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| """Test 06 — Storage, sessions, security (mission §10, §13). | |
| - SQLite persistence survives a restart of the app (session history rule) | |
| - events stored and queryable with filters | |
| - token auth is OFF on loopback, MANDATORY when exposed | |
| - loopback binding is the default | |
| """ | |
| from __future__ import annotations | |
| import json | |
| import sys | |
| from pathlib import Path | |
| sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent)) | |
| from fastapi.testclient import TestClient | |
| from lpu.accelerator.storage import TelemetryStorage | |
| from server.app import create_app | |
| def test_storage_persistence_across_restart(isolated_lpu_home, config): | |
| # first app instance records a session | |
| app1 = create_app(config) | |
| with TestClient(app1) as client: | |
| client.post("/api/detect") | |
| # upsert through a running SDK session file | |
| storage = TelemetryStorage() | |
| storage.upsert_session({"session_id": "s1", "state": "training", | |
| "epoch": 3, "step": 120, "psnr": 31.5}) | |
| storage.record_event({"ts": 1.0, "kind": "lpu", "level": "info", | |
| "text": "hello", "data": {}}) | |
| storage.close() | |
| # second instance sees the SAME history (dashboard restart must not | |
| # lose training history - mission §10) | |
| app2 = create_app(config) | |
| with TestClient(app2) as client: | |
| sessions = client.get("/api/sessions").json()["sessions"] | |
| assert any(s["session_id"] == "s1" and s["epoch"] == 3 | |
| for s in sessions) | |
| ev = client.get("/api/terminal").json()["events"] | |
| assert any(e["text"] == "hello" for e in ev) | |
| # filtered queries | |
| ev = client.get("/api/terminal", params={"kind": "lpu"}).json()["events"] | |
| assert ev and all(e["kind"] == "lpu" for e in ev) | |
| def test_token_auth_only_when_exposed(isolated_lpu_home, config, tmp_path): | |
| # loopback: no auth needed | |
| cfg = dict(config) | |
| cfg["server"] = {"host": "127.0.0.1", "expose": False} | |
| with TestClient(create_app(cfg)) as client: | |
| assert client.get("/api/status").status_code == 200 | |
| # exposed: token REQUIRED | |
| cfg2 = dict(config) | |
| cfg2["server"] = {"host": "0.0.0.0", "expose": True} | |
| app = create_app(cfg2) | |
| token_path = Path(cfg2["server"].get("_token_path", "")) if False else None | |
| with TestClient(app) as client: | |
| r = client.get("/api/status") | |
| assert r.status_code == 401, "exposed bind must require auth" | |
| # token file was created under the isolated home | |
| token_file = isolated_lpu_home / "server_token" | |
| assert token_file.exists() | |
| token = token_file.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip() | |
| r = client.get("/api/status", headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"}) | |
| assert r.status_code == 200 | |
| # wrong token refused | |
| r = client.get("/api/status", headers={"Authorization": "Bearer nope"}) | |
| assert r.status_code == 401 | |
| def test_no_token_in_logs(isolated_lpu_home, config): | |
| cfg = dict(config) | |
| cfg["server"] = {"host": "0.0.0.0", "expose": True} | |
| with TestClient(create_app(cfg)) as client: | |
| client.get("/api/status") # triggers a 401 | |
| token_file = isolated_lpu_home / "server_token" | |
| token = token_file.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip() | |
| # scan every log file under the isolated home for the token | |
| for log in isolated_lpu_home.rglob("*.log"): | |
| assert token not in log.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="ignore"), \ | |
| f"token leaked into {log}" | |
| for jl in isolated_lpu_home.rglob("*.jsonl"): | |
| assert token not in jl.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="ignore"), \ | |
| f"token leaked into {jl}" | |