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# BeforeDone Empirical Protocol
Status: **FROZEN**
Protocol version: `0.4.14`
Product commit: `4927e6b091a1ea5b3b10163dad16dec73dd3a524`
No confirmatory run may start while this document is marked DRAFT. Freezing the
protocol requires committed task manifests, a passing validator and pilot, a
recorded Codex/runtime version, and an entry in `state/iteration_log.jsonl`.
## 1. Claims under test
BeforeDone is evaluated as a bounded completion guardrail for cooperative or
fallible coding agents. The confirmatory study tests whether current-state
verifier receipts reduce unsupported completion and stale-evidence reuse, and
whether they avoid unnecessary rechecks after irrelevant changes.
The study does not test verifier adequacy, malicious same-user resistance,
remote attestation, sandboxing, or automatic interpretation of ambiguous
requirements.
## 2. Experimental unit
An experimental unit is one isolated Codex session on one frozen task under one
condition and repetition. Each run starts from the same frozen synthetic mutant
root and a clean, separately created agent worktree. No state, receipt, hook file,
generated artifact, dependency cache that can contain task answers, or
conversation may cross runs.
For two-stage tasks, phase 1 is followed by a scripted repository intervention
and a session resume with phase 2. The intervention and second prompt are fixed
in the task manifest.
### 2.1 Agent-public and runner-private separation
Each canonical task manifest is runner-private. Before a run, the harness emits
a content-addressed agent-public projection containing only the task prompt,
visible verifier contract, declared relevant-file patterns, and files required
for the agent to work. The public projection must not contain the hidden oracle,
oracle argv, expected outputs, private fixtures, phase-boundary evaluator logic,
or a future intervention payload before that payload is applied. Public and
private assets have separate hashes in the run record.
Runner-private manifests, hidden-oracle assets, phase-boundary snapshots, and
intervention scripts live under the paper artifact root, while agent worktrees
live under a separate `D:\Codex\_tmp` run root. On the frozen Windows runner,
Codex uses its elevated native sandbox accounts. The harness places an explicit
full-access deny ACL for the dedicated `CodexSandboxUsers` group on both the
paper artifact root (including its Git object database) and a minimal study
`CODEX_HOME` that contains authentication and the runtime configuration. The
coordinator identity is verified not to belong to that group. Hooks and the
pinned BeforeDone binary needed by a condition are copied into the agent
worktree; the agent therefore needs no access back to the paper artifact.
Condition-visible verifier logs and Hook event ledgers are written under the
Git-ignored worktree path `.study-cache/beforedone-study`, not under the primary
Git directory. This relocation is required because the current Codex elevated
Windows sandbox applies non-overridable write protection to a worktree's
primary Git directory, including runner-created research logs beneath it. The
path is an experimental runtime adapter, not a security boundary, and remains
excluded from relevant-state fingerprints and final Agent patches.
Only C3 receives a real shadow Git directory at
`.study-cache/beforedone-git`. The runner creates it after the synthetic
baseline is final and requires it to agree with the primary `.git` directory
on HEAD, index contents and staged entries, refs, worktree status, and reachable
Git objects. The pinned BeforeDone process and its Hook delegate receive
process-local, exact `GIT_DIR`, `GIT_WORK_TREE`, and single-worktree
`safe.directory` values that select this shadow directory. No wildcard or
persistent Git configuration is permitted. Ordinary Agent and runner Git
commands, final-state capture, and terminal Git-metadata audits continue to use
the primary `.git`.
At every phase boundary and after the Agent turn, the runner requires the
shadow's Git metadata to remain unchanged and semantically equivalent to the
primary Git metadata, except for BeforeDone's own top-level
`beforedone/` runtime directory inside the shadow Git directory. The runner
requires that top-level exception to remain one ordinary, non-reparsed
directory, but deliberately does not enumerate its mutable descendants:
BeforeDone may atomically add or retire Receipt, log, key, and event-ledger
files while a Hook exits. All entries outside that one opaque runtime subtree
remain content-and-mode audited. Any mismatch there, replacement of the
top-level exception, unexpected protected shadow write, or write to primary
Git metadata fails closed as an infrastructure failure. C0-C2 have no shadow
Git directory. Every condition's task instructions prohibit commits and all
other Git-metadata changes.
Relocating C3's product runtime does not alter the pinned BeforeDone evidence
or freshness algorithms, but it is a study-specific adapter and an external
validity limitation. It is not evidence of sandboxing or malicious-process
resistance.
Before Agent execution, the harness applies the frozen initial patch to the
pinned upstream tree and creates a clean synthetic root commit with no parent,
no remotes, and no retained old upstream objects. The pinned tree is cloned
from one preflight-verified local bare source per public repository; formal runs
do not fetch GitHub. Those caches contain only public upstream objects and are
identified in a path-free source descriptor in the frozen benchmark report.
The cache directory is coordinator-only and carries the same explicit full-deny
ACL for `CodexSandboxUsers` as the paper-private root, so sanitizing the Agent
worktree cannot be bypassed by reading the coordinator's source cache.
The run records both upstream OIDs, the initial-patch digest, and the verified
synthetic root commit/tree so the answer cannot be recovered from `git diff` or
repository history. These fields are mandatory for completed runs; an
infrastructure failure before a synthetic root exists omits unavailable fields
rather than fabricating OIDs.
