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| # Privacy & Biometric Data Notice — Sentinel-AI | |
| Sentinel-AI processes **face images and biometric embeddings**. In many | |
| jurisdictions that is special-category or sensitive personal data even when the | |
| person is not named. This document is an engineering checklist, not legal | |
| advice. Obtain a jurisdiction-specific review before any real-world use. | |
| --- | |
| ## 1. What the system processes | |
| | Data | Where it goes | Retention | | |
| |------|---------------|-----------| | |
| | Uploaded frame (`/analyze-frame`) | Processed in memory; decoded, detected, embedded, discarded | Not persisted by the API | | |
| | Face embedding (512-D vector) | Generated in memory; compared with the FAISS index | Not persisted per request | | |
| | FAISS index | `backend/index_artifacts/` on the local disk | Until deleted by the operator | | |
| | CelebA metadata + images | `Data/` on the local disk | Until deleted by the operator | | |
| | Matched attributes | Sent to Gemini/Groq/Cohere to draft an alert | Provider retention depends on your account/plan | | |
| | Generated person image (`/generate-person`) | Returned as base64; optionally saved to `backend/uploads/` | Until deleted by the operator | | |
| | Logs | Client IP, timestamps, provider error text | Operator-defined | | |
| The uploaded face image itself is **not** sent to the LLM providers. Only the | |
| matched attribute list and similarity score are sent when drafting an alert. | |
| `/generate-person` sends the user's text prompt to Google. | |
| The FAISS index contains CelebA-derived embeddings and attribute labels. It does | |
| not contain the raw dataset images; images are served from `CELEBA_IMAGES_DIR` | |
| when explicitly requested. | |
| --- | |
| ## 2. Legal frameworks to review | |
| At minimum, evaluate: | |
| - **GDPR / UK GDPR** — face images and embeddings can be biometric data under | |
| Article 9; identify a lawful basis and a condition for processing, run a DPIA, | |
| and document retention. | |
| - **Illinois BIPA** — written notice, written consent, a public retention and | |
| destruction policy, and no sale/profit from biometric identifiers. | |
| - **Texas CUBI / Washington My Health My Data / other US state laws** — notice, | |
| consent, and retention rules vary. | |
| - **CCPA/CPRA** — notice at collection, access/deletion rights, and limits on | |
| sensitive data use. | |
| - **Workplace / school / public-space rules** — surveillance notice, works | |
| council consultation, and prohibitions in some locations. | |
| - **CelebA dataset terms** — the dataset is licensed for non-commercial research. | |
| Do not use it for commercial identification, and do not imply that the | |
| depicted celebrities are suspects. | |
| If you cannot establish a lawful basis and consent/notice, do not deploy the | |
| system on real people. | |
| --- | |
| ## 3. Required operator controls | |
| ### Consent and notice | |
| - Post a clear notice before capture: what is collected, why, who can access it, | |
| how long it is kept, and how to request deletion. | |
| - For employees, contractors, or students, obtain written consent where required | |
| and make alternatives available. | |
| - Do not use the system on children or vulnerable people without a specific | |
| legal basis. | |
| ### Purpose limitation | |
| Use the system only for the stated security purpose (for example, verifying a | |
| person at a controlled entry point). Do not repurpose embeddings for emotion | |
| inference, marketing, or unrelated background checks. | |
| ### Retention and deletion | |
| - Set a retention period for generated alerts, uploads, and logs. | |
| - Delete `backend/uploads/` files and generated reports on schedule. | |
| - Provide a deletion procedure for a person's biometric data and confirm it in | |
| writing. | |
| - Deleting a `--save_to_disk` generated image is not enough if it was copied to | |
| backups; include backups in the retention policy. | |
| ### Access control | |
| - Enable `SENTINEL_API_KEY`, rate limits, TLS, and a reverse proxy before any | |
| shared use. | |
| - Restrict who can read `Data/`, `backend/index_artifacts/`, `backend/uploads/`, | |
| and logs. | |
| - Do not expose `/images/{id}` publicly: it serves identifiable celebrity photos. | |
| - Do not put provider keys in the frontend. | |
| ### Accuracy and human review | |
| - Face matching is probabilistic. The default threshold is calibrated for | |
| CelebA-style portraits, not for CCTV, low light, masks, or children. | |
| - Re-tune `MATCH_SIMILARITY_THRESHOLD` on your own camera footage and measure | |
| false accepts and false rejects by demographic group where lawful and ethical. | |
| - Never take an automated enforcement action (denial of entry, alert to police, | |
| employment decision) solely on the model's output. Require human verification. | |
| - Display confidence and expose the underlying attributes so an operator can | |
| challenge a bad match. | |
| ### Security | |
| - Encrypt disks and backups containing images, embeddings, or logs. | |
| - Rotate provider keys and the API token; see [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md). | |
| - Log access to biometric data and review it. | |
| - Do not send face images or embeddings to third-party analytics. | |
| --- | |
| ## 4. Generated faces and deepfakes | |
| `/generate-person` creates synthetic portraits. Depending on the prompt, the | |
| output may resemble a real person. Do not use it to impersonate, harass, or | |
| mislead. Label synthetic media, obtain consent for likeness, and comply with | |
| applicable disclosure laws. The endpoint is optional and can be disabled by | |
| removing the router or blocking the route at the proxy. | |
| --- | |
| ## 5. Research/demo use | |
| For a hackathon demo: | |
| - Use the bundled CelebA data and clearly state that it is a research dataset. | |
| - Do not display a real attendee's face as a "suspect" without consent. | |
| - Prefer a synthetic or volunteer image for live uploads. | |
| - Do not retain demo uploads or alerts after the session. | |
| - Treat any live camera feed as biometric data even if it is not stored. | |
| --- | |
| ## 6. Data subject requests | |
| Prepare a simple process to: | |
| 1. Verify the requester's identity without collecting more biometric data. | |
| 2. Search `backend/uploads/`, logs, and any exported reports for their data. | |
| 3. Delete or correct the data and confirm completion. | |
| 4. Record the request and outcome for accountability. | |
| Because the API does not persist per-request uploads or embeddings, most requests | |
| will concern index membership, generated files, or logs. Document that fact. | |
| --- | |
| ## 7. Incident response | |
| If biometric data is exposed: | |
| 1. Contain the exposure (revoke tokens, take the endpoint offline). | |
| 2. Preserve evidence without copying sensitive data further. | |
| 3. Assess whether notification is required (GDPR 72 hours where applicable; | |
| BIPA and state breach laws may also apply). | |
| 4. Notify affected people and the relevant authority if required. | |
| 5. Fix the root cause, rotate credentials, and update this document. | |
| --- | |
| ## 8. Open questions for your legal review | |
| - What is the lawful basis and retention period for each data type? | |
| - Is the deployment in a public, workplace, school, or retail context? | |
| - Are there local bans or restrictions on face recognition? | |
| - Do you need a DPIA, works council consultation, or vendor data-processing | |
| agreement with Google/Groq/Cohere? | |
| - Will any data leave your jurisdiction? Provider regions matter. | |
| - How will you handle a false match that caused harm? | |
| Answer these before processing real people's faces. | |