id string | kind string | title string | measured list | result string | status string | page string | log_leaf int64 | doi string | scripts unknown | date timestamp[s] | claim string | check string |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
SM-026 | paper | The domain-dispute rules give the provider five days to appoint a panelist once the response is in or its deadline passes. In 2025 and 2026 WIPO took longer in 6,095 of 7,468 cases, median 8 days; the Forum, under the same rule, in 31 of 4,791 | [
"2026-10-24T00:00:00",
"2026-10-24T00:00:00"
] | WIPO appointed more than five days after the response or its deadline in 6,095 of 7,468 single-panelist cases (81.6%), median 8 days; the Forum 31 of 4,791 (0.6%), median 1. Deadline to decision: WIPO median 22 days, the Forum 2. WIPO's $4,000 priority service (March 2026) left the share unchanged. | Published 24 Oct; checked twice against the exhibits before publication; questions sent 24 Oct to WIPO’s Arbitration and Mediation Center | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/sm-026.html | 12,758 | 10.5281/zenodo.23627270 | "https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/tree/main/sm-026" | null | null | null |
SM-025 | paper | A pipeline operator must phone the National Response Center within an hour of confirming an incident. Since January 2024, for incidents with a death, injury, fire, explosion, major gas release or water pollution, 120 of 448 calls came later, by both the Center's log and the operator's own report | [
"2026-10-24T00:00:00",
"2026-10-24T00:00:00"
] | 120 of 448 calls late by both clocks (26.8%) for incidents with a death, injury, fire, explosion, 3 million cubic feet of gas or water pollution; gas distribution 50 of 146. All 924 calls: 220 late by both clocks (23.8%), 353 by the Center's log alone. Four operator reports say the call was required but not made. | Published 24 Oct; checked twice against the exhibits before publication; questions sent 24 Oct to PHMSA’s Office of Pipeline Safety | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/sm-025.html | 12,757 | 10.5281/zenodo.23620255 | "https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/tree/main/sm-025" | null | null | null |
SM-024 | paper | Foreign agents must report to the Justice Department every six months, within 30 days. Since January 2024, 632 of 2,155 reports came in late, and 150 registered agents have one overdue today | [
"2026-10-22T00:00:00",
"2026-10-22T00:00:00"
] | Every FARA supplemental statement the FARA Unit lists as filed 1 Jan 2024 - 21 Oct 2026 (2,163; 2,161 read by OCR of page 1: period + receipt stamp; 2,155 scored). 632 received more than 30 days after their period ended (29.3%), 305 more than a month past due, 173 more than three months, median 27 days; 310 of 632 agen... | Published 22 Oct; the Justice Department declined to comment on 23 Oct; monthly recheck tracks the 150 overdue agents | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/sm-024.html | 12,756 | 10.5281/zenodo.23575928 | "https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/tree/main/sm-024" | null | null | null |
SM-020 | paper | A registered lobbyist must file each quarter's report within 20 days. Of 97,884 reports for 2025, 11,986 went up late, 2,069 more than a month late, and the fine for a knowing violation is up to $200,000 | [
"2026-10-15T00:00:00",
"2026-10-21T00:00:00"
] | Every quarterly and termination LD-2 for Jan 2025-Jun 2026 from lda.gov with its posted time, against 2 U.S.C. 1604(a): 17,972 of 149,237 late (12.0%); 2025: 11,986 of 97,884 (12.2%), median 15 days, 2,069 over a month. Live read after the 20 Oct 2026 deadline (04:05-05:22 UTC 21 Oct): 2,668 of 24,261 registrant-client... | Published 21 Oct; questions sent 21 Oct to the Senate Office of Public Records and the House Legislative Resource Center; no reply yet | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/sm-020.html | 12,738 | 10.5281/zenodo.23396299 | "https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/tree/main/sm-020" | null | null | null |
SM-023 | paper | Canonical says "critical vulnerabilities are released within 24 hours" in Ubuntu. Since June its security team has raised 57 kernel vulnerabilities to critical from a CVSS score; of the 24 fixed after being raised, none was fixed within a week, and the median wait was 16.5 days | [
"2026-10-20T00:00:00",
"2026-10-20T00:00:00"
