VertexAGI/cyberdata-3-large

CyberData 3 Large

57,828 chat examples for training ONE model to be strong at cybersecurity and at agentic coding. Re-cut from CyberData 2 (public datasets only; no model was run to write any of it) so the two halves are balanced and every row says which kind it is.

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The CyberData 3 family

Size	Repo	Examples	Train	Valid	~Tokens	Balance
Small	VertexAGI/cyberdata-3-small	10,000	9,370	630	19.6M	balanced across the five kinds
Medium	VertexAGI/cyberdata-3-medium	20,000	18,838	1,162	39.3M	balanced across the five kinds
Large	VertexAGI/cyberdata-3-large	57,828	54,350	3,478	100.6M	balanced across the five kinds
Full	VertexAGI/cyberdata-3-full	199,864	187,877	11,987	273.4M	everything (knowledge-heavy)

CyberData 3 Large is balanced across the five kinds (the quota per kind is in the table below) and nested: Small is inside Medium, Medium inside Large and Large inside Full, and every row keeps the same train/valid assignment in every size. Agentic windows are picked so that each long trajectory contributes one window before any contributes a second.

What is in this size

kind	Goal	What it is	Rows	Share of rows	Available in all of CyberData 3
agentic_coding	Agentic coding and tool use	software-engineering and security agent trajectories, cut into training windows	14,000	24.2%	34,483
cyber_reasoning	Cyber reasoning	step-by-step vulnerability analysis with a verified verdict	5,825	10.1%	5,825
vuln_finding	Vulnerability finding	review code, name the weakness (CWE), vulnerable vs patched	11,482	19.9%	11,482
secure_code_and_rules	Secure code and detection rules	fix or rewrite insecure code; write Sigma / detection rules	14,521	25.1%	14,521
security_knowledge	Security knowledge	CWE / CAPEC / ATT&CK / KEV / NIST / threat intelligence / defensive Q&A	12,000	20.8%	133,553

Rows are not tokens. An agentic row is a window of up to 4,096 tokens, while a knowledge answer is a few hundred, so by token count agentic coding is far heavier than its share of rows (this size is about 100.6M tokens in total, estimated as characters/3.6).

Agentic windows

Long agent trajectories (more than 12 messages) are cut into training windows: the system prompt, the task, and the most recent turns that fit in a 4,096-token budget (Nemotron-Cascade chat template), ending on an assistant turn. Train on the last assistant message only; everything before it is context. Up to 6 windows are cut per long trajectory (picked at random but fixed). Short trajectories stay whole. The window id is <episode id>#w<turn index>; all windows of an episode share a group and therefore a split. Tool-call arguments are JSON objects, not strings.

Where every row comes from (provenance)

provenance	rows	share	what it means
authoritative-structured	21,925	37.9%	real records (MITRE entries, Sigma rules, KEV entries, real CVE-fix code) turned into chat rows by fixed templates; every fact is copied or composed from a field of the record
third-party-synthetic	12,748	22.0%	AI-written Q&A by the dataset authors; the least reliable rows, so they are FILTERED: any row citing a CWE id that does not exist, or naming a CWE or ATT&CK technique with a name that does not match MITRE's data, is dropped (on 3,000-row samples roughly 15-19% of rows that cite ids had a nonexistent or mismatched one), as are refusals and duplicate questions
agent-trajectories	10,160	17.6%	security-agent and software-engineering agent trajectories
reasoning-verified	5,825	10.1%	reasoning traces written by DeepSeek-R1-0528 for the OpenVul authors and kept only when the final verdict matched the ground-truth label
verified-executed	3,840	6.6%	agent steps whose episodes were executed against a local environment and passed a deterministic reward check
nist-excerpt	2,187	3.8%	answers grounded in excerpts of NIST publications
grounded-third-party	895	1.5%	instruction sets written by their authors from real sources, who state their claims are checked against the source
human-annotated	248	0.4%	expert-annotated threat-report text turned into extraction tasks by a template

