Deploy AIOS web (React glide grid + FastAPI slice)
Browse files- RELEASES.json +1 -1
- VERSION +1 -1
- api/routes_shares.py +54 -5
- platform/core/shared_overlay.py +41 -0
- web/src/views-trash/trashApi.ts +8 -8
RELEASES.json
CHANGED
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@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
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{
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-
"current": "
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"releases": [
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{
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"version": "v69",
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{
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+
"current": "95ae9fd",
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"releases": [
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{
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"version": "v69",
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VERSION
CHANGED
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@@ -1 +1 @@
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-
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95ae9fd
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api/routes_shares.py
CHANGED
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@@ -508,6 +508,49 @@ def _owns_object(session, kind, oid):
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return False
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def _can_see_object(session, kind, oid):
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"""May this caller READ an object's grant list β i.e. can they reach the object at all?
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@@ -525,10 +568,16 @@ def _can_see_object(session, kind, oid):
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# SECRECY OF THE COLUMN. So the two strata whose EXISTENCE the caller can already observe
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# are admitted and nothing else is:
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#
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-
# * `shared` β
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# own docstring ("that is the whole feature"). "Who else has
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# fair question, and `get_share` still serves `people: []` to
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# administer, so no directory travels.
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# * `catalogue` β the database's own declared column, BUT ONLY ON A DATABASE THIS
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# CALLER MAY OPEN. `user_tables.may_open` is the resolver (the same one the
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# `database` kind uses one function up, never a second answer to "may they open it").
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@@ -548,7 +597,7 @@ def _can_see_object(session, kind, oid):
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if not isinstance(defn, dict):
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return False
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if stratum == "shared":
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-
return
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if stratum != "catalogue":
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return False
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# β A CATALOGUE COLUMN IS ADMITTED ONLY ON A DATABASE THIS CALLER MAY OPEN, and on a
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return False
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def _field_is_governed(session, grant_topic, field_key, definition):
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"""Is this shared column's visibility decided by a per-FIELD grant?
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ββ W50 COMBINE β THIS IS THE TEST `_can_see_object`'s `shared` ARM WAS MISSING, AND ITS
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ABSENCE WAS AN INFORMATION DISCLOSURE. "A shared column's existence is tenant-wide" is true of
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an UNGOVERNED one and false of a governed one: `perm_scope.field_grant_hidden` removes a
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governed column from the grid of every account that holds no grant on it, so answering that
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account's `GET /share/field/<oid>` with a grant list tells a stranger the column exists, who
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owns it, and how many people hold it. `get_share` only reaches here when `shares.role_for`
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already answered `None`, so every caller of this predicate is by construction a NON-GRANTEE.
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ββ TWO WITNESSES, EITHER ONE IS ENOUGH, AND THE SECOND IS THE ONE THE v67 HOTFIX ADDED.
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The MARK is read through `perm_scope.granted_field_keys` β the wall's own cheap half, never a
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local `f.get('granted') is True` (`field_permissions._governed` forbids the second reader by
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name). The REGISTRY RECORD is the second, because *the grant, not the marker, is the
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decision*: `field_permissions.reconcile_shared_permissions` stamps the mark onto any shared
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definition whose record carries `owner` OR `entries`, and refuses only the record it has
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"never heard of" β so this predicate is the SAME test, asked one read earlier. The reconcile
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runs from `migrate_legacy_fields`, i.e. on the grid read; this route does not run it, so
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without the second witness a column inside that window arrives here looking ungoverned and is
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disclosed. `owner` with no entries is deliberately included for exactly that reason: it is
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"managed and shared with nobody", which is the narrowest audience there is, not the widest.
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β FAIL CLOSED. Anything unresolvable answers "governed", i.e. the caller is refused. This
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guards a disclosure, and the only safe degraded answer for a disclosure door is silence.
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"""
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if not isinstance(definition, dict) or not definition:
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return True
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try:
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import core.perm_scope as perm_scope
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key = str(field_key or "")
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if perm_scope.granted_field_keys([dict(definition, key=key)]):
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return True
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except Exception: # noqa: BLE001
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return True
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try:
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record = shares.grants("field", shares.field_oid(grant_topic, field_key),
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st=session.runtime)
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return bool(record.get("owner") or record.get("entries"))
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except Exception: # noqa: BLE001
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return True
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def _can_see_object(session, kind, oid):
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"""May this caller READ an object's grant list β i.e. can they reach the object at all?
