## Problem
FCC supports API-key and local providers, but customers cannot use
models included with their ChatGPT subscription. Reusing Codex
credentials would also couple FCC to another application's mutable
authentication state.
## Changes
| Before | After |
| --- | --- |
| OpenAI subscription access was unavailable. | Customers connect
ChatGPT from the local Admin UI with browser PKCE or device code. |
| Provider availability came only from static settings. | A
process-owned connected account adds, refreshes, and evicts OpenAI
models dynamically. |
| FCC had no ChatGPT Codex transport. | `openai/<model-id>` uses
FCC-owned renewable credentials and neutral Responses conversion. |
| Retries and reasoning continuity had no subscription-provider
coverage. | Commit-boundary retries prevent duplicate output while
encrypted reasoning and tool IDs survive round trips. |
<!-- greptile_comment -->
<details open><summary><h3>Greptile Summary</h3></summary>
This PR adds ChatGPT OAuth and a…
Make provider model discovery the sole catalog owner (#1221)
## Problem
Startup model-list I/O was split between a non-enforcing
configured-model validator and the real discovery path. Both queried
providers and populated the same cache even though synchronous cache
warm-up was the validator's only required effect.
## Changes
| Before | After |
| --- | --- |
| Validation and discovery independently resolved providers, queried
model lists, and cached results. | `ProviderModelDiscovery` solely owns
model-list queries, failure reporting, and cache population. |
| Startup ran configured-model validation and then launched discovery. |
Startup synchronously warms referenced providers through discovery, then
launches the existing missing-provider background pass. |
| Absence from a provider catalog produced a non-enforcing missing-model
warning. | Provider catalogs remain discovery metadata and provider
execution remains authoritative. |
| Configured model references retained environment-source metadata for
validator diagnostics. | Configured model …
Fix cross-drive messaging startup with native Claude plan storage (#1085)
## Problem
Messaging startup computed a relative path from `ALLOWED_DIR` to FCC's
plan directory. Windows raises before Telegram or Discord polling starts
when those paths are on different drives, while Claude requires custom
plan directories to remain inside the project root. Fixes #1077.
## Changes
| Before | After |
| --- | --- |
| Runtime startup converted FCC's plan path relative to the customer
workspace. | Runtime startup no longer computes or transports a custom
plan path. |
| Managed Claude configuration carried `plans_directory` through four
ownership layers. | Managed Claude relies on its native user-level plan
storage. |
| `~/.fcc/agent_workspace` was described as a Claude workspace. | The
existing path is explicitly owned as messaging state for
`sessions.json`. |
| Cross-volume `ALLOWED_DIR` values could disable messaging startup. |
`ALLOWED_DIR` remains the project workspace regardless of filesystem
volume. |
Disable nonessential Anthropic traffic for FCC Claude sessions (#1083)
## Problem
Claude proxy environment policy was duplicated between `fcc-claude`,
managed messaging, and live smoke drivers. Managed messaging preserved a
legacy endpoint variable, inherited more Anthropic state, and did not
disable nonessential traffic, so FCC-launched Claude sessions could
drift apart.
## Changes
| Before | After |
| --- | --- |
| `fcc-claude` and managed messaging assembled proxy environments
independently. | One shared owner strips inherited Anthropic variables
and configures proxy URL, auth, discovery, compaction, and
nonessential-traffic policy. |
| Managed messaging carried a `/v1` API URL and converted it back to a
proxy root while also setting a legacy endpoint variable. | Managed
messaging receives the loopback-safe proxy root and uses the supported
`ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL` contract directly. |
| Managed and interactive policy could diverge while smoke drivers
duplicated both shapes. | `fcc-claude`, messaging, and Claude smoke
drivers use the same canonical envi…
Give messaging clear exact subtree semantics (#1072)
## Problem
Messaging `/clear` did not follow the selected platform message
boundary. Reply clears preserved the selected user prompt, while
standalone clears preserved user-authored messages and could reset FCC
state outside the invoking chat.
## Changes
| Before | After |
| --- | --- |
| Reply `/clear` removed a logical conversation branch but retained the
selected message. | Reply `/clear` deletes the selected message and its
literal reply subtree, including the clear command. |
| Standalone `/clear` retained user prompts and voice notes while
resetting global messaging state. | Standalone `/clear` deletes every
tracked message and resets FCC state only in the invoking platform and
chat. |
| Trees recorded only logical execution parentage. | Trees separately
persist logical execution ancestry and exact prompt/status reply
ownership. |
| Clear coordination used one global admission boundary. | Per-chat
clear generations coordinate admission, voice cancellation, persistence,
and bes…
Preserve user messages during messaging clear (#1068)
## Problem
Messaging `/clear` used one untyped collection for both internal reply
references and platform deletion targets. Clearing a branch or
cancelling a voice task could therefore delete the customer's prompt or
voice note along with FCC's own status and reply messages.
