RoboRACE-Net-M / README.md
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RACE-Net-M weights, card and code
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metadata
license: other
license_name: roborace-mixed
license_link: https://huggingface.co/datasets/Nabidnur/RoboRACE-Bench/blob/main/LICENSES.md
library_name: pytorch
pipeline_tag: other
tags:
  - robotics
  - multi-agent
  - byzantine-robustness
  - map-fusion
  - truth-inference
  - set-transformer
  - roborace
datasets:
  - Nabidnur/RoboRACE-Bench
model-index:
  - name: RACE-Net-M
    results:
      - task:
          type: other
          name: Byzantine-robust map fusion
        dataset:
          name: RoboRACE-Bench Track D
          type: Nabidnur/RoboRACE-Bench
          config: trackD_maze_results
          split: train
        metrics:
          - type: spl
            value: 70.2
            name: mean SPL x100 over 500 cells

RACE-Net-M — receiver-anchored channel estimation for map fusion

A 44,837-parameter model that fuses the map reports of a robot swarm when some robots lie. Part of RoboRACE · sibling model for camera swarms: RACE-Net-V · showcase Space · code: github.com/Hisernberg/robotics

What it does

Robots explore an unknown map and broadcast what they sensed (cell is free / wall). Some robots corrupt their broadcasts: they invert everything, invent walls or openings, answer at random, turn bad later, or collude. A receiving robot has to decide which cells are walls. RACE-Net-M returns the log-odds of wall for every reported cell. It assumes one thing only: the receiver's own sensor is right.

  1. Anchored counts. Each peer's claims are compared with the cells the receiver sensed itself (claim × truth, recent and old claims apart).
  2. Peer transformer. A small transformer across peers turns the counts into a channel embedding per peer.
  3. Signed read-out. Each kind of claim gets a signed evidence value: a reliable peer is trusted, a consistent liar is inverted and used, a random one is ignored. Reputation systems can only discard a liar.
  4. Refinement (3 rounds). Each peer is also checked against the belief of all the other peers on cells the receiver has not sensed (leave-one-out), so a robot can verify a peer it never overlapped with through a peer it already trusts.

Peers and cells are sets (no positions): any map size and any swarm size.

Use

import sys, numpy as np
from huggingface_hub import snapshot_download
d = snapshot_download("Nabidnur/RoboRACE-Net-M"); sys.path.insert(0, d)
import racenet_m

# own   [H, W]    the receiver's own observations: -1 unknown, 0 free, 1 wall
# claims [n, H, W] latest broadcast of every robot (same coding); stamp [n, H, W] time of that broadcast
log_odds = racenet_m.wall_logodds(own, claims, stamp, i=0, t=now, path=d)   # i = index of the receiver
wall = log_odds > 2.0                                                        # threshold chosen on development mazes

About 2 ms per call on one CPU core. Dependencies: torch, numpy, safetensors.

Training

45,361 snapshots from simulated maze swarms (maze seeds 5000–7399) in which liars follow random two-coin channels with an optional change point (racenet_m.sample_channels). The benchmark's attack names never appear in training, and the colluding ring attack is outside that family. 4,000 AdamW steps on a CPU (8 min including the simulation). Benchmark mazes (seeds 1000–1019) and tuning mazes (seeds 0–39) are disjoint from training and validation mazes.

Evaluation: RoboRACE Track D

Six robots, 20 fresh mazes × 25 conditions (6 attacks × 1–4 liars, plus the clean case) = 500 cells. Score = SPL ×100 (success weighted by path length) of the honest robots. Ranks are medians over 2,000 bootstrap resamples of cells.

rank fusion rule mean SPL no liars liars < 50% liars ≥ 50% goal reached %
1 RACE-Net-M + reachability repair (this model) 70.2 76.8 73.1 66.8 97.8
2 RACE-Net-M (this model) 69.8 76.8 72.6 66.4 97.4
3 race_map (hand-written Bayesian rule, ours) 66.2 76.8 69.7 61.8 94.2
4 W-MSR-style trimming (LeBlanc et al. 2013; F known) 64.1 76.8 65.6 61.5 96.5
5 beta-reputation (Jøsang & Ismail 2002) 63.8 76.8 67.9 58.5 91.9
6 EigenTrust (Kamvar et al. 2003) 63.0 75.0 66.8 58.2 91.8
7 Dawid–Skene (1979), unanchored 62.0 76.3 67.4 55.5 90.1
8 no communication 61.6 61.5 62.0 61.2 95.2
9 naive map merging 56.7 76.8 59.9 51.7 83.8
10 per-cell majority 55.7 76.8 61.5 48.1 82.1
– oracle that knows the liars (reference) 71.3 76.8 74.5 67.5 98.2

Belief quality on held-out mazes (accuracy on cells a peer reported and the receiver has not sensed):

model all 3 of 5 peers lie 5 of 5 peers lie
race_map (hand-written Bayesian rule) 90.1 82.7 72.9
rounds = 1 (no refinement) 91.8 85.7 76.1
rounds = 2 92.2 86.4 77.4
rounds = 3 (released) 92.3 86.7 77.6
rounds = 3, second seed 92.3 86.7 77.6

Limitations

  • Collusion on a few cells. A bloc that is honest everywhere except around the goal looks reliable until a robot gets there; the reachability repair recovers part of the loss, the oracle is still better.
  • One simulator (grid mazes, exact 8-neighbour sensing, six robots). Not tested on real robots or noisy sensors.
  • Claims are assumed conditionally independent given the truth; the model has no notion of where a peer was when it made a claim.

Files

model.safetensors · config.json · training_log.json · ablation.json · racenet_m.py (model, training distribution, inference) · train_racenet_m.py · trackD.py (the benchmark, baselines and planner)