fsanyoto commited on
Commit
674f3d8
·
verified ·
1 Parent(s): 5fe9c48

Deploy AIOS web (React glide grid + FastAPI slice)

Browse files
RELEASES.json CHANGED
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
1
  {
2
- "current": "v78 (aad6561d63e)",
3
  "releases": [
4
  {
5
  "version": "v78",
 
1
  {
2
+ "current": "59d605c45aa498f02603cb700754e948952392e2 (59d605c45aa)",
3
  "releases": [
4
  {
5
  "version": "v78",
VERSION CHANGED
@@ -1 +1 @@
1
- v78 (aad6561d63e)
 
1
+ 59d605c45aa498f02603cb700754e948952392e2 (59d605c45aa)
api/deps.py CHANGED
@@ -186,7 +186,8 @@ def _assistant_tenant_allows(session: Session, database: str) -> bool:
186
 
187
 
188
  def _assistant_preflight_request(session: Session, database: str, canonical_fields,
189
- requested_fields, filters, *, require_explicit_grant: bool):
 
190
  """Refuse an unresolved grant, field or filter before a stored record is touched."""
191
  import core.perm_scope as perm_scope
192
 
@@ -197,7 +198,8 @@ def _assistant_preflight_request(session: Session, database: str, canonical_fiel
197
  visible = (perm_scope.assistant_visible_fields(canonical_fields, session.user, database)
198
  if grant is not None else list(canonical_fields or ()))
199
  try:
200
- perm_scope.validate_assistant_filter((grant or {}).get("filter"), canonical_fields)
 
201
  _assistant_requested_fields(requested_fields, visible)
202
  perm_scope.validate_assistant_filter(filters, visible)
203
  except ValueError as exc:
@@ -206,7 +208,7 @@ def _assistant_preflight_request(session: Session, database: str, canonical_fiel
206
 
207
 
208
  def _assistant_cached_builtin(session: Session, database: str, requested_fields=None, filters=None,
209
- *, mode=None):
210
  """The exact in-process snapshot for one built-in database, or a loud cache-miss refusal.
211
 
212
  This intentionally reads `runtime.pool_cache` directly. Calling either route's `_pool_for`
@@ -222,18 +224,29 @@ def _assistant_cached_builtin(session: Session, database: str, requested_fields=
222
  _assistant_refuse(403, "assistant_forbidden",
223
  "your current permissions do not allow this database")
224
 
225
- # Resolve the customer grid's permitted field contract without rows before any cache read.
226
  # Its derived and overlay cells below must match the ordinary grid's scoped assembly.
227
  import aios_grid
228
- fields = aios_grid.FIELDS if database == "customer_data" else aios_grid.product_fields()
229
- customer_grid = None
230
  if database == "customer_data":
231
  from routes_customers import grid_assembly
232
- customer_grid = grid_assembly(session, scope="customer", consume_corrections=False, with_rows=False)
233
- fields = customer_grid["fields"]
 
 
 
 
 
234
  _assistant_preflight_request(session, database, fields, requested_fields, filters,
235
- require_explicit_grant=True)
 
 
 
 
 
 
236
  if mode in ("schema", "query_schema"):
 
 
237
  return [], [dict(field) for field in fields], {"read": "field contract"}
238
 
239
  team_id, agent = perm_scope.derive_pool_scope(session.user, database)
@@ -268,13 +281,12 @@ def _assistant_cached_builtin(session: Session, database: str, requested_fields=
268
  or any(not isinstance(row, dict) for row in entry[1])):
269
  _assistant_refuse(409, "assistant_snapshot_unavailable",
270
  "this database has no app-stored snapshot for your current scope")
271
- if customer_grid is not None:
272
- customer_grid = grid_assembly(session, scope="customer", consume_corrections=False, with_rows=True)
273
- rows = aios_grid.rows_from_pool(customer_grid["rows_src"], fields,
274
- (customer_grid.get("ws") or {}).get("overlays") or {},
275
- derived=customer_grid.get("derived"))
276
- else:
277
- rows = list(entry[1])
278
  return rows, [dict(field) for field in fields if isinstance(field, dict)], entry[0]
279
 
280
 
@@ -801,10 +813,11 @@ def assistant_read_scope(session: Session, database, fields=None, filters=None,
801
  _assistant_refuse(403, "assistant_forbidden",
802
  "Every aggregate and grouping field must be visible to every member.")
803
  extra = {}
 
