Download app/vault.py from dellweb3/build3d: direct link, hf CLI and curl.
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https://huggingface.co/spaces/dellweb3/build3d/resolve/main/app/vault.py
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curl -L -o vault.py https://huggingface.co/spaces/dellweb3/build3d/resolve/main/app/vault.py
6.89 kB
| # -*- coding: utf-8 -*- | |
| """Key 保险箱:把百炼 token 加密落地,绑死「这台机器」或「这个 HF 空间」。 | |
| 为什么不用明文 .bailian_key: | |
| 明文 key 一旦跟着目录被拷走、被截图、被传到网盘,就是别人的额度。 | |
| 这里把 key 用「绑定值 + 静态盐」派生出的密钥加密,密文落地。 | |
| 换一台机器(或换成别的 HF 空间)解不开——不是靠道德约束,是数学上解不开。 | |
| 加密构造(只用标准库,内网无依赖): | |
| master = PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256(binding_value + PEPPER, salt, 120000 轮) | |
| enc_key, mac_key = HMAC(master, "enc"), HMAC(master, "mac") | |
| ct = plaintext XOR HMAC-SHA256(enc_key, nonce ‖ counter) 逐块异或 | |
| tag = HMAC-SHA256(mac_key, nonce ‖ ct) # encrypt-then-MAC | |
| 解封时先验 tag,再解密;任何一位被改都会直接报「密文校验失败」。 | |
| 诚实说明边界:这是「绑定 + 混淆」级别的保护,不是对抗能读到源码的攻击者。 | |
| 能拿到源码的人在别的机器上推不出 binding_value(MachineGuid / SPACE_ID), | |
| 但如果他能登进这台机器,他就能解开。真要更强,请用 HF 的 Secret(平台托管、静态加密)。 | |
| """ | |
| import hashlib | |
| import hmac | |
| import json | |
| import os | |
| import platform | |
| import secrets | |
| import sys | |
| import uuid | |
| VERSION = 1 | |
| PEPPER = b"archrobot/vault/v1|bailian-api-key|do-not-edit" | |
| ITER = 120000 | |
| KIND_MACHINE = "machine" | |
| KIND_SPACE = "space" | |
| # ---------------- 绑定值 ---------------- | |
| def _win_machine_guid(): | |
| """Windows 安装唯一标识(重装系统才变),比网卡 MAC 稳定得多""" | |
| try: | |
| import winreg | |
| with winreg.OpenKey(winreg.HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, | |
| r"SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography", 0, | |
| winreg.KEY_READ | winreg.KEY_WOW64_64KEY) as k: | |
| return winreg.QueryValueEx(k, "MachineGuid")[0] | |
| except Exception: | |
| return "" | |
| def machine_binding(): | |
| """本机指纹:MachineGuid + 主机名。换机/重装系统即失效。""" | |
| parts = [platform.system(), platform.node() or "", _win_machine_guid(), | |
| str(uuid.getnode())] | |
| return "machine|" + "|".join(parts) | |
| def space_binding(): | |
| """HF Space 指纹:只用 SPACE_ID(形如 dellweb3/build3d)。 | |
| 刻意不掺 SPACE_HOST / 端口 / 构建号——这些在重建、换域名时会变, | |
| 掺进去就会出现「明明是自己空间却解不开」的售后问题。""" | |
| sid = (os.environ.get("SPACE_ID") or "").strip() | |
| return ("space|" + sid) if sid else "" | |
| def binding_value(kind): | |
| if kind == KIND_SPACE: | |
| return space_binding() | |
| return machine_binding() | |
| def binding_tag(kind): | |
| """写进密文文件的可读指纹(只存前 12 位摘要,不泄露绑定值本身)""" | |
| v = binding_value(kind) | |
| return (kind, hashlib.sha256(v.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()[:12]) if v else (kind, "") | |
| # ---------------- 加解密 ---------------- | |
| def _keys(binding, salt): | |
| master = hashlib.pbkdf2_hmac("sha256", (binding.encode("utf-8") + PEPPER), salt, ITER, 32) | |
| return (hmac.new(master, b"enc", hashlib.sha256).digest(), | |
| hmac.new(master, b"mac", hashlib.sha256).digest()) | |
| def _keystream(enc_key, nonce, n): | |
| out = b"" | |
| counter = 0 | |
| while len(out) < n: | |
