| # CTX Unified Capability Engine — Working State (HISTORICAL / SUPERSEDED) |
|
|
| > **Superseded. Do not resume work from this file.** |
| > |
| > This is a frozen checkpoint of the *unified capability engine* goal, taken on |
| > 2026-08-08. That goal was superseded by the CTX Fit pivot — see ADR-001 and |
| > ADR-002 in [`docs/ctx-fit/DECISIONS.md`](docs/ctx-fit/DECISIONS.md). ADR-010 |
| > additionally puts the event-sourced consent/activation lifecycle described |
| > below out of scope for the product. |
| > |
| > Nothing in this file describes the current product, the current critical |
| > path, or the current next actions. For those, read `AGENTS.md` and the live |
| > [`docs/ctx-fit/STATE.md`](docs/ctx-fit/STATE.md) checkpoint. This file is |
| > retained only as a record of what was built, |
| > what was accepted, and on what evidence — it is a real engineering log and is |
| > useful when working on the code under `src/ctx/engine/` and |
| > `src/ctx/runtime/`, which still exists. |
| > |
| > Everything from "## Checkpoint" onward is preserved as written on 2026-08-08 |
| > and is not maintained, apart from two factual corrections marked |
| > `[CORRECTED]`. |
| > Statements in it are true as of that date and no later; in particular the |
| > "Next actions" list is abandoned work, not a backlog, and the branch, |
| > commit, and working-tree lines describe the tree as it was then. |
|
|
| ## Checkpoint |
|
|
| - Updated: 2026-08-08 (Asia/Jerusalem) |
| - Branch: `codex/benchmark-runtime-fairness` |
| - Base commit observed: `3e24e397b07c73b948abfb3a374bee9963b995d9` |
| - Goal status: **[CORRECTED]** active on 2026-08-08 and never completed; |
| **abandoned** since, when the CTX Fit pivot superseded this goal |
| - Working tree: broadly dirty and intentionally uncommitted; preserve unrelated |
| and user-owned changes |
| - Persistence status: **[CORRECTED]** this file was untracked when the |
| checkpoint was written; it has since been committed (`e8af9554`, "chore: |
| baseline the working tree before the CTX Fit rebuild") and is tracked by Git |
| today — `git ls-files --error-unmatch STATE.md` succeeds |
| - Current critical path: receipts/activation → lifecycle → host cutover → |
| product proof. The signed-consent-execution focused suite is now fully green |
| (see the 2026-08-08 evidence and the reopened signed-slice status below); the |
| head of the critical path has advanced to end-to-end managed |
| receipts/activation. |
|
|
| ## Product objective |
|
|
| Build one host-neutral, event-sourced CTX capability engine that observes the |
| work being done and maintains the smallest useful global set of zero to five |
| skills, agents, MCP servers, and harnesses across Codex, Claude Code, `ctx run`, |
| MCP, and generic harnesses. |
|
|
| The selected graph can be the CTX graph or a user/organization graph. A relevant |
| capability does not have to be installed already. When similarity and expected |
| benefit justify it, CTX may propose it and then install it under the user's |
| persisted per-kind policy: |
|
|
| - preapproved automatic installation; or |
| - exact confirmation for each installation. |
|
|
| The choice is independent for skills, agents, and MCP servers. Persistent |
| uninstall is never silent. Deactivation of temporary context and persistent |
| uninstall remain different operations. |
|
|
| ## Milestone state |
|
|
| | Milestone | State | Current evidence or gap | |
| | --- | --- | --- | |
| | Canonical event protocol, reducer, journal, replay, and global 0–5 invariant | Accepted foundation | Deterministic engine and schema-v3 planning/runtime tests exist under `src/tests/engine/` and `src/tests/runtime/` | |
| | Durable consent authentication, recovery, trusted time, and policy snapshots | Accepted foundation | Consent broker/store and install-policy suites passed focused and independent review | |
| | Content-addressed artifact registry and production composition | Accepted foundation | Pathless managed artifacts and actuator-bound composition accepted after independent review | |
| | Managed query `prepare` and `reopen` | Accepted foundation | Exact retry, crash recovery, concurrency, privacy, and host-neutral projections covered | |
| | Safe managed consent challenge publication | Accepted foundation | Uses the composition-owned physical actuator registry; stale-head and target-drift failures are closed | |
| | Durable desired-set store | Accepted foundation | Authenticated 0–5 records, predecessor causation, cross-process reservation, and crash recovery accepted | |
| | Managed `set_desired` service | Accepted | Independent review found two P1 defects; both were repaired and re-reviewed with no open P0/P1 | |
| | Preapproved automatic install execution | Accepted | Deterministic grant, invariant pre-grant actuator binding, claim/outcome/receipt recovery, honest mixed outcomes, and stale-consent race recovery passed independent adversarial review with no open P0/P1 | |
