build3d / app /vault.py
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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""Key 保险箱:把百炼 token 加密落地,绑死「这台机器」或「这个 HF 空间」。
为什么不用明文 .bailian_key:
明文 key 一旦跟着目录被拷走、被截图、被传到网盘,就是别人的额度。
这里把 key 用「绑定值 + 静态盐」派生出的密钥加密,密文落地。
换一台机器(或换成别的 HF 空间)解不开——不是靠道德约束,是数学上解不开。
加密构造(只用标准库,内网无依赖):
master = PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256(binding_value + PEPPER, salt, 120000 轮)
enc_key, mac_key = HMAC(master, "enc"), HMAC(master, "mac")
ct = plaintext XOR HMAC-SHA256(enc_key, nonce ‖ counter) 逐块异或
tag = HMAC-SHA256(mac_key, nonce ‖ ct) # encrypt-then-MAC
解封时先验 tag,再解密;任何一位被改都会直接报「密文校验失败」。
诚实说明边界:这是「绑定 + 混淆」级别的保护,不是对抗能读到源码的攻击者。
能拿到源码的人在别的机器上推不出 binding_value(MachineGuid / SPACE_ID),
但如果他能登进这台机器,他就能解开。真要更强,请用 HF 的 Secret(平台托管、静态加密)。
"""
import hashlib
import hmac
import json
import os
import platform
import secrets
import sys
import uuid
VERSION = 1
PEPPER = b"archrobot/vault/v1|bailian-api-key|do-not-edit"
ITER = 120000
KIND_MACHINE = "machine"
KIND_SPACE = "space"
# ---------------- 绑定值 ----------------
def _win_machine_guid():
"""Windows 安装唯一标识(重装系统才变),比网卡 MAC 稳定得多"""
try:
import winreg
with winreg.OpenKey(winreg.HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE,
r"SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography", 0,
winreg.KEY_READ | winreg.KEY_WOW64_64KEY) as k:
return winreg.QueryValueEx(k, "MachineGuid")[0]
except Exception:
return ""
def machine_binding():
"""本机指纹:MachineGuid + 主机名。换机/重装系统即失效。"""
parts = [platform.system(), platform.node() or "", _win_machine_guid(),
str(uuid.getnode())]
return "machine|" + "|".join(parts)
def space_binding():
"""HF Space 指纹:只用 SPACE_ID(形如 dellweb3/build3d)。
刻意不掺 SPACE_HOST / 端口 / 构建号——这些在重建、换域名时会变,
掺进去就会出现「明明是自己空间却解不开」的售后问题。"""
sid = (os.environ.get("SPACE_ID") or "").strip()
return ("space|" + sid) if sid else ""
def binding_value(kind):
if kind == KIND_SPACE:
return space_binding()
return machine_binding()
def binding_tag(kind):
"""写进密文文件的可读指纹(只存前 12 位摘要,不泄露绑定值本身)"""
v = binding_value(kind)
return (kind, hashlib.sha256(v.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()[:12]) if v else (kind, "")
# ---------------- 加解密 ----------------
def _keys(binding, salt):
master = hashlib.pbkdf2_hmac("sha256", (binding.encode("utf-8") + PEPPER), salt, ITER, 32)
return (hmac.new(master, b"enc", hashlib.sha256).digest(),
hmac.new(master, b"mac", hashlib.sha256).digest())
def _keystream(enc_key, nonce, n):
out = b""
counter = 0
while len(out) < n:
out += hmac.new(enc_key, nonce + counter.to_bytes(4, "big"), hashlib.sha256).digest()
counter += 1
return out[:n]
def seal(plaintext, kind=KIND_MACHINE):
binding = binding_value(kind)
if not binding:
raise RuntimeError("拿不到绑定值(%s):HF 空间外无法生成空间级密文" % kind)
salt, nonce = secrets.token_bytes(16), secrets.token_bytes(16)
enc_key, mac_key = _keys(binding, salt)
data = plaintext.encode("utf-8")
ct = bytes(a ^ b for a, b in zip(data, _keystream(enc_key, nonce, len(data))))
tag = hmac.new(mac_key, nonce + ct, hashlib.sha256).digest()
k, fp = binding_tag(kind)
return {"v": VERSION, "alg": "hmac-sha256-ctr+hmac256", "binding": k,
"fingerprint": fp, "iter": ITER,
"salt": salt.hex(), "nonce": nonce.hex(),
"ct": ct.hex(), "tag": tag.hex()}
def unseal(blob):
kind = blob.get("binding") or KIND_MACHINE
binding = binding_value(kind)
if not binding:
raise RuntimeError("这个密文绑定的是 %s,当前环境不满足(不在目标机器 / 不在该 HF 空间)" % kind)
_, fp = binding_tag(kind)
if blob.get("fingerprint") and fp and blob["fingerprint"] != fp:
raise RuntimeError("绑定指纹不匹配:密文属于 %s…,当前环境是 %s…" %
(blob["fingerprint"], fp))
salt, nonce = bytes.fromhex(blob["salt"]), bytes.fromhex(blob["nonce"])
ct, tag = bytes.fromhex(blob["ct"]), bytes.fromhex(blob["tag"])
enc_key, mac_key = _keys(binding, salt)
if not hmac.compare_digest(hmac.new(mac_key, nonce + ct, hashlib.sha256).digest(), tag):
raise RuntimeError("密文校验失败:文件被改过,或不是在这台机器上生成的")
return bytes(a ^ b for a, b in zip(ct, _keystream(enc_key, nonce, len(ct)))).decode("utf-8")
# ---------------- 文件读写 ----------------
def load(path):
"""读一个 .vault 文件,返回明文 key;任何异常都往上抛,由调用方决定是否忽略"""
with open(path, encoding="utf-8") as f:
return unseal(json.load(f)).strip()
def save(path, plaintext, kind=KIND_MACHINE):
blob = seal(plaintext, kind)
with open(path, "w", encoding="utf-8", newline="\n") as f:
json.dump(blob, f, ensure_ascii=False, indent=1)
f.write("\n")
return blob
def main(argv):
kind = KIND_SPACE if ("space" in argv or "--space" in argv) else KIND_MACHINE
root = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))
out = os.path.join(root, "token.vault")
if "check" in argv:
print("绑定类型:", kind, "| 当前环境绑定值指纹:", binding_tag(kind)[1] or "(不可用)")
try:
k = load(out)
print("解封成功:token 长度 %d,前缀 %s…" % (len(k), k[:3]))
except Exception as e:
print("解封失败:", e)
return 0
src = os.environ.get("BAILIAN_API_KEY", "").strip()
for p in (os.environ.get("BAILIAN_KEY_FILE", ""), r"G:\Key-token\key-baliantoken.txt"):
if not src and p and os.path.isfile(p):
src = open(p, encoding="utf-8").read().strip()
if not src:
print("没有拿到明文 key:设 BAILIAN_API_KEY 或 BAILIAN_KEY_FILE")
return 2
blob = save(out, src, kind)
print("已写入 %s(%s,指纹 %s,密文 %d 字节)" %
(out, blob["binding"], blob["fingerprint"], len(blob["ct"]) // 2))
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.exit(main(sys.argv[1:]))