## Changes
| Before | After |
| --- | --- |
| Tree transitions exposed one message-ID set for repository unindexing
and platform deletion. | Tree transitions now separate internal
`reference_ids` from FCC-owned `clearable_message_ids`. |
| Reply and global clear deleted user prompts and voice notes with FCC
output. | Clear removes FCC statuses, replies, notices, and the explicit
`/clear` command while preserving user-authored messages. |
| The persisted message log accepted ordinary inbound content. | The
clearable-message log accepts only FCC output and explicit clear
commands, and drops legacy user-content entries when loading. |
| Tests treated user-message deletion as successful cleanup. |
Deterministic and …
## Problem
Telegram's online notice was sent directly by the SDK runtime and its
message ID was discarded, so `/clear` could not delete it. Moving
delivery into the workflow also needs to keep slow sends from blocking
commands and prevent acknowledged notices from losing clear ownership.
## Changes
| Before | After |
| --- | --- |
| The Telegram runtime sent a transport-specific startup side effect. |
The platform declares a semantic notice intent that the application
gives to the workflow after transport readiness. |
| Startup delivery bypassed the persisted message log. | The workflow
renders and records each acknowledged notice in the same bounded log
used by `/clear`. |
| Serializing send and record held workflow state across platform I/O. |
A dedicated clear generation reserves publication, delivery runs outside
the state lock, and a short receipt finalizer commits or compensates. |
| Concurrent clear, cancellation, or record failure could leave a
delivered notice unowned. | Cl…
Use task status as the sole stop confirmation (#1065)
## Problem
Messaging `/stop` edited each affected task status to `Stopped` and also
posted a second success message. The duplicate confirmation added noise
even though the existing status already represented the terminal result.
## Changes
| Before | After |
| --- | --- |
| Successful active, queued, global, and bound-voice stops posted a
second confirmation. | Successful stops use the affected task status as
their sole success UI. |
| Stop commands returned an ambiguous integer or `None`. | A typed
`StopOutcome` carries the cancelled count and terminal status ownership.
|
| Statusless voice cancellation could become silent if confirmations
were removed unconditionally. | Statusless voice cancellation receives
one fallback confirmation. |
| A global stop could under-report work when any affected status was in
another chat. | The invoking chat receives one summary whenever any
affected status is outside its scope. |
| Zero-work global stops reported that zero requests were cancelled.…
Make application shutdown completion-driven (#1056)
## Problem\n\nShutdown could report success after bounded messaging
cleanup, hidden persistence failures, or failed managed-process stops.
An Admin restart could then construct a replacement while the old
runtime still owned work.\n\n## Changes\n\n| Before | After |\n| --- |
--- |\n| Runtime reused bounded interactive stop semantics for terminal
messaging cleanup. | Workflow close cancels work, stops managed
sessions, awaits every claim and recovery task, then flushes
persistence. |\n| Explicit persistence failures were logged and treated
as successful writes. | Explicit flushes and authoritative writes
propagate failure and stay dirty for retry; timer writes remain best
effort. |\n| Managed sessions and aliases were removed before subprocess
termination was confirmed. | Manager and session terminal states prevent
reuse, retain failed owners and PIDs, reject ID collisions, and retry
exact sessions. |\n| Admin restart followed the restart request even
after incomplete shutdown. | Superv…
Replace global runtime resources with explicit ownership (#1042)
## Problem
Provider, messaging, and transcription resources relied on
process-global state, leaving replacement, cancellation, and shutdown
ownership ambiguous. Separate server lifetimes could share
event-loop-bound resources or retain failed cleanup work.
## Changes
| Before | After |
| --- | --- |
| Provider clients found limiters through global singleton and scoped
registries. | Each provider instance receives and owns one explicitly
constructed limiter. |
| Messaging queues and voice pipelines relied on singleton or
module-global state. | Each platform owns its limiter and outbox, while
the application owns one injected transcriber. |
| Messaging shutdown mixed ingress, active work, delivery, and SDK
cleanup. | Application shutdown quiesces ingress, drains work, closes
delivery, then releases transcription and providers. |
| Cancelled or failed provider cleanup could be forgotten or treated as
complete. | The provider manager retains shielded generation and
unpublished-runtime c…
Establish single-owner runtime with stream-safe provider hot swaps (#1036)
## Problem
Provider runtime ownership was split between lifecycle code and mutable
FastAPI state, so Admin replacements could leak the new runtime,
double-close the old runtime, or close providers still serving active
streams. The API package also owned concrete process composition,
obscuring subsystem boundaries.
## Changes
| Before | After |
| --- | --- |
| FastAPI routes inspected several concrete `app.state` resources. |
FastAPI receives one explicit `ApiServices` boundary and stores only
`app.state.services`. |
| Admin Apply persisted config and directly replaced one runtime
reference. | Admin Apply validates a candidate, commits atomically, and
publishes it through the single runtime owner. |
| Provider replacement could close clients used by active streams. |
Generation leases retain old providers until each streaming or
non-streaming response finishes. |
| Provider generations owned discovery state and model metadata. |
`ProviderRuntimeManager` owns one application-lifetime …