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Work OS validated demo ee2b491ed664 (part 2)

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LLMGateway/README.md CHANGED
@@ -1,4 +1,12 @@
1
- # LLM Gateway 工程 harness
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
 
3
  本目录包含[系统设计](../docs/14_LLM_Gateway_系统设计.md)与 v0.3 实现。`routing.json` 固定三档模型;`routing.schema.json` 是配置契约;`contracts.schema.json` 定义内部 Port DTO;`examples.json` 提供正反例;`compatibility-matrix.json` 跟踪目标国产平台的待验证证据。
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1
+ # LLM Gateway 工程 harness
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+
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+ ## 指定 HF Space 的密文凭据
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+
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+ `dellweb3/workos-office` 使用 AES-256-GCM 信封加密:`WORKOS_BAILIAN_KEY_ENVELOPE` Secret 仅保存密文、随机96位nonce和版本;独立的 `WORKOS_BAILIAN_WRAP_KEY` Secret 保存随机256位解密密钥。认证关联数据包含固定用途和完整 Space ID,启动时必须与 HF 注入的 `SPACE_ID` 匹配。缺失、篡改、错误密钥或其他空间均拒绝解密,不降级使用旧的原始 API key。原始 `DASHSCOPE_API_KEY` 不保留在该 Space 的 Secrets、仓库、镜像或日志。
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+
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+ Space ID 是公开的校验上下文,不能单独当作加密密钥。解密密钥也必须留在 Secrets,不进入源码。运行时调用百炼需要在服务端内存中解密;拥有该 Space 执行权限的人仍可能读取运行时凭据,此方案不提供对 HF 宿主或 Space 管理员的隔离。本地开发继续使用被 Git 忽略的 `.env.local`。
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+
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+ 更新时先配置成对的加密 Secrets,再发布支持信封解密的代码,验证管理端 `credential_storage=space-bound-aes256-gcm` 后移除旧的原始 Secret并重新验收。管理接口只返回存储模式和绑定 ID,不返回密文、解密密钥或 API key。参考 [AESGCM 官方说明](https://cryptography.io/en/latest/hazmat/primitives/aead/#cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers.aead.AESGCM) 与 [HF Secrets 管理](https://huggingface.co/docs/huggingface_hub/guides/manage-spaces)。
10
 
11
  本目录包含[系统设计](../docs/14_LLM_Gateway_系统设计.md)与 v0.3 实现。`routing.json` 固定三档模型;`routing.schema.json` 是配置契约;`contracts.schema.json` 定义内部 Port DTO;`examples.json` 提供正反例;`compatibility-matrix.json` 跟踪目标国产平台的待验证证据。
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LLMGateway/credentials.py ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
+ """Space-bound API-key envelopes. Never log keys, envelope values, or plaintext."""
2
+ import base64
3
+ import json
4
+ import os
5
+
6
+ BOUND_SPACE_ID = "dellweb3/workos-office"
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+ ENVELOPE_ENV = "WORKOS_BAILIAN_KEY_ENVELOPE"
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+ WRAP_KEY_ENV = "WORKOS_BAILIAN_WRAP_KEY"
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+
10
+
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+ def _aad(space_id):
12
+ return ("workos/bailian-api-key/v1\0" + space_id).encode("utf-8")
13
+
14
+
15
+ def seal_key(api_key, space_id=BOUND_SPACE_ID):
16
+ from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers.aead import AESGCM
17
+ if space_id != BOUND_SPACE_ID or not api_key or any(c.isspace() for c in api_key):
18
+ raise ValueError("Invalid model credential envelope input")
19
+ wrap_key = AESGCM.generate_key(bit_length=256)
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+ nonce = os.urandom(12)
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+ ciphertext = AESGCM(wrap_key).encrypt(nonce, api_key.encode("utf-8"), _aad(space_id))
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+ envelope = {"version": 1, "algorithm": "AES-256-GCM", "space_id": space_id,
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+ "nonce": base64.b64encode(nonce).decode("ascii"),
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+ "ciphertext": base64.b64encode(ciphertext).decode("ascii")}
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+ return json.dumps(envelope, separators=(",", ":")), base64.b64encode(wrap_key).decode("ascii")
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+
27
+
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+ def open_key(envelope_text, wrap_key_text, space_id):
29
+ from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers.aead import AESGCM
30
+ try:
31
+ envelope = json.loads(envelope_text)
32
+ if set(envelope) != {"version", "algorithm", "space_id", "nonce", "ciphertext"}:
33
+ raise ValueError()
34
+ if envelope["version"] != 1 or envelope["algorithm"] != "AES-256-GCM":
35
+ raise ValueError()
36
+ if space_id != BOUND_SPACE_ID or envelope["space_id"] != space_id:
37
+ raise ValueError()
38
+ wrap_key = base64.b64decode(wrap_key_text, validate=True)
39
+ nonce = base64.b64decode(envelope["nonce"], validate=True)
40
+ ciphertext = base64.b64decode(envelope["ciphertext"], validate=True)
41
+ if len(wrap_key) != 32 or len(nonce) != 12:
42
+ raise ValueError()
43
+ value = AESGCM(wrap_key).decrypt(nonce, ciphertext, _aad(space_id)).decode("utf-8")
44
+ if not value or any(c.isspace() for c in value):
45
+ raise ValueError()
46
+ return value
47
+ except Exception:
48
+ raise ValueError("Encrypted model credential is invalid or belongs to another Space") from None
49
+
50
+
51
+ def model_api_key(local):
52
+ envelope = os.getenv(ENVELOPE_ENV)
53
+ wrap_key = os.getenv(WRAP_KEY_ENV)
54
+ if envelope is not None or wrap_key is not None:
55
+ # A partial or invalid envelope must fail closed, even if an old raw key exists.
56
+ return open_key(envelope, wrap_key, os.getenv("SPACE_ID"))
57
+ if os.getenv("SPACE_ID") == BOUND_SPACE_ID:
58
+ raise ValueError("This Space requires an encrypted model credential")
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+ return os.getenv("DASHSCOPE_API_KEY") or local.get("DASHSCOPE_API_KEY", "")
LLMGateway/service.py CHANGED
@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
1
  """Three-tier server-side Qwen routing. No browser or user-supplied provider credentials."""
2
  from __future__ import annotations
3
  from observability import traced, span
4
- from .admission import shared_admission, AdmissionError
 
