avoigt1121 Claude Opus 5.5 commited on
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17acd0c
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1 Parent(s): e119adb

security: D5-A — accept the 8 pillow 12.3.0 CVEs here until 2026-11-20

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The project lead decided D5-A (2026-10-20): a justified acceptance in this repo
only. This Space takes identifiers only and opens no caller-supplied image; the
fix needs a fleet-wide gradio move (gradio 6.28.0 requires pillow<13).
security/accepted-vulns.txt feeds pip-audit --ignore-vuln; the scan fails on an
expired entry, and tests/test_accepted_vulns.py fails once the lock moves pillow
off 12.3.0, so the acceptance cannot outlive its reason. Scan green.

Slice: phase1-knowledge-specialist/s2
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

docs/plans/PLAN-phase1-knowledge-specialist.md CHANGED
@@ -150,7 +150,9 @@ The memo settled the approach. The only real choice left is where the endpoints
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  - **Recommend:** A, for this repo.
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  - **Blocks:** the s2 merge gate ("security scan green") and s3's first push. Everything else in s2
152
  is done and green.
153
- - **Status:** OPEN
 
 
154
 
155
  **Two-way defaults** (DECIDED by default; overrule in one line):
156
  - The plan and ADR-0001 stay here until s1 moves them into the new repo.
 
150
  - **Recommend:** A, for this repo.
151
  - **Blocks:** the s2 merge gate ("security scan green") and s3's first push. Everything else in s2
152
  is done and green.
153
+ - **Status:** DECIDED 2026-10-20 (project lead): A — accepted in this repo only, expiring 2026-11-20 or
154
+ when gradio allows pillow 13 (`security/accepted-vulns.txt`, `tests/test_accepted_vulns.py`). The
155
+ fleet-wide question stays open outside this plan.
156
 
157
  **Two-way defaults** (DECIDED by default; overrule in one line):
158
  - The plan and ADR-0001 stay here until s1 moves them into the new repo.
scripts/security_scan.sh CHANGED
@@ -115,8 +115,25 @@ else
115
  echo " setting up audit venv ($PYBIN)"
116
  "$PYBIN" -m venv "$VENV" && "$VENV/bin/python" -m pip install -q --upgrade pip pip-audit
117
  fi
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
118
  "$VENV/bin/python" -m pip_audit --requirement "$TMP/audit.txt" --no-deps --disable-pip \
119
- --format columns 2>/dev/null | tee "$OUT/pip-audit-$STAMP.txt"
120
  AUDIT_RC=${PIPESTATUS[0]}
121
  if [[ "$AUDIT_RC" -eq 0 ]]; then
122
  ok "pip-audit — no known vulnerabilities in the resolved tree"
 
115
  echo " setting up audit venv ($PYBIN)"
116
  "$PYBIN" -m venv "$VENV" && "$VENV/bin/python" -m pip install -q --upgrade pip pip-audit
117
  fi
118
+ # Recorded, expiring acceptances (security/accepted-vulns.txt; justified in
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+ # security/ACCEPTED-FINDINGS.md). An EXPIRED entry fails the scan: re-triage, never extend quietly.
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+ IGNORES=()
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+ if [[ -f security/accepted-vulns.txt ]]; then
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+ TODAY="$(date -u +%Y-%m-%d)"
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+ while read -r vid expires _rest; do
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+ [[ -z "${vid:-}" || "$vid" == \#* ]] && continue
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+ exp="${expires#expires=}"
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+ if [[ "$exp" < "$TODAY" ]]; then
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+ fail "accepted finding $vid expired on $exp — re-triage it (security/ACCEPTED-FINDINGS.md)"
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+ continue
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+ fi
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+ IGNORES+=(--ignore-vuln "$vid")
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+ done < security/accepted-vulns.txt
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+ [[ ${#IGNORES[@]} -gt 0 ]] && echo " accepting $(( ${#IGNORES[@]} / 2 )) recorded finding(s) until their expiry (security/accepted-vulns.txt)"
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+ fi
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+ # `${IGNORES[@]+…}`: macOS ships bash 3.2, where an empty array under `set -u` is unbound.
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  "$VENV/bin/python" -m pip_audit --requirement "$TMP/audit.txt" --no-deps --disable-pip \
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+ ${IGNORES[@]+"${IGNORES[@]}"} --format columns 2>/dev/null | tee "$OUT/pip-audit-$STAMP.txt"
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  AUDIT_RC=${PIPESTATUS[0]}
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  if [[ "$AUDIT_RC" -eq 0 ]]; then
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  ok "pip-audit — no known vulnerabilities in the resolved tree"
security/ACCEPTED-FINDINGS.md CHANGED
@@ -26,4 +26,4 @@ transitive of that kind is a reviewed change, not a silent one.
26
  | Stage | Result |
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  |-------|--------|
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  | **gitleaks** | One finding, **accepted as a false positive by fingerprint** (`.gitleaksignore`): commit `97e7d80`, `security/ACCEPTED-FINDINGS.md:13`, `generic-api-key`. That line of §0 quoted, verbatim, the docstring phrase §0 describes as a false positive, so it tripped the same rule. The text is reworded here; the old commit is local history on `dev` that has never been pushed, and is ignored by its exact fingerprint rather than rewritten. Not a secret: it is a list of identifier kinds. |
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- | **pip-audit** | **8 findings, OPEN, not accepted** — `pillow 12.3.0` (via gradio 6.28.0, which requires `pillow<13`): CVE-2026-112895 / -112400 / -112397 / -112896 / -112897 / -112395 / -112404 / -112899, all fixed in 13.0.0, all in parsing attacker-supplied image files (PDF append, GIF, PPM/PGM, TIFF, EPS). An anchored pin bump cannot fix it without breaking gradio's constraint, and every fleet repo's `dev` pins the same version. Recorded as Decision D5 in the plan; this file records no acceptance until it is decided. |
 
