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| | Web server* | |
| | Logging* | |
| | Monitoring* | |
| -------------------------------------------------------------- |
----------------------------------------------------------------------
* Option
--[ 2.3 Notable Physical Interfaces
The 9160 and 9260 have the following notable physical interfaces:
- a microSD slot
- a mSATA slot
- 4 pins for read-only UART labeled "debug"
- 4 pins for I2C/SPI labeled "I2C"
- USB B Port (which can be configured for client or host via BIOS)
- a PoE RJ45 port
- some other goodies: there's another spot if you wanted to add
an additional radio and another set of pads labeled "USB."
Unique to 9260 are the following physical components/interfaces:
- a bridge board with another set of read-only UART pins labeled "debug"
- an LTE modem with a dip switch
- a micro-USB port
- a 3 pin and 4 pin set
Additionally, the 9260 has a second RJ45 port, but I haven't determined its
use yet.
--[ 2.4 Notable Firmware/Software
LEO Versions: 3.2.0.829.23, 3.8.0.1119.42, 4.6.0.1211.28
Embedded OS (EOS) Linux Versions (They're based off ELBE/Debian):
9260: 3.16.35-c3p+, 9160: 4.9.124-ris-152.29
Phoenix Secure Core: MVV1R976 X64 & MVV1R994 X64
V2X RSU Server: roadside
V2X Chipset Firmware Version: 1.19.0-deb9-x86 1002
LTE Modem Firmware: MDM9650
Other relevant binaries: acme (V2X radio test), llc (same thing but when
using the Cobra Wireless binary [cw-llc]), rsu-configuration (custom
V2X configuration script), cv2x-daemon & cv2x-config, C2X_HOST_APP.bin
(API wrapper to interact with SXF17XX), aerolink libraries,
v2x_radio_test, mm_server
I also included a list of custom debs found on the units in the raw output
section of this paper.
--[ 3. Attack Surface
--[ 3.1 Lack of Everything
To be blunt, there is a lot to this embedded device, and to the V2X/CV2X
stack, and since the device isn't on every corner or in every car, there
isn't much public information about it. There were some vulnerabilities
found in IPA utilized and I've covered the state of public vulnerabilities,
teardowns, explanations or any other kind of information (easily)
accessible to the public. Due to this, the entire hardware side of
vehicle-to-everything, in its current state, is in its lack-of-everything.
Hopefully my work -- however basic it is -- will get some other hackers
jumping down these rabbit holes with or without me.
In the next few sections, I'm not going to list all the types of
vulnerabilities that you can find within each category but more just
to give a starting place to do your own research into them.
Most of the vulnerabilities from Phase 1 do not cover all the following
categories so I'm opting to exclude going into vast detail. As I continue
with my research, I will write more about them.
--[ 3.2 Hardware
Obviously with so many physical components and interfaces, there is a ton
of attack surface. Whether it be attaching a SOIC clip to the SPI chip
to overwrite the firmware, modify the EEPROM, read/modify over I2C,
insert malicious drivers or boot off USB, mSata, or microSD. Not going to
list it all here, but the physical/hardware attack surface is extensive.
--[ 3.3 Pre-Embedded Operating System (EOS) (BIOS/Bootloader/Kernel)
The pre-EOS components are definitely a great place to start on the
software/firmware side of things. There is some documentation on Phoenix
SecureCore and obviously plenty on syslinux. There are some custom kernel
modules but I haven't had to do much beyond modifying kernel modules to get
root access in Phase 1.
--[ 3.4 Firmware/EOS
A bunch of the firmware and EOS is closed source, custom, proprietary,
confidential, requires a license and is in no meaningful way in the hands
of the public. That said, what I will state is, these units all run a
customized Embedded Linux Build Environment (ELBE) Debian-based Linux EOS.
They often utilize a modified version of firmware if not running a
completely custom firmware built from scratch. This ends up being so
fascinating as it's all new and custom but also, it's so much work to wrap
your brain around it all.