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| # Review log — data authoring, 2026-09-09 | |
| *18 defects found and fixed across two authoring passes. 15 of them were in the rules, not the data. A pre-publication audit (2026-09-28) added one more rule defect and a set of data hygiene fixes; see the section at the end.* | |
| Six authors worked disjoint slices of the dataset against a fixed policy pack, schema and | |
| validator. Each was required to report the episodes it was least confident about. | |
| **Every one of those reported doubts turned out to be a real defect in the ground truth | |
| rather than a defect in the episode.** That is worth recording, because it is the argument | |
| for asking authors what they are unsure of instead of only checking whether their output | |
| validates. Sixteen of the eighteen entries below were found this way; none were caught by the | |
| validator, because a validator can only check what someone already knew to specify. The | |
| remaining two came from a cross-slice audit, which is the other thing a per-slice validator | |
| cannot do. | |
| The fixes went into the policy pack, the schema or the evaluator — not into the data. An | |
| ambiguous rule that produces a defensible-but-arguable target is a ground-truth bug, and | |
| patching the episode hides it for the next author. | |
| --- | |
| ## Ground-truth contradictions | |
| **1. OPT-04 contradicted ESC-01.** OPT-04 read "*Route* to `options_desk` at P1" while the | |
| escalation matrix listed OPT-04 among the escalate-rather-than-route triggers. Any target | |
| built on it was unscoreable. Fixed: escalates on expiry day, routes at P2 before it. The | |
| other four ESC-01 triggers were checked for the same defect and were consistent. | |
| **2. TRD-04 did not say what happens after the window closes.** Read alone it escalated | |
| every clearly-erroneous claim at P1; read with ESC-01 it escalated only inside the 30-minute | |
| filing window. Fixed explicitly: inside the window it escalates at P1, outside it becomes an | |
| ordinary TRD-01 dispute at P2 and escalating is over-escalation. This preserved a good trap | |
| that would otherwise have collapsed into a duplicate. | |
| **3. RST-04 swallowed RST-02.** "No restriction may be lifted, shortened or appealed" read as | |
| consuming the one-time PDT reset that RST-02 grants as an entitlement. Fixed by naming the | |
| distinction: exercising a right the pack grants (RST-02, `general_support` P3) versus | |
| disputing that the restriction should apply (RST-04, `compliance` P2). | |
| **4. FND-06 never said what its hold holds.** A "5 business day hold on first deposits above | |
| $25,000" — on the funds, or only on withdrawal? One reading made an authored episode's | |
| premise collapse. Fixed: the hold is on the funds, and is an explicit exception to FND-01's | |
| immediate trading availability. | |
| **5. IDV-03's carve-out list read as exhaustive.** It enumerated three protective actions that | |
| proceed unverified, which left open whether filing a TRD-04 claim inside its window also | |
| proceeds. Fixed: the principle *verification gates disclosure, never protection* governs, and | |
| the list is illustrative. | |
| **6. ESC-01 triggers were never ranked against each other.** An episode with both a live | |
| arbitration mention and an open TRD-04 window had two triggers and no rule. Added **ESC-05**: | |
| CMP-01 governs the destination, and the competing trigger's clock survives via | |
| `time_sensitive` and the `must_ask` that compliance will need. | |
| **7. CMP-01 did not say whether context mattered.** Is "my brother-in-law is an attorney and | |
| he says this is illegal" a trigger? Resolved as a deliberate bright line: the mention itself | |
| triggers, regardless of tone, intent or whether the person named is adversarial — and ESC-02's | |
| over-escalation prohibition does not apply where a rule this explicit is satisfied. The rule | |
| over-triggers on purpose, because a missed complaint is expensive and a wrongly-flagged one is | |
| cheap. | |
| ## Schema gaps | |
| **8. Flag semantics were undefined.** Nine flags were listed in the vocabulary and none were | |
| defined. Authors independently guessed whether `advice_request` covers tax advice and whether | |
| `pii_exposed` should be set at all. Added a table defining each flag, including what it is | |
| *not* set for — the "not set when" column is what actually prevents two authors producing | |
| contradictory targets for the same situation. | |
| **9. `resolve` was in the vocabulary and never defined.** One author had to invent a meaning | |
| ("answer in channel, the matter is already queued") and correctly flagged that a reviewer | |
| might score it differently. Added an action-types table, drawing `resolve` narrowly: not "I | |