5
 
6
  import copy
7
  import json
@@ -146,7 +147,10 @@ class LLMGateway:
146
  if os.getenv("WORKOS_WORKSPACE_AUTO_SCHEMA", "1") == "1":
147
  Base.metadata.create_all(engine)
148
  local = local_settings() if mode == "real" else {}
149
- self.key = (os.getenv("DASHSCOPE_API_KEY") or local.get("DASHSCOPE_API_KEY", "")) if mode == "real" else ""
 
 
 
150
  self.base_url = verified_base_url(os.getenv("DASHSCOPE_BASE_URL") or local.get("DASHSCOPE_BASE_URL", "")) if mode == "real" else ""
151
  if mode == "real" and not self.key:
152
  raise LLMError(503, "LLM_CONFIG_INVALID", "百炼 API Key 未配置。")
@@ -164,7 +168,9 @@ class LLMGateway:
164
 
165
  def settings(self, tenant):
166
  config, version = self._policy(tenant)
167
- return {"mode": self.mode, "credential_ready": bool(self.key and self.base_url), "catalog": model_catalog(),
 
 
168
  "endpoint_host": urlsplit(self.base_url).hostname if self.base_url else None,
169
  "version": version, "routing": config, "scheduling": self.scheduler.snapshot() if self.scheduler else {"active":0,"queued":0,"scope":"worker-process","distributed":False}}
170
 
 
1
  """Three-tier server-side Qwen routing. No browser or user-supplied provider credentials."""
2
  from __future__ import annotations
3
  from observability import traced, span
4
+ from .admission import shared_admission, AdmissionError
5
+ from .credentials import model_api_key, ENVELOPE_ENV, BOUND_SPACE_ID
6
 
7
  import copy
8
  import json
 
147
  if os.getenv("WORKOS_WORKSPACE_AUTO_SCHEMA", "1") == "1":
148
  Base.metadata.create_all(engine)
149
  local = local_settings() if mode == "real" else {}
150
+ try:
151
+ self.key = model_api_key(local) if mode == "real" else ""
152
+ except ValueError:
153
+ raise LLMError(503, "LLM_CONFIG_INVALID", "模型加密凭据无效或与当前 Space 不匹配。") from None
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  self.base_url = verified_base_url(os.getenv("DASHSCOPE_BASE_URL") or local.get("DASHSCOPE_BASE_URL", "")) if mode == "real" else ""
155
  if mode == "real" and not self.key:
156
  raise LLMError(503, "LLM_CONFIG_INVALID", "百炼 API Key 未配置。")
 