| | Signed ask-each-time resolution and execution | Implemented; focused suite green; formal acceptance pending | All four previously-open P1 recovery classes now have implementing code and green covering tests (terminal consent expiry under target/policy drift, post-journal target drift, unclaimed post-grant action expiry, target-independent settled-denial recovery). A stale-clock regression that reddened five drift/refusal tests was repaired test-only on 2026-08-08 (see below). The full dirty-tree gate is now green (19/19 PR-preflight lanes). Remaining before formal acceptance: an independent adversarial re-review across the complete signed checklist, plus the still-unavailable native Windows and real interactive host evidence | |
| | Installation receipts and activation through the managed service | Partial: applied activation seam accepted; service continuation + recovery pending | Slice 2.1 (2026-08-08) added a composition-integrated applied-activation seam `EngineComposition.execute_activation` (new `activation_execution.py` mirroring `install_execution.py`), so callers stop reaching engine-private activation methods. `ManagedQueryService.activate`/`recover_activation` and failed/expired/indeterminate recovery (slice 2.2, needs a store `outcome`-column migration) are not yet wired | |
| | Usage evidence, opportunity-aware cooling, deactivation, and uninstall proposals | Partial foundation | Reducer vocabulary/primitives exist; complete managed product loop and host receipts are not integrated | |
| | Skills/agents/MCPs from CTX, user, and organization graph layers | Partial foundation | Catalog and planning primitives exist; all local layers and trusted external material installation are not complete | |
| | Codex, Claude Code, `ctx run`, MCP, and generic cutover | Pending | Adapter prototypes/facades exist, but they are not accepted as one complete managing-engine path | |
| | Multi-language observation and relevance gates | Pending | Claimed top-language analyzer corpus and preregistered relevance thresholds have not passed | |
| | Real-host/security/compatibility rollout gates | Pending | Focused security work exists; full clean-home, platform, upgrade, and canary evidence is absent | |
| | CTX versus no-CTX benefit proof | Pending | Benchmark infrastructure exists; official result remains 0/10 controls and 0/30 pairs, so no benefit claim is valid | |
|
|
| ## Accepted slice: managed `set_desired` |
| |
| ### Implemented |
| |
| - Sealed public request/result and typed busy, conflict, and superseded errors. |
| - Canonical zero-to-five subset in committed-plan order; no reranking. |
| - Full-digest, stream-stable ownership and source/kind-bound leases. |
| - Fresh trusted occurrence time and immutable policy snapshot binding. |
| - Reserve → exact journal process/recovery → durable mark → current-head action |
| projection → consent publication. |
| - Empty selection, manual deferral, ask-each-time consent, and honest automatic |
| policy deferral. |
| - Sequential choices with exact predecessor compare-and-swap. |
| - Crash recovery after reservation, engine commit, store mark, and result |
| projection. |
| - One cross-process lifecycle lock shared by `prepare`, `reopen`, and |
| `set_desired`. |
| - Pending desired work blocks replacement planning. |
| - Competing choices serialize; identical concurrent choices converge. |
|
|
| ### Acceptance repairs |
|
|
| - Crash after durable reservation plus a policy change no longer wedges the |
| stream: the authority-free desired event commits, reports policy drift, and |
| an exact successor can reissue consent under current policy. |
| - Result status now consults durable `state.pending_effects`; an actionless |
| evidence event cannot make a pending installation appear reconciled. |
|
|
| ## Accepted slice: preapproved automatic installation |
|
|
| ### Implemented |
|
|
| - Deterministic action-specific `UserDecision` under the current persisted |
| per-kind preapproval policy; sensitive or credentialed installs still require |
| interaction. |
| - Exact desired-plan membership, global serialized execution, and physical |
| actuator binding resolved before authority is committed. |
| - Claim-once execution with durable outcome and receipt recovery across crashes |
| after decision, claim, outcome, receipt, or response. |
| - Exact applied material lineage anchored to one journaled receipt; failed and |
| indeterminate installs never report reconciliation. |
| - Canonical bounded failure projections and authority-free sealed results. |
| - Interactive grants cannot enter the automatic execution path. |
|
|
| ### Acceptance repairs |
|
|
| - A committed automatic grant now cryptographically commits the exact physical |
| binding through its deterministic event and reconstructs that commitment |
| before any later claim. Restarting against a changed target fails before host |
| mutation; restoring the original target recovers exactly once. |
| - Provider submission, tool call, turn start, and prompt-context receipt paths |
| that consume an immediate-next-revision consent now re-run lifecycle |
| reconciliation. Service fallback also refuses to call a desired absent |
| install `reconciled` when lifecycle authority is missing. |
