AI & ML interests

Content provenance, invisible watermarking, owner identification, tamper localization, AI Act Article 50 compliance

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Organization Card

Vereye

Vereye is an invisible image watermark that names the registered owner of any copy of an image, read blind from the copy alone, with a computed bound on naming a wrong owner. Vereye is an early-stage startup founded by Adam Weisman; Gil Weisman is co-founder, advisor and engineering reviewer.

On Meta's own Watermark Anything benchmark (200 COCO photos, 35 attacks, identical attacked pixels for every method), Vereye recovered the exact owner key from 98.74 % of attacked copies, against 70.27 % for Meta's Watermark Anything and 66.67 % for Adobe's TrustMark, with no false alarm on 7,000 attacked unmarked copies (Meta: 162, Adobe: 178). On Google DeepMind's SynthID-Image protocol at 512 px, on 300 photos never used in development, it named the exact owner of 99.70 % of attacked copies at random strength and 95.80 % at the most severe, with its stronger mark for small images; Google reports higher values for its closed SynthID on its own images.

What it does

When an image is sealed, Vereye writes a random 64-bit owner key with a 24-bit check into its pixels and records the owner in a signed registry. From any copy, cropped, compressed, rotated, recoloured, screenshotted or pasted into another picture, it:

  • names the registered owner, or says that no seal could be read;
  • says whether the copy is pixel-identical to the sealed original;
  • maps the areas that changed, without the original.

The decision is an exact key that passes its check and is found in the registry, not a score above a threshold. Sealing and reading are deterministic and training-free: no machine-learning model, and the geometry of a copy is solved in closed form. The registry stores no image and nothing from which one could be rebuilt, and its records are signed with post-quantum signatures. The mark lives in the pixels, so it still reads after a screenshot strips C2PA Content Credentials or EXIF metadata: it complements metadata provenance rather than replacing it.

Results

test Vereye Meta WAM Adobe TrustMark
Meta's WAM protocol, 200 COCO photos: exact key or message recovered 98.74 % 70.27 % 66.67 %
Same: false alarms on 7,000 attacked unmarked copies 0 162 178
SynthID-Image protocol, 512 px, current system, 300 photos never used, stronger mark for small images (PSNR 35.58 dB): exact owner, random / most severe 99.70 % / 95.80 %
Same protocol, earlier reader, 100 held-out photos, pre-registered, standard mark (PSNR 41.6 dB) 99.03 % / 86.38 %
Same protocol, earlier reader, the 50 of those photos all three ran on: exact message, random / most severe 99.17 % / 86.21 % 80.41 % / 68.14 % 75.59 % / 62.97 %
Tamper set, 40 photographs: edits found from the copy alone / untouched copies flagged 197 of 200 / 0 of 80 163 of 200 / 2 of 80
Attacked unmarked copies given an owner, all benchmarks 0 of 46,467

Read before comparing

  • SynthID is closed, so it was not run. Google reports 99.98 % / 99.72 % detection and 99.96 % / 98.84 % message recovery for SynthID-O on its own 10,000 ImageNet images, ahead of Vereye at both strengths.
  • Every SynthID-protocol verdict is public, with the script that scores it: anyone can re-check those numbers.
  • Wrong owner: an analytic bound of 5.7 ร— 10โปยนยณ per check with 10ยนยน registered images, under the assumption stated in the paper; measured, 0 of 46,467.

Links

Patents pending.

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