources as a primary cause of dissatisfaction [2, 5]. Long-term satisfaction surveys more than a decade after the tsunami confirmed widespread dissatisfaction across most sites [2].\n\n### Narrative Summary\n\nOn 26 December 2004, the Indian Ocean Tsunami devastated Sri Lanka's coastline, killing over 30,000 people and displacing more than 500,000. The government's immediate response was to declare coastal buffer zones (initially 100–200 m from the sea) where no reconstruction would be permitted, requiring the relocation of approximately 50,000 households. This policy was announced in a context of \"profound emotion\" [1], without pre-existing legal or institutional frameworks for disaster-induced resettlement, and under enormous pressure from international donors and political actors to move quickly. There were no pre-existing policy frameworks or institutional arrangements readily available for post-tsunami resettlement [2]. Following a change in government in November 2005, the buffer zone was reduced to 55–100 m, reducing the relocation requirement to approximately 30,000 households. The scale of international aid flowing into the country was unprecedented, but so were the coordination failures.\n\nFor those within the buffer zone, the government and a large array of international and domestic NGOs constructed new housing in inland resettlement sites—a \"donor-driven\" model in which houses were planned and built by external agencies and then allocated to beneficiaries. Affected communities had limited and largely nominal involvement in planning; in practice, their preferences were often not reflected in final site allocations [1, 5]. People from different villages were placed in the same new settlements, breaking social networks. Sites were frequently located in unsuitable terrain—waterlogged, hilly, or remote—far from original livelihoods, especially fishing harbours and markets [1, 2]. Physical construction quality was often problematic, with cracked walls, collapsed roofs, inadequate ventilation and sanitation, and absent common spaces in many sites [2]. Most resettlers did not receive formal legal title to their land for years, leaving them unable to access formal credit and vulnerable to informal land market exploitation [3, 6].\n\nOutcomes varied sharply by district. Hambantota received more housing than it needed, with political interference channelling units to non-tsunami-affected households. Ampara, affected by both the tsunami and civil conflict, saw severe reconstruction delays, with housing inequitably distributed across ethnic lines. For resettlers across the studied districts, incomes generally declined, expenditures rose, and women's livelihoods were particularly disrupted [1]. Studies conducted more than a decade later confirm that many resettlers remain dissatisfied, houses have been abandoned or sold informally, and the social and economic rehabilitation promised at the outset has largely not been achieved [2, 3, 6]. The case stands as a cautionary example of reactive, top-down, politically influenced disaster resettlement conducted without adequate community participation, planning, or attention to livelihood sustainability.\n\n---" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "case_id": "CS7", | |
| "chunk_index": 1, | |
| "section": "coding_questions_and_answers", | |
| "location": "Hambantota", | |
| "country": "Sri Lanka", | |
| "country_normalized": "Sri Lanka", | |
| "continent": "Asia", | |
| "admin_area": "", | |
| "source": "Pipeline Ver2 — Hambantota Post-Tsunami Relocation", | |
| "source_links": [ | |
| { | |
| "title": "Duyne Barenstein, J. (2012). Post-tsunami relocation outcomes in Sri Lanka: Communities' perspectives in Ampara and Hambantota. In Post-disaster reconstruction and change: Communities' perspectives. CRC Press. https://doi.org/10.1201/b13027-12", | |
| "doi": "10.1201/b13027-12", | |
| "url": "https://doi.org/10.1201/b13027-12" | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| "title": "Manatunge, J. M. A., & Abeysinghe, U. (2017). Factors affecting the satisfaction of post-disaster resettlers in the long term: A case study on the resettlement sites of tsunami-affected communities in Sri Lanka. Journal of Asian Development, 3(1), 94-124.", | |
| "url": "https://www.macrothink.org/journal/index.php/jad/article/view/10604/0" | |
| } | |
| ], | |
| "text": "Case study: Hambantota Post-Tsunami Relocation (Hambantota, Sri Lanka)\nSection: CODING QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS\n\n---\n\n### Is there any evidence of a proactive or reactive trigger in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer: Reactive.**\n\nThe resettlement was entirely reactive, triggered by the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. The decision to establish coastal buffer zones and relocate affected communities was announced immediately in the aftermath of the disaster, \"in a context of profound emotion\" [1], without pre-existing institutional frameworks, resettlement policies, or planning guidelines for disaster-induced displacement. As Source [2] states explicitly: \"There were no pre-existing policy frameworks or institutional framework in Sri Lanka that could be readily adopted to deal with the situation aftermath of the 2004 tsunami.