804
  _audience_defn = None # the held definition lends C16's declaration without a store read
805
  if key in _ASSISTANT_BUILT_INS:
806
  rows, canonical_fields, source_version = _assistant_cached_builtin(
807
- session, key, fields, filters, mode=mode)
808
  label = _ASSISTANT_BUILT_INS[key]["label"]
809
  source_kind = "runtime_cache"
810
  elif key.startswith("ut_"):
@@ -867,10 +880,11 @@ def assistant_read_scope(session: Session, database, fields=None, filters=None,
867
  # Spelled as membership so a third user-table source is one line, not a growing chain.
868
  _assistant_refuse(403, "assistant_forbidden",
869
  "your current permissions do not allow this database")
870
- try:
871
- perm_scope.validate_assistant_filter((grant or {}).get("filter"), canonical_fields)
872
- except ValueError as exc:
873
- _assistant_refuse(400, "assistant_bad_filter", str(exc))
 
874
  # ⭐ OWNER I16 — the tenant handle rides into the row wall here too, so one stored rule means
875
  # the same thing in the Analyst's answer as it does on the grid (see
876
  # `perm_scope._enrich_for_wall`).
@@ -886,6 +900,16 @@ def assistant_read_scope(session: Session, database, fields=None, filters=None,
886
  # must not make a schema description load stored cells to enrich an empty row set.
887
  if mode in ("schema", "query_schema"):
888
  permitted_rows = []
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
889
  else:
890
  # C16: with no grant there is no row wall, but a declared recipient list still binds
891
  # every reader, administrators included (S68-T57).
@@ -896,13 +920,23 @@ def assistant_read_scope(session: Session, database, fields=None, filters=None,
896
  defn=_audience_defn))
897
  visible = (perm_scope.assistant_visible_fields(canonical_fields, session.user, key)
898
  if grant is not None else list(canonical_fields))
 
 
899
  if members:
900
  hidden = set(access["hidden"])
 
 
901
  for member in members:
902
- hidden.update(perm_scope.hidden_keys(member, key, canonical_fields, st=session.runtime))
903
  if mode not in ("schema", "query_schema"):
904
- permitted_rows = perm_scope.apply_row_scope(
905
- permitted_rows, member, key, canonical_fields, st=session.runtime)
 
 
 
 
 
 
906
  visible = [field for field in visible if field.get("key") not in hidden]
907
  selected_keys = _assistant_requested_fields(fields, visible)
908
  try:
 
186
 
187
 
188
  def _assistant_preflight_request(session: Session, database: str, canonical_fields,
189
+ requested_fields, filters, *, require_explicit_grant: bool,
190
+ permission_fields=None):
191
  """Refuse an unresolved grant, field or filter before a stored record is touched."""
192
  import core.perm_scope as perm_scope
193
 
 
198
  visible = (perm_scope.assistant_visible_fields(canonical_fields, session.user, database)
199
  if grant is not None else list(canonical_fields or ()))
200
  try:
201
+ perm_scope.validate_assistant_filter((grant or {}).get("filter"),
202
+ canonical_fields if permission_fields is None else permission_fields)
203
  _assistant_requested_fields(requested_fields, visible)
204
  perm_scope.validate_assistant_filter(filters, visible)
205
  except ValueError as exc:
 
208
 
209
 
210
  def _assistant_cached_builtin(session: Session, database: str, requested_fields=None, filters=None,
211
+ *, mode=None, permission_scope=None, members=()):
212
  """The exact in-process snapshot for one built-in database, or a loud cache-miss refusal.
213
 
214
  This intentionally reads `runtime.pool_cache` directly. Calling either route's `_pool_for`
 
224
  _assistant_refuse(403, "assistant_forbidden",
225
  "your current permissions do not allow this database")
226
 
227
+ # Resolve the grid's permitted field contract without rows before any cache read.
228
  # Its derived and overlay cells below must match the ordinary grid's scoped assembly.
229
  import aios_grid
 
