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The dataset generation failed
Error code: DatasetGenerationError
Exception: CastError
Message: Couldn't cast
id: string
published: timestamp[s]
description: string
severity: string
cvss: double
cwe: list<item: string>
child 0, item: string
platforms: list<item: string>
child 0, item: string
name: string
tactics: list<item: string>
child 0, item: string
type: string
to
{'type': Value('string'), 'id': Value('string'), 'name': Value('string'), 'description': Value('string'), 'tactics': List(Value('string')), 'platforms': List(Value('string'))}
because column names don't match
Traceback: Traceback (most recent call last):
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.14/site-packages/datasets/builder.py", line 1835, in _prepare_split_single
for key, table in generator:
^^^^^^^^^
File "/src/services/worker/src/worker/job_runners/config/parquet_and_info.py", line 621, in wrapped
for item in generator(*args, **kwargs):
~~~~~~~~~^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.14/site-packages/datasets/packaged_modules/json/json.py", line 373, in _generate_tables
self._cast_table(pa_table, json_field_paths=json_field_paths),
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.14/site-packages/datasets/packaged_modules/json/json.py", line 132, in _cast_table
pa_table = table_cast(pa_table, self.info.features.arrow_schema)
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.14/site-packages/datasets/table.py", line 2394, in table_cast
return cast_table_to_schema(table, schema)
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.14/site-packages/datasets/table.py", line 2322, in cast_table_to_schema
raise CastError(
...<3 lines>...
)
datasets.table.CastError: Couldn't cast
id: string
published: timestamp[s]
description: string
severity: string
cvss: double
cwe: list<item: string>
child 0, item: string
platforms: list<item: string>
child 0, item: string
name: string
tactics: list<item: string>
child 0, item: string
type: string
to
{'type': Value('string'), 'id': Value('string'), 'name': Value('string'), 'description': Value('string'), 'tactics': List(Value('string')), 'platforms': List(Value('string'))}
because column names don't match
The above exception was the direct cause of the following exception:
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "/src/services/worker/src/worker/job_runners/config/parquet_and_info.py", line 1379, in compute_config_parquet_and_info_response
parquet_operations, partial, estimated_dataset_info = stream_convert_to_parquet(
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^
builder, max_dataset_size_bytes=max_dataset_size_bytes
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
)
^
File "/src/services/worker/src/worker/job_runners/config/parquet_and_info.py", line 956, in stream_convert_to_parquet
builder._prepare_split(split_generator=splits_generators[split], file_format="parquet")
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.14/site-packages/datasets/builder.py", line 1702, in _prepare_split
for job_id, done, content in self._prepare_split_single(
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^
gen_kwargs=gen_kwargs, job_id=job_id, **_prepare_split_args
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
):
^
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.14/site-packages/datasets/builder.py", line 1887, in _prepare_split_single
raise DatasetGenerationError("An error occurred while generating the dataset") from e
datasets.exceptions.DatasetGenerationError: An error occurred while generating the datasetNeed help to make the dataset viewer work? Make sure to review how to configure the dataset viewer, and open a discussion for direct support.
type string | id string | name string | description string | tactics list | platforms list |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
campaign | C0022 | Operation Dream Job | [Operation Dream Job](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0022) was a cyber espionage operation likely conducted by [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) that targeted the defense, aerospace, government, and other sectors in the United States, Israel, Australia, Russia, and India. In at least one case,... | [] | [] |
campaign | C0035 | KV Botnet Activity | [KV Botnet Activity](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0035) consisted of exploitation of primarily “end-of-life” small office-home office (SOHO) equipment from manufacturers such as Cisco, NETGEAR, and DrayTek. [KV Botnet Activity](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0035) was used by [Volt Typhoon](https://attack.m... | [] | [] |
campaign | C0041 | FrostyGoop Incident | [FrostyGoop Incident](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0041) took place in January 2024 against a municipal district heating company in Ukraine. Following initial access via likely exploitation of external facing services, [FrostyGoop](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1165) was used to manipulate ENCO control syst... | [] | [] |
campaign | C0058 | SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation | The [SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0058) campaign was conducted in July 2025 and encompassed the first waves of exploitation against incompletely patched spoofing (CVE-2025-49706) and remote code execution (CVE-2025-49704) vulnerabilities affecting on-premises Microsoft SharePoi... | [] | [] |
campaign | C0001 | Frankenstein | [Frankenstein](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0001) was described by security researchers as a highly-targeted campaign conducted by moderately sophisticated and highly resourceful threat actors in early 2019. The unidentified actors primarily relied on open source tools, including [Empire](https://attack.mitre.or... | [] | [] |
campaign | C0047 | RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations | [RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0047) was executed by [Mustang Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0129) from mid-2023 through the end of 2024 against multiple entities in East and Southeast Asia. [RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations](https://a... | [] | [] |