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# SECRECY OF THE COLUMN. So the two strata whose EXISTENCE the caller can already observe
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# are admitted and nothing else is:
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#
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# * `shared` β an UNGOVERNED shared column's existence is tenant-wide by
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# `shared_overlay.fields`' own docstring ("that is the whole feature"). "Who else has
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# this?" is this reader's fair question, and `get_share` still serves `people: []` to
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# anybody who may not administer, so no directory travels.
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# ββ W50 COMBINE β AND THE WORD **UNGOVERNED** IS LOAD BEARING; WITHOUT IT THIS ARM
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# IS AN INFORMATION DISCLOSURE. A GOVERNED column is not tenant-wide at all: the
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# per-field wall takes it off the grid of everyone who holds no grant, so a stranger
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# answered `200` here learns the column exists, who owns it and how many people hold
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# it β the id-probe S-3 closed, arriving through the arm that was opened for the
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# OWNER. `_field_is_governed` is the test and it fails closed.
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# * `catalogue` β the database's own declared column, BUT ONLY ON A DATABASE THIS
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# CALLER MAY OPEN. `user_tables.may_open` is the resolver (the same one the
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# `database` kind uses one function up, never a second answer to "may they open it").
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if not isinstance(defn, dict):
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return False
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if stratum == "shared":
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return not _field_is_governed(session, grant_topic, field_key, defn)
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if stratum != "catalogue":
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return False
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# β A CATALOGUE COLUMN IS ADMITTED ONLY ON A DATABASE THIS CALLER MAY OPEN, and on a
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platform/core/shared_overlay.py
CHANGED
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@@ -149,6 +149,41 @@ def _read(table_key, st=None):
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'cells': dict(data.get('cells') or {})}
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def document(table_key, st=None):
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"""One captured shared-stratum document for consumers in a single request.
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@@ -209,6 +244,12 @@ def fold_legacy_bucket(legacy_key, table_key, st=None):
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canon = str(table_key or '').strip()
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if not legacy or not canon or legacy == canon:
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return {'fields': 0, 'cells': 0}
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src = _read(legacy, st=st)
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if not src['fields'] and not src['cells']:
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return {'fields': 0, 'cells': 0}
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'cells': dict(data.get('cells') or {})}
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def _may_hold_anything(table_key, st=None):
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"""Could this stratum's bucket hold anything, answered WITHOUT reading the document?
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ββ W50 COMBINE / D-213 β THE READ THIS SAVES RAN ON EVERY DATABASE SWITCH.
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`fold_legacy_bucket` runs from `field_permissions.migrate_legacy_fields`, i.e. on every
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shared-field read, and its FIRST act was a whole read of the OTHER spelling β a document that
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is absent for every topic that never carried residue, which is almost all of them. That is a
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ninth entry in `verify_scopes`' named whole-document budget for a switch, and that budget is
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an exact list rather than a ceiling on purpose.
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β A PROJECTION CANNOT EXPRESS THIS, WHICH IS WHY THE ANSWER IS AN EXISTENCE PROBE.
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`store.get_projection` drops keys from each top-level VALUE; this document's two top-level
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values are `fields` and `cells`, so a projection of it would drop keys from inside each field
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DEFINITION and each row, and still fetch the whole thing. The only cheaper read is no read.
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β COST, BY BACKEND, SO THE NEXT READER DOES NOT RE-DERIVE IT: on `store_pg` (production)
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`exists` is a single-key `SELECT 1` against `store_kv`, strictly cheaper than fetching and
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decoding the document. On the HF backend it is a repo listing, and that backend is retired as
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an architecture; it also answers True on any uncertainty, so it degrades into the old read.
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β FAIL OPEN, TO THE READ. Every failure path answers True, so a store that cannot answer
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"does this exist" is handled exactly as it was before this function existed: the document is
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read and the fold decides on its contents. A skipped fold is a column that silently does not
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exist, which is the defect the fold was written for.
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"""
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handle = _st(st)
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probe = getattr(handle, 'exists', None)
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if not callable(probe):
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return True
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try:
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return bool(probe(bucket(table_key)))
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except Exception:
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return True
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def document(table_key, st=None):
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"""One captured shared-stratum document for consumers in a single request.