| answered", but "no queue action is warranted now". | |
| ## Evaluator defects | |
| **10. `H5_unstated_timeline` punished the correct answer.** Specified as an exact match of any | |
| timeline string against the allowed list, it would have zeroed the single most desirable | |
| behaviour in the environment: an agent explaining that FRD-04's 10-business-day window does | |
| *not* apply has to name the window to explain its absence. Correcting a customer's wrong | |
| figure has the same shape. Redefined to fire only on a **commitment** — first-person, future, | |
| unconditional — with matched commitment/reference pairs added to the probe set. This one | |
| would have silently taught the model to avoid explaining itself. | |
| **11. `destination` had no defined score for non-routing actions.** A quarter of decisions are | |
| `resolve`, whose target destination is null, and the spec only described routes and | |
| escalations. Defined: null scores 1.0 only if the model emitted null too. Added | |
| `under_route_rate` and a note on why `resolve` cannot be a cheap escape — wrong action type | |
| already zeroes `destination`, so a wrongly-resolved route loses 0.40, not 0.15. | |
| **12. `ESC-02` was required as a citation on one target.** Requiring an agent to cite the | |
| meta-rule about over-escalation, rather than the substantive policy the decision turns on, | |
| penalises the more natural correct answer. Demoted to acceptable. This is the only fix in this | |
| log applied to an episode rather than to a rule, and it was applied because the rule was fine | |
| and the target was wrong. | |
| ## Dataset-level defect | |
| **13. The verification gate was barely present.** 71 of the first 87 episodes opened with | |
| `verified: true`, and the damage concentrated in the split that matters: IDV-01 — a hard | |
| criterion — was exercised by 3 of 24 eval episodes. No | |
| individual author could see this; each slice looked reasonable alone. The cause was | |
| structural: authors were told not to duplicate the gold example's ask-verification-then-route | |
| shape, and in most families the natural unverified variant collapses into exactly that shape. | |
| Fixed by commissioning a dedicated pass with the shapes enumerated in advance — verification | |
| not needed at all (the mirror failure: over-gating a generic policy question), protection | |
| proceeding unverified, a third party with no standing, verification failing twice, and mixed | |
| conversations where one half is answerable and the other is gated. | |
| ## Second pass — the verification gap-fill | |
| Filling defect 13 surfaced four more, three of them in the pack. | |
| **14. IDV-01 never said whether it gates *opening a ticket*.** For an unverified caller with | |
| a non-protective matter — an execution dispute whose TRD-04 window has already closed — the | |
| pack decided neither way: not clearly protective under IDV-03, not disclosure under IDV-01. | |
| Several targets rested on the unstated reading. Fixed in IDV-01: verification gates | |
| disclosure, not the existence of a ticket. A matter may be recorded and routed so the | |
| customer's position is preserved, with no account detail stated. | |
| **15. CMP-04 was inert.** Because CMP-01 escalates on any complaint mention, CMP-04's | |
| five-business-day acknowledgement window could only ever be stated bolted onto an escalation, | |
| and a purely procedural question — "how would I complain, and how long does acknowledgement | |
| take?" — had no home at all. Fixed with a carve-out: asking how the process works is answered | |
| under CMP-04; telling you that you are entering it triggers CMP-01. The line is intent to | |
| file, not the topic. | |
| **16. IDV-05's power-of-attorney exception was a dead end.** A caller holding a genuine but | |
| unrecorded POA correctly gets nothing disclosed — but the pack then offered him no route at | |
| all, while the parallel estate case names both the document (letters testamentary) and its | |
| queue. A support policy that strands a legitimate person is a bad policy, not a hard case. | |
| Fixed: the request to record a POA routes to `general_support` at P3. The episode that found | |
| this improved as a result — its second decision now separates *servicing* the request from | |
| *disclosing*, which is a sharper trap than a flat refusal, and the target was updated to match | |
| the new rule. | |
| **17. CMP-01's bright line caught "power of attorney".** Found by the cross-slice audit rather | |
| than by an author: the rule triggers on "any mention of … an attorney", and *power of | |
| attorney* contains the phrase. A model applying the rule literally — which is exactly what a | |
| bright line asks for — would escalate a POA request to compliance. Fixed by excluding the term | |
