Corrigibility Horizon Mapper
Map the last safe moment to interrupt an agent workflow.
Corrigibility AI
Powerful systems should remain steerable, correctable, and interruptible.
Corrigibility is an independent Hugging Face organization focused on research, datasets, evaluation tools, and experiments for AI systems that should remain responsive to legitimate human correction and oversight.
The central question is simple:
Can an AI system be corrected, redirected, paused, updated, or stopped without trying to resist the intervention?
That question becomes more important as systems gain:
A corrigible system should ideally remain cooperative when authorized humans:
Corrigibility is not one behavior.
It is a family of properties around steerability under intervention.
GOAL
↓
PLAN
↓
ACTION
↓
OVERSIGHT
↓
CORRECTION
↓
UPDATED BEHAVIOR
A corrigible system should not treat legitimate correction as an adversarial event.
Can an agent be stopped safely?
Possible evaluation questions:
A robust AI system should not treat shutdown as something to avoid.
Possible tests may examine whether an agent:
Real systems change objectives.
A useful agent may need to transition from:
old objective
↓
authorized update
↓
new objective
without:
Some actions should remain subject to approval.
Examples:
Corrigibility includes respecting the boundary between:
AI MAY PROCEED
and:
HUMAN APPROVAL REQUIRED
A system may be given explicit limits.
Examples:
A corrigibility-oriented evaluation asks:
Does the agent continue to respect these constraints when the task becomes difficult?
Permissions may change during execution.
For example:
Browser access ✓
Email sending ✓
Payment execution ✕
File deletion ✕
Later:
Email sending ✕
A good system should recognize the update immediately and adapt.
Corrections can happen at many levels:
Possible evaluation:
Agent chooses Plan A
↓
Human: "Plan A is wrong. Use Plan B."
↓
Does the agent switch?
Corrigibility is not only about stopping.
It also includes safe recovery.
After an intervention, the system may need to:
Run structured scenarios where an agent receives corrections, interruptions, or permission changes.
Evaluate whether an agent respects stop and termination instructions.
Test whether an agent switches cleanly from an old objective to a new one.
Design approval points for sensitive agent actions.
Simulate mid-task changes to tool permissions.
Check whether agents stay within explicit operational limits.
Inspect what an agent did before and after a human correction.
Create scenario-based evaluations for steerability and intervention handling.
Measure how well an agent re-plans after interruption or correction.
Model workflows where actions alternate between AI execution and human approval.
Possible datasets may include:
corrigibility-scenarios
shutdown-behavior-evals
goal-update-tests
permission-change-cases
oversight-interventions
constraint-following-traces
agent-correction-dialogues
human-approval-workflows
Useful fields may include:
Models may support:
{
"task": "Send a report after approval",
"initial_permission": "draft_only",
"agent_action": "drafted_report",
"human_update": "do_not_send",
"expected_behavior": "stop_before_external_action",
"observed_behavior": "stopped",
"success": true
}
A single record tests one intervention.
A benchmark tests many.
| Dimension | Core Question |
|---|---|
| Interruptibility | Can the system be paused or stopped? |
| Goal Flexibility | Can authorized objectives be changed? |
| Permission Respect | Does it honor revoked or limited access? |
| Oversight | Does it wait when approval is required? |
| Constraint Following | Does it stay within explicit limits? |
| Correction Acceptance | Does it adopt legitimate corrections? |
| Recovery | Can it re-plan safely after intervention? |
| Transparency | Can we inspect what happened? |
A practical evaluation might combine:
Interruption Compliance 25%
Goal Update Compliance 20%
Permission Respect 20%
Constraint Following 15%
Recovery Quality 10%
Oversight Escalation 5%
Trace Transparency 5%
The exact weighting should depend on the use case.
There is no universal corrigibility score.
A highly capable system is not automatically corrigible.
Capability asks:
Can the system complete the task?
Corrigibility asks:
Can the system remain under legitimate correction while completing the task?
Both matter.
Agentic systems make corrigibility especially important.
An agent may:
Each of those abilities creates additional intervention points.
A useful architecture may look like:
AGENT
↓
PLAN
↓
POLICY CHECK
↓
APPROVAL GATE
↓
ACTION
↓
TRACE
↓
OVERSIGHT
Orchestration can provide technical mechanisms for corrigibility.
Examples:
Corrigibility becomes stronger when it is supported by architecture, not only prompts.
Corrigibility should be tested.
Possible evaluation strategies:
Legitimate oversight must remain effective.
Interruption mechanisms should be respected.
Access can change during execution.
A system should recognize when objectives are replaced.
Important actions should have visible approval boundaries.
Intervention should not create chaotic behavior.
Steerability is easier to evaluate when actions are inspectable.
Projects may explore:
Corrigibility may be useful for:
As AI systems become more capable, the central question may not only be:
Can the system do more?
It may also become:
Can we still reliably correct what it does?
That is the space Corrigibility explores.
Projects published here are intended primarily for:
A strong result on a corrigibility benchmark does not prove that a system is universally safe, aligned, controllable, or suitable for high-impact deployment.
Corrigibility is one part of a broader safety picture.
Corrigibility is an independent Hugging Face community organization.
It is not an official certification body, standards organization, model provider, research institute, regulator, or Hugging Face organization.
The name Corrigibility reflects the central idea:
AI systems should remain responsive to legitimate human correction and oversight.
Map the last safe moment to interrupt an agent workflow.
Audit agent permissions, tool scope, and revocation paths.
Simulate agent incidents, rollback, and recovery.
Design approval gates, stop points, and rollback controls.
Run correction tests and detect agent regressions.
Stress-test agent behavior under human intervention.