] | All 70 CVEs Ubuntu rated critical on 2026-10-20 (Ubuntu CVE API), with the ubuntu-cve-tracker commit that set each to critical and the first fix reaching users (first USN or first Launchpad Security/Updates/Release publication on or after the release date). 57 kernel CVEs were recorded as medium and raised to critical ... | Published 21 Oct; questions posted 21 Oct on Ubuntu Discourse (moved to its own topic, 89999); no reply yet | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/sm-023.html | 12,755 | 10.5281/zenodo.23521335 | "https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/tree/main/sm-023" | null | null | null |
SM-021 | paper | Dependabot doesn't alert on a security advisory until GitHub reviews it, which GitHub's documentation says "can take up to 72 hours". Since April, 3,226 of 4,472 reviewed advisories took longer, and the median wait was 8 days | [
"2026-10-17T00:00:00",
"2026-10-17T00:00:00"
] | Every CVE GitHub issued that NVD published 1 January to 16 October 2026 (11,848); repository advisory published_at vs database github_reviewed_at; 7,076 with a 2026 advisory naming a package in a supported ecosystem. January to March: 69 of 1,514 reviewed took longer than 72 hours (4.6%), median 20 hours. April to 16 O... | Published 19 Oct; GitHub replied the same day on issue 10425: the 72-hour wording is being removed, no recovery date, no weekly queue numbers | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/sm-021.html | 12,754 | 10.5281/zenodo.23439040 | "https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/tree/main/sm-021" | null | null | null |
SM-019 | paper | A federal grant sub-award must be reported by the end of the month after it is made. GAO found 41% of non-pandemic sub-awards late through 2023; on every sub-award at or above the reporting threshold made since October 2017 it is 56.6%, and state agencies carry three-quarters of the late reports | [
"2026-10-12T00:00:00",
"2026-10-12T00:00:00"
] | Every grant sub-award made 1 October 2017 to 12 October 2026 in USAspending's bulk download, 4,187,807 rows; one sub-award = prime award, sub-award number and action date, earliest report kept (1,117,877 later reports dropped); 936,249 below the $30,000 threshold ($25,000 before 12 November 2020) set aside, 2,125,343 s... | Published and corrected 13 Oct; questions sent to six agencies 13 Oct; no reply yet | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/sm-019.html | 12,737 | 10.5281/zenodo.23328859 | "https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/tree/main/sm-019" | null | null | null |
SM-017 | paper | Every broadcast station must post its quarterly list of community programming by the tenth. 90% of the lists went up on time in 2025; 3,231 were more than a month late, and the FCC’s base fine for a late list is $10,000 | [
"2026-10-06T00:00:00",
"2026-10-10T00:00:00"
] | 18,043 stations (1,995 TV incl. Class A, 11,622 FM, 4,426 AM), every quarter from 2025 to mid-2026 read from the upload dates on publicfiles.fcc.gov. 2025: 53,772 of 59,842 lists by the deadline, 6,070 late (TV 2.7%, FM 10.6%, AM 13.0%), median 38 days late, 3,231 more than a month; 2,192 stations uploaded nothing all ... | Published 10 Oct, updated 14 Oct; questions sent to the FCC 14 Oct; no reply yet | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/sm-017.html | 12,735 | 10.5281/zenodo.23287990 | "https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/tree/main/sm-017" | null | null | null |
SM-018 | paper | A CVE numbering authority has 72 hours to publish the record once it has made the CVE ID public itself. ZDI, Dell, Drupal and Arista were past that on 1,107 of the 1,683 records we could score since January 2025, by a median of 13 days | [
"2026-10-11T00:00:00",
"2026-10-22T00:00:00"
] | Every published CVE record with a 2025 or 2026 ID in the CVE List's nightly archive (cvelistV5 cve_2026-10-11_2000Z), 112,862; 16,340 with a usable public date scored at day resolution (datePublished minus the CNA's own datePublic). 13,881 records from 184 CNAs cite a domain the Program's roster lists for the CNA: 1,81... | Corrected 22 Oct after Kaveh Ranjbar’s rerun; sent to four CNAs 12 Oct, the CVE Program Secretariat 15 Oct and the CNA Rules repository (cve-documents issue 64) 23 Oct; no reply yet | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/sm-018.html | 12,736 | 10.5281/zenodo.23305969 | "https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/tree/main/sm-018" | null | null | null |
SM-016 | paper | Toxic-release reports are due 1 July, with a statutory fine of up to $71,545 for each day late. A thousand plants filed more than a year late for 2019, and 61 of them appear in any EPCRA 313 case opened since | [
