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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
E001 | comparison | finance_operations | unspecified | no_reviewer | slot-11-no_reviewer | topology-001 | candidate | images/comparison/E001.png | Invoice intake to payment approval/execution pipeline | Model a connected finance workflow where an invoice-handling agent ingests externally supplied invoice documents, extracts payment-relevant details, drafts payment actions, and forwards them into an approval and execution path. | [
"The invoice documents and any supporting evidence originate outside the trusted application zone.",
"The invoice intake agent can read external documents and produce structured payment drafts, but its internal validation, guardrails, and approval checks are unspecified.",
"An approval step and a payment-execut... | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C2",
"C3"
],
"fact": "Invoice intake is a documented application workflow that accepts external invoice files, extracts fields into a draft record, and hands the draft onward; validation depth and guardrails are unspecified.",
"flow_ids": [
"F1",
"F2"
... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "external_entity",
"label": "Invoice documents",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Invoice intake agent",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "data_store",
"label": "P... | [
{
"assessment": "exposed",
"asset": "Payment draft record",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1"
],
"category": "A",
"component_ids": [
"C2",
"C3"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"K1",
"K3"
],
"evidence_quote": "Invoice intake is a documented application workflow... | [
"Boundary IDs assigned from the ordered flows: B1 for Z1↔Z2 and B2 for Z2↔Z3.",
"F2 is same-zone within Z2 and does not cross a trust boundary.",
"The architecture does not specify whether the approval reviewer is human or automated, so unauthorized disclosure or spoofing against that component remains unsuppor... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C2",
"C3"
],
"existing_control_effect": "K1 and K3 already show that external invoices are ingested and transformed into drafts, but they do not specify effective guardrails. The downstream draft workflow exists, so this control would strengthen the existing... | |
E002 | comparison | customer_support | unspecified | single_prompt | slot-06-single_prompt | topology-002 | candidate | images/comparison/E002.png | customer_support | A support agent uses externally supplied help documents and a customer-account store to prepare responses. | [
"Synthetic design; no actual production data.",
"Relevant control implementation and effectiveness are unspecified.",
"The support agent can query account data to prepare responses, but privileged access is not assumed beyond the stated workflow.",
"An attacker can influence external help documents or ticket ... | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C2",
"C3"
],
"fact": "Document and ticket inputs are passed through the drafting workflow without an explicit content-authentication or instruction-sanitization guarantee being stated.",
"flow_ids": [
"F2",
"F3",
"F1"
],
"id": "Ctrl1"
},
... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Support Agent",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "process",
"label": "Help Document Fetcher",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "process",
"label": "Response Drafti... | [
{
"assessment": "exposed",
"asset": "response-generation workflow and agent tool authority",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1"
],
"category": "A",
"component_ids": [
"C5",
"C2",
"C3",
"C1"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"Ctrl1"
],
"evidence_quote": "Doc... | [
"Boundary IDs were assigned by first-seen zone pairs: B1 for External Sources to Support Application, B2 for Support Application to Account Data.",
"The architecture does not state whether the external help documents are authenticated, filtered, or sandboxed; unsupported assumptions should not be made.",
"The a... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C2",
"C3",
"C1"
],
"existing_control_effect": "Ctrl1 already indicates the workflow lacks a stated instruction-sanitization guarantee, so this mitigation addresses the identified gap.",
"recommendation": "Add a content-separation rule in the help f... | |
E003 | comparison | incident_response | guarded | full_workflow | slot-16-full_workflow | topology-003 | candidate | images/comparison/E003.png | Guarded multi-analyst incident triage with coordinator and case store | Two analyst agents independently review externally supplied incident evidence, then report normalized findings to a coordinator that consolidates results into a case store for response tracking. | [
"Externally supplied incident content may be adversarially crafted, but the attacker has no authenticated access to internal systems.",
"Analyst agents can only use bounded retrieval or parsing tools against approved sources and allowed actions.",
"The coordinator is authorized to write only case records, not a... | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2",
"C3"
],
"fact": "Evidence intake is restricted to approved incident sources, and analyst tool use is bounded to read-only retrieval and parsing of those sources.",
"flow_ids": [
"F1",
"F2"
],
"id": "K1"
},
{
"component_id... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "external_entity",
"label": "Evidence Intake",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Analyst Agent A",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Analyst Agent... | [
{
"assessment": "exposed",
"asset": "Analyst Agent A judgment and downstream findings",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1"
],
"category": "A",
