| ---
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| license: cc-by-4.0
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| language:
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| - en
|
| - zh
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| tags:
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| - accounting
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| - corporate-governance
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| - china
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| - supervisory-board
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| - audit-committee
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| - a-share
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| - cninfo
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| pretty_name: CSBA - China supervisory board abolition
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| size_categories:
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| - 1K<n<10K
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| configs:
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| - config_name: transitions
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| data_files: 04_abolition_transitions.csv
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| - config_name: announcements
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| data_files: 03_abolition_announcements.csv
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| - config_name: approval_dates
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| data_files: 05_approval_dates.csv
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| - config_name: sample_flags
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| data_files: 06_sample_flags.csv
|
| ---
|
|
|
| # CSBA — Board reform and the abolition of the supervisory board
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|
|
| Replication data for the paper **"Board reform and the abolition of the supervisory
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| board: evidence from China's 2025 governance wave"** by Xiangdong Liu (Jinan
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| University, ORCID 0000-0002-9438-9285),
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| Jiahao Chen (Jinan University, ORCID 0000-0003-4673-1311), Zhenyan Liu (University
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| of Manchester, ORCID 0009-0007-5672-2060) and Jinfeng Pan (Guangdong University of
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| Finance, ORCID 0009-0008-1950-7465).
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|
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| Code and documentation: https://github.com/ChenJiahaoJNU/CSBA
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|
|
| ## What this is
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|
|
| China's revised Company Law, effective 1 July 2024, lets a listed firm abolish its
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| supervisory board and vest the statutory oversight functions in the audit
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| committee of the board. No existing database records the reform, so the transition
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| file was reconstructed from public CNINFO announcements. Within a single year 2,482
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| A-share firms announced an abolition.
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|
|
| ## Files
|
|
|
| | file | rows | what it is |
|
| |------|------|------------|
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| | `01_cninfo_raw_hits.csv` | 2,674 | raw CNINFO search results before classification |
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| | `02_classified_candidates.csv` | 2,431 | hits classified as abolition-related |
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| | `03_abolition_announcements.csv` | 2,522 | the firm's own abolition announcements |
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| | `04_abolition_transitions.csv` | 2,482 | firm level, first and last announcement, cohort |
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| | `05_approval_dates.csv` | 2,482 | board proposal date and shareholder approval date |
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| | `06_sample_flags.csv` | 4,546 | the risk set, public columns only |
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|
|
| ### `04_abolition_transitions.csv`
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|
|
| One row per firm that announced an abolition.
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|
|
| | column | meaning |
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| |--------|---------|
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| | `secCode` | 6-digit stock code |
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| | `secName` | firm name as printed in the filing |
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| | `first_ann`, `last_ann` | first and last abolition announcement dates |
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| | `n_ann` | number of abolition announcements by that firm |
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| | `has_charter` | whether the announcement also amends the articles |
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| | `cohort_month`, `cohort_quarter`, `cohort_year` | derived from `first_ann` |
|
|
|
| ### `05_approval_dates.csv`
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|
|
| The sweep behind the paper's measurement-error section.
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|
|
| | column | meaning |
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| |--------|---------|
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| | `code` | 6-digit stock code |
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| | `ann` | first abolition announcement, which is the board's proposal |
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| | `meet` | general meeting date, from the firm's own resolution announcement |
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| | `n_res` | resolution announcements found in the 180-day window |
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| | `status` | `ok`, `no_date`, `no_orgid`, `query_fail`, `worker_error` |
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|
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| 2,377 of 2,482 resolved. Median gap 102 days, interquartile range 21 to 147. Only
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| **35.7 per cent** of firms vote in the same calendar quarter as their proposal,
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| which is why the paper makes no timing claim.
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|
|
| ### `06_sample_flags.csv`
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|
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| The 4,546-firm risk set with the licensed covariates stripped out. 2,072 firms
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| abolished, or 45.6 per cent, which is the figure the paper reports.
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|
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| ## Licence and what is deliberately absent
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|
|
| Everything here was reconstructed from **public CNINFO disclosures**. A-share
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| filings are public documents, and this data is released under CC BY 4.0.
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|
|
| The paper's explanatory variables come from a commercial vendor, whose licence
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| permits use for replication but **not redistribution**. They are therefore not
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| included. That covers return on assets, leverage, total assets, institutional
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| ownership, information asymmetry, risk-disclosure intensity, the CNRDS ESG rating,
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| MD&A text similarity, analyst coverage, stock-price crash risk and audit opinion.
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| Obtain them under your own licence; the pipeline in the code repository reads them
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| from a `vendor/` folder.
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|
|
| You can reproduce the transition file, the sample construction counts, the cohort
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| distribution and the approval-date analysis from this data alone.
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|
|
| ## Known limitations, stated by the authors
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|
|
| - **The treatment date is the board's proposal, not the shareholder vote.** Across
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| all 2,482 firms the two differ by a median of 102 days.
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| - **The approval-date extraction is automated and unvalidated by hand.** Nine of
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| 2,377 resolved firms (0.4 per cent) yield an impossible negative gap, so the file
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| is sound distributionally and **not firm-by-firm**. Do not quote an individual
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| firm's gap without checking that firm's filing.
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| - **Keyword recall is imperfect.** A single-phrase query would have missed 193
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| genuine announcements; this release uses a nine-keyword union.
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| - **The information-asymmetry result does not reproduce with alternative proxies**
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| (crash risk, analyst coverage, |ROA − CFO|). The paper reports this as a failure.
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|
|
| ## Citation
|
|
|
| If you use this data, please cite the paper, and this dataset:
|
|
|
| ```
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| Liu, X., Chen, J., Liu, Z., and Pan, J. Board reform and the abolition of the
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| supervisory board: evidence from China's 2025 governance wave. China Journal of
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| Accounting Research, forthcoming.
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| ```
|
|
|
| ```
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| @misc{csba2026,
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| title = {Board reform and the abolition of the supervisory board: evidence from
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| China's 2025 governance wave},
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| author = {Liu, Xiangdong and Chen, Jiahao and Liu, Zhenyan and Pan, Jinfeng},
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| year = {2026},
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| url = {https://huggingface.co/datasets/Changahou/CSBA}
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| }
|
| ```
|
|
|
