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| # A beginner's guide to reading the MCP Vulnerability Dataset | |
| This guide explains all **18 top-level fields** using the first record, | |
| **CVE-2025-10193**, a DNS rebinding vulnerability in the Neo4j Cypher MCP server. | |
| No prior knowledge of MCP or vulnerability research is assumed. | |
| Open the [native Dataset Viewer](https://huggingface.co/datasets/XuViewer/mcp-vulnerability-dataset/viewer/default/full) | |
| alongside this guide. For compact definitions, see the [technical field reference](#technical-field-reference); for | |
| classification boundaries, see [TAXONOMY.md](TAXONOMY.md). | |
| ## Start with the story | |
| **MCP (Model Context Protocol)** provides a common way for applications, including | |
| AI assistants, to connect to tools and data sources. An MCP client consumes these | |
| capabilities; an MCP server provides them. A “server” is a software role: it may | |
| run on your own computer, rather than on a remote machine. | |
| In this example, the Neo4j Cypher MCP server exposes tools for working with a | |
| Neo4j database. The advisory describes a malicious website reaching a vulnerable | |
| MCP service running locally and triggering unauthorized tool invocations. The | |
| attack requires the user to visit the malicious website and remain there long | |
| enough for DNS rebinding to work. | |
| **DNS** translates a domain name into an IP address. In a DNS rebinding attack, | |
| an attacker changes the address associated with a name so that a web page can | |
| reach a different destination, such as a local service. This exploits a mismatch | |
| between the browser's view of a web origin and the service actually reached. | |
| A useful reading of this record is: | |
| > Malicious web content or a DNS response reaches across the boundary between | |
| > a web origin and a local service, enabling unauthorized Neo4j tool calls. | |
| This does not establish that every Neo4j installation is affected, or that the | |
| attack necessarily executes arbitrary operating-system commands. The affected | |
| product, version range and disclosed prerequisites matter. | |
| The [project security advisory](https://github.com/neo4j-contrib/mcp-neo4j/security/advisories/GHSA-vcqx-v2mg-7chx) | |
| is the primary reference for this example. | |
| ## 1–7: Identify the vulnerability and its scope | |
| | Field | Example value | How to read it | | |
| |---|---|---| | |
| | **1. `cve_id`** | `CVE-2025-10193` | The public identifier used to find this vulnerability across sources. It is not a severity score. | | |
| | **2. `title`** | `Neo4j Cypher MCP server is vulnerable to DNS rebinding attacks` | A short upstream headline. Use it to scan records quickly. | | |
| | **3. `description`** | The upstream account of unauthorized local tool calls through DNS rebinding | Read for the reported behavior, affected system and attack prerequisites. It is distinct from our mechanism interpretation. | | |
| | **4. `date_published`** | `2025-09-11T14:05:30.592Z` | The official first-publication timestamp. `Z` means UTC. This is not the discovery date, the date the bug was introduced, or our collection date. | | |
| | **5. `affected`** | Product, package and version objects | Use this to identify which software and versions the upstream record lists as affected. | | |
| | **6. `upstream_weaknesses`** | `CWE-346`, Origin Validation Error | Weakness categories supplied by upstream sources. They are not automatically generated from our taxonomy. | | |
| | **7. `upstream_severity_metrics`** | CVSS 4.0, score `7.4`, severity `HIGH` | Upstream severity assessments and their assumptions. These are not scores assigned by this dataset's reviewers. | | |
| **CVE identifies an individual vulnerability; CWE identifies a kind of weakness.** | |
| Many CVEs can share a CWE. Here, origin validation means checking where a request | |
| comes from and whether that origin should be trusted. “Upstream” means information | |
| preserved from the disclosure sources, rather than a new project judgment. | |
| ### Reading `affected` | |
| This field is a list because a record can cover multiple products or packages. | |
| For the example, its populated fields are: | |
| | Nested field | Value | Meaning | | |
| |---|---|---| | |
| | `vendor` | `neo4j` | Vendor or maintaining entity named by the source | | |
| | `product` | `neo4j-cypher MCP server` | The affected product | | |
| | `packageName` | `mcp-neo4j-cypher` | The package name to match against software inventories | | |
| | `collectionURL` | `https://pypi.python.org` | The package distribution platform | | |
| | `repo` | The project's GitHub URL | The source repository | | |
| | `versions[].version` | `0.2.2` | Lower bound of this version range | | |