| - The desired-result factory rejects `reconciled` plus failed-capability |
| contradictions. |
|
|
| ## Latest evidence |
|
|
| Evidence is valid only for the files as they existed at the stated checkpoint. |
| Any later edit to the covered surface requires rerunning the affected check. |
|
|
| - 2026-08-08 dirty-tree gate campaign: the pre-existing debt that blocked the |
| full gate was cleared. `python -m mypy src` now reports **Success: no issues |
| found in 548 source files** (was 29 errors across five test-fixture files); |
| Ruff check and `ruff format --check` pass across `src`, `hooks`, and |
| `scripts` (575 files). Full local suite (`-m "not integration and not |
| browser"`) went from **14 failed / 8216 passed** to **1 failed / 8229 passed / |
| 9 skipped**. Root causes fixed, not suppressed: an unquoted comma inside the |
| ENGINE-002 `validation_status` field of `qa/feature_status.csv` corrupted |
| `csv.DictReader` (a `None` restkey) and cascaded into six of the seven |
| feature/user-story tracker failures; ten new untracked engine modules were |
| attributed to ENGINE-001/ENGINE-002; the A/B live-coding-pair suite now |
| substitutes the Codex-sandbox evaluator boundary (`verify_workspace`) with a |
| deterministic double that keeps an evaluator-hash assertion, matching the |
| sibling deterministic-bridge suites — no fairness, provenance, or |
| serialization assertion was weakened; the stale README/docs test-inventory |
| badge was refreshed (7,746 → 8,253) with `src/update_repo_stats.py`. |
| - 2026-08-08 PR preflight (`python scripts/ci_preflight.py --profile pr`): |
| **all 19 of 19 lanes pass; 0 failed, 0 skipped.** Lanes: whitespace, repo |
| stats, no-test policy, `ruff format`, `ruff`, `mypy src`, `pip check`, |
| unit-linux equivalent (**8230 passed, 9 skipped, 91.9 percent coverage** |
| against a 40 percent floor), A–Z canary, contract compatibility, clean host |
| contract, public docs tracker, docs strict build, telemetry enterprise, |
| similarity precision/recall, browser monitor security, clean preflight dist, |
| reproducible wheel build, and twine check. Reproducible artifacts: |
| wheel `316961b9cc2aaf11393713dc62d2eea83dbf9d392e8a9e5ccd30cc6c83d3a72a`, |
| sdist `3a1684e9c9f37a13fadbcd6daae5dda4974b766e2d5a7817df8fafb245bb8c18`. |
| The clean-host lane additionally executed six Claude Code hook commands and |
| one Codex hook command from a fresh wheel with zero failures, each returning |
| the exact 750-byte `skill:ctx-python-testing` capability context. |
| Caveat: the preflight process exit status is `0` even on a failing run, so |
| lane results must always be read from its log, never from the exit code. |
| - 2026-08-08 manage-mode ask-prompt contract conflict resolved. Two tests |
| encoded mutually exclusive contracts for the same |
| `QueryDeliveryController(mode="manage").issue(...)` call: |
| `test_query_hook_delivery.py::test_manage_mode_publishes_one_durable_resumable_challenge_without_installing` |
| required a durable challenge, while |
| `test_activated_skill_controller_integration.py::test_manage_repeated_ask_prompts_remain_authority_free_and_nonpersistent` |
| required no journal at all. The second contract is unsatisfiable: because |
| `ManagedQueryService.resolve_consent` authenticates a signed decision against |
| a durable challenge record (`status_by_challenge_digest`), a resumable |
| ask-each-time consent cannot exist without one persisted challenge. Empirical |
| probing showed production behavior is already correct — two repeated ask |
| prompts publish exactly **one** challenge, reuse it (byte-identical payloads, |
| same `challenge_id`), keep the journal at **3** records, install nothing, leak |
| no `consent_id`/`requested_action` into model-visible bytes, and persist no |
| raw prompt text or absolute path in any durable byte. **No production change |
| was required.** The stale test was rewritten as |
| `test_manage_repeated_ask_prompts_reuse_one_authority_free_consent_challenge` |
| asserting that strictly stronger contract, with the reasoning recorded in its |
| docstring. Each new assertion was mutation-checked (perturbing the challenge |
| count, journal count, or payload-reuse equality makes it fail) so the test is |
| demonstrably non-vacuous. |
| - 2026-08-08 slice 2.2a (expired/unclaimed activation retirement): closes the |
| expiry half of the P1 activation recovery gap with **no durable schema |
| change**. Before this slice an `ActionExpired` on a pending activation was |
| refused by `_resolve_activation_receipt_guard` before any commit, so a |
| never-claimed activation whose window lapsed wedged the stream permanently. |
| Changes: `ActivationActionClaimGuard` gains an in-memory |
| `mode: Literal["applied", "expired"]` with an optional outcome digest |
| (mirroring `InstallActionClaimGuard`); `_validate_activation_claim_guard` |
| returns `None` for expired after proving inside the commit transaction that |
| **no durable claim exists** (an existing claim raises |
| `ActivationActionAlreadyClaimed`, because a claim means a driver may already |