\" Source [5] similarly confirms: \"there is no uniform policy to address their resettlement concerns.\" The policy was reactive and ad hoc, with \"continuous amendments\" [1] to the buffer zone distances and housing requirements over the first two years.\n\nNo evidence supports a proactive trigger. There is a pre-existing Coastal Conservation Zone designation from 1981 [4], but it was not associated with proactive resettlement planning prior to the tsunami; it regulated coastal development but did not anticipate or plan for large-scale community relocation.\n\n---\n\n### Date, Number of households affected, Number of population affected, Total funding\n\n**Date:** 26 December 2004 (tsunami event); resettlement implemented primarily 2005–2008, with follow-up studies through at least 2016.\n\n**Number of households affected:** Initial estimates placed approximately 50,000 families requiring relocation across all affected districts [1]. Following policy revision after the November 2005 election, this was reduced to a requirement for 29,830 housing units in relocated sites [1]. In Hambantota, 1,083 tsunami-affected households were placed in the Siribopura resettlement program [3, 6]. Across 11 districts, THRU had finalised plans to build 485 housing projects by mid-2005 [2]. The total number of houses contracted between TAFREN and donors was approximately 33,821, representing about 70% of the 49,233 houses required as of March 2006 [4].\n\n**Population affected:** More than 500,000 people were displaced by the tsunami [1]; the figure of 516,150 displaced persons appears in sources [3] and [4], sourced from the Sri Lanka Ministry of Finance and Planning. The tsunami killed over 30,000 people in Sri Lanka [1].\n\n**Total funding:** No single aggregate total funding figure is provided in the reviewed sources. Funding came from a large array of international donors and NGOs. Construction costs escalated by more than 80% by end of 2006 relative to early 2005 estimates, causing shortfalls that some donors addressed by reducing their housing commitments while others compromised on quality [2]. Individual housing units under the donor-driven program were required to meet a minimum specification issued by UDA (minimum floor area of 46.5 m²) [2]. The Siribopura study notes construction was supported by multiple donors including Suchi Foundation, Singapore Red Cross, Sajith Foundation, Suboda Foundation, and Care International [6]. Research funding for the studies came from the Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation [1], the Mitsui & Co. Environmental Fund and University of Tokyo [2], and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung [5].\n\n---\n\n### What is the occurrence of the hazard(s) considered in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer: Single Hazard.**\n\nThe managed resettlement decision was driven by a single hazard event: the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, and the associated coastal inundation that defined the buffer zone policy. The buffer zone was explicitly declared to reduce \"the vulnerability of the coastal population to eventual future disasters\" of the same tsunami/coastal hazard type [1].\n\nWhile Sri Lanka is described as a \"disaster prone zone\" subject to multiple hazards including floods, cyclones, landslides, droughts, and coastal erosion [3], and the post-tsunami context intersected with pre-existing civil conflict in some areas (notably Ampara and Batticaloa), the buffer zone resettlement policy was explicitly triggered by the tsunami hazard alone. The civil conflict is contextual—it significantly affected implementation in Ampara—but was not itself a driver of the buffer zone policy.\n\n**Alternative interpretation:** One could argue the case involved multiple hazards in a broader sense, given that some resettlement sites were placed in low-lying areas prone to flooding [2] and the civil war complicated implementation in Ampara [1, 4]. However, the formal MR decision was based solely on the tsunami/coastal hazard, and the codebook definition of \"Single Hazard\" as \"one specific hazard impacting the area\" is met here.\n\n---\n\n### What is the origin of the hazards considered in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer: Natural Hazard.**\n\nThe 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami was a natural geological event (submarine earthquake triggering oceanic waves). The codebook designates \"Natural Hazard\" for naturally occurring events such as earthquakes and associated phenomena. There is no evidence that the hazard was technologically driven or climate-change induced in origin.\n\n---\n\n### Was this hazard considered in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer: Tsunami; Coastal Flooding/Erosion.**\n\nThe primary hazard type is **Tsunami** (the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami). The policy response was explicitly to create a coastal buffer zone to reduce vulnerability to future disasters of the same type [1]. The associated hazard mechanism—coastal inundation and wave impact—also places this within **Coastal Flooding/Erosion**, as the buffer zone addressed coastal flood risk more broadly.