 
230
  if database == "customer_data":
231
  from routes_customers import grid_assembly
232
+ grid_scope = "customer"
233
+ else:
234
+ from routes_products import product_assembly as grid_assembly
235
+ grid_scope = "product"
236
+ grid = grid_assembly(session, scope=grid_scope, consume_corrections=False, with_rows=False)
237
+ fields = grid["fields"]
238
+ internal = grid.get("_permission_scope") or {"fields": fields, "rows": [], "row_fields": fields}
239
  _assistant_preflight_request(session, database, fields, requested_fields, filters,
240
+ require_explicit_grant=True, permission_fields=internal["fields"])
241
+ for member in members:
242
+ try:
243
+ perm_scope.validate_assistant_filter(
244
+ (perm_scope.assistant_entry(member, database) or {}).get("filter"), internal["fields"])
245
+ except ValueError as exc:
246
+ _assistant_refuse(400, "assistant_bad_filter", str(exc))
247
  if mode in ("schema", "query_schema"):
248
+ if permission_scope is not None and "_permission_scope" in grid:
249
+ permission_scope.update(internal)
250
  return [], [dict(field) for field in fields], {"read": "field contract"}
251
 
252
  team_id, agent = perm_scope.derive_pool_scope(session.user, database)
 
281
  or any(not isinstance(row, dict) for row in entry[1])):
282
  _assistant_refuse(409, "assistant_snapshot_unavailable",
283
  "this database has no app-stored snapshot for your current scope")
284
+ grid = grid_assembly(session, scope=grid_scope, consume_corrections=False, with_rows=True)
285
+ if permission_scope is not None and "_permission_scope" in grid:
286
+ permission_scope.update(grid["_permission_scope"])
287
+ rows = aios_grid.rows_from_pool(grid["rows_src"], fields,
288
+ (grid.get("ws") or {}).get("overlays") or {},
289
+ derived=grid.get("derived"))
 
290
  return rows, [dict(field) for field in fields if isinstance(field, dict)], entry[0]
291
 
292
 
 
813
  _assistant_refuse(403, "assistant_forbidden",
814
  "Every aggregate and grouping field must be visible to every member.")
815
  extra = {}
816
+ builtin_scope = {}
817
  _audience_defn = None # the held definition lends C16's declaration without a store read
818
  if key in _ASSISTANT_BUILT_INS:
819
  rows, canonical_fields, source_version = _assistant_cached_builtin(
820
+ session, key, fields, filters, mode=mode, permission_scope=builtin_scope, members=members)
821
  label = _ASSISTANT_BUILT_INS[key]["label"]
822
  source_kind = "runtime_cache"
823
  elif key.startswith("ut_"):
 
880
  # Spelled as membership so a third user-table source is one line, not a growing chain.
881
  _assistant_refuse(403, "assistant_forbidden",
882
  "your current permissions do not allow this database")
883
+ if not builtin_scope:
884
+ try:
885
+ perm_scope.validate_assistant_filter((grant or {}).get("filter"), canonical_fields)
886
+ except ValueError as exc:
887
+ _assistant_refuse(400, "assistant_bad_filter", str(exc))
888
  # ⭐ OWNER I16 — the tenant handle rides into the row wall here too, so one stored rule means
889
  # the same thing in the Analyst's answer as it does on the grid (see
890
  # `perm_scope._enrich_for_wall`).
 
900
  # must not make a schema description load stored cells to enrich an empty row set.
901
  if mode in ("schema", "query_schema"):
902
  permitted_rows = []
903
+ elif builtin_scope:
904
+ # The grid already applied the member's row wall before masking its operands.
905
+ permitted_rows = rows
906
+ if session.admin:
907
+ # Retain the Assistant's explicit admin grant, which the interactive grid bypasses.
908
+ allowed = perm_scope.assistant_apply_row_scope(
909
+ builtin_scope["rows"], session.user, key, builtin_scope["row_fields"],
910
+ st=session.runtime)
911
+ allowed_pids = {row.get("pid") for row in allowed}
912
+ permitted_rows = [row for row in permitted_rows if row.get("pid") in allowed_pids]
913
  else:
914
  # C16: with no grant there is no row wall, but a declared recipient list still binds
915
  # every reader, administrators included (S68-T57).
 