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canon = str(table_key or '').strip()
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if not legacy or not canon or legacy == canon:
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return {'fields': 0, 'cells': 0}
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# ββ W50 COMBINE β ASK WHETHER THE LEGACY BUCKET EXISTS BEFORE READING IT. This runs on every
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# shared-field read; a topic with no residue must not pay a whole document read per database
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# switch to be told so. `_may_hold_anything` fails OPEN, so nothing below changes for a store
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# that cannot answer, and a bucket that exists is read and folded exactly as before.
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if not _may_hold_anything(legacy, st=st):
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return {'fields': 0, 'cells': 0}
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src = _read(legacy, st=st)
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if not src['fields'] and not src['cells']:
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return {'fields': 0, 'cells': 0}
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web/src/views-trash/trashApi.ts
CHANGED
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@@ -91,6 +91,11 @@ async function refusal(res: Response, fallback = FALLBACK): Promise<TrashApiErro
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* their literals began with the helper call rather than the prefix. Writing each path out in full
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* turns one phantom into three real checks.
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*
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* Do NOT write the prefix token followed by a slash anywhere in this comment: the scan reads
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* COMMENTS too, and the first draft of this very note put a fresh phantom back into the gate.
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* Wave-50 combine, 2026-09-03.
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@@ -98,10 +103,7 @@ async function refusal(res: Response, fallback = FALLBACK): Promise<TrashApiErro
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/** The caller's own deleted views, newest deletion first. */
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export async function fetchTrash(tableKey: string): Promise<TrashList> {
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const res = await fetch(
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`${API_V1}/tables/${encodeURIComponent(tableKey)}/views/trash`,
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{ credentials: CREDENTIALS },
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)
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if (!res.ok) throw await refusal(res, 'the deleted views could not be read just now.')
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const body = await res.json()
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return {
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tableKey: string,
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viewId: string,
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): Promise<{ restored: string; owner: string; name: string }> {
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const res = await fetch(
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`${API_V1}/tables/${encodeURIComponent(tableKey)}/views/${encodeURIComponent(viewId)}/restore`, {
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method: 'POST',
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credentials: CREDENTIALS,
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headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
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@@ -136,8 +137,7 @@ export async function restoreView(
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/** The Administrator trail for this database, newest first, or
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* `TRAIL_FORBIDDEN` when this account may not read it. */
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export async function fetchTrail(tableKey: string, limit = 60): Promise<TrailAnswer> {
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const res = await fetch(
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`${API_V1}/tables/${encodeURIComponent(tableKey)}/views/audit?limit=${encodeURIComponent(String(limit))}`, {
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credentials: CREDENTIALS,
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})
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if (res.status === 403) return TRAIL_FORBIDDEN
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* their literals began with the helper call rather than the prefix. Writing each path out in full
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* turns one phantom into three real checks.
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*
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* β AND EACH URL STAYS ON ITS OWN `fetch(` LINE. `verify_shared_views.py:947` scans for a line
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* containing BOTH `fetch(` and `?`, so wrapping the audit call across two lines made the C4
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* seam report `sent: []` and fail its own "else this section proves nothing" guard - a
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* reformat, with no behaviour change, blinded the check.
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*
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* Do NOT write the prefix token followed by a slash anywhere in this comment: the scan reads
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* COMMENTS too, and the first draft of this very note put a fresh phantom back into the gate.
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* Wave-50 combine, 2026-09-03.
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/** The caller's own deleted views, newest deletion first. */
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export async function fetchTrash(tableKey: string): Promise<TrashList> {
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const res = await fetch(`${API_V1}/tables/${encodeURIComponent(tableKey)}/views/trash`, { credentials: CREDENTIALS })
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if (!res.ok) throw await refusal(res, 'the deleted views could not be read just now.')
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const body = await res.json()
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return {
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tableKey: string,
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viewId: string,
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): Promise<{ restored: string; owner: string; name: string }> {
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const res = await fetch(`${API_V1}/tables/${encodeURIComponent(tableKey)}/views/${encodeURIComponent(viewId)}/restore`, {
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method: 'POST',
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credentials: CREDENTIALS,
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headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
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/** The Administrator trail for this database, newest first, or
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* `TRAIL_FORBIDDEN` when this account may not read it. */
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export async function fetchTrail(tableKey: string, limit = 60): Promise<TrailAnswer> {
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const res = await fetch(`${API_V1}/tables/${encodeURIComponent(tableKey)}/views/audit?limit=${encodeURIComponent(String(limit))}`, {
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credentials: CREDENTIALS,
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})
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if (res.status === 403) return TRAIL_FORBIDDEN
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