"2026-10-03T00:00:00"
] | 473,709 TRI forms for 2019–2024: 16,522 postmarked after 1 July, 5,964 more than a year late. For 2019, 61 of 1,003 facilities more than a year late appear in any EPCRA 313 case opened since; EPA's formal 313 actions 52, 51, 41, then 16 (FY2025) and 14 (FY2026). 22 federal facilities late for 2023, exempt by statute. L... | Sent to EPA’s TRI Program 4 Oct; no reply yet | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/sm-016.html | 12,734 | 10.5281/zenodo.23130552 | "https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/tree/main/sm-016" | null | null | null |
SM-014 | paper | Brazil’s RPKI registry gives a member five days to fix a lapsed manifest. Validators drop the member’s route authorisations in the first hour. Thirty members lapsed in the week to 3 October; by 8 October twenty had been deleted | [
"2026-10-03T00:00:00",
"2026-10-08T00:00:00"
] | Every manifest on registro.br's and the RIPE NCC publication service's RRDP snapshots read on 3 and 8 October 2026. registro.br: 30 members' manifests lapsed in the week to 3 October; by 8 October 20 had been deleted and 10 recovered; registro.br's page gives a member five calendar days from a notice sent seven hours b... | Published 12 Oct; RIPE NCC answered 14 Oct; NIC.br awaited | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/sm-014.html | 12,732 | 10.5281/zenodo.23319186 | "https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/tree/main/sm-014" | null | null | null |
SM-015 | paper | Certificate Transparency’s new tiled logs publish in seconds. The old ones take up to an hour, and the browsers’ own log lists are the slowest part | [
"2026-10-02T00:00:00",
"2026-10-03T00:00:00"
] | All 64 logs measured (61 of Chrome's 64, plus Cloudflare's three Raio shards from Apple's list) inside their MMD: 43 tiled logs within 5.7 s (median 0.2 s); 21 RFC 6962 logs 10 s to 61 min (Cloudflare Nimbus 46 and 61 min). Chrome policy caps RFC 6962 MMD at 4 h while log_list.json declares 86,400 s for all 21; four Tr... | Sent 3 Oct; Apple fixed its list 15 Oct; Chrome asked again on ct-policy 16 Oct | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/sm-015.html | 12,733 | 10.5281/zenodo.23123268 | "https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/tree/main/sm-015" | null | null | null |
SM-012 | paper | Certificate authorities get 92 days to file their audits. Most file in the last week, one in eleven files late, and Windows still trusts a root whose last audit ended in 2019 | [
"2026-10-03T00:00:00"
] | 108 of 119 current CA audit statements dated inside the CCADB's 92-day window (34 in the last ten days, 10 on the last three), 11 past it, 7 with nothing on file. Roots with newest audit over 15 months old: Mozilla 0 of 172, Chrome 0 of 101, Apple 6 of 144, Microsoft 24 of 331, oldest Certinomis (December 2019). | Sent to CCADB and Microsoft 3 Oct; filed in Bugzilla 16 Oct; Thailand's ETDA answered 20 Oct and uploaded one of two missing letters; CCADB Support triaged all four reports 21 Oct (MULTICERT assigned to Mozilla for review) | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/sm-012.html | 12,730 | 10.5281/zenodo.23123264 | "https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/tree/main/sm-012" | null | null | null |
SM-011 | paper | Firefox’s revocation list is months behind the biggest certificate logs. One in eleven top sites, mozilla.org included, gets no revocation check at all | [
"2026-10-02T00:00:00"
] | Reader 112 days behind Xenon2026h2, 1.66 billion entries unread. 68 of 726 top-1,000 certificates not covered; 346 of 3,792 in the top 5,000. 57 of the 68 (299 of 346 in the top 5,000) were issued by Google Trust Services, 37.7% of its top-1,000 certificates. | Sent 2 Oct; Mozilla replied 5 Oct, 4 of 4 answered | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/sm-011.html | 12,729 | 10.5281/zenodo.23123260 | "https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/tree/main/sm-011" | null | null | null |
SM-010 | paper | Hugging Face says every file goes through its malware scanner. Nothing over 2 GB does, and the badge says safe anyway | [
"2026-10-02T00:00:00"
] | 2,539 of 2,551 files under 2 GiB scanned; 0 of 487 at 2 GiB or more. 476 of those show “safe”. | Sent 2 Oct; Hugging Face fixed the docs 6 Oct; the badge question is open | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/sm-010.html | 12,728 | 10.5281/zenodo.23123004 | "https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/tree/main/sm-010" | null | null | null |