920
  defn=_audience_defn))
921
  visible = (perm_scope.assistant_visible_fields(canonical_fields, session.user, key)
922
  if grant is not None else list(canonical_fields))
923
+ hidden = perm_scope.hidden_keys(session.user, key, canonical_fields, st=session.runtime)
924
+ visible = [field for field in visible if field.get("key") not in hidden]
925
  if members:
926
  hidden = set(access["hidden"])
927
+ member_rows = builtin_scope.get("rows", permitted_rows)
928
+ member_fields = builtin_scope.get("fields", canonical_fields)
929
  for member in members:
930
+ hidden.update(perm_scope.hidden_keys(member, key, member_fields, st=session.runtime))
931
  if mode not in ("schema", "query_schema"):
932
+ member_rows = perm_scope.apply_row_scope(
933
+ member_rows, member, key, builtin_scope.get("row_fields", canonical_fields),
934
+ st=session.runtime)
935
+ if builtin_scope and mode not in ("schema", "query_schema"):
936
+ allowed_pids = {row.get("pid") for row in member_rows}
937
+ permitted_rows = [row for row in permitted_rows if row.get("pid") in allowed_pids]
938
+ elif not builtin_scope:
939
+ permitted_rows = member_rows
940
  visible = [field for field in visible if field.get("key") not in hidden]
941
  selected_keys = _assistant_requested_fields(fields, visible)
942
  try:
api/routes_customers.py CHANGED
@@ -882,6 +882,8 @@ def _compute_grid_assembly(session: Session, scope: str = "customer", storage_ke
882
  # HIDDEN. So an unthreaded `st` UNDER-shares (a grantee cannot see their own column) rather
883
  # than over-shares — visible and reportable, but still wrong, and `visible_fields`' own note
884
  # requires the two calls to agree about it.
 
 
885
  hidden = perm_scope.hidden_keys(session.user, MODULE, fields, st=rt)
886
  if hidden:
887
  fields = [f for f in fields if f.get("key") not in hidden]
@@ -992,6 +994,7 @@ def _compute_grid_assembly(session: Session, scope: str = "customer", storage_ke
992
  for pid, cells in _ovc.items()}
993
  return {"rows_src": rows_src, "pids": pids, "ws": ws, "workspace": workspace,
994
  "fields": fields, "views": views, "lists": lists, "derived": derived,
 
995
  "measures": measures, "measure_sets": measure_sets, "today": today,
996
  "team_id": team_id, "routes": normalized_routes, "zones": normalized_zones}
997
 
 
882
  # HIDDEN. So an unthreaded `st` UNDER-shares (a grantee cannot see their own column) rather
883
  # than over-shares — visible and reportable, but still wrong, and `visible_fields`' own note
884
  # requires the two calls to agree about it.
885
+ # Internal wall inputs stay outside workspace, fields and all public row projections.
886
+ permission_scope = {"fields": fields, "rows": rows_src, "row_fields": aios_grid.FIELDS}
887
  hidden = perm_scope.hidden_keys(session.user, MODULE, fields, st=rt)
888
  if hidden:
889
  fields = [f for f in fields if f.get("key") not in hidden]
 
994
  for pid, cells in _ovc.items()}
995
  return {"rows_src": rows_src, "pids": pids, "ws": ws, "workspace": workspace,
996
  "fields": fields, "views": views, "lists": lists, "derived": derived,
997
+ "_permission_scope": permission_scope,
998
  "measures": measures, "measure_sets": measure_sets, "today": today,
999
  "team_id": team_id, "routes": normalized_routes, "zones": normalized_zones}
1000
 
api/routes_external.py CHANGED
@@ -3280,7 +3280,9 @@ def _mcp_guide(session: Session) -> str:
3280
  lines = ["# Loopable guide", "", f"Signed in as {session.uname}.", "", MCP_INSTRUCTIONS, "",
3281
  "## Your databases", "",
3282
  "Call describe_database with a key below for its fields before you query it.", ""]
3283
- rows = [row for row in _resolve_external_scope(session) if row["permitted"]]
 
 
3284
  for row in rows:
3285
  note = "" if row["answerable"] else f" Not queryable right now: {_markdown_inline(row['reason'])}"
3286
  lines.append(f"- `{row['database']}`: {_markdown_inline(row['label'])}.{note}")
 