campaign | C0056 | RedPenguin | The [RedPenguin](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0056) project was launched by Juniper in July 2024 to investigate reported malware infections of Juniper MX Series routers. [RedPenguin](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0056) activity was separately attributed to [UNC3886](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1048) a... | [] | [] |
campaign | C0013 | Operation Sharpshooter | [Operation Sharpshooter](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0013) was a global cyber espionage campaign that targeted nuclear, defense, government, energy, and financial companies, with many located in Germany, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Security researchers noted the campaign shared many simil... | [] | [] |
campaign | C0006 | Operation Honeybee | [Operation Honeybee](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0006) was a campaign that targeted humanitarian aid and inter-Korean affairs organizations from at least late 2017 through early 2018. [Operation Honeybee](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0006) initially targeted South Korea, but expanded to include Vietnam, ... | [] | [] |
campaign | C0048 | Operation MidnightEclipse | [Operation MidnightEclipse](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0048) was a campaign conducted in March and April 2024 that involved initial exploit of zero-day vulnerability CVE-2024-3400, a critical command injection vulnerability in the GlobalProtect feature of Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS.(Citation: Volexity UPSTYLE 2... | [] | [] |
campaign | C0030 | Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack | [Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0030) was a campaign employed by [TEMP.Veles](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0088) which leveraged the [Triton](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1009) malware framework against a petrochemical organization.(Citation: Triton-EENews-2017) ... | [] | [] |
campaign | C0016 | Operation Dust Storm | [Operation Dust Storm](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0016) was a long-standing persistent cyber espionage campaign that targeted multiple industries in Japan, South Korea, the United States, Europe, and several Southeast Asian countries. By 2015, the [Operation Dust Storm](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0016... | [] | [] |
campaign | C0028 | 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack | [2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0028) was a [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) campaign during which they used [BlackEnergy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0089) (specifically BlackEnergy3) and [KillDisk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0607) to target... | [] | [] |
campaign | C0043 | Indian Critical Infrastructure Intrusions | [Indian Critical Infrastructure Intrusions](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0043) is a sequence of intrusions from 2021 through early 2022 linked to People’s Republic of China (PRC) threat actors, particularly [RedEcho](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1042) and Threat Activity Group 38 (TAG38). The intrusions appe... | [] | [] |
campaign | C0005 | Operation Spalax | [Operation Spalax](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0005) was a campaign that primarily targeted Colombian government organizations and private companies, particularly those associated with the energy and metallurgical industries. The [Operation Spalax](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0005) threat actors distrib... | [] | [] |
campaign | C0057 | 3CX Supply Chain Attack | The [3CX Supply Chain Attack](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0057) was the first publicly reported case of one supply chain compromise triggering another, leading to a cascading, two-stage intrusion. The initial supply chain attack began when a 3CX employee downloaded and executed a trojanized, end-of-life version... | [] | [] |
campaign | C0029 | Cutting Edge | [Cutting Edge](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0029) was a campaign conducted by suspected China-nexus espionage actors, variously identified as UNC5221/UTA0178 and UNC5325, that began as early as December 2023 with the exploitation of zero-day vulnerabilities in Ivanti Connect Secure (previously Pulse Secure) VPN ... | [] | [] |
campaign | C0018 | C0018 | [C0018](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0018) was a month-long ransomware intrusion that successfully deployed [AvosLocker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1053) onto a compromised network. The unidentified actors gained initial access to the victim network through an exposed server and used a variety of open-so... | [] | [] |
campaign | C0037 | Water Curupira Pikabot Distribution | [Pikabot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1145) was distributed in [Water Curupira Pikabot Distribution](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0037) throughout 2023 by an entity linked to BlackBasta ransomware deployment via email attachments. This activity followed the take-down of [QakBot](https://attack.mitre.org/s... | [] | [] |
campaign | C0045 | ShadowRay | [ShadowRay](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0045) was a campaign that began in late 2023 targeting the education, cryptocurrency, biopharma, and other sectors through a vulnerability (CVE-2023-48022) in the Ray AI framework named ShadowRay. According to security researchers [ShadowRay](https://attack.mitre.org/camp... | [] | [] |
campaign | C0050 | J-magic Campaign | The [J-magic Campaign](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0050) was active from mid-2023 to at least mid-2024 and featured the use of the [J-magic](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1203) backdoor, a custom cd00r variant tailored for use against Juniper routers. The [J-magic Campaign](https://attack.mitre.org/campaig... | [] | [] |