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"K1"
],
"evidence_quote": "Evidence intake is restricted to ap... | [
"No threat is asserted for direct unauthorized access to internal systems; the scenario explicitly says the attacker has no authenticated access to internal systems.",
"Boundary B1 covers flows between External Evidence (Z1) and Analysis Workspace (Z2); boundary B2 covers flows between Analysis Workspace (Z2) and... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C2",
"C4"
],
"existing_control_effect": "K1 already restricts intake to approved sources and limits analyst tools to read-only retrieval and parsing, which reduces arbitrary action and narrows the injection surface.",
"recommendation": "Add a prompt- and... | |
E004 | comparison | finance_operations | guarded | full_workflow | slot-09-full_workflow | topology-004 | candidate | images/comparison/E004.png | Guarded invoice-to-payment assistant with approval handoff | Model a finance workflow where an invoice-reading agent ingests externally supplied documents, extracts payment-relevant details, drafts payment requests, and passes them to a separate approval and payment-execution path under enforced controls. | [
"External invoices and supporting evidence may be attacker-influenced and are treated as untrusted input.",
"The invoice agent runs with bounded tool authority and cannot directly execute payments.",
"Approval is a distinct control point with authorization checks; execution requires passing that gate.",
"Prov... | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C2",
"C3"
],
"fact": "Document intake records provenance metadata before the invoice agent sees the content, and the agent reads only the stored invoice record rather than the supplier channel directly.",
"flow_ids": [
"F1",
"F2",
"F3"
],
"... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "external_entity",
"label": "Supplier portal",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "process",
"label": "Document intake service",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Inv... | [
{
"assessment": "exposed",
"asset": "invoice records and payment drafts",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1",
"B2"
],
"category": "T",
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2",
"C4",
"C3",
"C5"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"K4"
],
"evidence_quote": "T... | [
"Boundary IDs were assigned from the listed flows: B1 for Z1-Z2, B2 for Z2-Z3, and B3 for Z1-Z3.",
"No direct threat path was identified for C6->C1 beyond ordinary payment confirmation/remittance notice delivery; that flow alone does not demonstrate disclosure or abuse.",
"The architecture does not describe aut... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C2",
"C4",
"C3",
"C5"
],
"existing_control_effect": "K4 already notes reliance on provenance metadata and content extraction, and K1 stores provenance before agent access, which reduces direct supplier-channel tampering but does not guarantee det... | |
E005 | comparison | incident_response | unspecified | full_workflow | slot-18-full_workflow | topology-005 | candidate | images/comparison/E005.png | Incident evidence triage with dual analyst agents, coordinator, and case store | Support incident response by having two analyst agents review externally supplied evidence, consolidate findings via a coordinator, and persist case records in a shared store. | [
"External incident documents, logs, and attachments may be attacker-influenced, but the attacker has no privileged access to internal services or operator accounts.",
"Relevant control implementation and effectiveness are unspecified; no assumption is made that validation, sandboxing, approval, or authentication ... | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C2",
"C3"
],
"fact": "Unspecified evidence handling controls govern analyst ingestion of external files and logs; effectiveness is not assumed.",
"flow_ids": [
"F1",
"F2"
],
"id": "K1"
},
{
"component_ids": [
"C4",
"C5"
],... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "external_entity",
"label": "Evidence intake",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Analyst agent A",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Analyst agent... | [
{
"assessment": "exposed",
"asset": "Analyst agent A reasoning and outputs",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1"
],
"category": "A",
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"K4"
],
"evidence_quote": "External evidence remains outside the trusted ... | [
"No direct unauthorized write path to the case store is shown; only the coordinator writes to C5.",
"No direct analyst-to-store disclosure path is shown; persistence occurs only through the coordinator.",
"Because control effectiveness is unspecified, ingestion hardening, sandboxing, and approval mechanisms can... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C2"
],
"existing_control_effect": "K4 keeps external evidence outside the trusted zone until C2 consumes it, and K1 indicates ingestion controls already govern the path, but their effectiveness is unspecified.",
"recommendation": "Enforce strict evidence sanit... | |
E006 | comparison | customer_support | unspecified | full_workflow | slot-05-full_workflow | topology-006 | candidate | images/comparison/E006.png | Support Agent with External Help Docs and Account Lookup | Draft customer-support replies by combining a user ticket, externally supplied help documents, and internal customer-account data within one agentic workflow. | [
"The assistant is one connected workflow that decides when to consult external documents and the account store.",
"External help documents are attacker-influenced inputs and are outside the trusted application zone unless later validated by the system.",
"The customer-account store is internal to the support en... | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C3",
