text stringlengths 0 1.99k |
|---|
make: |
- comment out any lines in avahi-daemon.conf that mention ipv6 |
- add eth0:1 to not be managed by avahi. |
- Remove the 'rescue_mode=shell' from the APPEND line in RESCUE. |
There are two versions of the EOS that the unit includes: the rescue and |
live versions. It was a coin flip if the unit I got initially tried to boot |
to rescue or live. If it's booting to rescue, there are a few extra steps |
but really you can modify the bootloader parameters to boot to live. |
If you're struggling to get the device to boot to the live firmware image, |
just use the edit command within the EFI shell to modify the RESCUE file: |
- change the BOOT_IMAGE=/rescue/vmlinuz to BOOT_IMAGE=/live/vmlinuz |
- change the value of root_sfs from root_sfs=/live/rootfs to |
root_sfs=/rescue/rootfs |
Now, you really shouldn't have to do this but if you're still having |
trouble, you can look into modifying the update_ipconfig.sh script to get |
IPv4 configured properly. |
--[ 5 - Batch 1 of Vulnerabilities: Multiple Paths to Persistent Backdoors |
This first batch of vulnerabilities I've found are low hanging fruit, easy |
to find when you've gained whichever level or type of access is required. |
I will make some posts in the future going into much more detail of these |
vulnerabilities, their underlying components, and eventually provide proof |
of concepts (PoCs). Most are also fairly simple to fix (with physical access |
at least). That said, the fact that these types of hardware protections, |
misconfigurations, etc were found across all the devices I have (both new |
and used units) is wild. I put the cheesiest one last, so don't expect a |
long explanation for that one. |
I've listed them with very self-explanatory titles though. As most of these |
vulnerabilities were found using the Chipsec framework [17], I'm going to |
include the relevant raw output of the main chipsec scan results from |
running chipsec_main.py against one of the units. |
--[ 5.1 - Insecure SPI Flash Permissions Allow Persistent Firmware |
Modification - CVE-2025-25733 |
This vulnerability affects both the 9160 and 9260 RSUs and is a result of |
missing access controls. Both models of the RSUs support Serial Peripheral |
Interface (SPI) and contain a Winbond W25Q64JVSIQ NOR Flash Chip. Although |
I laid out multiple ways to access SPI, the simplest way I've found is via |
Chipsec. |
Looking at the Chipsec output, you can see where this vulnerability was |
found by the chipsec_main.py scan: |
[*] Software access to SPI flash regions: read = 0xFF, write = 0xFF |
[-] Software has write access to SPI flash descriptor |
[-] FAILED: SPI Flash Region Access Permissions are not programmed securely |
in flash descriptor |
This confirms the SPI Flash Descriptor, Basic Input Output System (BIOS), |
Intel Management Engine (ME), Gigabit Ethernet and Platform Data (PD) |
firmware could be readable and writable. |
You can also use the chipsec utility script -- chipsec_util.py -- to confirm |
this vulnerability: |
fs0:\EFI\chipsec-1.13.8> python chipsec_util.py spi info |
Then to flash malicious firmware you can use: |
fs0:\EFI\chipsec-1.13.8> python chipsec_util.py spi write malicious_firmware.bin |
Then you can verify the modifications persisted: |
fs0:\EFI\chipsec-1.13.8> python chipsec_util.py spi dump verify_dump.bin |
diff malicious_firmware.bin verify_dump.bin |
Needless to say, there are countless ways to leverage this, along with the |
fact that OS reinstalls/reboots do not affect this backdoor. Compromising |
the platform firmware components stored on the SPI flash is fairly stealthy, |
and if Secure Boot were to be enabled, this backdoor could enable a bypass. |
--[ 5.2 - Persistent Privilege Escalation via Modifiable EEPROM (Serial |
Presence Detect (SPD) Write Disable Not Set) - CVE-2025-25732 |
This vulnerability affects both the 9160 and 9260 RSUs and is a result of |
missing access controls. The EEPROM stores the root and default ('kapsch') |
user password hashes, which are copied into /etc/shadow at boot. |
This enables an attacker to: |
- Modify EEPROM to insert their own password hashes |
- Achieve persistent root access across reboots |
- Exploit SSH auto-start in rescue/live mode for remote access |
Here's code from the bash script that the eeprom_handler service executes |
upon every boot: |
function update_shadow_file_rootuser { |
local ENCRYPTED_PASSWORD=$1 |
local TMPFILE=$(tempfile -m 0640) grep -v ^root /etc/shadow > ${TMPFILE} |
local ROOT_LINE=$(grep ^root /etc/shadow | cut -d: -f1,3-) |
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