fsanyoto commited on
Commit
c4e6be8
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1 Parent(s): dedd4ff

Deploy AIOS web (React glide grid + FastAPI slice)

Browse files
RELEASES.json CHANGED
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
1
  {
2
- "current": "c05da70",
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  "releases": [
4
  {
5
  "version": "v29",
 
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  {
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+ "current": "74e86de",
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  "releases": [
4
  {
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  "version": "v29",
VERSION CHANGED
@@ -1 +1 @@
1
- c05da70
 
1
+ 74e86de
api/deps.py CHANGED
@@ -60,7 +60,12 @@ class Session:
60
  that tenant's admin, or a freshly provisioned Nurilab admin (role=admin β‡’ may_open
61
  everything) would open Royal's Odoo-backed surfaces through any module route. One
62
  chokepoint: `module_gate` and every inline `session.require` pass through here."""
63
- if not perms.may_open(self.user, module_key):
 
 
 
 
 
64
  raise err(403, "forbidden", f"your account does not have access to {module_key}")
65
  tcfg = getattr(self.runtime.tenant, "config", None) or {}
66
  tmods = tcfg.get("modules", "all")
 
60
  that tenant's admin, or a freshly provisioned Nurilab admin (role=admin β‡’ may_open
61
  everything) would open Royal's Odoo-backed surfaces through any module route. One
62
  chokepoint: `module_gate` and every inline `session.require` pass through here."""
63
+ # β›” THE SAME PREDICATE THE NAV USES, or the two disagree and the disagreement is
64
+ # invisible: a row the rail offers that the route 403s, or the reverse. The
65
+ # editor's explicit grant lands here too, so a database an administrator ticked
66
+ # is reachable by URL as well as visible in the rail.
67
+ import core.perm_scope as _perm_scope
68
+ if not _perm_scope.nav_may_open(self.user, module_key):
69
  raise err(403, "forbidden", f"your account does not have access to {module_key}")
70
  tcfg = getattr(self.runtime.tenant, "config", None) or {}
71
  tmods = tcfg.get("modules", "all")
api/routes_nav.py CHANGED
@@ -489,8 +489,15 @@ def nav(session: Session = Depends(require_session)):
489
  # the moment this import failed. A sentinel that can equal real data is not a sentinel.
490
  _ut_locked_mode = str(user_tables.AUTOMATION_RECORD_MODE)
491
  _lent = user_tables.lend(session.runtime, **{user_tables.STORE_KEY: _ut_defs})
 
 
 
 
 
492
  for e in user_tables.nav_entries(viewer=session.uname, is_admin=session.admin,
493
  st=_lent):
 
 
494
  pages.append({"key": e["key"], "label": e["label"],
495
  "source": e.get("source") or "Blank", "chrome": "main"})
496
  except Exception:
 
489
  # the moment this import failed. A sentinel that can equal real data is not a sentinel.
490
  _ut_locked_mode = str(user_tables.AUTOMATION_RECORD_MODE)
491
  _lent = user_tables.lend(session.runtime, **{user_tables.STORE_KEY: _ut_defs})
492
+ # β›” AND THE EDITOR'S DENY REACHES THIS HALF TOO. `nav_entries` is `may_open`-filtered
493
+ # β€” creator, admin or a share β€” which knows nothing about the access toggle in
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+ # Manage user. An administrator unticking a shared database left it on the rail.
495
+ # `nav_may_open` composes the two and cannot WIDEN past `may_open` on a `ut_*` key.
496
+ import core.perm_scope as _perm_scope
497
  for e in user_tables.nav_entries(viewer=session.uname, is_admin=session.admin,
498
  st=_lent):
499
+ if not _perm_scope.nav_may_open(session.user, e["key"], st=_lent):
500
+ continue
501
  pages.append({"key": e["key"], "label": e["label"],
502
  "source": e.get("source") or "Blank", "chrome": "main"})
503
  except Exception:
platform/core/perm_scope.py CHANGED
@@ -87,6 +87,50 @@ def may_access(user, module):
87
  return perms.may_open(user, module) # legacy record: the old grant wall
88
 
89
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
90
  def assistant_entry(user, module):
91
  """The explicit database grant an Assistant snapshot may rely on, else ``None``.
92
 