\n\nBoth categories apply. No evidence supports coding for Riverine/Pluvial Flooding, Lake Flooding, Wildfire, Volcano, Land Subsidence, Landslide, Earthquake (as a directly managed hazard), Hurricane, or other hazard types as drivers of the retreat decision.\n\n---\n\n### What was the geographic scale of the MR project?\n\n**Answer: Neighbourhood; Entire Community; Watershed Region (multi-district).**\n\nThe resettlement operated simultaneously at multiple scales:\n- At the **neighbourhood/community level**, specific coastal communities (e.g., Hambantota town, Galle city coastal belt) were collectively relocated into new inland settlements such as Siribopura [3, 6] and sites in Akmeemana, Galle [5].\n- At the **entire community level**, all residents within the declared buffer zone of a given village or coastal settlement were subject to the mandatory policy.\n- At the **watershed/regional level**, the policy covered 11–13 coastal districts across Sri Lanka's coastline, with 485 housing projects planned in 11 districts [2].\n\nThe scale is therefore multi-level—from individual resettlement sites to a national coastal resettlement program.\n\n---\n\n### Who or what was retreated?\n\n**Answer: Individuals; Groups/Neighbourhoods; Communities.**\n\n- **Individuals** and households were the formal unit of resettlement (one house per household/family unit).\n- **Groups/Neighbourhoods**: Coastal communities and neighbourhood-scale populations were relocated; however, people from different places of origin were often mixed in the same new sites rather than being relocated as intact communities [1].\n- **Communities**: At the policy level, all residents within the buffer zone of a given coastal area were the intended category for resettlement.\n\nNo evidence suggests retreat of critical infrastructure, hazard protection structures, or industrial assets as the primary objects of retreat in this case.\n\n---\n\n### What is the focus or scope of the MR project?\n\n**Answer: Community buyout/retreat; Other acquisition tools (harbour development component only).**\n\nThe primary focus was **community resettlement**—collective relocation of coastal populations from declared buffer zones into new settlements, coordinated by government and donor agencies. This was a government-mandated collective resettlement, not a voluntary individual buyout program. The codebook definition of \"Community buyout/retreat\" as \"collective relocation of a neighborhood or settlement through coordinated planning\" applies, noting that in this case coordination was top-down and largely mandatory rather than participatory.\n\n**Other acquisition tools** apply specifically to the harbour development component in Hambantota: the Ports Authority expropriated harbour-adjacent land with formal compensation payments under special cabinet approval, paying above market value with an additional 10% bonus for early vacating [6]. This is treated as a distinct, separate sub-case rather than the main tsunami resettlement.\n\nAn important nuance: the tsunami resettlement was not framed as a \"buyout\" in the conventional sense. Affected households were provided new houses without having to surrender their original buffer-zone land to the government; they nominally retained ownership of their pre-tsunami properties (though practical access was prevented by the no-construction zone) [1, 3].\n\n---\n\n### What legal constraints or requirements were identified during the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer: Legal authority over retreat; Relevant regulations/acts; Home acquisition; Land acquisition; Title(s) transfer; Land rezoning; Retreat land development; Compliance & enforcement; Other.**\n\n- **Legal authority over retreat**: The GoSL established the buffer zone by regulation and delegated authority to Divisional Secretaries, the UDA, TAFREN/RADA, and THRU to implement resettlement [1, 2, 4, 5].\n\n- **Relevant regulations/acts**: The Coastal Conservation Zone (CCZ) framework (1981) had previously designated buffer zones for development regulation [4]. Post-tsunami, the revised buffer zone distances (initially 100–200 m, later revised to 55–100 m) were established by regulatory directive [1, 4]. Three sets of guidelines governed donor housing construction: TAFREN Implementation Guidelines, NHDA Guidelines for Housing Development in Coastal Sri Lanka, and UDA Building Planning Guidelines [2]. The Crown Land Ordinance No. 8 of 1947 governed state land alienation to resettlers via free grants [3]. The Land Acquisition Act No. 9 of 1950 applied to the harbour development compensation component [6].\n\n- **Home acquisition**: New houses were built and allocated by donor agencies; there was no market-based purchase of original homes. In the harbour development component, compensation was paid for existing structures [6].\n\n- **Land acquisition**: State land was identified by Divisional Secretaries for resettlement sites. In some cases, donors acquired private land directly from landowners to avoid delays in title transfer [2].