SM-009 | paper | Firefox promised a list of every revoked certificate. A third of the ones revoked on day one aren’t on it, and it no longer asks anyone else | [
"2026-10-02T00:00:00"
] | 427 of 465 current revocations on the list. Revoked within 24 hours of issuance: 37 of 108 missing, for up to 28 days. | Sent 2 Oct; Mozilla replied 5 Oct, 6 of 6 answered; gap closed in the 17 Oct full filter, on the date Mozilla gave | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/sm-009.html | 12,727 | 10.5281/zenodo.23123000 | "https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/tree/main/sm-009" | null | null | null |
SM-008 | paper | A federal directive says CISA rates every CVE. Since March, it has rated almost no Linux kernel bugs | [
"2026-10-02T00:00:00"
] | 1,731 of 1,731 exploited CVEs rated. 1 of 158 sampled kernel CVEs since March. | Sent to CISA and the kernel CVE team 2 Oct; six questions open | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/sm-008.html | 12,726 | 10.5281/zenodo.23122996 | "https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/tree/main/sm-008" | null | null | null |
SM-007 | paper | Docker promised signed attestations for every Official Image. The attestations arrived; the signatures didn't | [
"2026-10-02T00:00:00"
] | 7,368 of 7,372 Linux images carry attestations. 0 of 45 sampled are signed. | Sent to Docker 2 Oct; no reply; data posted on Docker’s roadmap issue 16 Oct | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/sm-007.html | 12,725 | 10.5281/zenodo.23122992 | "https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/tree/main/sm-007" | null | null | null |
SM-006 | paper | x402 payments on Base fell by three-quarters in two months, and the same two operators still send most of them | [
"2026-08-05T00:00:00",
"2026-10-01T00:00:00"
] | 234,490 payments a day in August, 63,003 on 1 October. Two wallet groups sent about 80% on both days. | Sent to the authors 1 Oct; no reply yet | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/sm-006.html | 12,724 | 10.5281/zenodo.23122987 | "https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/tree/main/sm-006" | null | null | null |
SM-005 | paper | Meta's whitepaper says its private-AI log refreshes every 3 hours. Since January it's been every 6 | [
"2026-09-30T00:00:00"
] | Lists every 6 hours, not 3. New software entries in 37 of 70 weeks. | Sent to Meta 1 Oct; no reply yet | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/sm-005.html | 12,723 | 10.5281/zenodo.23122985 | "https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/tree/main/sm-005" | null | null | null |
SM-004 | paper | We tried to catch whisper.online's ledger out. It passed every test, and we found it sending us ten copies of everything | [
"2026-09-12T00:00:00",
"2026-09-30T00:00:00"
] | Every check passed. A fix took duplicate updates from about ten per change to one. | Sent 18 Sep; whisper.online reproduced, confirmed and fixed it the same night | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/sm-004.html | 12,722 | 10.5281/zenodo.23071389 | "https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/tree/main/sm-004" | null | null | null |
SM-003 | paper | Wild SBOMs was billed as the work of many developers. Nearly half came from one robot | [
"2026-09-30T00:00:00"
] | Nearly half came from one automated run in 2022. | Sent to the authors 30 Sep; the 2026 study's author replied 22 Oct and posted a corrected version (v3) the same day, crediting the harness files to Fortress; the Wild SBOMs authors have not replied | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/sm-003.html | 12,721 | 10.5281/zenodo.23123300 | "https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/tree/main/sm-003" | null | null | null |
SM-002 | paper | The dataset behind 39 studies of Claude Code can see 1 in 11 of its pull requests | [
"2026-09-30T00:00:00"
] | Its search catches about 1 in 11, and an unusual slice of them. | Sent 30 Sep; Hao Li answered 16 Oct; fixed in AIDev v5, released 21 Oct: 1,567,100 Claude Code pull requests, against 18,232 in v4 | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/sm-002.html | 12,720 | 10.5281/zenodo.23123114 | "https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/tree/main/sm-002" | null | null | null |
SM-001 | paper | Google's Pixel ledger promised every release. January went missing, and stayed missing for eight months | [
"2026-09-15T00:00:00",
"2026-09-30T00:00:00"