3280
  lines = ["# Loopable guide", "", f"Signed in as {session.uname}.", "", MCP_INSTRUCTIONS, "",
3281
  "## Your databases", "",
3282
  "Call describe_database with a key below for its fields before you query it.", ""]
3283
+ key_databases = _key_scope(session)[1]
3284
+ rows = [row for row in _resolve_external_scope(session) if row["permitted"]
3285
+ and external_access.database_allowed(key_databases, row["database"])]
3286
  for row in rows:
3287
  note = "" if row["answerable"] else f" Not queryable right now: {_markdown_inline(row['reason'])}"
3288
  lines.append(f"- `{row['database']}`: {_markdown_inline(row['label'])}.{note}")
api/routes_products.py CHANGED
@@ -504,6 +504,8 @@ def _compute_product_assembly(session: Session, scope: str = "product", storage_
504
  projected.append(item)
505
  fields = list(fields) + projected
506
 
 
 
507
  hidden = perm_scope.hidden_keys(session.user, MODULE, fields, st=session.runtime)
508
  if hidden:
509
  fields = [f for f in fields if f.get("key") not in hidden]
@@ -575,6 +577,7 @@ def _compute_product_assembly(session: Session, scope: str = "product", storage_
575
  for field in fields]
576
  return {"rows_src": rows_src, "pids": pids, "ws": ws, "workspace": workspace,
577
  "fields": fields, "views": views, "lists": lists,
 
578
  "derived": derived,
579
  "measures": measures, "measure_sets": measure_sets, "today": today,
580
  "team_id": team_id}
 
504
  projected.append(item)
505
  fields = list(fields) + projected
506
 
507
+ # Internal wall inputs stay outside workspace, fields and all public row projections.
508
+ permission_scope = {"fields": fields, "rows": rows_src, "row_fields": fields_base}
509
  hidden = perm_scope.hidden_keys(session.user, MODULE, fields, st=session.runtime)
510
  if hidden:
511
  fields = [f for f in fields if f.get("key") not in hidden]
 
577
  for field in fields]
578
  return {"rows_src": rows_src, "pids": pids, "ws": ws, "workspace": workspace,
579
  "fields": fields, "views": views, "lists": lists,
580
+ "_permission_scope": permission_scope,
581
  "derived": derived,
582
  "measures": measures, "measure_sets": measure_sets, "today": today,
583
  "team_id": team_id}
platform/core/external_oauth.py CHANGED
@@ -634,7 +634,7 @@ def _live_permission_user(username: str, tenant: str) -> dict:
634
  or any(not isinstance(field, str) for field in entry["hiddenFields"])):
635
  raise ExternalOAuthAuthError(AUTH_ERROR)
636
  modules = record.get("modules", "all")
637
- if modules != "all" and (not isinstance(modules, (list, tuple)) or not modules
638
  or any(not isinstance(key, str) or not key for key in modules)):
639
  raise ExternalOAuthAuthError(AUTH_ERROR)
640
  public = users._public(username, record)
 
634
  or any(not isinstance(field, str) for field in entry["hiddenFields"])):
635
  raise ExternalOAuthAuthError(AUTH_ERROR)
636
  modules = record.get("modules", "all")
637
+ if modules != "all" and (not isinstance(modules, (list, tuple))
638
  or any(not isinstance(key, str) or not key for key in modules)):
639
  raise ExternalOAuthAuthError(AUTH_ERROR)
640
  public = users._public(username, record)
platform/core/perm_scope.py CHANGED
@@ -219,19 +219,7 @@ def nav_may_open(user, key, st=None):
219
 
220
 
221
  def assistant_entry(user, module):
222
- """The explicit database grant an Assistant snapshot may rely on, else ``None``.
223
-
224
- The interactive application retains an admin break-glass path and a temporary legacy-grant
225
- compatibility path. Neither is an answer at the Assistant's app-stored data boundary:
226
- that reader must be able to name the migrated grant that admitted a database. In particular,
227
- a store-outage admin identity with no ``perms`` document is not an unresolved permission that
228
- may be widened into data access.
229
-
230
- ⭐ S67-T34 / D-276: ONE NAMED EXCEPTION, the grant the NAVIGATION uses. For the two registry
231
- topics in ``ASSISTANT_NAV_TOPICS`` an administrator account is admitted unfiltered (unless
232
- explicitly unticked), because ``nav_may_open`` leg 1 opens them to it; the AI list must equal
233
- the nav (R33). See the comment at that leg for why the outage identity no longer reaches it.
234
- """
235
  e = entry(user, module)
236
  # T55: the AI list and read use the same named admin grant for the Data topics.
237
  # Return the complete entry so hidden fields and row restrictions survive admission.
@@ -239,8 +227,11 @@ def assistant_entry(user, module):
239
  if isinstance(e, dict) and e.get('access') is False:
240
  return None
241
  return dict(e) if isinstance(e, dict) else {'access': True, 'filter': None}
242
- if (is_migrated(user) and isinstance(e, dict)
243
- and bool(e.get('access', True)) and may_access(user, module)):
 
