|
Download README.md from AD-Assurance-Lab/aeb-verification-captures: direct link, hf CLI and curl.
- Browser
- Download file 3.03 kB
-
https://huggingface.co/datasets/AD-Assurance-Lab/aeb-verification-captures/resolve/main/README.md
- Command line
-
hf download hf://datasets/AD-Assurance-Lab/aeb-verification-captures/README.md
-
curl -L -o README.md https://huggingface.co/datasets/AD-Assurance-Lab/aeb-verification-captures/resolve/main/README.md
3.03 kB
| license: apache-2.0 | |
| task_categories: | |
| - image-feature-extraction | |
| tags: | |
| - autonomous-driving | |
| - formal-verification | |
| - carla | |
| - automatic-emergency-braking | |
| size_categories: | |
| - n<1K | |
| # Camera frames and trained networks for the braking verification study | |
| The inputs to `AD-Assurance-Lab/formal-verification--aeb--code`, measured on 2026-09-10. | |
| **Why this exists.** The study's results are in git. These files are not: they are large and | |
| git ignores them. Without them the published numbers can be reproduced **in kind** but never | |
| **exactly**, because the simulator does not render bit-identical frames from one run to the | |
| next. Different frames give different networks, which give different certificates. | |
| ## What is here | |
| | | | | |
| |---|---| | |
| | `captures/Town01/` | 66 frame sets, one per scenario and sun altitude, plus the campaign manifests | | |
| | `models/Town01/` | 6 trained networks, three policies for each of two scenarios | | |
| | `MANIFEST.json` | a hash of every file, and the capture harness recorded inside every frame set | | |
| ## How the pieces fit | |
| A frame set is a rendered approach at one sun altitude: images, the range to the conflict | |
| point at each pose, and a stamp saying what made it. The stamp records the map, the cloud | |
| cover, the settle time, the determinism rules digest, the texture streaming and quality | |
| settings, and the order the knots were captured in. That last field exists because capture | |
| order silently ruined a dark endpoint once and nothing recorded it. | |
| The networks are what the certificates are computed on. Each certificate in the code | |
| repository names its network by hash, and those hashes are in `MANIFEST.json`. If they do | |
| not match, the certificate and the network are not a pair and nothing may be concluded from | |
| them together. | |
| ## Using them | |
| Clone the code repository, put these directories at `results/captures/` and | |
| `results/models/`, then: | |
| ```bash | |
| python -m study.status # where the study stands | |
| python tools/family_fidelity.py # how much light each piece of the range spans | |
| ``` | |
| Both run without a simulator. | |
| **Training reproduces exactly from these frames.** Four separate runs gave byte-identical | |
| checkpoints. So the networks here can be regenerated from the frames here, and the | |
| certificates from the networks. The chain is only broken if the frames are lost. | |
| ## What the study found | |
| Three policies differing only in which light levels their training frames came from. All | |
| three pass all three lighting conditions the standard tests, ten times out of ten, so the | |
| standard's own procedure cannot tell them apart. | |
| Driven at 65 light levels between those conditions, three repetitions each: the policy | |
| trained on the whole range crashes 0 times, and the policy trained on the regulatory test | |
| points crashes 21 times on the lead-vehicle scenario and 9 on the crossing pedestrian. A | |
| certificate names those light levels without simulating them. | |
| Method and results: `AD-Assurance-Lab/formal-verification--aeb--code`, `docs/STUDY_REPORT.md`. | |