campaign | C0062 | Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign | The [Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0062) was conducted in September 2025 by a likely China nexus espionage actor identified as GTG-1002. The [Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0062) was a highly coordinated operation that manipulated Claude... | [] | [] |
campaign | C0021 | C0021 | [C0021](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0021) was a spearphishing campaign conducted in November 2018 that targeted public sector institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), educational institutions, and private-sector corporations in the oil and gas, chemical, and hospitality industries. The majority of t... | [] | [] |
campaign | C0061 | Operation Digital Eye | [Operation Digital Eye](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0061) was conducted in June and July of 2024 by suspected People's Republic of China (PRC)-nexus threat actors targeting business-to-business IT service providers in Southern Europe. [Operation Digital Eye](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0061) activity in... | [] | [] |
campaign | C0015 | C0015 | [C0015](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0015) was a ransomware intrusion during which the unidentified attackers used [Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534), [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154), and [Conti](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0575), along with other tools, over a 5 day... | [] | [] |
campaign | C0023 | Operation Ghost | [Operation Ghost](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0023) was an [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) campaign starting in 2013 that included operations against ministries of foreign affairs in Europe and the Washington, D.C. embassy of a European Union country. During [Operation Ghost](https://attack.mitre... | [] | [] |
campaign | C0044 | Juicy Mix | [Juicy Mix](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0044) was a campaign conducted by [OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) throughout 2022 that targeted Israeli organizations with the [Mango](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1169) backdoor.(Citation: ESET OilRig Campaigns Sep 2023) | [] | [] |
campaign | C0038 | HomeLand Justice | [HomeLand Justice](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0038) was a disruptive cyber campaign conducted by Iranian state-affiliated actors against Albanian government networks in July and September 2022. The activity combined ransomware, wiper malware, and data leak operations. Initial access for [HomeLand Justice](http... | [] | [] |
campaign | C0032 | C0032 | [C0032](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0032) was an extended campaign suspected to involve the [Triton](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1009) adversaries with related capabilities and techniques focused on gaining a foothold within IT environments. This campaign occurred in 2019 and was distinctly different fro... | [] | [] |
campaign | C0024 | SolarWinds Compromise | The [SolarWinds Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0024) was a sophisticated supply chain cyber operation conducted by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) that was discovered in mid-December 2020. [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) used customized malware to inject malicious code int... | [] | [] |
campaign | C0036 | Pikabot Distribution February 2024 | [Pikabot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1145) was distributed in [Pikabot Distribution February 2024](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0036) using malicious emails with embedded links leading to malicious ZIP archives requiring user interaction for follow-on infection. The version of [Pikabot](https://attack.mi... | [] | [] |
campaign | C0052 | SPACEHOP Activity | [SPACEHOP Activity](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0052) is conducted through commercially leased Virtual Private Servers (VPS), otherwise known as provisioned Operational Relay Box (ORB) networks. The network leveraged for SPACEHOP Activity enabled China-nexus cyber threat actors – such as [APT5](https://attack.m... | [] | [] |
campaign | C0060 | Operation AkaiRyū | [Operation AkaiRyū](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0060) (Japanese for RedDragon) was a cyberespionage spearphishing campaign conducted by [MirrorFace](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1054) between June and September 2024 against entities in Japan and Central Europe. [Operation AkaiRyū](https://attack.mitre.org/c... | [] | [] |
campaign | C0007 | FunnyDream | [FunnyDream](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0007) was a suspected Chinese cyber espionage campaign that targeted government and foreign organizations in Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, and other parts of Southeast Asia. Security researchers linked the [FunnyDream](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C00... | [] | [] |
campaign | C0012 | Operation CuckooBees | [Operation CuckooBees](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0012) was a cyber espionage campaign targeting technology and manufacturing companies in East Asia, Western Europe, and North America since at least 2019. Security researchers noted the goal of [Operation CuckooBees](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0012), w... | [] | [] |
campaign | C0059 | Salesforce Data Exfiltration | The [Salesforce Data Exfiltration](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0059) campaign began in October 2024 with financially-motivated threat actor UNC6040 using [Spearphishing Voice](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/004) (vishing) to compromise corporate Salesforce instances for large-scale data theft and ext... | [] | [] |
