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HolyCyber — Layer: attack_knowledge
A focused dataset for the attack_knowledge domain of the HolyCyber corpus, built on its own from that domain's authoritative sources only.
Overview
- Rows: 2,925
- Groups (leakage units): 647
- Entities in the domain: 647
- Splits: test=280, train=2,367, val=278
- Task types: 10 | Subdomains: 6
- Row size (tiktoken cl100k, user+assistant): min 2,060 / median 2,265 / mean 2,287 / p90 2,477 / max 2,648 tokens
- Entity's own material: median 6% of an answer's tokens; 2,734 rows are below 25% (the balance is the labelled reference appendix)
- Total tokens: 6,689,467 | Rows below the 2,000-token floor: 0
- Canary: every row carries the decontamination canary
Record format
One JSON object per line; messages is a three-turn chat (system / user / assistant).
{"id": "6d408e38f3cb8dff", "row_key": "<domain>:<group_key>:<task_type>:<subdomain>:<part>",
"domain": "attack_knowledge", "subdomain": "...",
"task_type": "...", "difficulty": "intermediate", "group_key": "...",
"source": "...", "license": "...", "split": "train", "canary": "...",
"tokens": {"user": 180, "assistant": 2350, "total": 2530},
"core_share": 0.41, "appendix": true,
"references": [{"title": "...", "url": "..."}],
"messages": [{"role": "system", "content": "..."},
{"role": "user", "content": "..."},
{"role": "assistant", "content": "## ...\n..."}]}
| Field | Meaning |
|---|---|
id |
content hash of user+assistant, stable across rebuilds of the same row |
row_key |
stable identity across rebuilds (domain:group:task:subdomain:part) |
domain / subdomain |
this layer, and the slice of it the row covers |
task_type |
the question shape (detection, mitigation, mapping, ...) |
difficulty |
derived from the task shape, not guessed |
group_key |
the source entity; the unit of the train/val/test split |
source / license |
the authoritative source, and its licence |
tokens |
measured cl100k_base counts for user, assistant and total |
core_share |
share of the answer that is the entity's own material (1 - appendix) |
appendix |
whether the row carries a ## Reference: appendix |
references |
resolvable links for the entities cited in the answer |
canary |
decontamination marker |
What a row contains
Topic sections used in this layer's answers (structural labels such as Answer or Context and the appendix are excluded):
| Section | Rows |
|---|---|
| Summary | 912 |
| Defensive use | 839 |
| Underlying weaknesses | 588 |
| Consequences | 584 |
| Classification | 541 |
| Definition | 539 |
| Options | 534 |
| Rationale | 534 |
| Reference | 534 |
| Chaining | 481 |
| Related attack patterns | 441 |
| The chain | 419 |
How this layer is built
- Base cells — the rows the source parsers emit for this domain (one per entity x task type x subdomain).
- Task shapes — the same entity asked a different defensive question (detection, mitigation, framework mapping, response), built only from other sections of that entity's own record. No new facts are introduced.
- Reference pack — a row still under the token floor is padded with compact descriptions of other entities of this domain, taken from this domain's own source text; the window rotates per row.
Every row therefore comes from this domain's sources only, clears the 2,000-token floor, and no two rows are the same.
Task types
| Task type | Rows |
|---|---|
| relationship_reasoning | 953 |
| knowledge_explanation | 636 |
| identification | 534 |
| risk_assessment | 277 |
| chain_reasoning | 196 |
| definition | 161 |
| control_mapping | 72 |
| incident_response | 52 |
| mitigation_remediation | 41 |
| threat_attribution | 3 |
Subdomains
| Subdomain | Rows |
|---|---|
| pattern_overview | 1,331 |
| pattern_chain | 558 |
| pattern_prerequisites | 421 |
| pattern_consequences | 329 |
| pattern_execution | 245 |
| pattern_mitigation | 41 |
Sources
| Source | Rows |
|---|---|
| capec | 2,714 |
| mitre-attack | 211 |
Quality controls
- Exact duplicates removed: 0
- Near-duplicates removed: 74 (MinHash-LSH, Jaccard >= 0.90, same task type only)
- Quality gate: 0 rejected ({})
- Contaminated rows removed: 0 ({})
- Split integrity: group-level by
group_key; no group crosses a split
Intended use
Supervised fine-tuning / evaluation of a defensive cybersecurity assistant specialised in this domain. All rows are defensive, detection or analysis oriented; none contains functional exploit code or weaponised prompts.
from datasets import load_dataset
ds = load_dataset("json", data_files=dict(train="attack_knowledge/train.jsonl", validation="attack_knowledge/val.jsonl", test="attack_knowledge/test.jsonl"))
# rows whose answer is mostly the entity itself, not the appendix
core = ds["train"].filter(lambda r: r["core_share"] >= 0.5)
Limitations
2,734 of 2,925 rows are more than 75% labelled reference appendix: this domain's own records are shorter than the 2,000-token floor, so the row is completed with other entities' records. Mask the appendix when fine-tuning if you only want the core answer.
Paragraph-level reuse is measured in
research/AUDIT_REPORT.md; rows are unique but their appendix material is shared.