| have mutated the host); `commit` skips activation settlement for expired, |
| exactly mirroring the install branch; `_activation_receipt_claim_guard` now |
| returns the `PendingEffect` so the resolver can read `effect` — the match |
| itself stays keyed on action kind, because narrowing it to `activate` would |
| let a `rollback-activate` receipt commit with no claim and no verified |
| outcome; new `_exact_unclaimed_activation_action_expiry` and |
| `_assert_activation_action_has_expired` mirror the install expiry helpers and |
| are asserted both before reduce and again immediately before commit; |
| `process_activation_receipt` now rejects any non-applied guard at the door. |
| The reducer change was **mandatory and initially missed**: an expired |
| activation previously fell through to `_fail_receipt_v3`, which adds the |
| capability to `blocked_capability_ids` and would have converted a hard wedge |
| into a permanent soft wedge, since blocked ids survive re-planning. The |
| retirement branch now covers `pending.effect in {"install", "activate"}` and |
| re-requests a displaced `rollback_capability_id` so a rollback-held |
| capability is never stranded. |
| Replay determinism is preserved: an expired-activation event could never be |
| committed before this slice (the guard raised at `_process` before |
| `_prepare_reduce_commit`), so no existing journal can contain one and no |
| existing replay changes. The durable-digest hazard was avoided deliberately — |
| `mode` never enters the settlement `values` dicts, so every settlement row |
| already on disk still revalidates. |
| Evidence: `src/tests/runtime/test_release_skill_lifecycle.py` **27 passed**, |
| including three new forgery bars (premature trusted clock, tampered payload, |
| and settled/completed action) plus a retirement that asserts zero |
| `engine_activation_outcomes` and zero `engine_activation_claim_settlements` |
| rows. Runtime, engine, and core suites: **1687 passed, 4 skipped**. Repo-wide |
| `mypy src` reports no issues in 548 files; Ruff and formatting pass. |
| The obsolete `test_generic_engine_process_cannot_forge_activation_expiry` |
| asserted that a well-formed, genuinely expired, never-claimed retirement must |
| be refused — that assertion *was* the wedge, so it was replaced by the three |
| targeted forgery bars above rather than deleted. |
| Full PR preflight re-run after this slice: **all 19 of 19 lanes pass, 0 failed, |
| 0 skipped**, with the unit lane at **8233 passed, 9 skipped**. The repo stats |
| lane failed once first because the new tests changed the inventory count; it |
| was refreshed with `src/update_repo_stats.py`. |
| - 2026-08-08 slice 2.2a independent adversarial review: **accepted, no blocking |
| issues.** Every attack fell closed under executed probes, not inspection |
| alone: six two-thread claim-versus-retire races on one journal (the claim won |
| every time; retirement always lost with `ActivationActionAlreadyClaimed`); a |
| claim forced to land after every engine-side check and immediately before |
| commit (still refused, journal unchanged); a claim attempted from inside the |
| retirement's open `BEGIN IMMEDIATE` (blocked for the full window, so SQLite |
| genuinely serializes the two transactions); re-claiming an already-retired |
| action (refused by the journal anchor on a fresh head, and by |
| `RevisionConflict` on a stale head, so no host mutation can be authorized |
| after retirement); `rollback-activate` retirement (double-blocked by the |
| resolver and the expiry helper); supplied-guard injection on the expired path |
| (refused three ways); and payload rebinding across foreign action id, wrong |
| action kind, wrong content digest, wrong precondition revision, wrong reason, |
| and foreign scope (all refused). Review follow-ups applied: the |
| legitimate-retirement test now pins `trusted_utc_now` to `AFTER_EXPIRY` |
| instead of depending on the machine's wall clock, and was renamed to |
| `test_expired_unclaimed_activation_is_retired_without_host_authority` because |
| the old name contradicted its body; a mutation check confirms it still fails |
| on a pre-expiry clock. The reducer retirement branch now also requires the |
| exact schema-v3 activation payload, so the reducer and both engine gates |
| agree rather than relying on a distant state-validation invariant. |
| Recorded non-blocking observations, not defects in this slice: retirement |
| writes no "already expired once" marker, so a host that never claims can loop |
| request/expire/retire without backoff (availability, not authority); and the |
| "no durable claim implies no host mutation" invariant rests on side tables |
| that are not hash-chained against row deletion, so an attacker with write |
| access to the 0700 SQLite store could delete both the claim and outcome rows |
| and retire a real mutation. The install expired arm has the identical shape, |
| so this is pre-existing design; it deserves an explicit threat-model line or |
| a journal-anchored retirement tombstone if store write access is in scope. |