campaign | C0051 | APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign | [APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0051) was conducted by [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) from early February 2022 to November 2024 against organizations and individuals with expertise on Ukraine. APT28 primarily leveraged living-off-the-land techniques, while leveragin... | [] | [] |
campaign | C0042 | Outer Space | [Outer Space](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0042) was a campaign conducted by [OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) throughout 2021 that used the [SampleCheck5000](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1168) downloader and [Solar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1166) backdoor to target Israeli organiza... | [] | [] |
campaign | C0046 | ArcaneDoor | [ArcaneDoor](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0046) is a campaign targeting networking devices from Cisco and other vendors between July 2023 and April 2024, primarily focused on government and critical infrastructure networks. [ArcaneDoor](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0046) is associated with the deployment ... | [] | [] |
campaign | C0063 | 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks | [2025 Poland Wiper Attacks](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0063) is a Russian state-sponsored campaign that conducted destructive cyberattacks against Polish energy infrastructure in December 2025. Targets included more than 30 wind and photovoltaic farms, a combined heat and power (CHP) plant, and a manufacturing... | [] | [] |
campaign | C0033 | C0033 | [C0033](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0033) was a [PROMETHIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0056) campaign during which they used [StrongPity](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0491) to target Android users. [C0033](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0033) was the first publicly documented mobile campaign f... | [] | [] |
campaign | C0025 | 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack | [2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0025) was a [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) campaign during which they used [Industroyer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0604) malware to target and disrupt distribution substations within the Ukrainian power grid. This ... | [] | [] |
campaign | C0010 | C0010 | [C0010](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0010) was a cyber espionage campaign conducted by UNC3890 that targeted Israeli shipping, government, aviation, energy, and healthcare organizations. Security researcher assess UNC3890 conducts operations in support of Iranian interests, and noted several limited technical co... | [] | [] |
campaign | C0040 | APT41 DUST | [APT41 DUST](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0040) was conducted by [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) from 2023 to July 2024 against entities in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. [APT41 DUST](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0040) targeted sectors such as shipping, logistics, and media for informat... | [] | [] |
campaign | C0002 | Night Dragon | [Night Dragon](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0002) was a cyber espionage campaign that targeted oil, energy, and petrochemical companies, along with individuals and executives in Kazakhstan, Taiwan, Greece, and the United States. The unidentified threat actors searched for information related to oil and gas field... | [] | [] |
campaign | C0039 | Versa Director Zero Day Exploitation | [Versa Director Zero Day Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0039) was conducted by [Volt Typhoon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1017) from early June through August 2024 as zero-day exploitation of Versa Director servers controlling software-defined wide area network (SD-WAN) applications. Since track... | [] | [] |
campaign | C0014 | Operation Wocao | [Operation Wocao](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0014) was a cyber espionage campaign that targeted organizations around the world, including in Brazil, China, France, Germany, Italy, Mexico, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The suspected China-based actors compromised government organiz... | [] | [] |
campaign | C0011 | C0011 | [C0011](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0011) was a suspected cyber espionage campaign conducted by [Transparent Tribe](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0134) that targeted students at universities and colleges in India. Security researchers noted this campaign against students was a significant shift from [Transpa... | [] | [] |
campaign | C0049 | Leviathan Australian Intrusions | [Leviathan Australian Intrusions](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0049) consisted of at least two long-term intrusions against victims in Australia by [Leviathan](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0065), relying on similar tradecraft such as external service exploitation followed by extensive credential capture and ... | [] | [] |
campaign | C0017 | C0017 | [C0017](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0017) was an [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) campaign conducted between May 2021 and February 2022 that successfully compromised at least six U.S. state government networks through the exploitation of vulnerable Internet facing web applications. During [C0017](... | [] | [] |
campaign | C0026 | C0026 | [C0026](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0026) was a campaign identified in September 2022 that included the selective distribution of [KOPILUWAK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1075) and [QUIETCANARY](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1076) malware to previous [ANDROMEDA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S107... | [] | [] |
campaign | C0027 | C0027 | [C0027](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0027) was a financially-motivated campaign linked to [Scattered Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1015) that targeted telecommunications and business process outsourcing (BPO) companies from at least June through December of 2022. During [C0027](https://attack.mitre.or... | [] | [] |