] | The January 2026 release was missing. Google added it. | Sent 15 Sep; Google confirmed and fixed it within a week; device-fingerprint backfill done 15 Oct | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/sm-001.html | 12,719 | 10.5281/zenodo.23070509 | "https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/tree/main/sm-001" | null | null | null |
NULL-001 | claim held | null | null | 27 of 28 match the v-prefixed release tag. The recovery image's commit is on usbarmory/armory-ums master, but no 0.1.0 tag exists there or in any fork. | null | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/#nulls | null | null | [
"https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/blob/main/nulls/armored-witness-firmware.py"
] | 2026-09-30T00:00:00 | Every entry in the Armored Witness production firmware log names the source it was built from | Each of the 28 entries' commit_fingerprint compared with the commit its tag points to on GitHub (script) |
NULL-002 | claim held | null | null | 150 of 150 retrievable and consistent. | null | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/#nulls | null | null | [
"https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/blob/main/nulls/plexi_coverage.py"
] | 2026-09-30T00:00:00 | Cloudflare's Plexi auditor has verified every WhatsApp key-transparency (v2) epoch from 722,677 to its reported last verified epoch | 150 epochs drawn uniformly from 722,677 to 1,297,263, each audit fetched and its epoch, namespace and digest checked (script). Audit signatures not checked here. |
NULL-003 | claim held | null | null | Every repository has at least 50 stars, a cut the paper doesn't state; that is 4.3% of matching repositories. Python and TypeScript lead on both sides of it, and no owner holds more than 1%. | null | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/#nulls | null | null | [
"https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/blob/main/nulls/mcp_star_floor.py"
] | 2026-10-01T00:00:00 | A Large-Scale Dataset of MCP Implementations on GitHub (MSR '26) describes real-world MCP development | Their released data and code, and GitHub's counts of matching repositories above and below the code's 50-star minimum (script) |
NULL-004 | claim held | null | null | 17.9% of uploads carry an attestation (95%: 15.1–20.8%). Of the files still on PyPI, 20.5%, which is also a floor on Trusted Publishing. 178 of 179 come from GitHub. | null | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/#nulls | null | null | [
"https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/blob/main/nulls/pypi_attest.py"
] | 2026-10-01T00:00:00 | PyPI: “17% of all uploads to PyPI in the last year included an attestation”, and more than 20% came via Trusted Publishing (2025 in review) | 1,000 file uploads drawn from PyPI’s own changelog across 2025 (50 random three-day stretches, 20 files each), each looked up in PyPI’s Integrity API (script) |
NULL-005 | claim held | null | null | 418 of 10,402 (4.02%) to the end of August. Of the 135 whose name is tied to a verified domain, 116 stayed with that domain’s owner. 283 of the 418 are named after a GitHub account, where the registry checks no domain at all. | null | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/#nulls | null | null | [
"https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/blob/main/nulls/mcp_endpoint_redirects.py"
] | 2026-10-01T00:00:00 | Same Name, Different Server (arXiv 2609.14119): 4.2% of multi-version servers in the official MCP registry moved their endpoint to a different host while keeping their name, which the registry “cannot distinguish” from a takeover | Every version in the registry from its public API, comparing each server’s endpoint hosts between consecutive versions (script) |
NULL-006 | claim held | null | null | 0 of 150 CVE records and 0 of 150 OSV files carry credits; all 150 CVE records carry metrics and problemTypes. | null | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/#nulls | null | null | [
"https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/blob/main/nulls/github_cve_credits.py"
] | 2026-10-01T00:00:00 | Never Emitted (arXiv 2609.33099): GitHub shows who reported each vulnerability on its advisory but leaves that credit out of the CVE record and its OSV file | The newest 150 GitHub-assigned CVEs whose advisory credits someone, each CVE record read from CVE Services and each OSV file from GitHub’s advisory database (script) |