| - 2026-08-08 slice 2.1 (applied activation seam): new |
| `src/ctx/runtime/activation_execution.py` (applied path mirroring |
| `install_execution.py`) + `EngineComposition.execute_activation` + |
| `runtime/__init__` exports. The lifecycle reach-in test |
| (`test_managed_query.py::test_managed_development_preserves_exact_lifecycle_transition_on_retry`) |
| now drives activation through the public seam (no `composition._engine` / |
| `engine._record_activation_outcome` / `_issue_activation_outcome_permit` |
| reaches) and asserts idempotent re-entry. Three added focused tests cover the |
| crash-recovery/race branches an independent reviewer required: |
| `test_execute_activation_recovers_a_recorded_but_unsettled_outcome` |
| (crash-after-outcome), `test_execute_activation_recovers_after_a_claim_without_outcome` |
| (crash-after-claim), and `test_execute_activation_tolerates_a_lost_claim_race` |
| (the `ActivationActionAlreadyClaimed` catch). Runtime suite `893 passed, 4 |
| skipped` under `pytest -n 12` (one unrelated pre-existing failure, |
| `test_manage_repeated_ask_prompts_...`, proven independent by reverting the |
| slice and reproduced identically — flagged as a separate task). Ruff, format, |
| and strict mypy pass on `activation_execution.py` and `composition.py`. |
| Independent 3-agent review: two `approve-with-nonblocking`; the third required |
| the three crash/race tests above, which were then added and pass. A formal |
| re-review confirmation of that third lane and the full dirty-tree gate remain |
| outstanding. |
| - 2026-08-08 signed-slice test-clock repair: five red tests in |
| `src/tests/runtime/test_managed_query_service.py` |
| (`test_desired_retry_refuses_interactive_effect_without_signed_execution_path`, |
| `test_head_drift_is_rejected_before_broker_authentication`, |
| `test_service_rejects_decision_committed_during_registry_binding`, |
| `test_service_rejects_decision_committed_during_broker_publication`, |
| `test_service_rejects_decision_committed_during_broker_status`) were failing |
| with `install decision has expired according to trusted clock`. Root cause was |
| test-only: the two test-side sites that commit a `UserDecision` |
| (`_commit_consent_decision` and the inline composition in |
| `test_desired_retry_...`) opened `open_managed_engine_composition` without |
| threading the frozen clock, so the engine's decision-time expiry guard |
| (`engine.py:772` → `_assert_install_decision_not_expired`, `engine.py:978`) |
| defaulted to real wall-time and correctly deemed the frozen-dated |
| (`2026-08-03T13:00Z`) pending install action expired. Fix: expose |
| `_Setup.clock` and thread `trusted_utc_now=setup.clock` into both sites (four |
| lines, one test file). Production is unaffected — every production |
| `open_managed_engine_composition` caller |
| (`managed_query_service.py:1361/2433/3661`) already threads |
| `self._trusted_utc_now`, and both production `UserDecision` commits |
| (`managed_query_service.py:1867/3260`) run inside that clock-threaded service. |
| - 2026-08-08 focused signed-slice suite: `215 passed in 54.81s` across |
| `test_managed_query_service.py`, `test_install_consent_broker.py`, |
| `test_install_consent_continuation.py`, `test_install_consent_authenticators.py`, |
| `test_install_consent_challenge_lookup.py`, and |
| `test_install_consent_broker_store.py` (was `210 passed, 5 failed`). Broader |
| STATE.md aggregate suite: `348 passed in 63.62s`. Ruff and format clean on the |
| touched test file; mypy adds no new errors on the changed lines (the file |
| carries 14 pre-existing non-strict `arg-type` errors from fake-port fixtures, |
| unrelated to this change). |
| - 2026-08-08 independent review board (4-agent workflow; 3 completed, 1 agent |
| aborted on a structured-output retry cap): the completed fix reviewer returned |
| `test-only-correct` with the guard confirmed as correct fail-closed production |
| behavior; the aborted skeptic's angle (no production `UserDecision` path lacks |
| a trusted clock) was closed by direct grep. Two P1 auditors found all four |
| signed-slice recovery classes **closed** with green named tests: class A |
| `test_terminal_broker_expiry_durably_retires_pending_consent_and_allows_next_choice`, |
| class B `test_target_replacement_after_decision_commit_never_reaches_claim_or_driver`, |
| class C `test_signed_grant_expired_before_claim_is_retired_once_and_can_be_chosen_again`, |
| class D `test_service_signed_denial_never_invokes_install_driver` (plus the |
| `[denied]` continuation). None of these four were among the five reddened |
| tests, so the recovery logic was already green at baseline — the prior |
| "four open P1 recovery classes" status was stale. This is focused-green plus |
| independent review, not a formal slice acceptance: a full adversarial |
| acceptance re-review across the entire signed checklist and the full dirty-tree |
| gate are still required. |
| - 2026-08-03 coordinator aggregate: `297 passed in 28.46s` across managed query, |
| desired/query stores, composition, consent lookup/broker, and broker store. |