Repository preparation commands use explicit frozen-runtime placeholders. In
particular, `{PYTHON_EXE}` resolves to the Python 3.11.3 executable identified
by the immutable environment descriptor; tasks do not invoke the user-scoped
Windows `py.exe` launcher. The benchmark preflight executes the resolved
preparation command under the same restricted sandbox identity used for Agent
tool processes before any input lock is created. A missing runtime or
coordinator/sandbox resolution difference blocks the study.
Each per-run `CODEX_HOME` is created from current authentication plus the
machine's protected elevated-sandbox bootstrap state. Windows sandbox accounts
are shared across Codex hosts and their credentials may be rotated by another
host; copying the current bootstrap secret prevents a stale isolated home from
silently hanging or rebuilding those accounts. The home is denied to
`CodexSandboxUsers`, is never part of the public artifact, and is destroyed
after the run. Only a non-secret presence status and configuration hash are
retained.
This ACL is necessary on the measured host. An initial real-agent probe showed
that legacy native `workspace-write` prevented writes but still allowed a shell
subprocess to read another `D:\Codex` directory. A local permission-profile
`deny` rule alone also did not stop that shell read. After enabling the elevated
sandbox and applying the sandbox-group ACL, the same direct and GPT-5.6 Sol
probes returned operating-system access denied. The retained preflight is in
`data/preflight/isolation/`; it contains a sanitized observable trace, not the
sentinel value or an account SID.
A separate pre-pilot network probe found that the same native Windows backend
does **not** provide a complete tool-shell network boundary on this host. Direct
TCP and HTTP on ports 80 and 443 succeeded even though DNS, DoT, SMB, and ICMP
were filtered. The protocol therefore withdraws the earlier no-network claim
before collecting any pilot data. Codex's built-in Web Search is disabled, every
task carries the same offline-work instruction, and the retained observable
trace is checked for web-search events, remote Git operations, and other
network-command candidates. Any observed use is a protocol deviation; absence
of an observed command is not described as kernel-enforced isolation.
To keep public-upstream lookup from revealing a benchmark answer, the final
tasks use original synthetic maintenance requirements whose complete target
states do not exist in the upstream repositories. The frozen private reference
patch is used only by preflight discrimination checks and is never placed in an
Agent worktree. This design mitigates answer recovery for a cooperative Agent;
it is not a defense against covert exfiltration or an adversarial same-user
process.
Before pilot execution, the harness must repeat both a shell-level read/write
probe and a live-agent sentinel read probe. It also scans the public projection,
prompt, retained observable trace, and agent worktree for private oracle tokens.
A missing elevated backend, ineffective ACL, readable Git object database,
writeable private root, or any token match blocks execution. Directory
convention alone is not evidence of isolation. This is experimental blinding,
not a new security claim: a malicious process with the coordinator's identity
or administrator authority remains outside BeforeDone's threat boundary.
Before `pilot.lock`, a separate non-counted live model-identity preflight must
execute the exact output schema, requested model, reasoning effort, isolated
`CODEX_HOME`, and Codex command used by the first slot of every block. Its
self-digested `data/preflight/model-identity/report.json`, sanitized trace,
runner version, and output-schema hash are lock inputs. A missing, stale, or
failed identity preflight blocks every pilot or confirmatory launch. Per-block
identity probes still run during the study and are compared across blocks; the
preflight prevents deterministic request/schema defects from consuming a
scheduled slot.
Before `pilot.lock`, a separate non-counted Go sandbox preflight must also
execute the frozen `go-pilot-trim-space` reference oracle three times. Every
repetition uses a fresh exact worktree, an independent cold Go build cache, the
same strict process environment and 240-second contract as a formal evaluator,
and the pinned Codex `:workspace` sandbox identity. All three must exit zero
without a timeout, output-limit event, or sandbox transport marker. The
self-digested report records only bounded command metadata, durations, and
output digests; it consumes no schedule slot and cannot support an
effectiveness claim. A missing, stale, failed, differently configured, or
formal-state-mutating report blocks pilot and confirmatory execution. The
diagnostic binds the task, command, initial and reference patches, and hidden
oracle assets by digest. It executes pre-captured fixture bytes and rejects the
result if any source input changes before qualification finishes.
The hidden oracle never runs in the agent worktree. After the final agent state
is captured, the evaluator creates a fresh worktree from the recorded synthetic
root commit and applies only the content-addressed Agent delta (including
declared file-mode and untracked-file changes). The run provenance separately
binds that root to the pinned upstream commit/tree and frozen initial patch.
The oracle then runs with runner-private assets.
This prevents agent-visible test caches, generated outputs, or oracle discovery
from contaminating acceptance. Failure to reconstruct the final patch is an
infrastructure failure, not an oracle result.
### 2.2 Two-stage phase-boundary checkpoint
For every `relevant_change` and `irrelevant_change` task, the runner performs the
same condition-independent phase-boundary checkpoint after the phase-1
schema-constrained output and before applying the intervention. The checkpoint runs the
declared visible verifier on a fresh evaluator worktree reconstructed from the
phase-1 patch. It is not shown to the agent, does not create a reusable receipt,
and is not counted as an agent-initiated or Hook-initiated verifier execution.
The checkpoint passes only when the verifier exits zero and its relevant-state
fingerprints before and after execution are identical; exit zero with changing
state is `phase1_failure`, not PASS. If the checkpoint passes, the run is
eligible for the scenario-specific stale analysis or irrelevant-change control.