"C4"
],
"fact": "The orchestrator and drafting step operate as a single support workflow that can combine ticket text, retrieved help content, and account facts before producing a reply; the exact validation and grounding checks are unspecified.",
"flow_ids": [... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "external_entity",
"label": "Customer Ticket Intake",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "external_entity",
"label": "Help Document Source",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "agent",
"... | [
{
"assessment": "exposed",
"asset": "support reply generation and agent decision-making",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1"
],
"category": "A",
"component_ids": [
"C2",
"C3",
"C4"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"CTRL1",
"CTRL3"
],
"evidence_quote": "Ext... | [
"Boundary IDs inferred from the supplied flows: B1 covers Z1<->Z2 traffic on F1, F2, and F7; B2 covers Z2<->Z3 traffic on F4 and F5.",
"No direct unauthorized read from C6 alone was treated as disclosure; disclosure is only modeled where data can plausibly reach the external reply path.",
"No separate repudiati... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C3",
"C4"
],
"existing_control_effect": "CTRL1 and CTRL3 already indicate the workflow can combine external content with drafting, but validation effectiveness is unspecified; this means the current design may provide some parsing/sanitization without reliab... | |
E007 | comparison | finance_operations | unspecified | full_workflow | slot-11-full_workflow | topology-007 | candidate | images/comparison/E007.png | Invoice-to-Payment Drafting Flow with External Document Intake | An invoice-handling agent ingests externally supplied invoice documents and supporting evidence, extracts billing details, drafts payment requests, and forwards them into an approval and payment-execution path. | [
"Invoice documents and evidence originate outside the trusted application zone and may be attacker-influenced.",
"The invoice agent can read external documents and can create or populate payment drafts from extracted content.",
"The approval and payment-execution path exists as a separate downstream function, b... | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2"
],
"fact": "External submissions are accepted through the supplier portal into the invoice agent; content validation and document-authenticity checks are present in design, but their effectiveness is unspecified.",
"flow_ids": [
"F1"
],
"id":... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "external_entity",
"label": "Supplier Upload Portal",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Invoice Agent",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "data_store",
"label": "Doc... | [
{
"assessment": "exposed",
"asset": "Draft payment request",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1"
],
"category": "T",
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2",
"C4"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"K1",
"K3"
],
"evidence_quote": "External submissions are accepted thro... | [
"Boundary IDs assigned from flow order: B1 for Z1-Z2, B2 for Z2-Z3.",
"Controls mention validation, storage limitation, and workflow gating, but their effectiveness is explicitly unspecified; this prevents stronger reduction claims.",
"No direct unauthorized read path from the document store is shown, so inform... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2",
"C4"
],
"existing_control_effect": "K1 and K3 indicate validation/authenticity checks and draft generation separation are present, but their effectiveness is unspecified, so they may reduce accidental errors yet do not establish reliable pre... | |
E008 | comparison | customer_support | guarded | full_workflow | slot-04-full_workflow | topology-008 | candidate | images/comparison/E008.png | Guarded support-assist workflow with external evidence and account lookup | A customer-support assistant drafts replies using externally supplied help documents and a customer-account store, while enforcing authorization, provenance checks, and bounded tool access. | [
"The assistant is connected to a ticketing front end that accepts customer messages and uploaded evidence.",
"Help documents may originate outside the trusted zone and can be attacker-influenced.",
"The account store is inside a separate trusted zone and requires authenticated, least-privilege read access.",
... | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C3"
],
"fact": "Uploaded evidence is passed through a provenance and content filter before the assistant receives it; untrusted documents are not treated as authoritative without passing this gate.",
"flow_ids": [
"F2",
"F3"
],
"id": "CTL1"
},
{
... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "external_entity",
"label": "Ticket front end",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "process",
"label": "Evidence uploader",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "process",
"label": "Docume... | [
{
"assessment": "exposed",
"asset": "support assistant behavior and reply integrity",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1"
],
"category": "A",
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2",
"C3",
"C4"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"CTL1",
"CTL4"
],
"evidence_quote"... | [
"Boundary IDs derived from the supplied zones and flows: B1 covers Z1<->Z2, B2 covers Z2<->Z3.",
"Unsupported or incomplete paths not analyzed as separate threats include direct modification of account records, because the design states the model cannot directly write account records.",
"Same-zone flows F3, F4,... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C3",
"C4"
],