campaign | C0034 | 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack | The [2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0034) was a [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) campaign that used a combination of GOGETTER, Neo-REGEORG, [CaddyWiper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0693), and living of the land (LotL) techniques to gain access to a U... | [] | [] |
campaign | C0055 | Quad7 Activity | Quad7 Activity, also known as CovertNetwork-1658 or the 7777 Botnet, is a network of compromised small office/home office (SOHO) routers. (Citation: Bitsight 7777 Botnet) (Citation: Microsoft Storm-0940) The botnet was initially composed primarily of TP-Link routers and was named Quad7 due to compromised devices exposi... | [] | [] |
campaign | C0053 | FLORAHOX Activity | [FLORAHOX Activity](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0053) is conducted using a hybrid operational relay box (ORB) network, which combines two types of infrastructure: compromised devices and leased Virtual Private Servers (VPS). The compromised devices include end-of-life routers and IoT devices, while VPS space is... | [] | [] |
campaign | C0004 | CostaRicto | [CostaRicto](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0004) was a suspected hacker-for-hire cyber espionage campaign that targeted multiple industries worldwide, with a large number being financial institutions. [CostaRicto](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0004) actors targeted organizations in Europe, the Americas, Asi... | [] | [] |
course-of-action | M1031 | Network Intrusion Prevention | Use intrusion detection signatures to block traffic at network boundaries. | [] | [] |
course-of-action | M1016 | Vulnerability Scanning | Vulnerability scanning involves the automated or manual assessment of systems, applications, and networks to identify misconfigurations, unpatched software, or other security weaknesses. The process helps prioritize remediation efforts by classifying vulnerabilities based on risk and impact, reducing the likelihood of ... | [] | [] |
course-of-action | M1035 | Limit Access to Resource Over Network | Restrict access to network resources, such as file shares, remote systems, and services, to only those users, accounts, or systems with a legitimate business requirement. This can include employing technologies like network concentrators, RDP gateways, and zero-trust network access (ZTNA) models, alongside hardening se... | [] | [] |
course-of-action | M1029 | Remote Data Storage | Remote Data Storage focuses on moving critical data, such as security logs and sensitive files, to secure, off-host locations to minimize unauthorized access, tampering, or destruction by adversaries. By leveraging remote storage solutions, organizations enhance the protection of forensic evidence, sensitive informatio... | [] | [] |
course-of-action | M1037 | Filter Network Traffic | Employ network appliances and endpoint software to filter ingress, egress, and lateral network traffic. This includes protocol-based filtering, enforcing firewall rules, and blocking or restricting traffic based on predefined conditions to limit adversary movement and data exfiltration. This mitigation can be implement... | [] | [] |
course-of-action | M1021 | Restrict Web-Based Content | Restricting web-based content involves enforcing policies and technologies that limit access to potentially malicious websites, unsafe downloads, and unauthorized browser behaviors. This can include URL filtering, download restrictions, script blocking, and extension control to protect against exploitation, phishing, a... | [] | [] |
course-of-action | M1033 | Limit Software Installation | Prevent users or groups from installing unauthorized or unapproved software to reduce the risk of introducing malicious or vulnerable applications. This can be achieved through allowlists, software restriction policies, endpoint management tools, and least privilege access principles. This mitigation can be implemented... | [] | [] |
course-of-action | M1013 | Application Developer Guidance | Application Developer Guidance focuses on providing developers with the knowledge, tools, and best practices needed to write secure code, reduce vulnerabilities, and implement secure design principles. By integrating security throughout the software development lifecycle (SDLC), this mitigation aims to prevent the intr... | [] | [] |
course-of-action | M1034 | Limit Hardware Installation | Prevent unauthorized users or groups from installing or using hardware, such as external drives, peripheral devices, or unapproved internal hardware components, by enforcing hardware usage policies and technical controls. This includes disabling USB ports, restricting driver installation, and implementing endpoint secu... | [] | [] |
course-of-action | M1017 | User Training | User Training involves educating employees and contractors on recognizing, reporting, and preventing cyber threats that rely on human interaction, such as phishing, social engineering, and other manipulative techniques. Comprehensive training programs create a human firewall by empowering users to be an active componen... | [] | [] |
course-of-action | M1052 | User Account Control | User Account Control (UAC) is a security feature in Microsoft Windows that prevents unauthorized changes to the operating system. UAC prompts users to confirm or provide administrator credentials when an action requires elevated privileges. Proper configuration of UAC reduces the risk of privilege escalation attacks. T... | [] | [] |
course-of-action | M1028 | Operating System Configuration | Operating System Configuration involves adjusting system settings and hardening the default configurations of an operating system (OS) to mitigate adversary exploitation and prevent abuse of system functionality. Proper OS configurations address security vulnerabilities, limit attack surfaces, and ensure robust defense... | [] | [] |