Sources

Source	Rows	%	Provenance	License / terms	What it contributes
MITRE CWE	1,229	2.1%	authoritative-structured	MITRE CWE terms of use (royalty-free; keep the MITRE copyright notice)	Weakness definitions, mitigations, detection methods, and the entries' own bad/good code examples
MITRE CAPEC	88	0.2%	authoritative-structured	MITRE CAPEC terms of use (royalty-free; keep the MITRE copyright notice)	Attack-pattern descriptions, prerequisites, consequences, mitigations
MITRE ATT&CK (enterprise)	331	0.6%	authoritative-structured	MITRE ATT&CK terms of use (royalty-free; keep the MITRE copyright notice)	Techniques, mitigations, detection analytics, groups, software, campaigns
SigmaHQ detection rules	4,004	6.9%	authoritative-structured	Detection Rule License 1.1 (attribution to the rule authors, kept inside each rule)	Real rules: write a rule from a description, explain a rule
CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities	155	0.3%	authoritative-structured	US-government work, public domain	Exploited-in-the-wild status and required action per CVE
PrimeVul (paired vulnerable/fixed C/C++ functions)	6,954	12.0%	authoritative-structured	MIT (train + valid pairs only; the test pairs are never used)	Review a vulnerable function, review its patched version, fix it
CVEfixes (real CVE fix commits, many languages)	9,164	15.8%	authoritative-structured	Apache-2.0 per the Hub listing (the original CVEfixes release is CC BY 4.0)	The same three code tasks across PHP/Python/JavaScript/Java/Go/Ruby/C/C++ and others
OpenVul rejection-sampling vulnerability reasoning (Leopo1d)	5,825	10.1%	reasoning-verified	Apache-2.0 (reasoning distilled from DeepSeek-R1-0528 by the dataset's authors)	Step-by-step reasoning about whether C/C++ code is vulnerable, kept only when the verdict matched the label; vulnerable and patched versions in pairs
Annotated threat-report corpus	248	0.4%	human-annotated	CC-BY-4.0 per the Hub tag (the dataset card has no text)	Entity extraction and relationship listing from real threat-report excerpts
CTI instruction dataset (reloading0101)	895	1.5%	grounded-third-party	CC-BY-4.0	CVE/ATT&CK/KEV/Sigma-grounded threat-intelligence instructions and follow-ups; its authors state every claim is checked against the source
NIST SP excerpt instructions (nuhmanpk)	2,187	3.8%	nist-excerpt	CC-BY-4.0 (source documents are NIST publications)	Answers grounded in excerpts of NIST SP 800-series documents
OWASP defensive repair trajectories (Humanlearning)	3,840	6.6%	verified-executed	Apache-2.0	Agent steps from episodes that were executed and reward-verified in a local environment (successful episodes only, no anti-cheat flags)
Trendyol cybersecurity instructions	4,273	7.4%	third-party-synthetic	Apache-2.0	AI-written defensive Q&A, filtered (see below)
Fenrir v2.1	3,246	5.6%	third-party-synthetic	Apache-2.0	AI-written defensive Q&A, filtered, de-duplicated against Trendyol
CyberNative code vulnerability pairs	4,581	7.9%	third-party-synthetic	Apache-2.0	Review vulnerable code and write the safer version
YARA / Suricata rules Q&A	648	1.1%	third-party-synthetic	Apache-2.0	Write a YARA or Suricata rule
0xKitkat/AgentForge-1152 (security split)	576	1.0%	agent-trajectories	Apache-2.0	Defensive security-agent trajectories with tool use
nvidia/SWE-Hero-openhands-trajectories	3,052	5.3%	agent-trajectories	CC-BY-4.0	Software-engineering agent trajectories (OpenHands), length-capped at 120,000 characters
nvidia/Open-SWE-Traces (resolved runs only)	6,532	11.3%	agent-trajectories	CC-BY-4.0	Coding-agent trajectories whose patch was verified to fix the task (OpenHands / SWE-agent / mini-swe-agent), length-capped at 120,000 characters

Considered and left out

• trendmicro-ailab/Primus-Reasoning and Primus-Instruct: gated (access request required).
• rmems/incident-response-oncall-trajectories: tagged Apache-2.0, but its own rights note says it is not training data for any model-weight update.
• netgoat-ai/Koda-IDS-CyberReasoning: inspected and rejected. After quality filtering only templated scenarios for one vendor's tool API remained.
• ayshajavd/code-security-vulnerability-dataset: mostly a repackaging of BigVul (no clear license), PrimeVul-derived samples and CyberNative, so it added little that was new.
• Benchmark sets (CyberMetric, MMLU computer security, CTI-Bench): kept out so they stay usable for evaluation; a scan found none of their questions verbatim here.

Splits and checks

train.jsonl has 54,350 rows and valid.jsonl has 3,478. Rows derived from the same object (a CWE entry, a Sigma rule, a code-fix pair, an agent episode and ALL of its windows, a vulnerable/patched pair) share one split. Checked by script (build_scripts/verify_cd3.py): unique ids, no group in both splits, validation share 4-9%, nesting between sizes with identical split assignments, every line parses and ends on an assistant message, and no row mentions any of the 916 CVEs reserved for CVE-recall evaluation. CyberMetric and MMLU-security questions are kept out so those benchmarks stay usable.

Format

One JSON object per line: {"id", "kind", "source", "task", "provenance", "group", "messages"}. row_index.csv lists id, kind, source, task, provenance, split, group. Files are not shuffled; shuffle before training. messages is standard chat format; agent rows carry tool_calls; reasoning rows keep the source's <think>...</think> block followed by the final answer.

from datasets import load_dataset
ds = load_dataset("VertexAGI/cyberdata-3-large")
print(ds["train"][0]["kind"], ds["train"][0]["messages"][-1]["content"][:200])

Limitations

• The cyber half is supply-limited. Real vulnerable/fixed code comes from PrimeVul and CVEfixes, reasoning only from OpenVul (C/C++ vulnerability detection), so Large already contains every row of those kinds; there is nothing larger to add for them.
• Windows of one trajectory overlap and are highly correlated (they share a long prefix). Do not count them as independent examples, and split by group.
• Agent trajectories are length-capped at 120,000 characters before windowing, so the very longest runs are absent.
• Templated rows teach the answer format and the content of the records as written; they are not a verified knowledge base. They will not make a model recall facts about specific CVEs.
• third-party-synthetic and grounded-third-party rows can contain errors beyond what our filters can check; train on a stricter subset by dropping them.
• Not a benchmark and not a safety dataset.

Licensing and attribution

A mixture of independently licensed sources (see the table). Required attribution: (c) The MITRE Corporation for CWE, CAPEC and ATT&CK content; SigmaHQ rule authors (Detection Rule License 1.1; author fields are kept in the rule text); CC-BY-4.0 sources (nvidia SWE-Hero and Open-SWE-Traces, reloading0101, nuhmanpk, mrmoor) must be credited as listed. The OpenVul reasoning was written by DeepSeek-R1-0528; check DeepSeek's terms for your use. No source is gated or carries a non-commercial restriction.