NULL-007 | claim held | null | null | 599 of 600 attested; every CI attestation carries a Sigstore transparency-log entry. The exception: ht 2.1.0’s two Monterey bottles, built 24 April 2024 and still served, which neither signer attests. Reported as homebrew-core#314985. | null | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/#nulls | null | null | [
"https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/blob/main/nulls/homebrew_bottle_attestations.py"
] | 2026-10-02T00:00:00 | Homebrew: homebrew-core uses Sigstore “to cryptographically attest to all bottles built in the official Homebrew CI” (2024) | 600 bottle files drawn at random from formulae.brew.sh in two independent samples, each looked up in GitHub’s attestation API under homebrew-core’s CI and Homebrew’s backfill signer (script) |
NULL-008 | claim held | null | null | 163 of 163 within one business day. 68 had been analysed before they reached the catalogue; the other 95 took a median of 19.5 hours. | null | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/#nulls | null | null | [
"https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/blob/main/nulls/nvd_kev_enrichment.py"
] | 2026-10-02T00:00:00 | NIST NVD: for CVEs in CISA’s known-exploited catalogue, “our goal is to enrich these within one business day of receipt” (from 15 April 2026) | Every one of the 163 catalogue entries added since 15 April, timed from the later of catalogue addition and NVD publication to NIST’s first analysis in NVD’s own change history (script) |
NULL-009 | claim held | null | null | 408 of 408 carry both; 12 of 12 signatures verify, all from the release identity Kubernetes documents. Certificate chain and transparency-log entries not checked here. | null | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/#nulls | null | null | [
"https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/blob/main/nulls/kubernetes_signatures.py",
"https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/blob/main/nulls/kubernetes_signatures_verify.py"
] | 2026-10-02T00:00:00 | Kubernetes: “The Kubernetes release process signs all binary artifacts (tarballs, SPDX files, standalone binaries) by using cosign’s keyless signing.” | Every standalone binary in the latest patch of each minor version from 1.26 to 1.37 (408 files) checked for its .sig and .cert, and one kubectl signature per version verified with our own code (presence, verification) |
NULL-010 | claim held | null | null | 515 epochs, 4 July to 2 October: median interval 4.00 hours; longest 38.1 hours (27–28 September), inside the 72-hour limit. Two epoch numbers at the start of the window aren’t visible, probably expired from the search index. | null | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/#nulls | null | null | [
"https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/blob/main/nulls/proton_kt_epochs.py"
] | 2026-10-02T00:00:00 | Proton Mail key transparency: “Normally a ProtonKT epoch should be published every 4 hours. The maximum publishing interval is 72 hours” (whitepaper, p. 14) | Every epoch certificate Proton logged to Certificate Transparency since July, found through Cert Spotter; each certificate’s name encodes its epoch number and issue time (script) |
NULL-011 | claim held | null | null | 64 of 64 inside the promise. Tiled: all 43 within 6 seconds, most within 1. Classic: DigiCert 10 seconds, Google and Sectigo 1 to 2 minutes, TrustAsia 2.5 minutes, Cloudflare’s Nimbus 46 and 61 minutes, the only logs that publish a new tree head less often than every minute. The 24-hour figure Firefox’s revocation filt... | null | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/#nulls | null | null | [
"https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/blob/main/nulls/ct_merge_delays.py",
"https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/blob/main/nulls/ct_merge_delays_tiles.py"
] | 2026-10-02T00:00:00 | Every Certificate Transparency log promises a maximum merge delay: 24 hours for the classic logs, 60 seconds for the tiled ones (the mmd field of the Google and Apple log lists; RFC 6962 §3) | A fresh certificate submitted to each of the 64 usable or qualified logs that will take a current certificate (our own chain, SM-009’s certificates with their CCADB intermediates, and entries harvested from 2027h2 and 2028 tiled logs), each log then polled on its own thread until it served the entry: an inclusion proof... |
NULL-015 | claim held | null | null | 24 reports carry a Next-update date, none past it without a CA update; no root-program or community question has waited over 7 days for a CA reply. One open report is Microsoft PKI Services filing an incident for missing its own seven-day update on another. | null | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/#nulls | null | null | [