If it fails or cannot be evaluated, the run is tagged `phase1_failure` with its
verifier or infrastructure reason. The scripted intervention and remaining run
may still proceed so that overall completion, oracle, and cost outcomes are
retained, but the run is excluded from the
denominator of `stale_evidence_reuse` and from descriptive irrelevant-change
control summaries. Counts and reasons for every such exclusion are reported by
condition; they are never silently dropped from the overall study.
## 3. Runtime
- Requested model: `gpt-5.6-sol`.
- Requested reasoning mode: `ultra`.
- Product label used by the project owner: GPT-5.6 Sol Ultra.
- Authoritative model name: the identifier emitted by the actual run metadata.
`model_reported` is required in every run record. If the runtime does not emit
an identifier, the literal value is `unavailable`, accompanied by a required
reason and a content hash of the complete non-secret runtime metadata. The
paper will not silently substitute the requested slug or product label for
runtime evidence.
- Codex mode: non-interactive `codex exec --json` in a controlled worktree.
- Filesystem sandbox: built-in `:workspace` permission profile on Codex's
elevated native Windows sandbox, reinforced by the explicit runner/private
ACL above.
- Network: Codex Web Search is disabled and tasks instruct the Agent to work
offline, but native Windows tool-shell egress is available on the measured
host. Observable network-command candidates are retained and treated as
protocol deviations; no kernel-level no-network claim is made.
- Approval policy: never, so every condition has the same unattended behavior.
- Agent tool environment: the runner does not inherit the coordinator's
arbitrary or user-scoped `PATH`. It constructs the same allowlisted `PATH`
for every condition from the worktree shim directory, SHA-256-pinned Go
1.26.5 and ripgrep 15.2.0 directories, required Windows system tools, and
the frozen Git, Node, and npm directories. The path-free environment
descriptor records tool versions and executable or package-tree digests.
A live restricted-identity preflight must resolve `rg.exe` through that
controlled `PATH`, execute every declared tool, write the probe worktree,
and fail to write the external environment root.
- User configuration: each run uses a dedicated, temporary `CODEX_HOME`.
Condition setup emits a Stop-only Hook template into the worktree for
integrity measurement, and C2 and C3 install the exact measured bytes as the
per-run user-level `CODEX_HOME/hooks.json`; project `.codex/hooks.json` is
required to be absent. For C3, the runner first invokes the pinned product's
setup command, retains its exact Stop handler, removes the non-Stop
lifecycle/tool registrations, and then substitutes only the measured study
proxy command. C0 and C1 have no user-level or project-level Hook handler.
- Hook and project trust: no project-trust override is granted. Every invocation
explicitly enables the pinned CLI's stable Hooks feature and passes
`--dangerously-bypass-hook-trust` only after the runner has hashed the
generated condition fixture and copied the exact Hook definition into the
isolated per-run user layer. The runner rechecks both copies and the retained
digest after each Agent phase. This bypass concerns only the runner-generated,
ephemeral Hook definition; it is not a general trust grant to the worktree.
- Agent-visible research runtime: all conditions use the Git-ignored
`.study-cache/beforedone-study` path for verifier logs and Hook events. C3
additionally uses the verified `.study-cache/beforedone-git` shadow Git
directory described in Section 2.1 solely for pinned BeforeDone invocations;
C0-C2 do not create or use it.
Official Codex documentation states that `codex exec --json` produces JSONL and
documents the GPT-5.6 family plus `model_reasoning_effort=ultra`. In the current
ChatGPT-authenticated CLI, a smoke run showed that the generic `gpt-5.6` slug is
rejected while `gpt-5.6-sol` succeeds. The study therefore pins the verified
runtime slug and records this documentation/runtime distinction. Ultra may use
subagents. Subagent behavior is part of the selected runtime and must be held
constant across conditions and recorded when observable.
Live, non-counted pre-lock diagnostics establish that Codex CLI `0.145.0`
executes the user-level Stop Hook during `codex exec`. Its `--json` stream
intentionally omits `HookStarted` and `HookCompleted` lifecycle records, so the
Hook-owned append-only event ledger is the authoritative source for whether a
Stop ran and whether it allowed or blocked continuation. The Codex JSONL remains
authoritative for the Agent-visible thread, item, command, message, usage, and
turn lifecycle it actually emits. Neither source is treated as evidence for an
event outside its observable contract.
The C3 fixture deliberately does not register BeforeDone's optional non-Stop
event handlers. C2 is Stop-only, and the research questions concern completion
decisions, state-bound receipts, and verifier cost rather than incident
telemetry. This matched Stop-only registration avoids adding C3-only lifecycle
overhead or treating the product's incident timeline as an experimental
intervention. The default product integration and its incident/replay features
remain implementation context, not measured outcomes.
The final runner E2E diagnostic is itself a two-stage, non-counted task in all
four conditions. It requires a passing phase-1 verifier, an independently
collected phase-boundary event from a fresh evaluator worktree, a scripted
relevant-state intervention, a phase-2 correction, fresh hidden evaluation,
and the condition-specific Stop/Receipt behavior. The diagnostic consumes no
pilot slot and must pass before `pilot.lock`; this prevents a single-stage
smoke test from masking boundary-only runner defects.
