Anonymization policy
Released 2026-09-11 as v1.0.2 (methodology v0.1). This snapshot is frozen: later corrections and additions ship as a new version with a new tag, never as an edit to the bytes a citation points at — cite the tag or the Digital Object Identifier, not a branch. Two version numbers mean two different things here: the tag names this public snapshot, while methodology v0.1 names the definitions, which stay unchanged until a second provider has been measured (section 7). Every figure quoted in this document set is asserted against the shipped evidence by
scripts/analyze.py, which fails when a number and the evidence disagree and warns when a file is edited after the date above.
Everything under evidence/ is produced by scripts/anonymize.py, which
builds a deterministic pseudonym map from the raw dump and refuses to finish
if any forbidden pattern survives (exit code 1 + LEAK report). The map is
rebuilt from scratch on every run; nothing is hand-edited.
What is removed or pseudonymized
| Class | Example form | Replacement | Assignment rule |
|---|---|---|---|
| OS user & home | /home/<real>/… |
/home/user/… |
fixed |
| Host/user prompt | <user>@<host>: |
user@host: |
fixed |
| Workspace/project names | <projectname>-<hash8> cache dirs and bare names |
ws-A-cache, ws-A … |
letter by first appearance |
| Chat session ids | 8-hex short ids and full UUIDs | sess-01 … |
number by order in the session statistics table |
| Other UUIDs (tool calls, request ids) | full UUIDs | call-001 … |
number by first appearance |
| BYOK model record ids | model_17…_xxxxxx |
byok-model-01 … |
number by sorted order |
| Account/tenant id | vendor tenant UUID | <account-id> |
fixed pattern |
| LAN addresses | 192.168.x.x |
<lan-ip-1> … |
number by sorted order |
| Private hostnames | ssh aliases appearing in captured lines | <host-1> |
fixed list |
| API keys | never collected: the BYOK export drops the apiKey field at the source, secret://… state-DB entries are not read; a sk-… pattern guard exists as a backstop |
<redacted-key> |
pattern |
Echo lines (the investigating agent's own shell commands, captured inside the IDE logs) are dropped entirely — they are self-referential, not evidence.
Full chat transcripts are excluded from the published bundle altogether: regex scrubbing cannot be trusted to catch everything a user typed into a work session.
What is kept, deliberately
- All timestamps (millisecond precision, local time AWST = UTC+8).
- All error codes and banner/message strings, verbatim.
- Product identifiers: client name/version/commit, model display names and
registry ids (
qmodel_38max,qwen3.8-max-tp) — public product facts. - The vendor's public pricing URL, the error-dictionary version and fetch time.
- The operator handle
2makeitwork(intended public attribution). - The screenshot (IDE UI text only; no filesystem paths visible in it).
Re-checking
anonymize.py audits its own output against the forbidden-pattern list
(/home/<user>, username, private hostnames, LAN ranges, key patterns,
tenant id, BYOK ids). To independently spot-check:
grep -rE "/home/[a-z]|@[a-z]+:[a-z]|192\.168\.|sk-[A-Za-z0-9]{16}" evidence/ && echo FOUND || echo clean
Pseudonyms are stable only within one run against one raw dump; re-collecting
after new activity may renumber call-NN/sess-NN. Correlations inside the
published files (timeline ↔ events ↔ stats) are therefore self-consistent,
and that is all the study requires.