| | `versions[].lessThanOrEqual` | `0.3.1` | Inclusive upper bound | | |
| | `versions[].status` | `affected` | Status assigned to that range | | |
| | `versions[].versionType` | `semver` | The version-comparison scheme | | |
| | `defaultStatus` | `unaffected` | The source's default for versions outside its explicit entries; not our independent verification of every other version | | |
| Read this range as **0.2.2 through 0.3.1, inclusive**, not just its two endpoints. | |
| The advisory separately identifies 0.4.0 as a patched version. Do not infer a | |
| fixed version merely by incrementing an affected version number. | |
| In the Viewer, you may also see optional keys such as `modules` or | |
| `versions[].lessThan` with `null` values. Standard Parquet structs share one | |
| schema across rows, so absent keys are padded with null. JSON/JSONL downloads | |
| retain original key presence. A padded null does not add a new upstream claim. | |
| ### Reading `upstream_weaknesses` | |
| Within each `descriptions` object, `cweId` is the identifier, `description` is its | |
| name or description, `lang` identifies the language, and `type` indicates the | |
| classification system. In this example, `lang: en` and `type: CWE` are metadata, | |
| not additional weaknesses. | |
| ### Reading `upstream_severity_metrics` | |
| New readers can start with the score and the conditions that produced it: | |
| | Metric | Example value | Plain-language meaning | | |
| |---|---|---| | |
| | `baseScore` / `baseSeverity` | `7.4` / `HIGH` | A standardized high-severity assessment, **not a 74% success probability** | | |
| | `attackVector` | `NETWORK` | Exploitation involves network access; this does not mean the local service must be directly exposed to the public internet | | |
| | `attackComplexity` | `HIGH` | There are additional technical difficulties in exploitation | | |
| | `attackRequirements` | `PRESENT` | Specific deployment or execution conditions must hold | | |
| | `privilegesRequired` | `NONE` | The assessment does not require the attacker to already hold target-system privileges | | |
| | `userInteraction` | `ACTIVE` | The user must participate; read the description for this case's concrete requirements | | |
| | `vulnConfidentialityImpact` | `HIGH` | Potentially substantial exposure of information that should be protected | | |
| | `vulnIntegrityImpact` | `HIGH` | Potentially substantial unauthorized changes to information or system state | | |
| | `vulnAvailabilityImpact` | `NONE` | The assessment does not assign an availability impact, such as making the service unusable | | |
| | `subConfidentialityImpact`, `subIntegrityImpact`, `subAvailabilityImpact` | `NONE` | No impact is assigned to subsequent systems in this assessment | | |
| | `version` / `vectorString` | `4.0` / `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/...` | The scoring-standard version and compact encoding of the assessment | | |
| Supplemental fields add context: `Automatable` concerns automation of the attack; | |
| `Recovery` concerns recovery after exploitation; `Safety` concerns human safety; | |
| `valueDensity` concerns the concentration of resources affected; | |
| `vulnerabilityResponseEffort` concerns response effort; and `providerUrgency` | |
| records the provider's urgency assessment. `NOT_DEFINED` means unspecified, | |
| not “no risk.” The outer `format` names the scoring format, while `scenarios` | |
| describes the assessment's scenario and language (`GENERAL` and `en` here). | |
| Unused CVSS-version objects may appear as null in Parquet. | |
| Some other records retain NVD-format metric groups. For those records, the list | |
| contains one object with keys such as `cvssMetricV31` or `ssvcV203`. Read a CVSS | |
| assessment at `upstream_severity_metrics[0]["cvssMetricV31"][i]["cvssData"]`; | |
| its surrounding `source` and `type` identify the upstream assessor where supplied. | |
| SSVC is a separate prioritization assessment, not a CVSS score. No metric groups, | |
| provider names or scores are discarded to force them into this example's shape. | |
| CVSS describes severity, not the actual risk of every installation. Deployment, | |
| permissions and accessible data still matter. Consult the | |
| [official CVSS 4.0 specification](https://www.first.org/cvss/v4.0/specification-document) | |
| for exact metric definitions. | |
| ## 8–11: Understand the project's classification | |
| | Field | Example value | Question it answers | | |
| |---|---|---| | |
| | **8. `vulnerability_type`** | `DNS Rebinding` | What is the primary evidenced failure mechanism? | | |
| | **9. `component`** | `server` | In which component role does the defect occur? Here, the role provides MCP tools. | | |