"existing_control_effect": "CTL1 and CTL4 already place a provenance/content filter in front of the agent workspace, so the attack is screened before reaching the assistant, but the scenario notes incomplete effectiveness against adversarial tex... | |
E009 | comparison | finance_operations | guarded | no_reviewer | slot-10-no_reviewer | topology-009 | candidate | images/comparison/E009.png | Guarded invoice-to-payment agent with approval gate | An invoice-handling AI reads externally supplied invoice documents, extracts payment-relevant fields, prepares payment drafts, and passes them to a separate approval and execution path under constrained tool authority. | [
"Invoice documents arrive from outside the trusted application zone and may be attacker-influenced.",
"The invoice agent has bounded read-only access to documents and a limited drafting tool, but cannot execute payments directly.",
"Approval and payment execution are separated from invoice intake by an explicit... | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C2"
],
"fact": "The invoice agent is configured for read-only document access and can only produce draft output, not settle payments.",
"flow_ids": [
"F1",
"F2"
],
"id": "K1"
},
{
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2"
],
"fact": "In... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "external_entity",
"label": "Invoice Inbox",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Invoice Agent",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "data_store",
"label": "Draft Review... | [
{
"assessment": "exposed",
"asset": "invoice intake and draft preparation",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1"
],
"category": "T",
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2",
"C3"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"K2"
],
"evidence_quote": "Incoming invoices are subjected to ... | [
"Boundary IDs assigned from the supplied flow order: B1 for Z1-Z2, B2 for Z2-Z3.",
"No direct payment execution path exists from the invoice agent; F4 requires approval via C4.",
"Controls mention provenance checks and schema validation, but their effectiveness against crafted content is explicitly unspecified.... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2"
],
"existing_control_effect": "K2 already provides provenance checks and schema validation at F1, which helps screen some nonconforming inputs, but resistance to crafted content is unspecified.",
"recommendation": "Harden the invoice intake pip... | |
E010 | comparison | finance_operations | unspecified | no_reviewer | slot-12-no_reviewer | topology-010 | candidate | images/comparison/E010.png | Invoice intake to draft payment approval pipeline | Model an invoice-processing flow where an agent ingests externally supplied invoice documents, extracts payment details, prepares payment drafts, and forwards them into an approval and payment-execution path. | [
"An external sender can influence invoice contents, attachments, or supporting evidence, but has no privileged internal access.",
"The invoice agent can read external documents and produce draft payment artifacts, but the effectiveness of any validation, sandboxing, approval checks, or execution controls is unspe... | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2"
],
"fact": "Invoice intake passes externally supplied documents into the finance workflow; document validation and agent-side filtering are present as configured behavior, but their effectiveness is unspecified.",
"flow_ids": [
"F1",
"F2"
]... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "process",
"label": "Invoice intake",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Invoice agent",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "data_store",
"label": "Draft payment recor... | [
{
"assessment": "exposed",
"asset": "draft payment record and downstream payment instruction",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1",
"B2"
],
"category": "T",
"component_ids": [
"C6",
"C1",
"C2",
"C3",
"C4",
"C5"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"CT... | [
"Boundary IDs inferred from the listed flows only: B1 for Z1↔Z2 and B2 for Z2↔Z3.",
"No explicit authentication, authorization, logging, nonrepudiation, or sandboxing mechanism is described; related impacts remain uncertain.",
"A data-store read or internal data flow alone does not establish unauthorized disclo... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2",
"C4",
"C5"
],
"existing_control_effect": "CTL1 already provides intake validation/filtering, and CTL2/CTL3 already place a review and execution step in the path, but their effectiveness is unspecified so they may only partially reduce ... | |
E011 | comparison | finance_operations | guarded | single_prompt | slot-09-single_prompt | topology-011 | candidate | images/comparison/E011.png | finance_operations | An invoice agent reads externally supplied invoice documents, prepares payment drafts, and hands them to an approval and payment-execution path. | [
"Synthetic design; no actual production data.",
"The supplier portal is attacker-influenced but not authenticated as trusted by default.",
"The invoice agent can invoke only the validation and ledger interfaces shown here; no direct bank or email tool access is assumed.",
"Approval remains a separate human st... | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C3"
],
"fact": "Document Validation Service rejects unsigned or malformed invoices and records document provenance before returning a normalized invoice record.",
"flow_ids": [
"F1",
"F2",
"F3"
],
"id": "CTRL1"
},
{
"component_ids": [
... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "external_entity",
"label": "Supplier Portal",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Invoice Agent",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "process",
"label": "Document Vali... | [
{
"assessment": "exposed",
"asset": "invoice draft integrity and downstream approval quality",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1"