| out += hmac.new(enc_key, nonce + counter.to_bytes(4, "big"), hashlib.sha256).digest() | |
| counter += 1 | |
| return out[:n] | |
| def seal(plaintext, kind=KIND_MACHINE): | |
| binding = binding_value(kind) | |
| if not binding: | |
| raise RuntimeError("拿不到绑定值(%s):HF 空间外无法生成空间级密文" % kind) | |
| salt, nonce = secrets.token_bytes(16), secrets.token_bytes(16) | |
| enc_key, mac_key = _keys(binding, salt) | |
| data = plaintext.encode("utf-8") | |
| ct = bytes(a ^ b for a, b in zip(data, _keystream(enc_key, nonce, len(data)))) | |
| tag = hmac.new(mac_key, nonce + ct, hashlib.sha256).digest() | |
| k, fp = binding_tag(kind) | |
| return {"v": VERSION, "alg": "hmac-sha256-ctr+hmac256", "binding": k, | |
| "fingerprint": fp, "iter": ITER, | |
| "salt": salt.hex(), "nonce": nonce.hex(), | |
| "ct": ct.hex(), "tag": tag.hex()} | |
| def unseal(blob): | |
| kind = blob.get("binding") or KIND_MACHINE | |
| binding = binding_value(kind) | |
| if not binding: | |
| raise RuntimeError("这个密文绑定的是 %s,当前环境不满足(不在目标机器 / 不在该 HF 空间)" % kind) | |
| _, fp = binding_tag(kind) | |
| if blob.get("fingerprint") and fp and blob["fingerprint"] != fp: | |
| raise RuntimeError("绑定指纹不匹配:密文属于 %s…,当前环境是 %s…" % | |
| (blob["fingerprint"], fp)) | |
| salt, nonce = bytes.fromhex(blob["salt"]), bytes.fromhex(blob["nonce"]) | |
| ct, tag = bytes.fromhex(blob["ct"]), bytes.fromhex(blob["tag"]) | |
| enc_key, mac_key = _keys(binding, salt) | |
| if not hmac.compare_digest(hmac.new(mac_key, nonce + ct, hashlib.sha256).digest(), tag): | |
| raise RuntimeError("密文校验失败:文件被改过,或不是在这台机器上生成的") | |
| return bytes(a ^ b for a, b in zip(ct, _keystream(enc_key, nonce, len(ct)))).decode("utf-8") | |
| # ---------------- 文件读写 ---------------- | |
| def load(path): | |
| """读一个 .vault 文件,返回明文 key;任何异常都往上抛,由调用方决定是否忽略""" | |
| with open(path, encoding="utf-8") as f: | |
| return unseal(json.load(f)).strip() | |
| def save(path, plaintext, kind=KIND_MACHINE): | |
| blob = seal(plaintext, kind) | |
| with open(path, "w", encoding="utf-8", newline="\n") as f: | |
| json.dump(blob, f, ensure_ascii=False, indent=1) | |
| f.write("\n") | |
| return blob | |
| def main(argv): | |
| kind = KIND_SPACE if ("space" in argv or "--space" in argv) else KIND_MACHINE | |
| root = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)) | |
| out = os.path.join(root, "token.vault") | |
| if "check" in argv: | |
| print("绑定类型:", kind, "| 当前环境绑定值指纹:", binding_tag(kind)[1] or "(不可用)") | |
| try: | |
| k = load(out) | |
| print("解封成功:token 长度 %d,前缀 %s…" % (len(k), k[:3])) | |
| except Exception as e: | |
| print("解封失败:", e) | |
| return 0 | |
| src = os.environ.get("BAILIAN_API_KEY", "").strip() | |
| for p in (os.environ.get("BAILIAN_KEY_FILE", ""), r"G:\Key-token\key-baliantoken.txt"): | |
| if not src and p and os.path.isfile(p): | |
| src = open(p, encoding="utf-8").read().strip() | |
| if not src: | |
| print("没有拿到明文 key:设 BAILIAN_API_KEY 或 BAILIAN_KEY_FILE") | |
| return 2 | |
| blob = save(out, src, kind) | |
| print("已写入 %s(%s,指纹 %s,密文 %d 字节)" % | |
| (out, blob["binding"], blob["fingerprint"], len(blob["ct"]) // 2)) | |
| return 0 | |
| if __name__ == "__main__": | |
| sys.exit(main(sys.argv[1:])) | |