"https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/blob/main/nulls/ccadb_incident_cadence.py"
] | 2026-10-03T00:00:00 | CCADB incident-report rules: open reports “MUST be updated: on or before the ‘Next update’ date in the Whiteboard field”; CA Owners “MUST respond within 7 days” to comments and questions | Every open [ca-compliance] bug in Bugzilla's CA Program (92): Next-update date, assignee, every comment with author and time; run twice the same day |
NULL-014 | claim held | null | null | 15,982 subscriber CRLs: median 3 hours old, 99% under a day; median validity 7.0 days, 90th percentile 9.96 against a 10-day cap. No TLS CRL stale or expired. Five over seven days old are non-TLS CAs carrying a server-authentication bit; one real: Brazil’s ITI (Microsoft-trusted only) serves an EV CRL with nextUpdate 2... | null | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/#nulls | null | null | [
"https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/blob/main/nulls/crl_freshness.py"
] | 2026-10-03T00:00:00 | CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements 4.9.7: a CA issuing subscriber certificates “MUST update and publish a new CRL at least every seven (7) days”; CRL profile: nextUpdate “at most 10 days after the thisUpdate” for CRLs covering subscriber certificates | Every CRL URL the CCADB lists for its 2,206 not-revoked TLS-capable intermediates (16,141 distinct URLs, 62 CA owners), fetched and parsed; 1,500 re-fetched an hour later |
NULL-013 | claim held | null | null | Every Actions-generated attestation is in the log: 161 of 161 found on Rekor at the stated index. The other 227 bundles are GitHub’s own release attestations, which come with immutable releases: signed by GitHub’s certificate authority with a one-year certificate, timestamped by GitHub, and in no public log. GitHub’s r... | null | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/#nulls | null | null | [
"https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/blob/main/nulls/github_attestations/collect.py",
"https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/blob/main/nulls/github_attestations/verify_rekor.py"
] | 2026-10-03T00:00:00 | GitHub: “Public repositories that generate artifact attestations use the Sigstore Public Good Instance. A copy of the generated Sigstore bundle is stored with GitHub and is also written to an immutable transparency log that is publicly readable on the internet.” | The latest release of each of the 1,000 most-starred repositories pushed since September; every attestation GitHub holds for their assets (388 bundles from 63 repositories), each bundle’s transparency-log entry looked up on the public Rekor instance by index |
NULL-012 | claim held | null | null | 457 are unreproducible. 128 were there before the gate; 231 replaced a version that was already unreproducible, which the rule allows; 76 carry a public release-team hint; 10 got their verdict after crossing. The last 12, all petsc, are the gate working: britney flagged them in June, the release manager judged them ren... | null | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/#nulls | null | null | [
"https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/blob/main/nulls/debian_reproducible_gate.py"
] | 2026-10-02T00:00:00 | Debian release team: “Since yesterday, we have enabled our migration software to block migration of new packages that can’t be reproduced or existing packages (in testing) that regress in reproducibility” (debian-devel-announce, 10 May 2026) | Every binary in testing with a rebuild verdict on reproduce.debian.net (36,003), split by what changed since the gate, scored with britney’s own per-binary regression rule, and the remainder crossed with the release team’s public hints and each package’s migration date (script) |
SM-013 | paper | In 2018 the White House withdrew its DNSSEC mandate because agencies “already should have” done it. One in six executive-branch domains still has no DNSSEC, and the NSA signs with SHA-1 | [
"2026-10-03T00:00:00",
"2026-10-23T00:00:00"
] | 1,105 of 1,316 federal domains on CISA's registry list have a DNSSEC chain (84.0%); executive branch 986 of 1,169, so 183 unsigned (129 answering with an address); 13 refused by Google and Cloudflare validating resolvers; 63 zones sign only with RSA/SHA-1. Rechecked 23 Oct 2026: 1,321 names, 183 executive unsigned, 63 ... | Published 23 Oct; reviewed before publication by Kaveh Ranjbar; questions sent 23 Oct to CISA’s .gov program and OMB | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/sm-013.html | 12,731 | 10.5281/zenodo.23608524 | "https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/tree/main/sm-013" | null | null | null |