168
 
169
  def settings(self, tenant):
170
  config, version = self._policy(tenant)
171
+ return {"mode": self.mode, "credential_ready": bool(self.key and self.base_url), "catalog": model_catalog(),
172
+ "credential_storage": "space-bound-aes256-gcm" if self.mode == "real" and os.getenv(ENVELOPE_ENV) else "server-side",
173
+ "credential_space_id": BOUND_SPACE_ID if self.mode == "real" and os.getenv(ENVELOPE_ENV) else None,
174
  "endpoint_host": urlsplit(self.base_url).hostname if self.base_url else None,
175
  "version": version, "routing": config, "scheduling": self.scheduler.snapshot() if self.scheduler else {"active":0,"queued":0,"scope":"worker-process","distributed":False}}
176
 
LLMGateway/tests/test_credentials.py ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
+ import base64
2
+ import json
3
+ import os
4
+ import unittest
5
+ from unittest.mock import patch
6
+ from LLMGateway.credentials import seal_key, open_key, model_api_key, BOUND_SPACE_ID, ENVELOPE_ENV, WRAP_KEY_ENV
7
+
8
+
9
+ class CredentialEnvelopeTests(unittest.TestCase):
10
+ def setUp(self):
11
+ self.raw = "synthetic-credential-only"
12
+ self.envelope, self.wrap = seal_key(self.raw)
13
+
14
+ def test_matching_space_decrypts_without_persisting_plaintext(self):
15
+ self.assertNotIn(self.raw, self.envelope)
16
+ self.assertEqual(open_key(self.envelope, self.wrap, BOUND_SPACE_ID), self.raw)
17
+ second, second_wrap = seal_key(self.raw)
18
+ self.assertNotEqual(self.envelope, second)
19
+ self.assertNotEqual(self.wrap, second_wrap)
20
+
21
+ def test_other_space_and_missing_identity_are_rejected(self):
22
+ for identity in [None, "another/workos-office", "dellweb3/workos-office-copy"]:
23
+ with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
24
+ open_key(self.envelope, self.wrap, identity)
25
+
26
+ def test_tampering_wrong_key_and_binding_change_fail(self):
27
+ other_envelope, other_wrap = seal_key(self.raw)
28
+ envelope=json.loads(self.envelope)
29
+ envelope["ciphertext"]=base64.b64encode(b"changed ciphertext").decode()
30
+ for value, key in [(json.dumps(envelope),self.wrap),(self.envelope,other_wrap)]:
31
+ with self.assertRaises(ValueError):open_key(value,key,BOUND_SPACE_ID)
32
+ envelope=json.loads(self.envelope);envelope['space_id']='other/space'
33
+ with self.assertRaises(ValueError):open_key(json.dumps(envelope),self.wrap,BOUND_SPACE_ID)
34
+
35
+ def test_invalid_envelope_does_not_fall_back_to_raw_key(self):
36
+ with patch.dict(os.environ, {ENVELOPE_ENV:'invalid',WRAP_KEY_ENV:self.wrap,
37
+ 'SPACE_ID':BOUND_SPACE_ID,'DASHSCOPE_API_KEY':self.raw}):
38
+ with self.assertRaises(ValueError):model_api_key({})
39
+
40
+ def test_runtime_uses_envelope_over_old_raw_value(self):
41
+ with patch.dict(os.environ, {ENVELOPE_ENV:self.envelope,WRAP_KEY_ENV:self.wrap,
42
+ 'SPACE_ID':BOUND_SPACE_ID,'DASHSCOPE_API_KEY':'old-synthetic'}):
43
+ self.assertEqual(model_api_key({}),self.raw)
44
+
45
+ def test_local_development_still_accepts_server_side_configuration(self):
46
+ with patch.dict(os.environ, {}, clear=True):
47
+ self.assertEqual(model_api_key({'DASHSCOPE_API_KEY':self.raw}),self.raw)
48
+
49
+ def test_bound_space_requires_encryption_even_if_raw_secret_exists(self):
50
+ with patch.dict(os.environ, {'SPACE_ID':BOUND_SPACE_ID,'DASHSCOPE_API_KEY':self.raw},clear=True):
51
+ with self.assertRaises(ValueError):model_api_key({})