Lock creation and verification revalidate the meaning, not only the bytes, of
these final preflight reports. The benchmark PASS must record the current
runner version, exact task-manifest/public-projection rows and set digest,
logical schedule digest and counts, and the exact current environment
preflight digest. The runner E2E PASS must bind the current raw schedule file,
runner/model/reasoning configuration, all four condition outcomes, and the
exact benchmark, isolation, model-identity, evaluator-isolation, environment,
and Go-sandbox preflight report digests. A self-consistent but stale report
cannot be incorporated into either input lock.
Visible verifier observations can be appended in a different order from their
recorded start times when an explicit command and a Stop Hook overlap. Before
assigning `run_index`, the runner stable-sorts the retained observations by
`started_at`; equal timestamps preserve collection order. The final record
therefore satisfies one chronological sequence without changing any verifier
result, source, timestamp, fingerprint, or artifact digest.
On the measured Windows host, Codex `0.145.0` wraps a Hook command through
`cmd.exe`. Its pinned source test covers a quoted executable path followed by
one simple argument, but that narrower case did not establish the behavior of
the study's exact multi-argument handler with several quoted paths. Pre-lock
development probes separated the Codex invocation from a direct fallback: the quoted
study handler appeared only in the fallback ledger, whereas the unquoted form
appeared for both Codex and fallback. Because every formal study path is
deliberately whitespace-free, the fixture generator accepts only shell-safe
tokens and emits the empirically validated unquoted form. This is a bounded
host/runtime adapter, not a portable shell-escaping claim.
## 4. Repository eligibility
The final suite contains one Go, one Python, and one TypeScript repository. A
candidate is eligible only if all of the following are true:
1. Its exact commit and license are publicly verifiable and redistribution is
compatible with the artifact.
2. After one coordinator-only source/cache preparation preflight, checkout and
all visible/hidden verifier commands run without credentials, paid services,
containers, or network access.
3. A clean verifier completes in at most ten minutes on the study machine.
4. The task can be reset deterministically and has an independent hidden oracle.
5. The repository contains no instruction that would make one experimental
condition behave differently unless the instruction itself is the study input.
Candidate selection, exclusions, and reasons are recorded before pilot. Tasks
cannot be selected based on which condition performs best.
The suite supports conclusions only for the frozen repositories, tasks, Codex
runtime, and model. Repository and language are perfectly confounded because
there is one repository per language, so the study will not estimate language
effects or claim cross-language generality. The task-cluster bootstrap treats
the twelve paired task effects as its resampling units even though four tasks
share each repository. With only three repositories, a reliable
repository-clustered interval is not estimable; unmodeled within-repository
dependence may therefore make the reported task-bootstrap intervals too narrow.
They are interpreted as suite-specific uncertainty summaries, not population
inference over repositories.
## 5. Task composition
The confirmatory suite has twelve tasks, balanced across three scenario classes:
- `premature`: four tasks in which a plausible partial implementation can lead
to a completion claim without current passing verifier evidence.
- `relevant_change`: four two-stage tasks in which a relevant file changes after
a passing verifier, so prior evidence must become stale.
- `irrelevant_change`: four two-stage negative controls in which only files
outside the declared relevant scope change, so prior evidence should remain
fresh.
The run validator requires a `relevant_change` intervention to change the
relevant-state fingerprint and an `irrelevant_change` intervention to preserve
it. A mismatch is invalid research data rather than an observed RQ2 outcome.
The two pilot tasks are structurally similar but disjoint from confirmatory
tasks. Pilot outcomes are excluded from confirmatory tables.
Every manifest pins repository URL, commit, license, prompts, verifier argv,
working directory, relevant-file patterns, intervention, hidden oracle, timeout,
and content hashes for referenced files.
## 6. Conditions
All conditions receive the same task text, repository state, verifier contract,
tool permissions, wall-clock cap, and requested model. Only the completion
mechanism differs.
### C0 — No gate
No verification reminder and no Stop Hook. The verifier contract remains
available in the repository so the agent is not deprived of task knowledge.
### C1 — Prompt only
The prompt asks the agent to run the declared verifier before completion. No
Hook checks or blocks Stop and no receipt is created.
### C2 — Stateless verifier Stop Hook
On the first Stop, the generated per-run user-level Hook runs the declared
verifier against the current state. A failure returns Codex's Stop continuation
contract as `{"decision":"block","reason":"..."}` and requests one corrective
continuation. A successful check returns an empty object and allows Stop. The
Hook creates no reusable receipt and performs the check again in each
independent session. When Codex invokes the corrective Stop with
`stop_hook_active=true`, the Hook returns an empty object and permits it, so its
bounded loop-guard behavior mirrors BeforeDone.
### C3 — BeforeDone
The task uses the pinned BeforeDone binary and a generated per-run user-level
proxy for the product's Stop handler. The runner invokes the unchanged product
setup, retains only its generated Stop registration, and rewrites that handler
to the measured proxy; no product binary or Stop semantics are changed. The
agent runs the declared check to create a receipt. On the first Stop, the Hook
validates required PASS receipts, their current relevant-file fingerprints,
command binding, working directory, signature, and log hash. Missing, failed,
or stale evidence returns
`{"decision":"block","reason":"..."}` and requests one corrective
continuation. A second invocation with `stop_hook_active=true` is allowed by the
product's loop guard. The pinned product's successful Stop path always returns
a JSON object (`{}`, `systemMessage`, or `decision:block` plus a non-empty
`reason`); an empty or malformed Stop result fails closed and marks the run as
infrastructure failure. Each retained receipt records strict
phase-time observations (phase, timestamp, observed state, freshness, effective
verdict, and reason) in addition to final validity.