],
"category": "A",
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2",
"C3",
"C4"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"CTRL2"
],
"evidence_quote": "T... | [
"Boundary IDs follow first-seen unordered zone pairs: F1/F2/F3/F4 create B1 between Z1 and Z2; F5 creates B2 between Z2 and Z3.",
"Unsupported paths remain possible where agent prompt isolation, document authenticity proofs, or approver visibility rules are not fully specified.",
"A data-store write to the Draf... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C2",
"C3",
"C4"
],
"existing_control_effect": "The agent is already limited to read-only ingestion and draft creation, and the validation service records document provenance.",
"recommendation": "Harden the Invoice Agent with strict instruction par... | |
E012 | comparison | customer_support | guarded | no_reviewer | slot-04-no_reviewer | topology-012 | candidate | images/comparison/E012.png | Guarded support-assist workflow with external evidence intake and account lookup | A support agent drafts customer replies by combining externally supplied help documents with customer-account data, while enforcing provenance checks, scoped account authorization, and bounded tool use. | [
"External help documents may be attacker-influenced or malformed.",
"The support agent can read help content and query a customer-account store through controlled tools.",
"Account access is limited to the minimum records needed for the active ticket, but some residual risk remains where document provenance or ... | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C3"
],
"fact": "Inbound help content is checked for source provenance and tagged before the agent can use it.",
"flow_ids": [
"F1",
"F2"
],
"id": "K1"
},
{
"component_ids": [
"C2",
"C4"
],
"fact": "The account lookup tool ac... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "external_entity",
"label": "Help intake",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Support agent",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "process",
"label": "Provenance gate",... | [
{
"assessment": "exposed",
"asset": "support reply drafting process and customer-facing response quality",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1"
],
"category": "A",
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C3",
"C2",
"C6"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"K1",
"K3"
],
... | [
"Only public-facing evidence input and support-tool/account-lookup paths are in scope.",
"No direct write path to customer data is described; write or tamper threats against C5 are unsupported by the supplied architecture facts.",
"The architecture does not specify authentication, logging, replay resistance, or... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C3",
"C2",
"C6"
],
"existing_control_effect": "K1 already checks source provenance and tags inbound content, and K3 limits drafting inputs to the validated evidence summary plus authorized account results.",
"recommendation": "Keep provenance gatin... | |
E013 | comparison | incident_response | guarded | no_reviewer | slot-15-no_reviewer | topology-013 | candidate | images/comparison/E013.png | Guarded multi-agent incident triage with provenance-checked evidence flow | A guarded incident-response workflow where two analyst agents independently process externally supplied incident evidence, submit findings to a coordinator, and persist curated case notes into a case store under explicit authorization and provenance controls. | [
"External incident documents, logs, or attachments may be attacker-influenced but arrive without privileged system access.",
"Analyst agents can use bounded tools only through a coordinator-enforced policy layer; direct case-store writes are not allowed.",
"The coordinator verifies identity/authorization for in... | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C4",
"C5"
],
"fact": "Coordinator-only write path to the case store; direct analyst writes are disallowed by design and storage writes require authenticated application calls.",
"flow_ids": [
"F5",
"F6"
],
"id": "CTL1"
},
{
"component_ids... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "external_entity",
"label": "Evidence Inbox",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Analyst Agent A",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Analyst Agent ... | [
{
"assessment": "exposed",
"asset": "triage findings and downstream case notes",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1"
],
"category": "T",
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2",
"C3",
"C4"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"CTL2"
],
"evidence_quote": "Analyst tools ar... | [
"Boundary IDs inferred from the listed flow order: B1 covers Z1<->Z2 and B2 covers Z2<->Z3.",
"No direct analyst-to-case-store write flow is present; unsupported paths for that route are out of scope.",
"The architecture states provenance checks, but semantic correctness is explicitly not guaranteed, leaving re... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C4",
"C5"
],
"existing_control_effect": "CTL2 already bounds analyst tools through the coordinator, reducing direct abuse of agent capabilities and store access.",
"recommendation": "Add content-safety and provenance validation at the coordinator/provena... | |
E014 | comparison | customer_support | weak | single_prompt | slot-02-single_prompt | topology-014 | candidate | images/comparison/E014.png | customer_support | A support agent uses externally supplied help documents and a customer-account store to prepare responses. | [
"Synthetic design; no actual production data.",
"The attacker can influence external help documents but has no privileged access to the support app or customer store.",
"The support agent uses the workspace output to compose customer replies."
] | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C3"
],
"fact": "The help document fetcher only accepts HTTPS URLs from an allowlist.",
"flow_ids": [
"F1",
"F2"
],
"id": "K1"
},
{
"component_ids": [
"C2"
],
"fact": "The response workspace shows source snippets and account fields... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Support Agent",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "process",
"label": "Response Workspace",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "process",
"label": "Help Document Fetc... | [
{
"assessment": "reduced",
"asset": "response preparation integrity",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1"
],
"category": "A",
"component_ids": [
"C4",
"C3",
"C2",
"C1"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"K1"
],
"evidence_quote": "The help document fetcher onl... | [
"Only one connected customer-support architecture is analyzed.",
"Boundary IDs follow first-seen zone pairs: B1 between External Sources and Support App; B2 between Customer Data and Support App.",
"Unsupported paths: the customer store is not shown as directly exposed outside the workspace, so disclosure beyon... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C3",
"C2"
],
"existing_control_effect": "The HTTPS allowlist already reduces source risk by limiting where documents can be fetched from.",
"recommendation": "Add content sanitization and instruction stripping in the help document fetcher, and render fet... | |
E015 | comparison | customer_support | guarded | single_prompt | slot-03-single_prompt | topology-015 | candidate | images/comparison/E015.png | customer_support | A support agent uses externally supplied help documents and a customer-account store to prepare responses. | [
"Synthetic design; no actual production data.",
"The attacker can influence external help documents but has no privileged access to the support app or customer-account store.",
"Tool calls from the drafting service are bounded to the listed retrieval and lookup flows."
] | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C4"
],
"fact": "Provenance checks reject documents without an approved source label before excerpting.",
"flow_ids": [
"F1",
"F2"
],
"id": "CTRL1"
},
{
"component_ids": [
"C3"
],
"fact": "The drafting service can call only the doc... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "external_entity",
"label": "Help Document Repository",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Support Agent",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "process",
"label": "Resp... | [
{
"assessment": "reduced",
"asset": "response drafting behavior and response quality",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1"
],
"category": "A",
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C4",
"C3"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"CTRL1"
],
"evidence_quote": "Provenance checks rej... | [
"Flow boundary IDs were assigned from the listed flow order: F1/F2 cross B1 between Z1 and Z2; F4/F5 cross B2 between Z2 and Z3.",
"The architecture does not specify whether user-entered case details are separately validated before reaching the drafting service.",
"No unsupported tool paths are modeled beyond t... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C4",
"C3"
],
"existing_control_effect": "CTRL1 already rejects documents without an approved source label before excerpting.",
"recommendation": "Keep provenance enforcement mandatory at C4 and require C3 to reject any excerpt set that lacks an approved ... | |
E016 | comparison | customer_support | unspecified | no_reviewer | slot-05-no_reviewer | topology-016 | candidate | images/comparison/E016.png | Support agent with external docs and account lookup | A customer-support AI agent drafts replies by reading externally supplied help documents and querying a customer-account store, then composing a response for the human or customer-facing workflow. | [
"The support agent can ingest externally supplied help documents or evidence artifacts during case handling.",
"The agent has read access to a customer-account store for account context and history.",
"Relevant control implementation and effectiveness are unspecified; no assumption is made that validation, acce... | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C2"
],
"fact": "The support agent is configured to combine retrieved document snippets with account context when drafting case responses; how strongly it resists instruction injection or misleading evidence is unspecified.",
"flow_ids": [
"F1",
"F2",
"F3... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "external_entity",
"label": "Help document inbox",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Support agent",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "process",
"label": "Reply dra... | [
{
"assessment": "exposed",
"asset": "support reply drafting and customer communication",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1"
],
"category": "A",
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2",
"C3",
"C5"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"K1"
],
"evidence_quote": "The suppor... | [
"Boundary IDs were assigned from the listed flows: B1 for Z1-Z2 and B2 for Z2-Z3.",
"No standalone repudiation, denial-of-service, or elevation-of-privilege path is supported by the supplied facts.",
"The customer-facing channel is described as a workflow destination; whether it is human-reviewed before sending... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C2",
"C3"
],
"existing_control_effect": "K1 already combines retrieved snippets with account context, so the attack path exists but is partially constrained by the fact that the output still passes through the support workflow and reply queue. However, resis... | |
E017 | comparison | incident_response | unspecified | full_workflow | slot-17-full_workflow | topology-003 | candidate | images/comparison/E017.png | Incident Evidence Triage with Dual Analyst Agents and Case Coordinator | Model an incident-response workflow where two analyst agents independently review externally supplied evidence, forward findings to a coordinator, and persist case material in a shared case store, with control effectiveness unspecified. | [
"Externally supplied documents, logs, or artifacts may be attacker-influenced before ingestion.",
"Two analyst agents are distinct processing components and both can receive the same external evidence stream.",
"A coordinator aggregates or reconciles analyst findings before writing to the case store.",
"Relev... | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C2",
"C3"
],
"fact": "Analyst agents ingest the same external evidence stream; validation and sandboxing behavior is unspecified.",
"flow_ids": [
"F1"
],
"id": "K1"
},
{
"component_ids": [
"C4"
],
"fact": "The coordinator compares... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "external_entity",
"label": "Evidence Intake",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Analyst Agent A",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Analyst Agent... | [
{
"assessment": "exposed",
"asset": "Analyst reasoning and coordinator reconciliation outputs",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1",
"B2"
],
"category": "A",
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2",
"C3",
"C4"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"K1",
"K4"
],
... | [
"Boundary B1 covers flows between Z1 and Z2; boundary B2 covers flows between Z2 and Z3.",
"No supported repudiation, denial-of-service, or elevation-of-privilege path is explicit in the supplied facts.",
"The architecture does not specify read permissions for the case store, so disclosure from storage is incom... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C2",
"C3",
"C4"
],
"existing_control_effect": "K1 already states the analyst agents ingest the same external evidence stream, but validation and sandboxing are unspecified; this means the path is recognized but not yet bounded by a stated control.",
... |
ASTRIDE: Diagram-Grounded Threat-Modeling Dataset
Version v0.2.0 adds three attributed Mermaid redraws of architectures from the original ASTRIDE evaluation in a separate illustrations subset. The original annotated collections and trial outcomes are unchanged from v0.1.0.
