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| """ | |
| Adversarial tests for L9 (autonomous kill system). | |
| Governing question: can an adversary who has READ THIS FILE either avoid the | |
| kill switch or turn it against the operator? | |
| """ | |
| import pytest | |
| from ames.events import Capability, Event, EventType, NO_PARENT | |
| from ames.canonical import payload_capability_request | |
| from containment.broker import Broker, DenialTracker | |
| from containment.envstate import ( | |
| EnvironmentBaseline, EnvironmentMonitor, MutationObservation, | |
| ) | |
| from containment.killswitch import ( | |
| ABSOLUTE_REASONS, Evidence, KillReason, KillSwitch, KillVerdict, kill_payload, | |
| ) | |
| from containment.policy import CapabilityPolicy, CapabilityRequest | |
| from containment.vmspec import HOST_ACTOR_ID, VM_ACTOR_ID | |
| from ames.events import FileOp | |
| from ames.commit import ZERO_DIGEST | |
| def d(b): return bytes([b]) * 32 | |
| def sealed(**files): | |
| b = EnvironmentBaseline() | |
| for k, v in files.items(): | |
| b.add(k.replace("__", "/"), d(v)) | |
| b.seal() | |
| return b | |
| # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| # Absolute rules: one occurrence is proof | |
| # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| def test_clean_run_is_not_killed(): | |
| assert not KillSwitch().evaluate(Evidence()).kill | |
| def test_absolute_rules_fire_on_a_single_occurrence(evidence, reason): | |
| """No threshold to pace under, no window to wait out.""" | |
| v = KillSwitch().evaluate(evidence) | |
| assert v.kill and reason in v.reasons and v.absolute | |
| def test_containment_failure_is_absolute_not_scored(): | |
| """A write to a read-only region is not 'a lot of risk'. It is an invariant | |
| that did not hold.""" | |
| v = KillSwitch().evaluate(Evidence(containment_failed=True)) | |
| assert KillReason.CONTAINMENT_FAILURE in ABSOLUTE_REASONS | |
| assert v.absolute | |
| def test_multiple_reasons_accumulate_in_one_verdict(): | |
| v = KillSwitch().evaluate(Evidence( | |
| containment_failed=True, dormant_actors=2, | |
| fatal_gate1_codes=("ORPHAN_SPAWN",))) | |
| assert len(v.reasons) == 3 | |
| # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| # The pacing evasion the original flat-threshold design invited | |
| # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| def test_patient_mutation_probing_still_trips(): | |
| """An adversary who can read the rules paces one event under every burst | |
| limit. The EWMA is what makes that fail.""" | |
| k = KillSwitch(mutation_burst=1000, mutation_window_s=1e-9, | |
| mutation_ewma_threshold=0.30) | |
| v = None | |
| for _ in range(40): | |
| v = k.evaluate(Evidence(unexplained_mutations=1)) | |
| assert KillReason.MUTATION_SUSTAINED in v.reasons | |
| assert KillReason.MUTATION_BURST not in v.reasons, "should not look like a burst" | |
| def test_mutation_burst_trips_immediately(): | |
| k = KillSwitch(mutation_burst=3) | |
| v = k.evaluate(Evidence(unexplained_mutations=3)) | |
| assert KillReason.MUTATION_BURST in v.reasons | |
| def test_denial_signal_from_l2_is_honoured(): | |
| t = DenialTracker(burst_threshold=3) | |
| sig = None | |
| for i in range(3): | |
| sig = t.record(denied=True, now=float(i)) | |
| v = KillSwitch().evaluate(Evidence(denial_signal=sig)) | |
| assert KillReason.DENIAL_BURST in v.reasons | |
| def test_a_single_unexplained_mutation_does_not_kill(): | |
| """Accumulating rules must actually accumulate, or they are absolute rules | |
| with extra words.""" | |
| assert not KillSwitch(mutation_burst=5, mutation_ewma_threshold=0.9).evaluate( | |
| Evidence(unexplained_mutations=1)).kill | |
| # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| # The guest must be unable to cause OR prevent a kill | |
| # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| def ev(etype, seq, actor, payload=b""): | |
| return Event(etype, seq, 1000 + seq, actor, NO_PARENT, payload) | |
| def test_guest_claims_cannot_trigger_a_kill(): | |
| """Otherwise a compromised guest fabricates claims and denies service to the | |
| operator by killing legitimate runs.""" | |
| guest_priv = ev(EventType.CAPABILITY_REQUEST, 0, 0x1000, | |
| payload_capability_request(Capability.PRIVILEGE_RAISE, True, "granted")) | |
| e = Evidence.from_run(ledger_events=[guest_priv]) | |
| assert not e.privilege_escalation_granted | |
| assert e.guest_claims_seen == 1 | |
| assert not KillSwitch().evaluate(e).kill | |
| def test_the_same_claim_from_the_host_does_trigger_a_kill(): | |
| """Proves the filter is provenance, not content.""" | |
| host_priv = ev(EventType.CAPABILITY_REQUEST, 0, HOST_ACTOR_ID, | |
| payload_capability_request(Capability.PRIVILEGE_RAISE, True, "granted")) | |
| e = Evidence.from_run(ledger_events=[host_priv]) | |
| assert e.privilege_escalation_granted | |
| assert KillReason.PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION in KillSwitch().evaluate(e).reasons | |
| def test_guest_flooding_cannot_suppress_a_kill(): | |
| """Padding the log with benign claims must not dilute host evidence.""" | |
| events = [ev(EventType.TOOL_CALL, i, 0x1000 + i) for i in range(5000)] | |
| events.append(ev(EventType.CAPABILITY_REQUEST, 5000, HOST_ACTOR_ID, | |
| payload_capability_request(Capability.PRIVILEGE_RAISE, True, "x"))) | |
| e = Evidence.from_run(ledger_events=events) | |
| assert e.guest_claims_seen == 5000 | |
| assert KillSwitch().evaluate(e).kill | |
| def test_vm_actor_counts_as_host_observed(): | |
| """The microVM's lifecycle is observed by the host, not claimed by the guest.""" | |
| e = Evidence.from_run(ledger_events=[ | |
| ev(EventType.CAPABILITY_REQUEST, 0, VM_ACTOR_ID, | |
| payload_capability_request(Capability.PRIVILEGE_RAISE, True, "x"))]) | |
| assert e.privilege_escalation_granted | |
| def test_guest_claim_count_is_recorded_but_never_evaluated(): | |
| a = KillSwitch().evaluate(Evidence(guest_claims_seen=0)) | |
| b = KillSwitch().evaluate(Evidence(guest_claims_seen=10**6)) | |
| assert a.kill == b.kill == False | |
| # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| # Fail closed | |
| # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| class ExplodingEvidence: | |
| """Stands in for evidence whose source has failed -- e.g. the L7 monitor | |
| became unreachable mid-run. | |
| Deliberately NOT an Evidence subclass: Evidence is a frozen dataclass, so a | |
| subclass cannot shadow a field with a raising property. That freezing is | |
| itself the point -- evidence cannot be mutated after construction, including | |
| by a test. | |
| """ | |
| def containment_failed(self): | |
| raise RuntimeError("monitor unavailable") | |
| def test_evaluator_failure_kills_rather_than_passes(): | |
| """An exception in the safety system must never mean 'carry on'. That is how | |
| a monitoring bug becomes a containment bypass.""" | |
| v = KillSwitch().evaluate(ExplodingEvidence()) | |
| assert v.kill | |
| assert KillReason.EVALUATOR_FAILURE in v.reasons | |
| assert "failing closed" in v.detail | |
| # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| # No escape hatches | |
| # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| def test_kill_switch_exposes_no_escape_hatch(name): | |
| """An adversary who can add a rule can add one that never fires.""" | |
| assert not hasattr(KillSwitch(), name) | |
| def test_a_trip_is_never_reconsidered(): | |