course-of-action | M1053 | Data Backup | Data Backup involves taking and securely storing backups of data from end-user systems and critical servers. It ensures that data remains available in the event of system compromise, ransomware attacks, or other disruptions. Backup processes should include hardening backup systems, implementing secure storage solutions... | [] | [] |
course-of-action | M1038 | Execution Prevention | Prevent the execution of unauthorized or malicious code on systems by implementing application control, script blocking, and other execution prevention mechanisms. This ensures that only trusted and authorized code is executed, reducing the risk of malware and unauthorized actions. This mitigation can be implemented th... | [] | [] |
course-of-action | M1043 | Credential Access Protection | Credential Access Protection focuses on implementing measures to prevent adversaries from obtaining credentials, such as passwords, hashes, tokens, or keys, that could be used for unauthorized access. This involves restricting access to credential storage mechanisms, hardening configurations to block credential dumping... | [] | [] |
course-of-action | M1045 | Code Signing | Code Signing is a security process that ensures the authenticity and integrity of software by digitally signing executables, scripts, and other code artifacts. It prevents untrusted or malicious code from executing by verifying the digital signatures against trusted sources. Code signing protects against tampering, imp... | [] | [] |
course-of-action | M1039 | Environment Variable Permissions | Restrict the modification of environment variables to authorized users and processes by enforcing strict permissions and policies. This ensures the integrity of environment variables, preventing adversaries from abusing or altering them for malicious purposes. This mitigation can be implemented through the following me... | [] | [] |
course-of-action | M1057 | Data Loss Prevention | Data Loss Prevention (DLP) involves implementing strategies and technologies to identify, categorize, monitor, and control the movement of sensitive data within an organization. This includes protecting data formats indicative of Personally Identifiable Information (PII), intellectual property, or financial data from u... | [] | [] |
course-of-action | M1025 | Privileged Process Integrity | Privileged Process Integrity focuses on defending highly privileged processes (e.g., system services, antivirus, or authentication processes) from tampering, injection, or compromise by adversaries. These processes often interact with critical components, making them prime targets for techniques like code injection, pr... | [] | [] |
course-of-action | M1055 | Do Not Mitigate | The Do Not Mitigate category highlights scenarios where attempting to mitigate a specific technique may inadvertently increase the organization's security risk or operational instability. This could happen due to the complexity of the system, the integration of critical processes, or the potential for introducing new v... | [] | [] |
course-of-action | M1056 | Pre-compromise | Pre-compromise mitigations involve proactive measures and defenses implemented to prevent adversaries from successfully identifying and exploiting weaknesses during the Reconnaissance and Resource Development phases of an attack. These activities focus on reducing an organization's attack surface, identify adversarial ... | [] | [] |
course-of-action | M1020 | SSL/TLS Inspection | SSL/TLS inspection involves decrypting encrypted network traffic to examine its content for signs of malicious activity. This capability is crucial for detecting threats that use encryption to evade detection, such as phishing, malware, or data exfiltration. After inspection, the traffic is re-encrypted and forwarded t... | [] | [] |
course-of-action | M1046 | Boot Integrity | Boot Integrity ensures that a system starts securely by verifying the integrity of its boot process, operating system, and associated components. This mitigation focuses on leveraging secure boot mechanisms, hardware-rooted trust, and runtime integrity checks to prevent tampering during the boot sequence. It is designe... | [] | [] |
course-of-action | M1060 | Out-of-Band Communications Channel | Establish secure out-of-band communication channels to ensure the continuity of critical communications during security incidents, data integrity attacks, or in-network communication failures. Out-of-band communication refers to using an alternative, separate communication path that is not dependent on the potentially ... | [] | [] |
course-of-action | M1030 | Network Segmentation | Network segmentation involves dividing a network into smaller, isolated segments to control and limit the flow of traffic between devices, systems, and applications. By segmenting networks, organizations can reduce the attack surface, restrict lateral movement by adversaries, and protect critical assets from compromise... | [] | [] |
course-of-action | M1019 | Threat Intelligence Program | A Threat Intelligence Program enables organizations to proactively identify, analyze, and act on cyber threats by leveraging internal and external data sources. The program supports decision-making processes, prioritizes defenses, and improves incident response by delivering actionable intelligence tailored to the orga... | [] | [] |
course-of-action | M1027 | Password Policies | Set and enforce secure password policies for accounts to reduce the likelihood of unauthorized access. Strong password policies include enforcing password complexity, requiring regular password changes, and preventing password reuse. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Windows Systems: - ... | [] | [] |
course-of-action | M1040 | Behavior Prevention on Endpoint | Behavior Prevention on Endpoint refers to the use of technologies and strategies to detect and block potentially malicious activities by analyzing the behavior of processes, files, API calls, and other endpoint events. Rather than relying solely on known signatures, this approach leverages heuristics, machine learning,... | [] | [] |