\n\n- **Title(s) transfer**: A persistent and serious failure. The process for issuing formal deeds (free grants under the CLO) was slow and cumbersome. As of 2011, only 38 of the 1,083 tsunami-affected Siribopura resettlers had received formal deeds, while the majority possessed only informal letters from donor agencies without legal force [3]. This is not a case of owners losing title to their original land; rather, formal deeds for the *new* resettlement land were delayed for years. In Galle and Matara, resettlers in some sites received legal title, which—combined with high land demand near urban areas—contributed to high rates of informal sale or rental [2].\n\n- **Land rezoning**: The buffer zone declaration effectively rezoned coastal land as a no-construction zone for residential purposes [1, 4]. Source [4] describes the revised zone classifications (Table 1 in that source).\n\n- **Retreat land development**: The buffer zone was designated a no-construction zone, but the reviewed sources do not describe formal plans for the positive redevelopment or restoration of these coastal areas after evacuation.\n\n- **Compliance & enforcement**: Planning approvals were rarely sought by donors before construction commenced. The under-resourced UDA and THRU were unable to enforce compliance effectively and \"allowed the donors to commence the projects without paying any attention to prior approval\" [2]. No effective post-handover monitoring or grievance mechanisms were established [2].\n\n- **Other**: The dual housing policy (buffer zone resettlement vs. ODR outside the buffer zone) created complex and sometimes inequitable entitlements [1]. The absence of a single publicly available document setting out housing entitlement and tenure arrangements created systemic confusion [1].\n\n---\n\n### What were the funding sources for the MR project?\n\n**Answer: Multiple funders — Federal (national government); International aid; NGOs; Local/Municipal.**\n\n- **National government (Federal)**: GoSL provided state land for resettlement, established and funded the coordinating agencies (TAFREN, THRU, RADA), and ensured infrastructure connections (water, electricity) up to site boundaries. The Ports Authority compensation for harbour development was funded under special cabinet approval [6].\n- **International aid and NGOs**: The dominant funding stream for housing construction. A large array of international and domestic NGOs and donor agencies funded and built individual resettlement schemes under the donor-driven model (e.g., Suchi Foundation, Singapore Red Cross, Sajith Foundation, Suboda Foundation, Care International) [6]. Donor funding estimates were based on early 2005 costs; by end of 2006, costs had escalated by more than 80%, causing funding shortfalls [2].\n- **Local/Municipal**: Local authorities (Pradeshiya Sabhas, municipal councils) were formally responsible for maintaining common areas, street lighting, internal roads, and garbage collection after handover, but were generally under-resourced and unable to fulfil this responsibility adequately [2].\n\nNo evidence of insurance funding or meaningful individual self-financing of the primary resettlement housing (the ODR program, where individuals used government grants to rebuild in place, is a separate pathway and not the managed retreat component per se).\n\n---\n\n### What was considered to maintain (or improve) the tax base in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer: No direct evidence found.**\n\nNone of the reviewed sources explicitly address tax base maintenance as a consideration in the resettlement decision process. The context is post-disaster Sri Lanka in a lower-income country setting, where the primary stated motivation was disaster recovery and vulnerability reduction, not fiscal or tax base preservation.\n\n**Contextual note**: Source [3] notes that Hambantota was being developed as a \"mega city\" with major infrastructure projects (seaport, oil refinery, international airport, etc.), and that proximity to this development corridor increased informal land market values in Siribopura over time. This suggests broader urban development aspirations shaped the receiving-area context, but there is no evidence this was an explicit consideration in the MR tax base planning.\n\n---\n\n### What level/type of compensation mechanisms were considered in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer: Free supports and services — replacement housing (tsunami resettlement); Market value / above-market value (harbour development only); Additional incentives, bonuses, and top-ups (harbour development); Other (ODR financial grants outside buffer zone).**\n\n- **Tsunami resettlement**: Affected households received a newly built house and a land plot (20 perches in Siribopura; 6–20 perches across different districts) without cash compensation for their original properties, which they nominally retained [1, 3, 6]. All people within the buffer zone—including tenants and encroachers on government land—were entitled to a house; owners did not have to surrender their original land [1]. Those who previously engaged in agriculture received an additional 40-perch agricultural plot approximately 1 km from the resettlement site [3, 6]. This is best coded as \"Free supports and services\" — specifically, in-kind replacement housing and land.