| # EU AI Act — Transparency & Documentation |
|
|
| The EU AI Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/1689) sets obligations based on the |
| **risk category** of an AI system. This document records the |
| classification and the implemented transparency measures for mona-agent |
| and the mona.expert engine. |
|
|
| ## Classification |
|
|
| **Limited risk (Article 50 — transparency).** mona-agent is an AI |
| assistant that helps users operate their own devices: it reasons in the |
| cloud, executes local tools on request, and answers in chat. It is not |
| used in any Annex III high-risk context (no critical infrastructure, no |
| biometrics, no employment/credit decisions, no law enforcement) as |
| provided by mona.expert. |
|
|
| The mona.expert engine orchestrates third-party foundation models |
| (OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, DeepSeek, OpenRouter) on the user's behalf |
| under their own API keys. mona.expert does not deploy or fine-tune |
| general-purpose models itself. |
|
|
| ## Transparency obligations — implemented |
|
|
| | Obligation | Implementation | |
| |---|---| |
| | Users know they interact with AI | The dashboard labels the assistant as AI; the CLI and docs state it explicitly | |
| | AI output is distinguishable | Chat responses are marked `assistant` in the conversation model; no synthetic content is presented as human | |
| | Documentation | This page + [COMPLIANCE.md](COMPLIANCE.md) + [SECURITY.md](../SECURITY.md) | |
| | Human oversight | Every tool call is visible in the activity feed before, during and after execution; the user can stop the agent at any time; shell actions are allowlisted by default | |
| | Record-keeping | Full audit log of tasks, tool calls, LLM calls, and results (`mona_audit_log`, `mona_messages`) | |
| | Traceability | Every run has a `run_id`; device metrics are snapshotted with history | |
|
|
| ## Safety measures |
|
|
| - **Sandboxed execution** — allowlisted shell, path-confined file tool, |
| egress-only networking, per-tool timeouts. |
| - **No autonomous self-improvement** — the agent does not modify its own |
| code, prompts, or safety policy. |
| - **Prompt-injection resistance** — tool results are fed back as |
| structured `TOOL RESULT` messages with explicit boundaries; the system |
| prompt reasserts the tool contract every iteration (max 8 steps). |
| - **Content transparency** — no deepfakes, no synthetic personas; the |
| agent does not generate content for distribution. |
|
|
| ## Model information (transparency record) |
|
|
| - The device never stores model credentials and never selects a |
| provider — the cloud engine resolves the model per user preference |
| (default `auto`). |
| - Provider and model of each call are recorded in the audit log. |
| - Users configure their own provider keys; mona.expert stores them |
| encrypted (AES-256-GCM) and never shares them. |
|
|
| ## Residual risk & mitigations |
|
|
| | Risk | Mitigation | |
| |---|---| |
| | Erroneous tool call | User-visible confirmation via activity feed; allowlisted commands by default; `MONA_SHELL_UNSAFE=1` is an explicit user opt-in | |
| | Hallucinated data | System prompt instructs the model to read real data via tools and never invent it | |
| | Privacy leakage | Metrics minimised to system telemetry; see [GDPR.md](GDPR.md) | |
|
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| ## Contact |
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| AI Act / compliance questions: `compliance@mona.expert`. |
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