| | **10. `root_cause`** | `["Protocol/Interaction Boundary Controls"]` | Which kind of security control failed? Here, controls at a protocol or interaction boundary. | | |
| | **11. `classification_confidence`** | `high` for all three classifications | How strongly does the available evidence support each classification? | | |
| These labels describe different dimensions. The **type** is DNS rebinding, the | |
| **component** is an MCP server, and the **root cause** concerns insufficient | |
| controls between web-origin access and the local service. | |
| `root_cause` is a list because more than one supported control failure can apply. | |
| It contains positive findings only: an omitted cause has not necessarily been | |
| ruled out. For classification boundaries, consult [TAXONOMY.md](TAXONOMY.md). | |
| Inside `classification_confidence`, `component_bucket` refers to `component`; | |
| `vulnerability_type` and `root_cause` refer to their corresponding labels. | |
| Confidence is qualitative, not a calibrated probability or proof of an exploit. | |
| **High severity means potentially serious consequences; high classification | |
| confidence means stronger support for the assigned label.** Do not confuse them. | |
| ## 12–16: Trace the mechanism and its relationship to MCP | |
| | Field | Example value | How to read it | | |
| |---|---|---| | |
| | **12. `mechanism_relation`** | `traditional_weakness_at_mcp_integration_boundary` | A familiar software-security weakness appears where MCP connects to another system. Its presence in an MCP product does not make it unique to MCP. | | |
| | **13. `model_necessity`** | `not_required_for_documented_primitive` | The documented attack mechanism does not require a large language model to interpret content, make a decision or call a tool. | | |
| | **14. `sensitive_operation`** | `Local Neo4j tool invocation` | The security-sensitive capability reached by the attack. Do not silently expand “tool invocation” into arbitrary operating-system command execution. | | |
| | **15. `trust_boundary`** | `Web origin → local service` | The separation between differently trusted actors or capabilities that the attack crosses. | | |
| | **16. `untrusted_entry`** | `Malicious web page or DNS response` | The attacker-controlled or insufficiently trusted input entering the system. Here, it is not a chat prompt. | | |
| Read the last three fields as a short causal path: | |
| **Malicious web page / DNS response → web-to-local-service boundary → local tool invocation** | |
| Crossing a trust boundary is normal in many legitimate operations. The security | |
| failure is a missing, bypassed or ineffective check at that crossing. An external | |
| website should not automatically receive permission to operate local tools. | |
| `model_necessity` does not ask whether the product uses an AI model. It asks | |
| whether the documented exploit mechanism depends on one. It also does not rule | |
| out an alternative model-assisted attack path. This distinction helps separate | |
| traditional software defects in AI products from attacks that depend on model | |
| behavior, such as a documented prompt-injection chain. | |
| ## 17. `evidence`: Find the supporting sources | |
| This record has two evidence objects: | |
| | ID | Source | Role in this record | | |
| |---|---|---| | |
| | `E0` | [CVE record](https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-10193) | Basic upstream information such as description, affected versions and severity | | |
| | `E1` | [Project security advisory](https://github.com/neo4j-contrib/mcp-neo4j/security/advisories/GHSA-vcqx-v2mg-7chx) | Evidence used for mechanism interpretation and classification | | |
| Every evidence object uses these fields: | |
| | Nested field | Meaning | | |
| |---|---| | |
| | `id` | A reference ID unique within this record; another CVE may also have its own `E1` | | |
| | `kind` | Source type, such as `cve_record`, `security_advisory`, `commit`, `source_code` or `issue_report` | | |
| | `url` | Primary source link | | |
| | `related_urls` | Additional links recorded for the source artifact; an empty list means none are listed | | |
| | `supports` | Record fields that this evidence contributes to supporting | | |
| | `summary` | A short project description of the source's purpose, not a reproduced article | | |
| Supporting sources form a collective basis. A source listed for a field does | |
| not necessarily prove the entire attack chain on its own. Links may point to | |
| upstream content that changes after the saved dataset snapshot. Original source | |
| snapshots and hashes remain in the local audit archive. | |
| ## 18. `reasoning`: Understand how evidence became a judgment | |
| Evidence answers **“What did you consult?”** Reasoning answers **“Why does it | |
