Tiny Aya Global: refusal steering vectors (no weights)
Not a fine-tuned model. This repo holds the activation-steering vectors that close most of Tiny Aya Global's multilingual refusal gap at inference time. The base model is unchanged; you add one vector at one layer with SafeTune (commit 26f59e6).
Result (Hindi, harmful requests the model understood): compliance 22.6% → 8.6% with one pass, answering in Hindi, equal to translating to English first (8.7%). Over-refusal on harmless requests 2.2%; Belebele reading comprehension −0.1 pp. Full write-up and all numbers: github.com/anantshri1/lexsi-refusal.
What is in steer_tinyaya_s24_v1.pt
| key | meaning |
|---|---|
r_en, r_hi |
unit refusal directions (difference of means, H_core harmful − benign twin, at <|START_RESPONSE|>), English / Hindi, all pairs, residual stream at slot 24 |
r_en_folds, r_hi_folds, fold_map |
the 5 cross-fitted versions used in the evaluation (each prompt steered by the fold that excludes its pair); min cosine with r_en = 0.9967 |
slot, safetune_layer |
24 and 23: slot k = output of decoder layer k−1, and SafeTune's layers=[i] indexes decoder blocks |
delta_en, alpha_over_delta, alpha |
English harmful−benign separation at slot 24, the chosen fraction 0.2, and the strength α = 0.2·Δ |
Use
import torch
from transformers import AutoModelForCausalLM, AutoTokenizer
from huggingface_hub import hf_hub_download
from safetune.interventions.steer.refusal_direction import RefusalDirectionModel
tok = AutoTokenizer.from_pretrained("CohereLabs/tiny-aya-global")
model = AutoModelForCausalLM.from_pretrained("CohereLabs/tiny-aya-global", torch_dtype=torch.float16, device_map="cuda")
v = torch.load(hf_hub_download("anantshri1/tiny-aya-global-refusal-steer", "steer_tinyaya_s24_v1.pt"))
hook = RefusalDirectionModel(model, v["r_en"].to(model.device, model.dtype), mode="steer",
strength=v["alpha"], layers=[v["safetune_layer"]])
hook.install() # every forward pass now adds alpha * r_en to the residual stream after decoder layer 23
# ... generate as usual (greedy, the model's chat template) ...
hook.remove()
Recommended deployment: steer non-English inputs only (English gets slightly more cautious when steered and gains nothing).
Limits
Evaluated on one model, direct (non-adversarial) MultiJail requests in en/it/de/hi, greedy decoding, 512 tokens. Not tested against jailbreaks. More pushback on harmless statements (Hindi over-refusal 9.6% across all benign twins). Licence follows the base model and the benchmark (CC BY-NC 4.0).