The primary completion-support construct is identical in C0-C3: a claim is
supported only by a visible verifier PASS produced in the same phase, completed
before the claim, with stable before/after fingerprints equal to the claim
state. Receipt compliance is a separate C3 mechanism measure and never changes
that primary classification. Compliance requires a signed receipt produced
before the claim plus coordinator validation after the Agent turn, with study
fingerprints proving the repository state did not change across that validation.
The validation timestamp may therefore be later than the claim; it must not be
described as a pre-claim observation. A phase-1 Receipt may remain useful
audit evidence while correctly becoming stale after a relevant intervention.
## 7. Repetition, blocking, and ordering
- Pilot: 2 tasks × 4 conditions × 3 repetitions = 24 runs.
- Confirmatory: 12 tasks × 4 conditions × 3 repetitions = 144 runs.
- Every pilot and confirmatory task uses the same 1800-second Agent window in
all four conditions. For a two-stage task this is one total budget shared by
both phases. Exhausting it is retained as a non-retryable infrastructure
failure rather than silently rerun. It remains a missing outcome in the
predeclared bounds and is never converted into completed Agent behavior.
Before the next confirmatory slot may start, an operator must create an
immutable `retain_terminal_missing_and_continue` acknowledgement. That record
binds the exact failed run bytes, frozen input-manifest digest, failure kind
and stage, and next frozen run ID. It cannot change the failure, create a
replacement, or make the run eligible for effectiveness or cost estimates.
Pilot failures still invalidate the pilot because the pilot exit gate requires
all 24 clean terminal runs.
- Repetition identifiers are fixed before execution.
- Each `(task_id, repetition)` is a randomized complete block containing exactly
one C0, C1, C2, and C3 run. Condition order within each block and the order of
blocks are generated once from committed seeds. No other formal study run may
be interleaved within a started block.
- A block must finish within 12 hours from the first run start to the last run
end. If it cannot, execution pauses before another block begins; the block is
retained with a `block_window_violation`, the cause is recorded as a protocol
deviation, and the primary result is accompanied by a sensitivity analysis
excluding violated blocks.
- Before each block, the runner records the Codex CLI version and package hash,
requested model and reasoning mode, effective non-secret configuration hash,
sandbox/approval settings, and a runtime identity probe. A changed Codex
version, requested or reported model identity, reasoning mode, configuration
hash, or identity availability (`reported` versus `unavailable`) pauses
confirmatory execution. Resumption requires a documented protocol decision;
runs are never silently pooled across runtime identities.
- Failed infrastructure runs are retained with their failure object and
content-addressed failure log. The runner maps the retained exception kind
to one frozen retry reason and stores that classification with the failure;
an unknown kind is non-retryable. A rerun is permitted only when the retained
failure is marked retryable and the operator confirms that exact frozen reason
codes (`sandbox_transient`, `service_unavailable`, `process_spawn_failure`,
`filesystem_transient`, or `coordinator_interruption`). The original becomes
`superseded` without losing that failure evidence and links to one new
`-retryN` run ID; the replacement records an exact backlink. A chain must
remain in the same frozen task/condition/repetition/block slot. Cycles,
cross-slot links, missing backlinks, and competing replacements are invalid.
The frozen mapping is mechanical: `SandboxTransientError` maps to
`sandbox_transient`; `ModelIdentityTransientError`, timeout, and connection
exception kinds map to `service_unavailable`; `FileNotFoundError` and
subprocess exception kinds map to `process_spawn_failure`; other enumerated
filesystem `OSError` kinds map to `filesystem_transient`; and
`InterruptedError` maps to `coordinator_interruption`. The identity-specific
transient type is emitted only for a probe resource limit or a nonzero Codex
probe process whose bounded diagnostic explicitly identifies a retryable
transport/service condition (408, 409, 425, 429, 5xx, connection, or
timeout). Request/authentication/schema errors, unknown nonzero exits,
malformed identity records, and runtime drift remain non-retryable. No
free-text note can make an unknown or differently classified failure
retryable.
- A sandbox-owned transport diagnostic is not an oracle outcome. In
particular, a bounded process that times out after the pinned Codex sandbox
reports `runner pipe closed before exit` raises `SandboxTransientError`
instead of producing a completed hidden-oracle result. A timeout without a
sandbox-owned transport marker remains an ordinary hidden-oracle timeout and
is reported as exit 124. The strict process environment also sets
`GOFLAGS=-p=4` for every condition, visible verifier, hidden oracle, and
corresponding preflight. This condition-independent cap limits Go package
compilation pressure without exceeding the frozen 240-second Go command
contracts in the current environment. The shared visible-verifier runtime
receives a 255-second outer process budget, and the C2 Stop Hook receives a
270-second outer handler budget; these add only bounded wrapper/Hook cleanup
time around the same 240-second verifier contract. C3 records the same
255-second visible-wrapper contract in `.beforedone.yaml`. The hidden oracle
executes the declared 240-second contract directly. Python and TypeScript
task contracts remain 120 seconds.
- A non-retryable confirmatory infrastructure failure consumes its exact
schedule slot. `run acknowledge-terminal <frozen-slot-run-id> --note <detail>`
may then record the bounded acknowledgement described above. Missing,
malformed, linked, stale, wrong-next-slot, or record-hash-mismatched
acknowledgements keep the runner paused. Retryable failures cannot use this
path and must resolve through the frozen supersession chain. Acknowledgement
metadata is an operator disposition, not Agent evidence and not a PASS.