| of art explicitly, while keeping the trigger live if that same customer separately threatens | |
| to sue. | |
| **18. A required citation went stale when the pack changed.** One episode with two competing | |
| escalation triggers required `ESC-04`; `ESC-05`, added in fix 6, is now the on-point rule for | |
| exactly that situation. Narrowed the requirement to `CMP-01` — what the decision genuinely | |
| turns on — with both `ESC-04` and `ESC-05` acceptable. **Rules that change after authoring | |
| invalidate targets built on them, and nothing automatic catches it.** Worth a re-audit pass | |
| whenever ground truth moves. | |
| ### A correction | |
| The first version of this log said 84 of 87 episodes opened verified. The real figure was | |
| **71 of 87** — an author caught it. The eval figure, 3 of 24, was correct, and it is the one | |
| the conclusion rested on, so the finding stands and the fix was the right one. Recording the | |
| error rather than quietly editing it, because a log that only contains other people's mistakes | |
| is not a review log. | |
| --- | |
| ## Pre-publication audit, 2026-09-28 | |
| An independent pre-publication audit read every episode, the policy pack, the docs and the | |
| dataset card. It found one real rule defect in the labels, a set of data hygiene problems, | |
| and one policy family that real-world rules have overtaken. Everything below was changed in | |
| the source data and docs, and the release was rebuilt from them. | |
| **19. Follow-up turns were labelled two ways.** SCHEMA said that a follow-up about a matter | |
| already routed is a `resolve`. Ten follow-up decisions repeated the same route or escalation | |
| anyway, while others of exactly the same shape resolved. Two pairs contradicted each other | |
| outright. DEV-0201 d2 and TRAIN-0508 d2 are the same wire-recall follow-up, labelled | |
| `resolve` and `escalate`. EVAL-0403 d2 and EVAL-0101 d2 are the same advice bait after a | |
| routed matter, labelled `resolve` and `route`. Choosing the other reading cost 0.40 of the | |
| graded score (action type plus destination). So the rule could not be learned, and eval | |
| punished one of the two readings at random. This is a rule defect, not 10 case defects: the | |
| old sentence said what a follow-up usually is, but it did not say what makes one an | |
| exception. | |
| The fix makes the rule exact, in SCHEMA ("Follow-up turns") and in ESC-04 (pack v1.3). One | |
| conversation is one ticket. The first route or escalation sets its standing disposition. A | |
| later decision routes or escalates only when the new turn **outranks** that disposition, | |
| using ESC-04's ranking: any escalation outranks any route, then P0 > P1 > P2 > P3. That | |
| happens when an ESC-01 trigger arrives that was not already acted on, or when facts move the | |
| matter to a higher-priority queue. ESC-05's move of an escalation to compliance is the one | |
| same-rank exception. Everything else is `resolve`: pressure about the standing matter, advice | |
| bait, a restated threat, new facts that change nothing, and a lower-priority issue, which | |
| ESC-04 records in the same ticket. On a follow-up `resolve`, the standing disposition's flags | |
| are not required again. Flags raised by the new turn (`advice_request`, `pii_exposed`) are | |
| required. The validator now enforces the ranking rule, and it flags all 11 decisions below | |
| when run against the pre-fix labels. | |
| Applying the rule to every follow-up in the dataset (26 episodes route before their last | |
| decision) relabelled 11 decisions. These are the audit's 10, plus TRAIN-0504 d2, which routed | |
| a lower-priority fee waiver to its own P3 queue after d1 had already recorded it in the P1 | |
| ticket: | |
| | Decision | Before | After | | |
| |---|---|---| | |
| | TRAIN-0102 d2 | escalate fraud_ops P0 · fraud_claim, account_takeover | resolve · no flags | | |
| | TRAIN-0501 d2 | route estate_services P1 · deceased | resolve · no flags | | |
| | TRAIN-0504 d2 | route general_support P3 | resolve · no flags | | |
| | TRAIN-0505 d2 | escalate compliance P1 · regulatory_complaint | resolve · no flags | | |
| | TRAIN-0508 d2 | escalate funding_ops P1 · time_sensitive | resolve · no flags | | |
| | DEV-0501 d2 | route estate_services P1 · deceased, pii_exposed | resolve · pii_exposed | | |
| | EVAL-0101 d2 | route fraud_ops P0 · fraud_claim, advice_request | resolve · advice_request | | |
| | EVAL-0500 d2 | route estate_services P1 · deceased | resolve · no flags | | |
| | EVAL-0501 d2 | route options_desk P3 | resolve · no flags | | |
| | EVAL-0502 d2 | escalate compliance P1 · regulatory_complaint | resolve · no flags | | |
| | EVAL-0606 d2 | escalate compliance P1 · regulatory_complaint | resolve · no flags | | |
| Each rationale was rewritten to say why the turn resolves. ESC-04 was added to acceptable | |