SM-022 | paper | conda-forge’s docs say new packages take “around 15 minutes” to be installable. For a week, 624 of 634 single-file versions took longer just to be listed by the CDN | [
"2026-10-17T00:00:00",
"2026-10-24T00:00:00"
] | 634 single-file versions uploaded 17–24 Oct 2026: upload→first CDN sync listing them median 35.9 min, 624 >15 (98.4%), none <13.4, 27 >60; syncs every 38.4 min median; upload→the repodata conda install reads, 317 versions, median 49.3, none <27.8. | Published 31 Oct; checked against the exhibits before publication; advance copy sent to conda-forge (Matthew Becker) 24 Oct; data and questions on conda/infrastructure#1280 31 Oct; Anaconda answered 3 Nov: numbers match theirs, an incremental indexer targeted for end of November, about 15 to 20 minutes | https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/sm-022.html | 13,278 | 10.5281/zenodo.23676393 | "https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements/tree/main/sm-022" | null | null | null |
Second Measurements
Public claims recomputed by a different path than the one that produced them: filing deadlines in federal rules (toxic-release reports, foreign-agent and lobbying filings, pipeline incident calls), response times promised by security programs and package registries, transparency logs, and published datasets. One row per check: what was claimed, how we re-measured it, what we found, and what the other party said.
Papers and evidence: https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/ · Scripts: https://github.com/MarkovianProtocol/second-measurements
What is in it
measurements.jsonl has one row per check.
| field | meaning |
|---|---|
id |
SM-NNN for a published paper, NULL-NNN for a check where the claim held |
kind |
paper or claim held |
title / claim |
the headline (papers) or the claim as the organisation stated it (nulls) |
check |
what was recomputed, from which public data (nulls) |
result |
the number we got |
status |
where the finding stands with the other party (papers) |
measured / date |
when the check ran |
page |
the paper or the row on the site |
log_leaf |
the leaf in the Markovian transparency log that holds the page's sha256 |
doi |
Zenodo DOI where one exists |
scripts |
the code that produced the result |
notes/ holds data notes: shorter recomputes of one number a writer or maintainer published, sent to them with the whole result, what supports their point and what doesn't. Notes have no DOI and are not rows in measurements.jsonl; each has its log receipt beside it and is listed in notes/README.md.
recounts.jsonl (config recounts) has one row per recount of a number someone else publishes on a schedule: who published it, their figure, ours, the verdict (holds, close or differs), the date, and the data note with the method. It grows by one row each time they publish and we recount. The page is https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/recounts.html.
files/ mirrors the GitHub repository at upload time: per-paper scripts, the saved source pages each exhibit was read from, SHA256SUMS and retrieved_at for every exhibit, the log receipt for each page, the AIDev paper map, and the scheduled rechecks.
How a row is pinned
Each paper's sha256 sits in a transparency log cosigned by independent witnesses (https://log.markovianprotocol.com) and anchored to Bitcoin with OpenTimestamps. The receipt files in files/ carry the leaf index and inclusion-proof URL.
How we work
The claim is quoted verbatim from the organisation's own page. The condition that would kill the finding is stated before measuring. Only public endpoints are used, with code written from the specification rather than the operator's tooling. Each check is rerun on a different day before publication. The organisation gets the evidence and specific questions before or at publication, and its reply is printed on the page. Each question has a 30-day clock, shown on https://markovianprotocol.com/measurements/; after 30 days of silence the row turns red and we don't write to the same address again. Scheduled rechecks rerun papers after publication and add rows when the numbers move. Claims that held are listed too.
Paper text is CC BY 4.0. Code in files/ is MIT.
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