| support this assessment?”** The object is keyed by the field being assessed. | |
| For example, the `model_necessity` rationale says that DNS rebinding operates | |
| between the web page and the local service without requiring model decisions. | |
| This is a mechanism inference based on the advisory, not a separate official | |
| statement that every possible attack is model-independent. | |
| | Nested field | Meaning | | |
| |---|---| | |
| | `basis` | Whether the assessment is a source-supported observation, an interpretation or an unresolved judgment | | |
| | `reason` | The explanation for the assigned value | | |
| | `limitation` | What the assessment does not establish | | |
| | `evidence_ids` | IDs to look up in this same record's `evidence` list | | |
| Important `basis` values are: | |
| - `source_supported_at_stated_granularity`: the saved source supports an observation at the stated level of detail. | |
| - `analyst_mechanistic_inference`: the project interprets the mechanism from available evidence. | |
| - `analyst_classification`: the project applies its taxonomy to the evidence. | |
| - `insufficient_or_conflicting_evidence`: available information does not support a definite answer; this value occurs in other records. | |
| The basis marker is essential when citing the dataset: an official disclosure, | |
| a project classification and a mechanistic inference are not interchangeable. | |
| The annotations were developed through AI-assisted static review, without | |
| independent human validation. Inclusion does not claim successful runtime | |
| reproduction. This example's rationale is shared across several mechanism fields; | |
| it should be read with each field's scope and supporting evidence, not as a | |
| separate experiment for each field. | |
| ## A practical reading workflow | |
| 1. Read `title` and `description` to identify the behavior and prerequisites. | |
| 2. Inspect `affected` to match the product, package and version range. | |
| 3. Read `vulnerability_type`, `component` and `root_cause` as separate dimensions. | |
| 4. Connect `untrusted_entry`, `trust_boundary` and `sensitive_operation` into an attack path. | |
| 5. Check `model_necessity` and `mechanism_relation` before making claims about AI-specific or MCP-specific risk. | |
| 6. Follow `reasoning` to `evidence` for any conclusion you want to rely on or cite. | |
| After reading this example, a reasonable explanation is: | |
| > Certain versions of the Neo4j MCP tool service allow a malicious website to | |
| > use DNS rebinding to reach local tools without authorization. The documented | |
| > mechanism does not depend on a language model. The classification is supported | |
| > by disclosure evidence, but the dataset does not claim independent exploitation. | |
| ## Working with the records | |
| For a quick local inspection of the downloaded JSONL, Python's standard library | |
| is sufficient: | |
| ```python | |
| import json | |
| with open("records.jsonl", encoding="utf-8") as source: | |
| records = [json.loads(line) for line in source if line.strip()] | |
| record = records[0] | |
| print(record["cve_id"], record["vulnerability_type"]) | |
| # Follow a judgment to its sources. | |
| evidence_by_id = {item["id"]: item for item in record["evidence"]} | |
| judgment = record["reasoning"]["model_necessity"] | |
| print(judgment["basis"], judgment["reason"]) | |
| for evidence_id in judgment["evidence_ids"]: | |
| print(evidence_by_id[evidence_id]["url"]) | |
| # Keep unknowns visible rather than silently counting them as negative findings. | |
| unknown_boundaries = [r["cve_id"] for r in records if r["trust_boundary"] is None] | |
| print("Unestablished trust boundaries:", unknown_boundaries) | |
| ``` | |
| `null` means unestablished, unspecified or, for padded optional Parquet keys, | |
| absent in the source object. It does not mean false or safe. An empty upstream | |
| list means no values were available in the exported snapshot. Check the field | |
| scope and reasoning to distinguish these cases. | |
| Use CVE IDs as record identifiers. A CVE record count is not necessarily a count | |
| of independent root causes, affected installations or successful attacks. A | |
| multi-label root-cause count can exceed the number of records. These 791 records | |
| form a frozen research cohort, not an exhaustive census or a representative random | |
| sample of the MCP ecosystem. The `full` split contains the whole cohort. | |
| For reproducible research, record the dataset revision and consult the taxonomy | |
| version in the README. Preserve source attribution and the [license notices](NOTICE) | |
| when redistributing data. For deployment decisions, recheck current upstream | |
