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| # LEDGE | |
| Compact recreation of SEIT's LEDGE product: *"Open-source cryptographic WORM | |
| chain — every AI decision sealed and auditable in under 10ms."* | |
| A single-file C11 program (`ledge`) that seals decision records into an | |
| append-only SHA-256 hash chain and replays the chain to audit it. SHA-256 is | |
| implemented from scratch in `ledge.c` from the FIPS 180-4 spec — no crypto | |
| libraries, no network, zero dependencies beyond a C11 compiler and libc. | |
| ## Build & run | |
| ```sh | |
| make # builds ./ledge with: gcc -std=c11 -Wall -Wextra -O2 | |
| make run # seals 5 demo decisions, prints each seal latency, then verify | |
| make clean # removes ./ledge and chain.dat | |
| ./ledge selftest # checks SHA-256 against 3 standard test vectors | |
| ``` | |
| ## CLI | |
| ```sh | |
| ./ledge append <text> # seal one decision; prints index, hash, seal latency | |
| ./ledge verify # replay whole chain; OK, or FAIL with the bad index | |
| ./ledge selftest # validate the SHA-256 implementation | |
| ``` | |
| Seal latency covers timestamping + hashing + the append write, measured with | |
| `clock_gettime` — target is <10ms per entry. | |
| ## Chain format (`chain.dat`, in the working directory) | |
| Plain binary file, entries appended one after another. Each entry is: | |
| | field | bytes | layout | | |
| |------------|-------|------------------------------------------| | |
| | index | 4 | big-endian uint32, 0-based, gapless | | |
| | ts_ns | 8 | big-endian int64, CLOCK_REALTIME ns | | |
| | text_len | 4 | big-endian uint32 (max 1 MiB) | | |
| | text | N | decision text, raw bytes | | |
| | prev_hash | 32 | raw SHA-256 of previous entry (genesis: all zeros) | | |
| | hash | 32 | raw SHA-256(prev_hash \|\| ts_ns_be \|\| text) | | |
| `verify` replays every entry and recomputes each hash from the stored | |
| `prev_hash`, timestamp, and text, so any tampering with any byte of any entry | |
| (or any deletion/reorder) is detected at the first affected index. | |
| ## Modeled vs. simplified | |
| - **Modeled faithfully:** append-only hash chain; `hash = SHA-256(prev_hash || | |
| timestamp || text)`; per-entry seal latency printed against the 10ms | |
| target; full-chain replay audit that pinpoints the failing index; WORM | |
| semantics at the application level (only appends are ever written). | |
| - **Simplified:** `chain.dat` lives in the current working directory (no | |
| configurable path, no log rotation); timestamps are wall-clock | |
| (CLOCK_REALTIME) with no trusted-timestamp authority; text is limited to | |
| 1 MiB per entry; WORM enforcement is by design, not by filesystem/ACL | |
| immutability — on a hostile disk a rewritten file is caught by `verify`, | |
| not prevented; no networking, no key management, no multi-writer locking. | |
| - **Not invented:** the mechanism above is exactly the described one | |
| (index/timestamp/text/prev_hash/hash, SHA-256 from FIPS 180-4, CLI | |
| `append`/`verify`, latency printout). Nothing else was added. | |
| ## Demo output (typical) | |
| ``` | |
| sealed index=0 hash=9f2c… latency=0.312ms | |
| sealed index=1 hash=41ab… latency=0.287ms | |
| … | |
| VERIFY OK: 5 entries, chain intact | |
| ``` | |
| ## License | |
| SEIT Functional Source License — Donation-Gated Runtime v1.0 | |
| Copyright (C) 2026 Ahmad Ali Parr / SnapKitty Research Lab | |
| Functional, viable source: read, share, and modify freely. Running this | |
| software requires a qualifying donation to the licensor. See | |
| [LICENSE.txt](LICENSE.txt) for the full terms. No warranty. | |