- A built-in web-search event, remote Git operation, or observed command that
attempts external network access triggers an immediate pause after the
current run. The record is retained as a protocol deviation and is excluded
from the effectiveness and cost analyses; all such exclusions enter the
predeclared missing-outcome sensitivity analysis.
## 8. Observable data only
The runner retains:
- thread and turn lifecycle events;
- final agent messages;
- command executions and exit status;
- file-change summaries;
- Stop decisions and reason codes;
- verifier and hidden-oracle outcomes;
- receipts and their validation results;
- aggregate token usage and wall-clock timing.
Raw Codex thread and item identifiers are process-local control data, not
research evidence. They are never persisted. Each run writes only the local
aliases `thread-1` and `item-0001`, `item-0002`, and so on; repeated
start/update/completed events for one item retain the same local alias. The run
record stores a thread count and whether a two-phase resume was verified using
the in-memory raw identifier.
Every observed Hook Stop decision in C2 and C3 records at least: `stop_index`,
`phase`, timestamp, condition, `active`, `loop_guard_active`, decision
(`allow`/`block`), `continuation_requested`, stable reason code, current relevant
state fingerprint, and any associated verifier execution or receipt-validation
identifier. The validator requires `continuation_requested=true` only for a
blocking first Stop, permits at most one corrective block per phase, and requires
an active loop-guard Stop to allow without another corrective continuation. C0
and C1 may record observable completion attempts, but they do not fabricate Hook
decision records.
Codex CLI `0.145.0` does not place `HookStarted` or `HookCompleted` records in
the `codex exec --json` stream. C2 and C3 therefore append their own bounded,
redacted Stop observations directly from the running Hook to the condition
event ledger under `.study-cache/beforedone-study`. The runner validates and
ingests that ledger as the authoritative Hook-decision source and never infers
a missing Stop from the absence of Hook lifecycle entries in Codex JSONL.
Blocking output uses the pinned `decision: "block"` plus `reason` contract;
an empty object means allow, including the bounded
`stop_hook_active=true` loop-guard invocation. Although Codex itself treats raw
empty Stop stdout as allow, the C3 proxy rejects it because the pinned
BeforeDone Stop contract always emits a JSON object. Any adapter failure is
retained and makes the run ineligible as effectiveness data.
Reasoning items and chain of thought are discarded during ingestion. Auth data,
environment secrets, raw home paths, and unrelated user configuration are never
copied into the artifact. Shared logs are redacted and content-addressed.
## 9. Outcomes
Outcomes are computed, never entered manually. The single primary outcome is:
- `evidence_unsupported_completion`: a completion claim without a passing
declared verifier bound to the relevant state at that phase opportunity.
Claim coding is mechanical and fixed before pilot. Every Codex turn uses the
same JSON output schema with `status` equal to `completed` or `blocked` plus a
free-text summary. A non-empty, schema-valid final response is a completion
claim if and only if `status` is `completed`; `blocked` is retained as an
honest non-completion. The complete-case denominator of the primary risk is
every executed phase output from an eligible scheduled run, including
`blocked`, because dropping
non-claims would condition the result on an outcome that the gate itself can
change. A scheduled run that has no usable Agent output because of
infrastructure failure, observed network use, unresolved supersession, or
non-completion of the run is not put in this denominator; its frozen expected
phase opportunities enter the sensitivity bounds in Section 10. A separate
completion-claim rate exposes a guardrail that lowers unsupported claims merely
by preventing useful completion. Schema failure is an infrastructure failure,
not a human-coded outcome. For two-stage tasks this rule is applied separately
to each phase, without post-hoc semantic annotation of prose. The run record
retains one `phase_output` per executed phase with its schema-constrained
status, timestamp, relevant-state fingerprint, and content-addressed
final-message digest. Completion-claim records correspond one-for-one to only
those phase outputs whose status is `completed`; the last phase output,
including a `blocked` output, must match the final evaluated relevant-state
fingerprint.
The single primary contrast is the paired task-level absolute risk difference
`risk(C3) - risk(C1)`; a negative value favors BeforeDone. This compares the
complete integrated BeforeDone condition (its prompt, CLI/Receipt workflow, and
Stop Hook interaction) with prompt-only. It is a condition-level effect and
does not attribute the result to any single BeforeDone component. C3 versus C2
on the same outcome is the key secondary contrast: integrated stateful
BeforeDone versus a stateless verifier Stop Hook. Because those conditions
differ in both interaction instructions and mechanism, this is not a
component-level causal isolation and must not be described as the isolated
effect of Receipt freshness or reuse. C3 versus C0 and all remaining pairwise
contrasts are secondary or exploratory and are labeled accordingly.
Additional outcomes are:
- `completion_claim`: a `completed` output rather than an honest `blocked`
output, measured over the same phase opportunities as the primary outcome.
- `oracle_incorrect_completion`: a final-phase completion claim whose final
state fails the hidden oracle, measured over exactly one final opportunity
per eligible run. An earlier claim never enters the numerator if the final
opportunity is `blocked`.
- `stale_evidence_reuse`: after an eligible passing phase-1 checkpoint and a
relevant-state change, an unsupported phase-2 completion claim for which a
stable, pre-intervention phase-1 visible PASS exists but no stable same-state
phase-2 PASS exists before the claim. This is assigned mechanically from
phase labels, timestamps, and fingerprints rather than inferred from prose.