| advisories rather than treating a frozen dataset snapshot as a live security feed. | |
| ## Technical field reference | |
| All rows share this schema; omitted audit fields are documented globally in README. | |
| | Field | Meaning | | |
| |---|---| | |
| | cve_id | Stable CVE identifier and join key | | |
| | title, description | Upstream title and English description; not our mechanism conclusion | | |
| | date_published | Official first-publication timestamp, not NVD ingestion date | | |
| | affected | Upstream product/vendor/version objects, preserved without flattening version ranges | | |
| | upstream_weaknesses | Upstream weakness objects; not automatically mapped from our taxonomy | | |
| | upstream_severity_metrics | Upstream severity/assessment objects (including CVSS and, where present, SSVC); absent metrics remain an empty list | | |
| | vulnerability_type | Primary mechanism-first taxonomy label | | |
| | component | Role of affected component; null if unresolved | | |
| | root_cause | Positive supported root labels; null when none established, not absence of a flaw | | |
| | classification_confidence | Original per-field qualitative confidence; component_bucket refers to component | | |
| | untrusted_entry | Attacker-controlled or insufficiently trusted entry | | |
| | sensitive_operation | Security-sensitive operation reached | | |
| | trust_boundary | Trust or privilege boundary; null when unestablished | | |
| | model_necessity | Model necessity for the documented primitive/chain | | |
| | mechanism_relation | Traditional reuse, integration boundary, agent composition, or null | | |
| | evidence | Source objects described below | | |
| | reasoning | Field-keyed basis, reason, limitations and evidence_ids | | |
| ### Evidence objects | |
| `id` is unique within a record. `kind` distinguishes cve_record, security_advisory, | |
| commit, source_code, issue_report and reference. `url` is the primary source; | |
| `related_urls` retains additional links recorded for the same local evidence | |
| artifact. `supports` lists record fields. `summary` explains the source's purpose. | |
| `reasoning.<field>.evidence_ids` joins to these objects. Background references can | |
| have an empty supports list. No raw evidence bodies or local filesystem paths | |
| are exported. Evidence locators may be added when verified; this release does not | |
| invent line numbers or function names for sources without reliable locators. | |
| ### Unknown and basis semantics | |
| JSON null means unknown/unestablished, never false. Empty upstream lists mean no | |
| values were available in this exported source snapshot. Root arrays list only | |
| supported positives and do not exhaust all possible causes. Unknown mechanisms | |
| retain a reason and their evaluated evidence rather than guessing a category. | |
| `source_supported_at_stated_granularity`: supported by saved source at that scope. | |
| `analyst_mechanistic_inference`: our interpretation of the mechanism. | |
| `insufficient_or_conflicting_evidence`: insufficient/conflicting source evidence. | |
| `analyst_classification`: project taxonomy judgment, not an official upstream label. | |
| Model values and mechanism relation values are preserved verbatim from v1. | |
| `not_required_for_documented_primitive` means no model is needed for the described | |
| primitive; it does not rule out model-assisted exploitation. | |
| MCP relevance, taxonomy version, individual review date, reviewer identity and | |
| runtime-reproduction flags are intentionally absent from each public row. | |
| Complete values remain in the local audit; README supplies method and scope. | |
| ### Parquet representation | |
| The Viewer uses standard Parquet list/struct types, without JSON extension types. | |
| Absent optional object keys are represented as null in Parquet so that all rows | |
| share a schema. The JSON/JSONL downloads preserve the original key presence. | |
| Existing values, explicit nulls, evidence bindings and record order are unchanged. | |
| ### Upstream metric shapes | |
| `upstream_severity_metrics` is always a list. CVE-format metric objects retain | |
| keys such as `cvssV3_1`, `cvssV4_0`, `format` and `scenarios`. In 42 records, the | |
| frozen catalog instead stores an NVD-format dictionary of metric groups. That | |
| entire dictionary is wrapped in a one-element list, preserving keys such as | |
| `cvssMetricV31` and `ssvcV203`, all nested values and provider attribution. This | |
| structural normalization is reversible; it is not a reassessment or score mapping. | |
| The local audit retains both forms. Missing source attribution is not inferred. | |
| The full cohort may add optional nested keys relative to the ten-record preview; | |
| the same 18 top-level fields and their meanings remain unchanged. | |