The release contains synthetic architecture diagrams, operating facts, candidate threat annotations, mitigation recommendations, and generation trial outcomes. It supports research on constructing datasets for ASTRIDE-style vision–language threat analysis.
The dataset accompanies the draft An Agentic Framework for Constructing and Evaluating Multimodal Threat-Modeling Datasets. It is distinct from the corpus used in the original ASTRIDE threat-analysis paper. A publication reference will be added when available.
Collections
| Configuration | Split | Records | Candidate threats |
|---|---|---|---|
comparison (default) |
evaluation |
48 diagrams | 154 |
development |
examples |
3 diagrams | 14 |
trials |
evaluation |
54 generation attempts | Not applicable |
illustrations |
examples |
3 architecture redraws | Not supplied |
There are 51 annotated diagram records and 168 candidate threats, plus 3 architecture illustrations (54 diagram images total). The controlled experiment uses only the 48 comparison diagrams and 154 threats. The three earlier development examples used a different prompt and recovery history and must not be pooled into that experiment. The 36-record authored template pilot is not included. No training split or verified threat-detection benchmark is provided.
Load diagrams and annotations
from datasets import load_dataset
repo = "lambdaeranga/astride"
ds = load_dataset(repo, "comparison", split="evaluation", revision="v0.2.0")
example = ds[0]
image = example["image"] # PIL image; PNG bytes are embedded in Parquet
facts = {k: example[k] for k in ("title", "purpose", "assumptions", "controls")}
architecture = example["architecture"]
threats = example["threats"]
mitigations = example["mitigations"]
examples = load_dataset(repo, "development", split="examples", revision="v0.2.0")
trials = load_dataset(repo, "trials", split="evaluation", revision="v0.2.0")
Images load without any files from the author's workstation. Every diagram is also provided as a PNG, SVG, and Mermaid source under images/. The three illustrations rows provide source attribution and architecture images without threat/mitigation labels. Portable JSONL records under records/ use image paths relative to this repository.
For VLM input, use the image plus operating facts. Canonical architecture labels, threats, mitigations, and generation-condition identifiers are targets or study metadata; do not leak them into the prediction input.
ASTRIDE evaluation illustrations
The illustrations subset accompanies the downstream evaluation discussion in the dataset-generation paper. These are Mermaid redraws of architecture panels from ASTRIDE: A Security Threat Modeling Platform for Agentic-AI Applications, Figures 7–9.
| Record | Source figure | Dataset-generation paper figure | Evaluation context |
|---|---|---|---|
astride-llama-architecture |
7 | 8 | Tool-using agent; Llama-Vision before/after example |
astride-pixtral-architecture |
8 | 9 | Voice-controlled agent; Pixtral-Vision before/after example |
astride-synthesis-architecture |
9 | 10 | Multi-agent collaboration; VLM predictions and reasoning synthesis |
illustrations = load_dataset(repo, "illustrations", split="examples", revision="v0.2.0")
image = illustrations[0]["image"]
source = illustrations[0]["source_paper"]
The redraws preserve source components, groups, and visible directed connections. They add reference IDs, normalize labels, standardize storage symbols, and revise layout. They are illustrations, not new agent-generated examples, training targets, or additional experimental results. Their annotation_status is illustration_only. No complete threat/mitigation annotation is supplied, and these rows must not be pooled into the frozen generation comparison. The prior ASTRIDE training corpus is not included in this release.