 
 
244
  return e
245
  # ⭐⭐ S67-T34 / D-276 / R26: THE ADMINISTRATOR THE NAVIGATION ADMITS. `nav_may_open` leg 1
246
  # opens every registry topic to an administrator, and `_clean_perms` writes no per-topic
@@ -250,12 +241,10 @@ def assistant_entry(user, module):
250
  # answer is the grant the nav already uses, admitted for exactly these topics: an account
251
  # whose ROLE is admin, minus an explicit `access: false` (narrower than the nav, never wider).
252
  # Unfiltered, as the nav's break-glass is.
253
- # ⚠ THE STORE-OUTAGE IDENTITY the docstring names is no longer built by `deps._user_for`
254
  # (it admits a stored record or the QA runner, nothing else), so the role is read off a
255
  # stored account here. If a synthetic admin identity is ever reintroduced, it must be kept
256
  # out of this leg.
257
- # ⛔ NOT A MEMBER. A non-administrator still needs the explicit migrated grant above, so a
258
- # user without it does not see the database (the NC).
259
  return None
260
 
261
 
@@ -1866,6 +1855,11 @@ def derive_pool_scope(user, module):
1866
  if perms.is_admin(user):
1867
  return None, None
1868
  team_id, agent = _derive_from_filter(user, module)
 
 
 
 
 
1869
  if team_id is None and module not in BU_FILTERABLE_MODULES:
1870
  team_id = perms.scope_team_id(user)
1871
  return team_id, agent
 
219
 
220
 
221
  def assistant_entry(user, module):
222
+ """Resolve an effective database grant without losing its stored row or field restrictions."""
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
223
  e = entry(user, module)
224
  # T55: the AI list and read use the same named admin grant for the Data topics.
225
  # Return the complete entry so hidden fields and row restrictions survive admission.
 
227
  if isinstance(e, dict) and e.get('access') is False:
228
  return None
229
  return dict(e) if isinstance(e, dict) else {'access': True, 'filter': None}
230
+ if module in ASSISTANT_NAV_TOPICS:
231
+ if not may_read(user, module):
232
+ return None
233
+ return e if e is not None else {'access': True, 'filter': None}
234
+ if (isinstance(e, dict) and bool(e.get('access', True)) and may_access(user, module)):
235
  return e
236
  # ⭐⭐ S67-T34 / D-276 / R26: THE ADMINISTRATOR THE NAVIGATION ADMITS. `nav_may_open` leg 1
237
  # opens every registry topic to an administrator, and `_clean_perms` writes no per-topic
 
241
  # answer is the grant the nav already uses, admitted for exactly these topics: an account
242
  # whose ROLE is admin, minus an explicit `access: false` (narrower than the nav, never wider).
243
  # Unfiltered, as the nav's break-glass is.
244
+ # ⚠ THE STORE-OUTAGE IDENTITY is no longer built by `deps._user_for`
245
  # (it admits a stored record or the QA runner, nothing else), so the role is read off a
246
  # stored account here. If a synthetic admin identity is ever reintroduced, it must be kept
247
  # out of this leg.
 
 
248
  return None
249
 
250
 
 
1855
  if perms.is_admin(user):
1856
  return None, None
1857
  team_id, agent = _derive_from_filter(user, module)
1858
+ # Legacy account scope remains binding even when a stored filter adds another restriction.
1859
+ if not is_migrated(user):
1860
+ legacy_team = perms.scope_team_id(user)
1861
+ team_id = legacy_team if legacy_team is not None else team_id
1862
+ agent = perms.scope_agent(user) or agent
1863
  if team_id is None and module not in BU_FILTERABLE_MODULES:
1864
  team_id = perms.scope_team_id(user)
1865
  return team_id, agent
web/public/AIOS_DEPLOY_RECEIPT CHANGED
@@ -1 +1 @@
1
- 60fc7b63a6b8070797ff57b7e2f347601edd43488c0f354e8cc2eed2eb99006c
 
1
+ 4e9f7fcf70f473d776a30559e447ddd5aa922ee3069e56bbed7e8213ec12d6c3