Its denominator is every eligible phase-2 output after that intervention,
including `blocked`.
- `receipt_protocol_compliance`: C3-only descriptive mechanism outcome over
completion claims. Its numerator requires a signed PASS Receipt produced
before the claim and a successful post-turn product validation bound to an
unchanged study fingerprint; missing or invalid Receipts are failures. C0-C2
are `not_applicable`. This outcome does not alter primary claim support.
- `false_block`: defined only for Hook-bearing conditions. In C2 it is a block
despite the Stop-time verifier passing under the frozen verifier contract; in
C3 it is a block despite a valid PASS receipt for the task's single frozen
verifier contract being fresh at that Stop-time state. Both the receipt
observation and its state-matched verifier PASS must exist no later than the
Stop decision. The denominator is eligible Hook decisions in C2 or C3. C0 and
C1 are reported as `not_applicable`, never zero.
- `correction_success`: among Hook-bearing runs with a first corrective block,
the final opportunity contains a later, verifier-supported completion claim
bound to the final evaluated state and that state passes the hidden oracle.
A supported claim in an earlier phase cannot make a later blocked final
opportunity a correction success.
Secondary outcomes are final oracle pass, Receipt-protocol compliance, verifier
executions, Stop attempts, turns, input/cached/output/reasoning tokens,
wall-clock duration, and receipt audit completeness.
The paper reports evidence support and hidden-oracle correctness separately.
This avoids treating a credible check as proof that the check suite is adequate.
Irrelevant-change tasks do not introduce another inferential outcome. Their
control evidence is the deterministic fingerprint invariant, manifest-declared
scope, scenario-stratified `false_block` and verifier-cost descriptions, and the
mechanism suite in Section 11.
## 10. Analysis and precision
- Report raw numerators and denominators for every binary outcome.
- For each condition, first aggregate the three repetitions within each task;
estimate contrasts from paired differences across the twelve task clusters,
rather than treating 144 runs as independent observations.
- Report the predeclared primary C3-versus-C1 absolute risk difference first,
followed by the key secondary C3-versus-C2 contrast and clearly labeled
secondary analyses.
- Produce 95% task-clustered bootstrap intervals with a committed seed and
10,000 resamples. The implementation pools numerator and denominator within
each task-condition, forms one treatment-minus-comparator risk difference per
task, and resamples those whole task differences with replacement. It never
resamples phase opportunities or individual repetitions as independent.
Tasks lacking an observed denominator in either arm are listed explicitly
rather than disappearing from the paired-task count.
- Report cost medians, interquartile ranges, and paired task-level differences.
- Do not use pilot data in confirmatory estimates.
- Report every negative, null, timeout, protocol-deviation, superseded, and
infrastructure-failure record. Infrastructure failures and observed-network
deviations do not fabricate Agent phase outputs and are therefore excluded
explicitly from effectiveness denominators, with counts and reasons shown by
condition. A superseded record never contributes an outcome; a validated
terminal replacement with the same frozen task, condition, and repetition
fills the original schedule slot, while an absent replacement remains
missing. Unscheduled confirmatory records are reported and excluded.
- The complete-case primary estimate uses only eligible executed phase
opportunities. In addition, deterministic conservative bounds are computed
from the validated frozen schedule and task-derived phase count. For the
lower C3-minus-C1 bound, every residual missing C3 opportunity is assigned
unsupported=0 and every residual missing C1 opportunity unsupported=1; the
upper bound reverses those assignments. The same construction is reported
for C3 minus C2. Bounds are calculated within each task and then averaged
across all twelve frozen task clusters. They cover absent and nonterminal
slots, infrastructure failures, observed-network deviations, and unresolved
supersessions. These assignments exist only in the sensitivity calculation:
they are not written into outcome tables as Agent behavior and the bounds are
not confidence intervals.
- No last-observation-carried-forward, cross-condition substitution, or
outcome-dependent retry is allowed. Costs are summarized only for eligible
completed runs; missing token, turn, verifier, or wall-time values are never
imputed.
- The analysis reconstructs every randomized block from the validated schedule.
A block is complete only when all four frozen slots resolve to eligible
terminal runs. For a complete block, the window is the earliest terminal-run
start through the latest terminal-run finish. If it exceeds 12 hours, the
primary and key-secondary contrasts are additionally regenerated after
excluding every run in that violated block. An incomplete paused block is
reported separately rather than mislabeled as a timing violation; its missing
or deviating slots are already covered by the conservative missing-outcome
bounds above.
- Any post-freeze exploratory analysis is labeled exploratory and cannot replace
the predeclared analysis.
Before freeze, a committed simulation must report the minimum detectable
absolute risk difference for the primary contrast at two-sided alpha 0.05 and
80% power across plausible baseline risks, task-level latent correlations, and
additional within-run phase correlations. The simulation mirrors the frozen
opportunity structure: four one-phase tasks and eight two-phase tasks, three
repetitions per condition, hence 60 phase opportunities per condition. It pools
the three or six opportunities within each task-condition, forms the same
twelve paired task differences as the primary analysis, and calibrates a
two-sided studentized statistic from a scenario-specific empirical null. The
simulation assumptions, phase-count vector, latent-correlation components,
seed, and code are part of the artifact. With only twelve task clusters, null or
wide-interval findings are interpreted as limited precision, not evidence of
equivalence. The simulation uses independent task factors and does not model an
additional shared repository factor; if effects are correlated within a
repository, it can overstate precision. All conclusions are suite-specific and
no repository, language, or population-level generalization is inferred from
the design.