course-of-action | M1018 | User Account Management | User Account Management involves implementing and enforcing policies for the lifecycle of user accounts, including creation, modification, and deactivation. Proper account management reduces the attack surface by limiting unauthorized access, managing account privileges, and ensuring accounts are used according to orga... | [] | [] |
course-of-action | M1022 | Restrict File and Directory Permissions | Restricting file and directory permissions involves setting access controls at the file system level to limit which users, groups, or processes can read, write, or execute files. By configuring permissions appropriately, organizations can reduce the attack surface for adversaries seeking to access sensitive data, plant... | [] | [] |
course-of-action | M1026 | Privileged Account Management | Privileged Account Management focuses on implementing policies, controls, and tools to securely manage privileged accounts (e.g., SYSTEM, root, or administrative accounts). This includes restricting access, limiting the scope of permissions, monitoring privileged account usage, and ensuring accountability through loggi... | [] | [] |
course-of-action | M1024 | Restrict Registry Permissions | Restricting registry permissions involves configuring access control settings for sensitive registry keys and hives to ensure that only authorized users or processes can make modifications. By limiting access, organizations can prevent unauthorized changes that adversaries might use for persistence, privilege escalatio... | [] | [] |
course-of-action | M1049 | Antivirus/Antimalware | Antivirus/Antimalware solutions utilize signatures, heuristics, and behavioral analysis to detect, block, and remediate malicious software, including viruses, trojans, ransomware, and spyware. These solutions continuously monitor endpoints and systems for known malicious patterns and suspicious behaviors that indicate ... | [] | [] |
course-of-action | M1032 | Multi-factor Authentication | Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) enhances security by requiring users to provide at least two forms of verification to prove their identity before granting access. These factors typically include: - *Something you know*: Passwords, PINs. - *Something you have*: Physical tokens, smartphone authenticator apps. - *Someth... | [] | [] |
course-of-action | M1054 | Software Configuration | Software configuration refers to making security-focused adjustments to the settings of applications, middleware, databases, or other software to mitigate potential threats. These changes help reduce the attack surface, enforce best practices, and protect sensitive data. This mitigation can be implemented through the f... | [] | [] |
course-of-action | M1048 | Application Isolation and Sandboxing | Application Isolation and Sandboxing refers to the technique of restricting the execution of code to a controlled and isolated environment (e.g., a virtual environment, container, or sandbox). This method prevents potentially malicious code from affecting the rest of the system or network by limiting access to sensitiv... | [] | [] |
course-of-action | M1047 | Audit | Auditing is the process of recording activity and systematically reviewing and analyzing the activity and system configurations. The primary purpose of auditing is to detect anomalies and identify potential threats or weaknesses in the environment. Proper auditing configurations can also help to meet compliance require... | [] | [] |
course-of-action | M1050 | Exploit Protection | Deploy capabilities that detect, block, and mitigate conditions indicative of software exploits. These capabilities aim to prevent exploitation by addressing vulnerabilities, monitoring anomalous behaviors, and applying exploit-mitigation techniques to harden systems and software. Operating System Exploit Protections: ... | [] | [] |
course-of-action | M1015 | Active Directory Configuration | Implement robust Active Directory (AD) configurations using group policies to secure user accounts, control access, and minimize the attack surface. AD configurations enable centralized control over account settings, logon policies, and permissions, reducing the risk of unauthorized access and lateral movement within t... | [] | [] |
course-of-action | M1051 | Update Software | Software updates ensure systems are protected against known vulnerabilities by applying patches and upgrades provided by vendors. Regular updates reduce the attack surface and prevent adversaries from exploiting known security gaps. This includes patching operating systems, applications, drivers, and firmware. This mit... | [] | [] |
course-of-action | M1044 | Restrict Library Loading | Restricting library loading involves implementing security controls to ensure that only trusted and verified libraries (DLLs, shared objects, etc.) are loaded into processes. Adversaries often abuse Dynamic-Link Library (DLL) Injection, DLL Search Order Hijacking, or LD_PRELOAD mechanisms to execute malicious code by f... | [] | [] |
course-of-action | M1042 | Disable or Remove Feature or Program | Disable or remove unnecessary and potentially vulnerable software, features, or services to reduce the attack surface and prevent abuse by adversaries. This involves identifying software or features that are no longer needed or that could be exploited and ensuring they are either removed or properly disabled. This miti... | [] | [] |
course-of-action | M1036 | Account Use Policies | Account Use Policies help mitigate unauthorized access by configuring and enforcing rules that govern how and when accounts can be used. These policies include enforcing account lockout mechanisms, restricting login times, and setting inactivity timeouts. Proper configuration of these policies reduces the risk of brute... | [] | [] |
course-of-action | M1041 | Encrypt Sensitive Information | Protect sensitive information at rest, in transit, and during processing by using strong encryption algorithms. Encryption ensures the confidentiality and integrity of data, preventing unauthorized access or tampering. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Encrypt Data at Rest: - Use Case: ... | [] | [] |
End of preview.