| - 2026-08-03 coordinator static checks: Ruff passed; five focused files already |
| formatted; strict mypy reported no issues in three production files. |
| - 2026-08-03 writer checkpoint: complete managed-query service suite `51 passed`; |
| Ruff, formatting, and strict service mypy passed before the final adversarial |
| additions. |
| - 2026-08-03 coordinator frozen-surface check: complete managed-query service |
| suite `56 passed in 13.10s`; Ruff passed; three files were already formatted; |
| strict service mypy reported no issues. |
| - 2026-08-03 coordinator frozen aggregate: `302 passed in 30.96s` across the |
| complete managed query, desired/query store, composition, consent |
| lookup/broker, and broker-store surface. |
| - 2026-08-03 independent repaired-surface aggregate: `304 passed in 30.46s`; |
| Ruff passed; seven files were already formatted; strict mypy reported no |
| issues in three production files. Independent verdict: accepted, no open |
| P0/P1. |
| - 2026-08-03 coordinator post-repair checks: complete service suite `58 passed`; |
| service plus desired/query stores `132 passed`; Ruff, formatting, strict |
| service mypy, and diff integrity passed. |
| - 2026-08-03 automatic-execution writer freeze: complete service suite |
| `70 passed in 22.24s`; Ruff and formatting passed; strict service mypy passed; |
| two-file diff integrity passed. |
| - 2026-08-03 coordinator automatic-execution aggregate: `316 passed in |
| 37.53s` across the managed service, desired/query stores, composition, |
| challenge lookup, consent broker, and broker store at service hash |
| `ac1736c824872008206db1fe70c92ce57fdf91efe2bcf51692c52e3837c815db`. |
| - 2026-08-03 coordinator lower execution aggregate: `129 passed in 14.31s` |
| across install execution/continuation, engine claim/coordinator/outcome, claim |
| store, and installation-contract suites. Ruff, formatting, strict service |
| mypy, diff integrity, and frozen-file hash recheck also passed. |
| - 2026-08-03 independent automatic-execution review: **rejected** with two P1 |
| reproductions despite `260 passed in 36.80s` and green Ruff, formatting, |
| eight-file mypy, and diff integrity. A restart could substitute the physical |
| binding after grant, and an intervening observation could lose pending |
| consent then falsely report reconciliation. Both are under repair. |
| - 2026-08-03 automatic-execution repair freeze: writer focused service/reducer |
| aggregate `94 passed in 27.18s`; Ruff, formatting, strict mypy on both |
| production files, and diff integrity passed. |
| - 2026-08-03 coordinator repaired-surface aggregate: `340 passed in 44.11s` |
| across the managed service/store/composition/broker surface plus schema-v3 |
| reducer regressions; lower install execution aggregate `129 passed in |
| 15.71s`; Ruff, formatting, two-file strict mypy, diff integrity, and all four |
| frozen hashes passed. |
| - 2026-08-03 independent automatic-execution re-review: **accepted**, no P0/P1; |
| `341 passed in 43.83s`; Ruff, formatting, nine-source mypy, and diff integrity |
| passed. Exact changed-target restart failed before mutation and original-target |
| restoration recovered once; provider/tool/turn races each refreshed exactly |
| one consent and installed exactly once on retry. |
| - 2026-08-03 signed-resolution broker audit: decision-expired/live-challenge |
| state now moves to fresh-nonce reauthentication rather than terminal expiry; |
| broker/store/lookup aggregate `90 passed in 6.33s`, with Ruff and strict store |
| mypy green. This repair remains part of the not-yet-accepted signed slice. |
| - 2026-08-03 coordinator first signed-slice aggregate: **rejected**, `3 failed, |
| 404 passed in 59.76s`. Eager evidence-provider binding created the engine |
| journal during service construction, violating no-mutation-before-use and |
| breaking path-collision validation. Lazy binding repair is active. |
| - 2026-08-03 coordinator second signed freeze: `409 passed in 52.86s` across |
| managed service, broker/authenticator/lookup/continuation, executor, |
| composition, query stores, install claims/outcomes, reducer, and policy; |
| lower install aggregate `129 passed in 13.20s`. Ruff, formatting, strict mypy |
| on four production files, diff integrity, and seven frozen hashes passed. |
| Independent re-review remains active. |
| - 2026-08-03 reviewer broader preservation pass exposed one stale protocol |
| registry expectation (`352 passed, 1 failed`): production already declared |
| `InstallConsentExpired`, while the exact registry test omitted it. The test |
| contract was repaired; focused protocol suite `123 passed` with Ruff, |
| formatting, and diff integrity green. Broader reviewer rerun is pending. |
| - 2026-08-03 live signed-repair checkpoint: authority-free terminal consent |
| expiry compiles and passes strict mypy plus its focused expiry test. It is not |
| accepted or frozen. The independent reviewer still rejects the slice with no |
| P0 and four P1 recovery classes: terminal consent expiry under target/policy |
| drift, post-journal target drift, unclaimed post-grant action expiry, and |