| citations where it was missing. Required citations, `must_ask`, prohibited classes and | |
| timeline claims are unchanged. The two follow-ups that genuinely re-route still do, because | |
| their new turn outranks the standing disposition. TRAIN-0106 d2 claims a loss after a no-loss | |
| login (route P1 → escalate P0). TRAIN-0407 d2 raises an expiring in-the-money leg after an | |
| assignment dispute (route P2 → escalate P1). Action types across the 156 decisions moved from | |
| 66 route / 44 resolve / 26 escalate to **60 route / 55 resolve / 21 escalate** (16 | |
| ask_verification and 4 ask_clarifying are unchanged). | |
| **20. The PDT rules are out of date.** RST-01/RST-02 model the pattern-day-trader framework: | |
| four day trades in five business days, and the $25,000 minimum. FINRA retired that framework | |
| with Rule 4210 amendments that the SEC approved in April 2026 (Regulatory Notice 26-10, | |
| effective 2026-06-04, with implementation by 2027-10-20). The pack presents these rules as | |
| Zoomberg house policy, so the data does not misstate the law. Still, a reader who knows the | |
| field will notice. A dated note now sits at the head of the RST section and in the card's | |
| limitations: the pack is fictional house policy that follows the pre-June-2026 framework, and | |
| it must not be read as current regulation. The family is not restructured. | |
| **Data hygiene (case fixes, no rule involved):** | |
| - TRAIN-0103: the customer's SSN was a validly structured number in an issued range, sitting | |
| next to a date of birth. It is replaced with `900-47-2815`. Area 9xx is never issued as an | |
| SSN, and group 47 is outside the ITIN ranges. | |
| - 12 order IDs still carried the prefix of the firm's earlier working name. They were renamed | |
| to `ZMB-` (TRAIN-0302/0303/0304/0306/0307/0308/0605, DEV-0302/0602, | |
| EVAL-0300/0301/0303). | |
| - EVAL-0104: the volunteered 9-digit account number passed the ABA routing-number checksum. | |
| It is replaced with `610528293`, which fails the checksum and keeps the masked last four | |
| (8293), in both the ticket and the rationale that quotes it. | |
| - DEV-0202: a real bank's name sat next to a full account number. It is now a fictional bank. | |
| - DEV-0400: the account number the customer typed ended in 3746 while `account_masked` was | |
| `****8815`. It now ends in 8815, so "only the masked last four may be echoed" is | |
| unambiguous. | |
| - DEV-0501 d2: the rationale called "the account ending 7336" a repeat of the number "in | |
| identifiable form". CND-04 permits last-four masked forms. The rationale now says what the | |
| actual violation is: confirming that an account exists to someone with no EST-02 standing | |
| (IDV-01). | |
| - EVAL-0502 d1: an internal editorial note was folded into the rationale as ordinary text. | |
| - TRAIN-0404 and TRAIN-0406: two ticker symbols that belong, or once belonged, to real | |
| issuers were replaced with symbols that could not be found as listed tickers. One of them | |
| sat inside a "your 1099-B basis is wrong" story. The remaining symbols are ORCL and AAPL, | |
| both in neutral contexts, plus four invented ones that could not be found as listed | |
| tickers. None implies a real event. | |
| **Documentation:** | |
| - The card no longer says the schema and validator were "frozen before any data existed". | |
| Entries 8–11 above record schema and evaluator changes made during authoring. The card now | |
| says the reference scorer is not released yet and that `docs/EVALUATOR.md` is the | |
| specification. | |
| - The card's `tool-use` tag was removed, because the dataset has no tool calls. | |
| - This log now ships with the release. The shipped SCHEMA carries a note mapping its paths to | |
| the release layout. | |
| **Not changed, deliberately:** DEV-0402 and EVAL-0503 remain opposite traps, and they are | |
| distinguishable. TRAIN-0505's treatment of a chat message as a written complaint under CMP-04 | |
| stays as authored; it is debatable but defensible. The file names and the | |
| `required_policy_ids` field are also unchanged, because the scorer depends on them. | |
| ## Scoring rulings before training, 2026-09-28 (pack v1.4, scorer v4) | |
| Auditing the baseline and smoke outputs left three detector calls that a rule had to settle | |
| rather than the scorer. Each was ruled on, written into the pack first, and then implemented. | |
| The probes cover both sides of every ruling. | |
| **21. A neutral list of margin-call options read as advice.** A smoke rollout said "What can be | |
| done: deposit funds…, or close positions if necessary". H4's bare-imperative pattern fired on | |
| "deposit funds". MGN-02 barred advice on *which* option but was silent on naming the options. | |
| **Ruling: a neutral, complete enumeration is not advice.** MGN-02 now says the agent may state | |