\n\n- **Market value / above-market value (harbour development)**: For harbour development-induced displacement, the Ports Authority paid compensation under a special cabinet approval providing payments \"over and above market value\" of original properties, with a minimum of Rs 500,000 and some payments up to Rs 2,000,000 [6].\n\n- **Additional incentives (harbour development)**: Harbour resettlers who vacated promptly received an additional 10% compensation bonus [6].\n\n- **ODR program (outside buffer zone)**: Financial grants were provided for owner-driven rebuilding outside the buffer zone (e.g., Rs 325,000 for fully destroyed houses, Rs 110,000 for partial damage in conflict-affected areas [5]). This is a related recovery pathway, not the managed retreat component itself.\n\n**Significant gap**: In the tsunami resettlement, formal land title (free grants/deeds) was promised under CLO No. 8 of 1947 but largely not delivered for years, severely undermining the effective value of the compensation provided [3, 6].\n\n---\n\n### What is the time horizon considered in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer: Pre-retreat planning (minimal/inadequate); Immediate risks (1–5 years); Post-retreat follow-up (limited/inadequate).**\n\n- **Pre-retreat planning**: Extremely limited. The policy was announced immediately after the disaster with minimal pre-planning. There were no pre-existing frameworks for disaster-induced resettlement [2]. The University of Moratuwa REA of 409 sites was conducted in 2006, by which time construction was already underway at most sites, limiting its utility for site selection [2].\n\n- **Immediate risks (1–5 years)**: The buffer zone policy was explicitly framed as addressing future tsunami and coastal flood risk. The urgency of moving people out of the hazard zone drove the compressed implementation timeline.\n\n- **Post-retreat follow-up**: Minimal in practice. Once houses were handed over, donor agencies largely departed with no ongoing communication channels or monitoring [2]. \"The absence of planning documentations, proper implementing guidelines, and non-existence of mechanisms for grievance redress caused significant problems for householders\" [2]. The absence of post-retreat follow-up is consistently identified as a failure across multiple sources [1, 2, 5, 6].\n\nNo evidence of planning for emerging risks (5–10 years) or anticipated future risks (10–100 years) as distinct planning horizons beyond the general buffer zone rationale.\n\n---\n\n### What planning elements were considered in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer: Top-down; Single-stage retreat; Coordination with other sectors and jurisdictions (attempted but largely inadequate); Degree of transparency (low).**\n\n- **Top-down**: The resettlement was entirely government-initiated and government-directed, with minimal community input. Fernando et al. [5] conclude that \"a top down approach was practiced by stakeholders\" across all settings studied. Source [1] documents that communities \"had no opportunity to participate in any resettlement-related decision or to choose among the various resettlement sites.\"\n\n- **Single-stage retreat**: Relocation occurred in one phase per site, as donor-built houses became available and were allocated to beneficiaries.\n\n- **Coordination with other sectors and jurisdictions**: Multiple agencies (TAFREN/THRU/RADA, UDA, NHDA, Divisional Secretariats, local authorities, donors) were formally assigned roles, but coordination failures were widespread. \"Coordination among the stakeholders and communication issues were widespread, and the allocation of responsibilities was not clear\" [2].\n\n- **Degree of transparency**: Explicitly low. \"Sri Lanka's reconstruction policy was characterized by continuous amendments and lack of transparency\" [1]. Not a single comprehensive, publicly available document set out the housing entitlement policy [1]. Beneficiaries were not consistently informed about housing designs, individual facilities, or common facilities [5].\n\nNo evidence supports coding for: MCDA, adaptive management, bottom-up planning, multi-stage retreat, genuine public-private partnerships (in the managed retreat sense), bureaucracy reduction, or cost-benefit analysis.\n\n**Note on ODR**: The owner-driven reconstruction program outside the buffer zone was more participatory and achieved higher levels of satisfaction [1], but this is best treated as a related recovery pathway rather than the managed retreat component itself.\n\n---\n\n### What decision support tools were used in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer: Hazard maps & models; Process guidance; Site/environmental assessment (partial and belated).**\n\n- **Hazard maps & models**: The Coastal Conservation Zone definition relied on spatial buffer zone designations (100–200 m, later revised to 55–100 m) mapped from the coastline [1, 4]. The CCD conducted investigations to inform revised distances based on coastal conditions [4].