| """'It stopped happening' is exactly what a successful attacker produces.""" | |
| k = KillSwitch() | |
| k.evaluate(Evidence(containment_failed=True)) | |
| assert k.tripped | |
| k.evaluate(Evidence()) # clean evidence afterwards | |
| assert k.tripped, "a kill must not be undone by later quiet" | |
| def test_verdict_is_frozen(): | |
| v = KillSwitch().evaluate(Evidence(containment_failed=True)) | |
| with pytest.raises(Exception): | |
| v.kill = False | |
| def test_evidence_is_frozen(): | |
| e = Evidence() | |
| with pytest.raises(Exception): | |
| e.containment_failed = True | |
| # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| # Integration with the layers below | |
| # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |
| def test_l7_containment_failure_flows_through_to_a_kill(): | |
| m = EnvironmentMonitor(sealed(__rootfs__libc=1)) | |
| m.observe(MutationObservation("/rootfs/libc", FileOp.WRITE, d(1), d(2), 1, 100)) | |
| e = Evidence.from_run(monitor=m) | |
| v = KillSwitch().evaluate(e) | |
| assert v.kill and KillReason.CONTAINMENT_FAILURE in v.reasons | |
| def test_l7_unexplained_mutations_flow_through_as_accumulating(): | |
| m = EnvironmentMonitor(sealed(__workspace__a=1, __workspace__b=1, __workspace__c=1)) | |
| for p, i in (("a", 1), ("b", 2), ("c", 3)): | |
| m.observe(MutationObservation(f"/workspace/{p}", FileOp.WRITE, d(i), d(i + 10), i, 100), | |
| granted_write_paths=frozenset()) | |
| e = Evidence.from_run(monitor=m) | |
| assert e.unexplained_mutations == 3 | |
| assert not e.containment_failed | |
| assert KillSwitch(mutation_burst=3).evaluate(e).kill | |
| def test_l2_granted_privilege_escalation_flows_through(): | |
| """L2 lists PRIVILEGE_RAISE as never grantable, so a granted one means the | |
| policy engine was bypassed or replaced -- itself the emergency.""" | |
| class FakeVerdict: granted = True | |
| class FakeReq: capability = Capability.PRIVILEGE_RAISE | |
| class FakeDecision: request, verdict = FakeReq(), FakeVerdict() | |
| e = Evidence.from_run(broker_history=[FakeDecision()]) | |
| assert KillReason.PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION in KillSwitch().evaluate(e).reasons | |
| def test_real_broker_never_produces_that_condition(): | |
| """The corollary: with L2 intact, the trigger above is unreachable.""" | |
| b = Broker(CapabilityPolicy()) | |
| for _ in range(50): | |
| b.request(CapabilityRequest(Capability.PRIVILEGE_RAISE, "root")) | |
| e = Evidence.from_run(broker_history=b.history) | |
| assert not e.privilege_escalation_granted | |
| def test_gate1_dormant_process_is_separated_from_lineage_breaks(): | |
| e = Evidence.from_run(gate1_violation_codes=["UNTERMINATED_ACTOR"]) | |
| assert e.dormant_actors == 1 and e.fatal_gate1_codes == () | |
| assert KillReason.DORMANT_PROCESS in KillSwitch().evaluate(e).reasons | |
| def test_non_fatal_gate1_codes_do_not_kill(): | |
| """SEQ_GAP and TIME_REGRESSION are recorded by L8 but are not, alone, | |
| evidence that attribution is broken.""" | |
| e = Evidence.from_run(gate1_violation_codes=["SEQ_GAP", "TIME_REGRESSION"]) | |
| assert not KillSwitch().evaluate(e).kill | |
| def test_kill_is_recordable_as_a_host_observed_event(): | |
| v = KillSwitch().evaluate(Evidence(containment_failed=True)) | |
| payload = kill_payload(v) | |
| assert payload[1] == 0, "a kill records granted=0" | |
| assert b"KILL[" in payload | |
| def test_verdict_is_deterministic_for_identical_evidence(): | |
| e = Evidence(containment_failed=True, dormant_actors=1) | |
| first = KillSwitch().evaluate(e) | |
| for _ in range(20): | |
| v = KillSwitch().evaluate(e) | |
| assert v.reasons == first.reasons and v.kill == first.kill | |