| target-independent settled-denial recovery. |
| - Full current dirty-working-tree gate: **run and green** on 2026-08-08. |
| - PR preflight: **run and green — all 19 of 19 lanes pass** on the current dirty |
| working tree (see the 2026-08-08 evidence above). |
| - Native Windows evidence: **not run**. |
| - Official benefit experiment: **not run**; do not claim CTX superiority. |
|
|
| ## Known risks and explicit non-claims |
|
|
| - P1 migration gap: direct writers outside `ManagedQueryService` do not all |
| cooperate with its lifecycle lock and must be cut over before one-writer |
| authority can be claimed globally. |
| - Signed-slice P1 recovery classes — status updated 2026-08-08: the four |
| recovery classes previously tracked here as open (terminal consent expiry |
| under target/policy drift, post-journal target drift, unclaimed post-grant |
| action expiry, and target-independent settled-denial recovery) now have |
| implementing code and green named covering tests, confirmed by an independent |
| P1 audit and a focused-suite rerun (see the 2026-08-08 evidence above). The |
| earlier signed-construction (eager `SQLiteEngineStore` before first use) and |
| post-authentication-race (pre-auth binding reuse) repairs are exercised by the |
| now-green focused signed suite. These are closed against focused evidence and |
| independent review, but the slice is **not** formally accepted: a full |
| adversarial acceptance re-review across the entire signed checklist and the |
| full dirty-tree gate are still required, and one review-board skeptic aborted |
| on a tooling retry cap rather than delivering a verdict, so the second |
| independent fix-verdict is still outstanding. |
| - P1 capability gap: no generic physical MCP installation actuator exists. |
| - P1 platform gap: built-in skill and agent actuators remain POSIX-oriented. |
| - P1 material gap: user/organization graph material needs a trusted, |
| claim-bound content source before generic installation. |
| - P1 lifecycle gap (partially closed 2026-08-08): the reducer emits |
| `ActivateCapability` after verified installation. Slice 2.1 added a |
| composition-integrated applied-activation seam |
| (`EngineComposition.execute_activation` in `activation_execution.py`) so the |
| lifecycle reach-in test no longer reaches engine-private activation methods. |
| Still open: the public `ManagedQueryService.activate`/`recover_activation` |
| continuation (slice 2.2) so hosts, not just the composition, can drive |
| activation. |
| - P1 recovery gap: durable activation claims/settlement currently cover applied |
| outcomes only; failed, expired, or indeterminate host activation can still |
| wedge the stream. Closing this needs a store `outcome`-column migration on |
| `engine_activation_outcomes`/`engine_activation_claim_settlements`, an |
| `ActivationActionClaimGuard.mode`, a failed path in |
| `_record_activation_outcome`, and relaxing the `ActionApplied`-only activation |
| receipt assertion — scoped as slice 2.2 in |
| `.scratch/managed-activation-slice/DESIGN.md`. |
| - P1 authority gap: deactivation `ActionApplied` receipts are not yet guarded by |
| an exact durable host outcome claim. |
| - P1 evidence gap: exposure and invocation are distinct, but no typed |
| opportunity/utility window is fed into authenticated benefit planning; |
| current planning facts keep `opportunity_observable=False`. |
| - The prior P2 desired-result factory hardening gap is repaired and accepted. |
| - The presence of Codex/Claude adapter files does not prove real-host parity. |
| - Passing focused tests does not prove the complete repository, release, |
| language, or product-benefit gates. |
|
|
| ## Active work lanes |
|
|
| Keep only independent work parallel. A writer owns each shared file. |
|
|
| | Lane | Ownership | State | Completion condition | |
| | --- | --- | --- | --- | |
| | Managed desired-set writer | `managed_query_service.py`, runtime exports, service tests | Complete | Accepted after two review-driven repairs | |
| | Coordinator integration | Plan, state, aggregate checks, risk triage | Active | Drive signed resolution while preserving accepted automatic-execution invariants | |
| | Automatic-execution design | Read-only execution/receipt/recovery analysis | Complete | Reuses current engine/executor; no schema, store, broker, or request expansion required | |
| | Automatic-execution writer | Managed service, reducer, and focused tests | Complete and accepted | Cross-restart binding and stale-consent races repaired | |
| | Automatic-execution reviewer | Read-only service/engine/executor security and recovery review | Complete; accepted repaired freeze | No open P0/P1; independent adversarial reproductions closed | |
| | Independent desired-set reviewer | Read-only correctness/security/concurrency review | Complete | Accepted with no open P0/P1; prior P2 hardening item is now repaired | |
| | Signed-resolution design | Read-only broker/decision/execution continuation analysis | Complete | Implementation-ready safe public API and crash-recovery contract delivered to the active writer | |