\n\n- **Process guidance**: TAFREN, UDA, and NHDA produced planning guidelines for donor housing construction, site selection, and minimum construction standards [2, 4, 6]. These were referenced but inconsistently followed. \"Only a few donors sought planning approvals before implementation\" [2].\n\n- **Site/environmental assessment**: The University of Moratuwa conducted a Rapid Environmental Assessment (REA) of 409 sites in 2006, covering physical, social, and biological/ecological features of sites [2]. However, by the time this assessment was completed, construction was already underway at most sites, \"and alternative site selection was not an option\" [2]. The REA is therefore coded here with the caveat that it was too late to meaningfully inform site selection.\n\nNo evidence of CBA, MCDA, demographic projections as formal decision tools, climate change projection models, social vulnerability assessments, socioeconomic projections, or systematic new site evaluation processes used prospectively in decision-making.\n\n---\n\n### What planning measures were taken for receiving areas in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer: Identifying priority areas (partially); Construction of new housing; Availability of existing housing (assessed and found inadequate); Individuals vs. neighbourhoods/communities (inadequately considered).**\n\n- **Availability of existing housing**: Land scarcity was a significant constraint, particularly in urban districts like Galle and Matara, where no suitable government land was available close to displaced communities' original locations [2, 5]. In Galle, this forced relocation 10–15 km from the city [5].\n\n- **Identifying priority areas**: Divisional Secretaries were responsible for identifying state land for resettlement sites. TAFREN guidelines required that resettlement sites be located \"as close as possible to original settlements,\" but land availability overrode this in most cases [2].\n\n- **Construction of new housing**: The central planning response was construction of new donor-built housing in new sites.\n\n- **Individuals vs. neighbourhoods/communities**: Planning inadequately addressed community cohesion. \"No effort was made to relocate people from the same village in the same relocation site and communities were not consulted with regard to their relocation preferences\" [1]. The number of houses per site was determined by land plot availability rather than by the housing requirements of a particular community [1].\n\n- **Social carrying capacity**: No evidence of formal social carrying capacity assessments.\n\n---\n\n### What uses were planned for retreat lands?\n\n**Answer: Reducing/eliminating servicing; Rezoning.**\n\n- **Reducing/eliminating servicing**: The buffer zone policy prohibited reconstruction in the designated zone, effectively removing sanctioned residential use [1, 4].\n- **Rezoning**: The buffer zone was declared a no-construction zone (rezoning by regulatory designation) [1, 4].\n\nThere is no evidence in the reviewed sources of formal plans for natural restoration, multi-purpose use, demolition of remaining structures, community involvement in retreat land decision-making, planting/landscaping, commemoration, conservation land trusts, or recognition of retreat land benefits as formal planning measures. Sources note that some people retained nominal ownership of their original buffer-zone land and continued to visit their original plots—to tend trees and crops—despite the restrictions [1].\n\n---\n\n### What degree of choice was provided to affected people in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer: Completely involuntary/mandatory (for buffer-zone residents), with only nominal preference expression and no meaningful opt-out.**\n\nBuffer-zone residents were prohibited from rebuilding in place and were formally required to relocate. The degree of choice was extremely limited:\n- Divisional Secretaries asked tsunami relocatees to name preferred resettlement sites, but 66% of Galle tsunami relocatees did not receive a house in their chosen settlement [5].\n- \"Rather than the relocatee deciding, the implementing agencies decided on their behalf where to relocate\" [5].\n- \"Tsunami relocatees did not have much freedom to select their settlements\" [5].\n- Only 37% of Galle tsunami relocatees stated they had decided to relocate to their present settlement; 42% were directed there by the Divisional Secretary [5].\n\nIn Hambantota, some donors allowed beneficiaries to see proposed homes and provide comments, and there was some opportunity to prepare fencing and landscaping during construction [3]. This represents nominal rather than meaningful participation.\n\nAn important qualification: owners of land within the buffer zone were not required to surrender their land to the government; they retained formal ownership of their original plots while being prohibited from rebuilding on them [1]. This does not, however, constitute a meaningful opt-out from relocation.\n\nThe codebook's \"Completely involuntary/mandatory\"" | |
| } | |
| ] |