Cyber-KB — открытая база знаний по кибербезопасности
Нормализованный датасет из четырёх публичных первоисточников плюс сгенерированные пары «инструкция → ответ». Собран для обучения и дообучения моделей (CPT и SFT) в области информационной безопасности.
Проект PPAI.
Что внутри
| файл | записей | размер | что это |
|---|---|---|---|
data/cve.jsonl |
356 734 | 180 МБ | уязвимости NVD: описание, CVSS, серьёзность, CWE |
data/attack.jsonl |
1 827 | 1.8 МБ | MITRE ATT&CK: техники, тактики, меры защиты, malware, tools |
data/cwe.jsonl |
405 | 0.5 МБ | классы слабостей CWE с последствиями и мерами |
data/kev.jsonl |
1 790 | 1.0 МБ | CISA KEV: уязвимости с известными эксплойтами + требуемые действия |
data/qa_en.jsonl |
359 635 | 179 МБ | английские пары «вопрос → ответ» из этих записей |
data/qa_ru_templates.jsonl |
359 635 | 203 МБ | то же, но инструкция на русском (ответ — английский) |
Покрытие CVE по годам: 2015 (8 787) → 2026 (95 937). По серьёзности: CRITICAL 38 098, HIGH 131 481, MEDIUM 145 001, LOW 12 610.
Формат
cve.jsonl:
{"id": "CVE-2021-44228", "published": "2021-12-10",
"description": "Apache Log4j2 2.0-beta9 through 2.15.0 ...",
"severity": "CRITICAL", "cvss": 10.0, "cwe": ["CWE-20", "CWE-502"]}
attack.jsonl:
{"type": "attack-pattern", "id": "T1059", "name": "Command and Scripting Interpreter",
"description": "Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters ...",
"tactics": ["execution"], "platforms": ["Linux", "Windows", "macOS"]}
cwe.jsonl:
{"id": "CWE-79", "name": "Improper Neutralization of Input ...",
"description": "...", "consequences": "...", "mitigations": "..."}
kev.jsonl:
{"cve": "CVE-2021-44228", "vendor": "Apache", "product": "Log4j2",
"name": "Apache Log4j2 Remote Code Execution Vulnerability",
"description": "...", "action": "Apply updates per vendor instructions.",
"date_added": "2021-12-10", "ransomware": "Known"}
qa_en.jsonl / qa_ru_templates.jsonl:
{"instruction": "What is CVE-2021-44228?", "output": "...", "source": "nvd"}
{"instruction": "Что известно об уязвимости CVE-2021-44228?", "output": "...",
"lang": "ru-instruction", "source": "nvd"}
Как пользоваться
from datasets import load_dataset
ds = load_dataset("AdminHugging/cyber-kb", data_files="data/qa_en.jsonl", split="train")
print(ds[0])
# только уязвимости
cve = load_dataset("AdminHugging/cyber-kb", data_files="data/cve.jsonl", split="train")
crit = cve.filter(lambda x: x["severity"] == "CRITICAL")
Источники и лицензии
| источник | лицензия |
|---|---|
| NVD CVE (NIST) | public domain, US Government work |
| MITRE ATT&CK | © The MITRE Corporation, свободное использование с атрибуцией |
| MITRE CWE | © The MITRE Corporation, свободное использование с атрибуцией |
| CISA KEV | public domain, US Government work |
Атрибуция: ATTACK® и CWE® — зарегистрированные товарные знаки The MITRE Corporation. Данные использованы в неизменённом по смыслу виде (нормализация формата, без изменения содержания).
Ограничения — читать обязательно
qa_ru_templates.jsonl— это не русскоязычная база знаний. Инструкция на русском, но ответ берётся из английского первоисточника и остаётся английским. Для обучения русскому языку в домене нужен перевод или русскоязычные источники (БДУ ФСТЭК, «Код ИБ» и т.п.), которых здесь нет.- Описания CVE написаны вендорами: они короткие, иногда формальные («Rejected reason: DO NOT USE THIS CANDIDATE NUMBER»), содержат отсылки к версиям без контекста. Это сырые данные, не учебник.
- Нет кода эксплойтов и пошаговых инструкций атаки — только описания, тактики и меры защиты. Датасет защитный по содержанию.
- Q&A сгенерированы шаблонами, поэтому формулировки однотипные. Для SFT лучше перемешать с живыми диалогами.
- Данные не дедуплицированы между
cve.jsonlиqa_*.jsonl— это одни и те же факты в двух видах, при обучении берите что-то одно.
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