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| license: mit | |
| tags: | |
| - genomics | |
| - microbiology | |
| - horizontal-gene-transfer | |
| - crispr | |
| - causal-inference | |
| pretty_name: LEDGER | |
| size_categories: | |
| - 1M<n<10M | |
| # LEDGER data | |
| Processed data for LEDGER, a latent-variable model that separates *exposure* from *establishment* | |
| when estimating which mobile genetic elements a bacterial genome will accept. Code lives at [bryanc5864/LEDGER](https://github.com/bryanc5864/LEDGER). | |
| The core problem: when an element is missing from a genome, the host either never met it or met it | |
| and rejected it. Regressing observed presence on host features estimates the product of those two | |
| things, and exposure tracks the same phylogeny as the defense repertoire, so susceptibility is never | |
| separately identified. LEDGER uses CRISPR spacers as a record of encounter that survives regardless | |
| of the outcome. | |
| ## Contents | |
| ``` | |
| simulation/ 5,551 per-fit records from every simulation sweep (JSONL, one object per fit) | |
| genomes/ | |
| annotations/ DefenseFinder 3.0.0 systems tables for 1,200 P. aeruginosa genomes | |
| matrices/ host x defense-system presence matrices, split chromosomal/extrachromosomal | |
| crispr/ 27,620 CRISPR spacers (MinCED), pooled and per genome | |
| elements/ Y and S matrices: 1,200 hosts x 2,589 spacer-derived elements | |
| clusters/ ANI lineage clusters at three thresholds | |
| metadata/ NCBI assembly metadata and the stratified cohort definition | |
| results/ exclusion-restriction audit, CRISPR proximity test, real-data fit output | |
| figures/ every figure in the paper, PNG and PDF | |
| main.pdf the paper | |
| ``` | |
| ## The two matrices | |
| `genomes/elements/Y.tsv.gz` and `S.tsv.gz` are the observables the model consumes. Rows are the | |
| 1,200 genomes, columns the 2,589 elements. `S[i,j] = 1` means host *i* carries a CRISPR spacer | |
| targeting element *j*, so it demonstrably encountered it. `Y[i,j] = 1` means the element (strictly, | |
| a >= 95% identity match to the protospacer, outside any CRISPR array) is resident in that genome. | |
| Three things about this data are worth knowing before using it: | |
| - The informative cell, encounter without establishment, holds 25,099 pairs. | |
| - Self-targeting pairs (spacer present *and* element resident) are depleted 0.54x relative to | |
| independence, which is what the model predicts, since a spacer against a resident element is | |
| self-targeting and gets purged. | |
| - The false-match rate is zero: 2,589 dinucleotide-shuffled decoy sequences produced no hits at all | |
| against the same 1,200 genomes under identical search settings. | |
| CRISPR arrays were masked out of the genomes before searching. Without that step every spacer | |
| matches its own array, `Y` becomes identical to `S`, and the informative cell is empty. | |
| ## Simulation records | |
| `simulation/*.jsonl` is one JSON object per model fit: the full configuration, every metric, the | |
| realised marginal rates and the convergence status. Nothing is aggregated. Three audit scripts in | |
| the code repository recompute all 181 published numbers from these records. | |
| Superseded runs are kept rather than deleted and are named accordingly, including a permutation | |
| control that turned out not to be a null and a threat sweep whose arms were confounded by a shared | |
| random stream. | |
| ## Raw genomes | |
| Not mirrored here. They are public NCBI assemblies; `make genomes` in the code repository | |
| re-downloads them (about 18 GB) and reproduces everything above. | |
| ## License | |
| MIT, Bryan Cheng, 2026. | |