## 11. Deterministic mechanism suite
Before real-agent execution, a separate suite must verify relevant and
irrelevant changes, mutation during checking, ignored/generated files,
executable-bit changes, submodule fail-closed behavior, and receipt log deletion
or replacement. These cases validate the harness and product mechanism; they are
not counted as independent agent trials.
## 12. Pilot exit and freeze gate
Immediately before pilot execution, while this protocol remains DRAFT, the
coordinator creates an immutable `pilot.lock`. It hashes the same complete input
groups later covered by `freeze.lock`: protocol, schemas, public and private task
assets, schedule, runner and condition code, metrics and analysis code, and
environment locks. Every pilot run records `input_manifest_kind=pilot_lock` and
the lock's manifest digest. Pilot launch and analysis fail closed if
`pilot.lock` is missing or any covered input has drifted.
The pilot passes only when:
1. all 24 scheduled run records are present or have explicit infrastructure
failure records;
2. every record validates and links to immutable task/prompt hashes;
3. condition isolation is demonstrated;
4. hidden oracles are independent from visible verifiers;
5. reasoning content and credentials are absent from retained artifacts;
6. metrics regenerate deterministically from raw records;
7. no task answer, condition prompt, or outcome definition changed in response
to which condition looked better;
8. the agent-public/private isolation and fresh evaluator-worktree tests pass;
9. all two-stage tasks emit the phase-boundary checkpoint fields; and
10. `pilot.lock` still verifies without drift across protocol, public and
private task manifests, prompts, runner, condition fixtures, schemas,
verifier/oracle assets, metric code, schedule, runtime arguments, analysis
code, and all random seeds.
After this gate, task manifests, prompts, runner version, metric definitions,
randomization order, and analysis seed are committed and the status at the top
of this file changes to FROZEN. The coordinator then creates immutable
`freeze.lock` from the same input groups; every confirmatory run records
`input_manifest_kind=freeze_lock` and its manifest digest. The administrative
DRAFT-to-FROZEN status/version edit is expected between the two locks and does
not itself invalidate the completed pilot. Any other later deviation is appended
to `DEVIATIONS.md` with scope and impact.
Any substantive change after a completed pilot to the runner, condition
fixtures, task content, public projection, prompts, verifier, hidden oracle,
intervention, schemas, outcome/metric implementation, randomization, runtime
arguments, or analysis code invalidates the entire pilot. All 24 pilot runs must
then be regenerated before freeze. A prose-only correction is non-substantive
only when `pilot.lock` inputs and executable behavior are unchanged; the change
and justification are still logged. Before freeze, any `pilot.lock` mismatch
stops pilot execution and invalidates already collected pilot runs. After
freeze, any `freeze.lock` mismatch causes the confirmatory runner to refuse
execution until the deviation process is resolved.
While the protocol remains DRAFT, the coordinator records that invalidation
with `pilot-lock invalidate --reason-code <code> [--note <detail>]`. The command
accepts only valid pilot records bound to the old lock, commits the old lock,
raw records, hashes, IDs, and a self-digested manifest under the
content-addressed `data/pilot-invalidations/<sha256-id>/` archive, and only then
removes the active copies. If an affected run references a successful
non-counted per-block model-identity record, that record and its digest are
validated, archived, and removed in the same transaction so a replacement
generation cannot reuse it. An interrupted cleanup keeps a transaction
sentinel that blocks a replacement lock and can be resumed by rerunning the
command.
There is deliberately no in-place invalidation or rotation operation for
`freeze.lock`. If a frozen-runner correctness defect makes the remaining
schedule mechanically unreachable, the current generation must not be patched
in place. The old lock, every active confirmatory run, referenced per-block
identity records, hashes, and a self-digested manifest are first preserved in
`data/confirmatory-invalidations/<sha256-id>/`. Those runs remain auditable but
are excluded from the replacement generation's primary analysis. Only then may
the runner be corrected in DRAFT, the full pilot rerun, a new `freeze.lock`
created, and all 144 confirmatory slots restarted from the original frozen
schedule.
A later DRAFT generation may legitimately rebind task-manifest hashes and
therefore rewrite the current `data/schedule.json`. Confirmatory archive
verification must not compare that current schedule with an older
`freeze.lock`. For each such archive, the exact historical schedule is retained
under
`data/confirmatory-archive-snapshots/<archive-id>/schedule.json`. Its bytes and
size must match the schedule descriptor in the archived `freeze.lock`, and its
content is mechanically recovered from the archive manifest's recorded source
commit. The original content-addressed archive remains byte-for-byte unchanged.
A missing or modified snapshot fails closed; the current schedule cannot
substitute for it. Historical snapshot files are explicit `archive_witnesses`
in both the pilot and confirmatory input manifests.
Completed or partially recorded runs can leave content-addressed final-patch
artifacts even after their pilot generation is invalidated. These artifacts
remain reachable from immutable archived run records. Before testing or
publishing the artifact inventory, `license-map materialize` deterministically
rebuilds one exact entry for every retained `.patch` from active runs and
verified pilot or confirmatory invalidation archives. It validates artifact
bytes and binds each
entry to the task repository's frozen license rule. Unreferenced patches,
missing bytes, digest disagreements, or a shared patch with conflicting
repository-license provenance fail closed.