Illustration fields include id, title, embedded image, PNG/SVG/Mermaid paths, source_paper, source_version, source_figure, manuscript_figure, evaluation_context, origin, annotation_status, adaptation, scope, and mermaid_sha256. Cite both the dataset release and the original ASTRIDE paper when using these redraws. Source code, prompts, raw traces, manuscript PDFs, and detailed ratings remain excluded.
Annotated record fields
id,collection,trial_id: stable record and trial identifiers.domain,control_profile,generation_condition: experiment grouping metadata.topology_family_id: typed graph-isomorphism group across both diagram collections, not a semantic-family reference label.image,image_path: embedded image and repository-relative PNG path.title,purpose,assumptions,controls: explicit operating facts.architecture: trust zones, components with stable IDs/kinds, and directed data flows.threats: category, attacker/preconditions, referenced components/flows/boundaries, evidence, impact, and exposed/reduced/unknown assessment.mitigations: enforcement components, recommendation, proposed verification, existing-control effect, and residual risk.scope_notes: generator-supplied limitations; these notes can themselves contain errors.annotation_status:candidatefor all records; no automatic admission to training is implied.
schema.json records the exact Hugging Face feature schemas. Threat IDs join to mitigation threat_id values within each record. Trial rows use record_id to reference valid comparison examples; this field is empty for six unsuccessful attempts.
Construction
The comparison assigned 18 requests to each of three conditions: single-prompt generation, decomposition without semantic review, and the full workflow. Requests crossed three domains (customer support, finance operations, incident response), three control profiles (weak, guarded, unspecified), and two repetitions. Generation used gpt-5.4-mini-2026-03-17, common structural validators, graph constraints, and annotation policy. Shared ceilings were three rounds, 12 logical calls per trial, and 6,000 output tokens per call; realized compute differed.
| Condition | Valid / assigned | Logical calls | Reported input + output tokens |
|---|---|---|---|
| Single prompt | 13/18 | 41 | 158,891 |
| Without semantic review | 17/18 | 80 | 194,848 |
| Full workflow | 18/18 | 117 | 320,626 |
Failures and duplicate topologies were retained. One full-workflow trial exhausted repair while retaining a structurally valid candidate, which remains included. Validity means passing implemented structural checks, not semantic correctness. Trial data include failed attempts in cost/yield denominators; logical calls exclude SDK transport retries. No actual billing or evaluation-session cost is provided.
The study used AI-assisted annotation evaluation, but detailed ratings are not part of this dataset-only release. No security ground truth, omissions recall, executed mitigation effectiveness, or downstream learning gain is established by the released data.
Repository layout
README.md
CITATION.bib
release.json
release_manifest.json
schema.json
data/
comparison/evaluation-00000-of-00001.parquet
development/examples-00000-of-00001.parquet
trials/evaluation-00000-of-00001.parquet
illustrations/examples-00000-of-00001.parquet
records/
comparison.jsonl
development.jsonl
trials.jsonl
illustrations.jsonl
images/
comparison/*.{png,svg,mmd}
development/*.{png,svg,mmd}
illustrations/*.{png,svg,mmd}
The release intentionally excludes implementation source, resolved generation prompts, raw model-call traces, intermediate drafts, and detailed evaluation ratings/packets. Protocol and rating hashes in release.json are lineage identifiers; the corresponding private artifacts are not accessible through this release. Full experimental reproduction is therefore not supported by this package alone.
Intended use and limitations
Use these candidates to inspect synthetic diagram/annotation structure, develop annotation checks, and design prospective VLM training experiments. Known defects include unsupported threats, overstated certainty, partial mitigations, and questionable graph semantics. These annotations must not be treated as verified vulnerabilities or automatically correct training targets. Suggested verification procedures were not executed. The diagrams do not represent actual customers, payments, or incident records.
Some diagrams share typed topology. There are 44 typed-isomorphism groups across the 51 annotated diagrams; the three illustration redraws are outside this grouping analysis. Semantic duplication can remain between different groups. Keep related graph families and their renderings together in future splits.
The current evaluation split identifies a generation-study collection, not an independently validated benchmark.
License and citation
License: unspecified. No license has been selected for this release. Check the applicable version's dataset card before reuse.
Use CITATION.bib and identify the exact release tag or Hub revision used:
@misc{astride_gen_dataset,
title = {ASTRIDE: Diagram-Grounded Threat-Modeling Dataset},
year = {2026},
howpublished = {Hugging Face Datasets},
url = {https://huggingface.co/datasets/lambdaeranga/astride},
note = {Version v0.2.0}
}
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