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Commit History
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Make sandboxes private (#195)
Unverified signature* Make sandbox Spaces private Co-authored-by: Codex <codex@openai.com> * Remove legacy sandbox auth fallback Co-authored-by: Codex <codex@openai.com> * Address sandbox privacy review comments Co-authored-by: Codex <codex@openai.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Codex <codex@openai.com>15d6506
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Protect sandbox control-plane routes (#142)
Aksel Joonas ReediUnverified signature* Protect sandbox control-plane routes The sandbox server exposed command and file APIs on public Spaces without validating the client. This adds bearer-token validation to every non-health endpoint and provisions a per-sandbox API secret so control-plane access is not coupled to URL knowledge. Constraint: Existing sandboxes may only have HF_TOKEN configured, so the server accepts SANDBOX_API_TOKEN first and falls back to HF_TOKEN for compatibility. Rejected: Make every sandbox private by default | that changes product behavior and still leaves the embedded API without a server-side auth boundary. Confidence: high Scope-risk: narrow Directive: Do not add new sandbox API routes without the auth dependency unless the route is intentionally public health/status only. Tested: UV_CACHE_DIR=/tmp/uv-cache uv run --extra dev pytest tests/unit/test_sandbox_api_auth.py * Preserve sandbox reconnect with API token Review caught that Sandbox.connect would send only the HF token while newly…98e4465