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  | Stage | Result |
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  |-------|--------|
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  | **gitleaks** | One finding, **accepted as a false positive by fingerprint** (`.gitleaksignore`): commit `97e7d80`, `security/ACCEPTED-FINDINGS.md:13`, `generic-api-key`. That line of §0 quoted, verbatim, the docstring phrase §0 describes as a false positive, so it tripped the same rule. The text is reworded here; the old commit is local history on `dev` that has never been pushed, and is ignored by its exact fingerprint rather than rewritten. Not a secret: it is a list of identifier kinds. |
29
+ | **pip-audit** | **8 findings, ACCEPTED until 2026-11-20 (plan D5-A, the project lead, 2026-10-20)** — `pillow 12.3.0` (via gradio 6.28.0, which requires `pillow<13`): CVE-2026-112895 / -112400 / -112397 / -112896 / -112897 / -112395 / -112404 / -112899, all fixed in 13.0.0. **Why acceptable here:** all eight are in parsing attacker-supplied image files (PDF append, GIF, PPM/PGM, TIFF, EPS); this Space's inputs are identifiers only (ADR-0001 §6), it has no image or file input, and it never opens an image a caller supplies. **Why not fixed:** an anchored pin bump cannot move pillow without breaking gradio's constraint; every fleet repo's `dev` pins the same version, so the fix is a fleet-wide gradio move, tracked separately. **Ends** when a gradio release allowing `pillow>=13` is pinned (tests/test_accepted_vulns.py then fails until the entries are removed) or on 2026-11-20, when the scan fails on the expired entries. Mechanism: `security/accepted-vulns.txt` → `pip-audit --ignore-vuln`. |
security/accepted-vulns.txt ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
+ # Accepted pip-audit findings — each line: <advisory id> expires=<YYYY-MM-DD> <package> <affected version>
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+ # scripts/security_scan.sh passes every unexpired id to `pip-audit --ignore-vuln` and FAILS on an
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+ # expired one, so an acceptance cannot outlive its date. tests/test_accepted_vulns.py fails once the
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+ # lock moves the package off the affected version, so a fixed finding cannot stay accepted.
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+ # Justification: security/ACCEPTED-FINDINGS.md §1 (plan D5-A, decided 2026-10-20 by the project lead).
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+ CVE-2026-112895 expires=2026-11-20 pillow 12.3.0
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+ CVE-2026-112400 expires=2026-11-20 pillow 12.3.0
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+ CVE-2026-112397 expires=2026-11-20 pillow 12.3.0
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+ CVE-2026-112896 expires=2026-11-20 pillow 12.3.0
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+ CVE-2026-112897 expires=2026-11-20 pillow 12.3.0
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+ CVE-2026-112395 expires=2026-11-20 pillow 12.3.0
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+ CVE-2026-112404 expires=2026-11-20 pillow 12.3.0
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+ CVE-2026-112899 expires=2026-11-20 pillow 12.3.0
tests/test_accepted_vulns.py ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
+ """Accepted pip-audit findings stay narrow, documented, dated, and die when they are fixed."""
2
+
3
+ from __future__ import annotations
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+
5
+ import datetime
6
+ import re
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+ from pathlib import Path
8
+
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+ ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
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+ LINE = re.compile(r"^(?P<id>\S+) expires=(?P<date>\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}) (?P<pkg>\S+) (?P<ver>\S+)$")
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+
12
+
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+ def _entries():
14
+ out = []
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+ for raw in (ROOT / "security/accepted-vulns.txt").read_text().splitlines():
16
+ line = raw.strip()
17
+ if not line or line.startswith("#"):
18
+ continue
19
+ m = LINE.match(line)
20
+ assert m, f"malformed acceptance line: {line!r}"
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+ out.append(m.groupdict())
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+ return out
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+
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+
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+ def _locked(package: str) -> str | None:
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+ lock = (ROOT / "requirements.txt").read_text()
27
+ m = re.search(rf"^{re.escape(package)}==(\S+)$", lock, re.MULTILINE | re.IGNORECASE)
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+ return m.group(1) if m else None
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+
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+
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+ def test_every_acceptance_is_well_formed_dated_and_short_lived():
32
+ for e in _entries():
33
+ expires = datetime.date.fromisoformat(e["date"])
34
+ # D5-A: no acceptance runs past 2026-11-20 without a new decision.
35
+ assert expires <= datetime.date(2026, 11, 20), e
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+
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+
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+ def test_every_acceptance_is_justified_in_the_findings_record():
39
+ record = (ROOT / "security/ACCEPTED-FINDINGS.md").read_text()
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+ for e in _entries():
41
+ suffix = e["id"].split("-")[-1]
42
+ assert e["id"] in record or f"-{suffix}" in record, e["id"]
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+
44
+
45
+ def test_an_acceptance_dies_when_its_package_moves_off_the_affected_version():
46
+ """When the lock moves pillow to a fixed version, remove the entries; this fails until then."""
47
+ for e in _entries():
48
+ assert _locked(e["pkg"]) == e["ver"], (
49
+ f"{e['pkg']} is now {_locked(e['pkg'])} in requirements.txt; {e['id']} was accepted "
50
+ f"for {e['ver']} only — remove it from security/accepted-vulns.txt"
51
+ )