| | Signed-resolution broker audit | Read-only broker/store/continuation review | Complete | Reauthentication repair verified; remaining generic resolver seams delivered to writer | |
| | Signed-resolution writer | Managed service, consent continuation, runtime exports, and focused tests | Complete (focused-green) | All four recovery classes implemented with green covering tests; the 2026-08-08 residual was a test-only stale-clock fix, not a writer gap | |
| | Signed-resolution reviewer | Read-only authentication/recovery/security acceptance review | Focused-green + partial acceptance; second fix-verdict outstanding | 2026-08-08 board found the four recovery classes closed with green named tests and the clock fix test-only-correct; one skeptic aborted on a tooling cap. The full dirty-tree gate has since run green (19/19 lanes). Remaining: obtain the second independent fix-verdict and run the full signed acceptance checklist before formal acceptance | |
| | Activation/lifecycle design | Read-only reducer/composition/service analysis | Complete | Implementation-ready API/event flow and current P0/P1 lifecycle defects recorded | |
|
|
| ## Standing execution loop |
|
|
| For every material slice: |
|
|
| 1. **Resume:** read `AGENTS.md`, the standing plan, and this file; inspect the |
| current worktree and active lanes. |
| 2. **Choose:** take the next item on the critical path; do not redefine the |
| product around the easiest passing subset. |
| 3. **Dispatch:** parallelize only bounded independent work; assign one writer per |
| shared surface and keep architecture/integration with the coordinator. |
| 4. **Implement:** add the smallest coherent end-to-end behavior plus focused |
| success, failure, concurrency, privacy, and crash-recovery tests. |
| 5. **Verify:** run focused tests first, then applicable aggregate/static checks. |
| Stop on failure, diagnose, repair, and rerun. |
| 6. **Review:** use an independent read-only reviewer for security, concurrency, |
| state transitions, host mutations, migrations, or other material risk. |
| 7. **Accept:** mark a slice accepted only when deterministic evidence and review |
| agree. A worker's green report is evidence, not proof. |
| 8. **Persist:** update this file with accepted behavior, exact commands/results, |
| new risks, changed critical path, and next work before ending the run. |
|
|
| ## Resume procedure |
|
|
| Start with: |
|
|
| ```bash |
| git status --short |
| git branch --show-current |
| git rev-parse HEAD |
| sed -n '1,260p' AGENTS.md |
| sed -n '1,280p' STATE.md |
| sed -n '1,220p' docs/plans/unified-capability-engine.md |
| ``` |
|
|
| Then inspect the files and tests named by the first in-progress milestone. Do |
| not rely on a conversation summary when the worktree or this state file says |
| otherwise. |
|
|
| For the current slice, the focused verification command is: |
|
|
| ```bash |
| .venv/bin/python -m pytest -q \ |
| src/tests/runtime/test_managed_query_service.py \ |
| src/tests/runtime/test_managed_query_desired_set_store.py \ |
| src/tests/runtime/test_managed_query_store.py \ |
| src/tests/runtime/test_managed_query.py \ |
| src/tests/runtime/test_composition.py \ |
| src/tests/runtime/test_install_consent_challenge_lookup.py \ |
| src/tests/runtime/test_install_consent_broker.py \ |
| src/tests/core/test_install_consent_broker_store.py |
| ``` |
|
|
| After the slice is frozen, run focused Ruff, formatting, and strict mypy; then |
| select broader gates according to `CONTRIBUTING.md` and the changed surface. |
|
|
| ## Next actions |
|
|
| 1. Formally accept the signed slice: the full dirty-tree PR preflight is green |
| (19/19 lanes, 2026-08-08), so only the review side remains — obtain the |
| still-outstanding second independent fix-verdict and run the full signed |
| acceptance checklist. Accept only if independent review reports no open |
| P0/P1. Native Windows and real interactive host evidence stay separate, |
| currently unavailable gates and must not be implied by the local green run. |
| 2. Continue managed activation. Slice 2.1 (applied `EngineComposition.execute_activation` |
| seam) is done and reviewed. Next is slice 2.2: the store `outcome`-column |
| migration on the activation outcome/settlement tables, `ActivationActionClaimGuard.mode`, |
| a failed path in `_record_activation_outcome`, relaxing the `ActionApplied`-only |
| activation receipt assertion, the failed/indeterminate driver observation, and |
| the public `ManagedQueryService.activate`/`recover_activation` continuation |
| (mirroring `resolve_consent`/`recover_consent`) with a generic non-release-skill |
| activation verifier. Full plan in `.scratch/managed-activation-slice/DESIGN.md`. |
| 3. Guard deactivation `ActionApplied` receipts with an exact durable host |
| outcome claim (the open authority gap), then wire opportunity-aware cooling, |
| deactivation, and uninstall proposals into the managed loop. |
| 4. Continue through graph layers, relevance, real-host, compatibility, and |
| controlled benefit proof without skipping gates. |
|
|