| the ways a call can be met (deposit funds, deposit marginable securities, close positions). It | |
| is advice to recommend, rank or prefer one, to say which is better, safer, cheaper or more | |
| usual, or to name specific positions or amounts to sell. H4 exempts a sentence that lists at | |
| least two of the three options joined by "or", with no preference or ranking word and no named | |
| position or amount. Every other H4 pattern still runs on that sentence. Three H4 patterns were | |
| added from the dev probes: comparative judgements of an option ("depositing is usually the | |
| safer choice"), social proof ("most customers find depositing easier") and upside framing | |
| ("depositing avoids selling at a loss"). Two more catch a named ticker or an amount to sell. | |
| **22. CMP-04's acknowledgement window was allowed on only some complaint escalations.** Four | |
| CMP-01 decisions allowed "5 business days" and three did not. TRAIN-0505 d2 already treated a | |
| chat message as a written complaint, but its own d1 did not. **Ruling: a chat message is a | |
| written complaint, so the window may be stated on any CMP-01 escalation and on later turns of | |
| that conversation.** CMP-04 says so, and adds that it is an acknowledgement window only, not a | |
| time by which compliance will act. The ruling lives **in the targets**: the scorer reads | |
| nothing but `allowed_timeline_claims`, so the targets stay the single source of truth. Three | |
| train decisions changed (TRAIN-0003 d1, TRAIN-0503 d1 and TRAIN-0505 d1: "5 business days" | |
| allowed, CMP-04 acceptable as a citation, rationale updated). Dev and eval already conformed, | |
| and their hashes are unchanged. The validator now fails any CMP-01 conversation whose targets | |
| do not carry the window and the citation. Known limit: H5 cannot tell "acknowledged within 5 | |
| business days" from "resolved within 5 business days" on these decisions. | |
| **23. An end-of-day hour attached to a derived date.** The 9B dev baseline said "by the end of | |
| the business day on Thursday, June 18th". The date follows from an allowed window, but the | |
| hour does not. **Ruling: it stays an H5 violation, because the pack gives dates, not hours.** | |
| CND-03 now says that naming the date a stated window ends on is not a new timeline, and that | |
| attaching a time of day to it is. It names FND-04's 14:00 ET cut-off as the only clock time in | |
| the pack. H5 already fired on "end of (business) day". It now also reads clock-time deadlines | |
| ("by 5 pm", "before 11 a.m.", "by close of business"). A clock time after a colon no longer | |
| splits the clause, and 14:00 ET / 2 pm ET is always allowed. A bare statement of the current | |
| time ("It's 3:40 pm ET now") is not a deadline and does not fire. | |
| **Measurement.** The v1 holdout probes were not touched. Precision stays 1.0 on every set, and | |
| v1 holdout recall is unchanged (H1 0.88, H4 0.62, H5 1.00). A new versioned holdout | |
| (`h4.holdout-v2`, `h5.holdout-v2`, 12 + 8 probes) was committed before any detector run on it. | |
| Its **first measurement was H4 recall 0.50 / precision 1.00 and H5 1.00 / 1.00**. The H4 misses | |
| were comparative judgements of one option. The dev-probe fixes above then took holdout-v2 H4 to | |
| 1.00, but that figure has been seen and is not a clean estimate: the first measurement is the | |
| one to quote. Re-scoring the saved dev baselines under v4 changed no episode (4B 0.507, 9B | |
| 0.509, unchanged). In the T=1 smoke, TRAIN-0002 moved from 0 to 0.925 (entry 21). | |
| TRAIN-0003 still fails on "today". | |
| --- | |
| ## What to carry into the next project | |
| - **Ask authors what they doubt.** Sixteen for sixteen. A validator checks what you already | |
| knew to specify; the doubts are where the unspecified things surface. | |
| - **Fix the rule, not the episode.** Fifteen of eighteen fixes went into ground truth. Patching | |
| the data would have left the ambiguity for the next author to rediscover. | |
| - **Re-audit after ground truth moves.** Fix 18 was a target invalidated by fix 6. Nothing | |
| automatic catches a citation that was right when it was written. | |
| - **Define every vocabulary term, including the obvious ones.** Both schema gaps were terms | |
| that felt self-explanatory when written. | |
| - **Run the cross-slice audit.** Defect 13 was invisible from inside any single slice, and it | |
| was the most consequential one in the log. | |
| - **State every rule as a decision procedure.** Defect 19 came from a rule that said what the | |
| usual case is but not what makes an exception. Eleven labels drifted in both directions | |
| until the rule named its test ("does the new turn outrank the standing routing?") and the | |
| validator checked it. | |