 
87
  return perms.may_open(user, module) # legacy record: the old grant wall
88
 
89
 
90
+ def nav_may_open(user, key, st=None):
91
+ """May this account SEE `key` β€” in the nav, and at the route gate? The ADMISSION question.
92
+
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+ β›”β›” WHY THIS EXISTS: THE EDITOR'S DECISION REACHED THE READ DOOR AND NOTHING ELSE. Measured
94
+ on live 2026-08-18, on a real account. An administrator ticked *Odoo products* for Naomi in
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+ Manage user and saved; the record stored `perms.product_data.access = True` and
96
+ `may_access()` agreed. **The database never appeared.** `perms.nav_pages` and
97
+ `deps.Session.require` both ask `perms.may_open` β€” the LEGACY `user['modules']` array β€” which
98
+ still read `['sales', 'customers', 'products']`, and `products` is the key of the ARCHIVED
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+ *SKU* module, not of `product_data`. So `nav_pages` answered `['customer_data']` and the
100
+ route would have 403'd her even by URL. Two permission systems, the editor writing one and
101
+ every DOOR reading the other ([[two-permission-systems-one-armed]]).
102
+
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+ ⭐ THE ASYMMETRY IS THE WHOLE DESIGN, and it is not the same rule twice:
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+
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+ 1. an admin sees everything (break-glass, as everywhere else);
106
+ 2. an EXPLICIT `access: false` DENIES, on any key β€” an administrator unticking a box must
107
+ take the row off the nav, and before this it did not;
108
+ 3. a `ut_*` key with no explicit deny defers to `user_tables.may_open` β€” creator, admin or
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+ a `core.shares` grant β€” and **an `access: true` entry may NEVER widen past it**. The
110
+ editor must not become a way to hand somebody another user's private table;
111
+ 4. a REGISTRY TOPIC with an explicit entry takes that entry, grant included. Here the
112
+ editor IS the authority: `_clean_perms` writes an entry for every governed topic on
113
+ every save, so an entry means an administrator decided;
114
+ 5. anything else β€” a module this editor does not govern β€” falls through to
115
+ `perms.may_open`, UNCHANGED.
116
+
117
+ β›” LEG 5 IS LOAD-BEARING AND IT IS WHY `may_access` COULD NOT SIMPLY BE CALLED HERE.
118
+ `may_access` reads migrated-and-undeclared as DENY, which is correct for a governed topic and
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+ catastrophic for the nav: Naomi's block declares the ten governed keys and nothing else, so
120
+ `sales` would have gone from visible to denied β€” an outage dressed as a permission fix.
121
+ """
122
+ if perms.is_admin(user):
123
+ return True
124
+ e = entry(user, key)
125
+ if e is not None and not bool(e.get('access', True)):
126
+ return False
127
+ if str(key or '').startswith(_ut().KEY_PREFIX):
128
+ return bool(_ut().may_open(key, (user or {}).get('username'), False, st=st))
129
+ if e is not None:
130
+ return bool(e.get('access', True))
131
+ return perms.may_open(user, key)
132
+
133
+
134
  def assistant_entry(user, module):
135
  """The explicit database grant an Assistant snapshot may rely on, else ``None``.
136
 
platform/core/perms.py CHANGED
@@ -189,7 +189,12 @@ def nav_pages(user):
189
  # API no longer advertises it as a surface of the PRODUCT.
190
  if m['key'] == 'settings':
191
  continue
192
- if not may_open(user, m['key']):
 
 
 
 
 
193
  continue
194
  row = {'key': m['key'], 'label': m['label'],
195
  'chrome': 'main' if m.get('nav', True) else 'utility'}
 
189
  # API no longer advertises it as a surface of the PRODUCT.
190
  if m['key'] == 'settings':
191
  continue
192
+ # β›” `nav_may_open`, NOT `may_open`: the permission editor's explicit decision is
193
+ # what an administrator just made, and until 2026-08-18 it reached the READ door
194
+ # and never this list β€” a database granted in Manage user, saved and confirmed,
195
+ # simply did not appear. Deferred import because `perm_scope` imports THIS module.
196
+ import core.perm_scope as _perm_scope
197
+ if not _perm_scope.nav_may_open(user, m['key']):
198
  continue
199
  row = {'key': m['key'], 'label': m['label'],
200
  'chrome': 'main' if m.get('nav', True) else 'utility'}