bioeval-all / bioeval_core /container_tools /restricted_python.py
mr-sarthakgupta
Initial dataset import
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#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Run analysis Python while denying network and child-process escape paths."""
from __future__ import annotations
import ctypes
import errno
import os
import runpy
import sys
from pathlib import Path
BLOCKED_AUDIT_PREFIXES = ("socket.", "subprocess.")
BLOCKED_AUDIT_EVENTS = {
"os.fork",
"os.forkpty",
"os.exec",
"os.posix_spawn",
"os.spawn",
"os.system",
}
WORKSPACE = Path(os.getenv("BIOEVAL_WORKSPACE", "/app")).resolve()
SYSTEM_READ_ROOTS = tuple(
Path(path).resolve()
for path in (
"/usr",
"/bin",
"/lib",
"/lib64",
"/etc",
sys.prefix,
sys.base_prefix,
)
if Path(path).exists()
)
SCMP_ACT_ALLOW = 0x7FFF0000
SCMP_ACT_ERRNO = 0x00050000
SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ = 7
CLONE_THREAD = 0x00010000
BLOCKED_SYSCALLS = (
"socket",
"socketpair",
"connect",
"bind",
"listen",
"accept",
"accept4",
"sendto",
"sendmsg",
"sendmmsg",
"recvfrom",
"recvmsg",
"recvmmsg",
"shutdown",
"fork",
"vfork",
"execve",
"execveat",
"ptrace",
"process_vm_readv",
"process_vm_writev",
"mount",
"umount2",
"pivot_root",
"chroot",
"setns",
"unshare",
"bpf",
"keyctl",
"add_key",
"request_key",
"userfaultfd",
)
class ScmpArgCmp(ctypes.Structure):
_fields_ = [
("arg", ctypes.c_uint),
("op", ctypes.c_uint),
("datum_a", ctypes.c_uint64),
("datum_b", ctypes.c_uint64),
]
def install_seccomp_filter() -> None:
"""Kernel-enforce no network, child process, namespace, or tracing syscalls."""
try:
seccomp = ctypes.CDLL("libseccomp.so.2", use_errno=True)
except OSError as exc:
raise RuntimeError("libseccomp is required for restricted Python") from exc
seccomp.seccomp_init.argtypes = [ctypes.c_uint32]
seccomp.seccomp_init.restype = ctypes.c_void_p
seccomp.seccomp_syscall_resolve_name.argtypes = [ctypes.c_char_p]
seccomp.seccomp_syscall_resolve_name.restype = ctypes.c_int
seccomp.seccomp_rule_add.argtypes = [
ctypes.c_void_p,
ctypes.c_uint32,
ctypes.c_int,
ctypes.c_uint,
]
seccomp.seccomp_rule_add.restype = ctypes.c_int
seccomp.seccomp_rule_add_array.argtypes = [
ctypes.c_void_p,
ctypes.c_uint32,
ctypes.c_int,
ctypes.c_uint,
ctypes.POINTER(ScmpArgCmp),
]
seccomp.seccomp_rule_add_array.restype = ctypes.c_int
seccomp.seccomp_load.argtypes = [ctypes.c_void_p]
seccomp.seccomp_load.restype = ctypes.c_int
seccomp.seccomp_release.argtypes = [ctypes.c_void_p]
context = seccomp.seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW)
if not context:
raise RuntimeError("could not initialize seccomp")
try:
deny = SCMP_ACT_ERRNO | errno.EPERM
for name in BLOCKED_SYSCALLS:
number = seccomp.seccomp_syscall_resolve_name(name.encode())
if number < 0:
continue
result = seccomp.seccomp_rule_add(context, deny, number, 0)
if result != 0:
raise OSError(-result, os.strerror(-result))
clone_number = seccomp.seccomp_syscall_resolve_name(b"clone")
if clone_number >= 0:
comparison = ScmpArgCmp(0, SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, CLONE_THREAD, 0)
result = seccomp.seccomp_rule_add_array(
context, deny, clone_number, 1, ctypes.byref(comparison)
)
if result != 0:
raise OSError(-result, os.strerror(-result))
clone3_number = seccomp.seccomp_syscall_resolve_name(b"clone3")
if clone3_number >= 0:
result = seccomp.seccomp_rule_add(
context, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO | errno.ENOSYS, clone3_number, 0
)
if result != 0:
raise OSError(-result, os.strerror(-result))
result = seccomp.seccomp_load(context)
if result != 0:
raise OSError(-result, os.strerror(-result))
finally:
seccomp.seccomp_release(context)
def _inside(path: Path, root: Path) -> bool:
try:
path.relative_to(root)
return True
except ValueError:
return False
def _check_open(args: tuple[object, ...]) -> None:
if not args or isinstance(args[0], int):
return
path = Path(os.fspath(args[0]))
resolved = (Path.cwd() / path if not path.is_absolute() else path).resolve()
mode = args[1] if len(args) > 1 else None
flags = args[2] if len(args) > 2 and isinstance(args[2], int) else 0
write_requested = (
isinstance(mode, str) and any(marker in mode for marker in ("w", "a", "x", "+"))
) or flags & os.O_ACCMODE != os.O_RDONLY or bool(
flags & (os.O_CREAT | os.O_TRUNC | os.O_APPEND)
)
if write_requested:
if not _inside(resolved, WORKSPACE):
raise PermissionError("Analysis Python may only write inside /app.")
return
readable = _inside(resolved, WORKSPACE) or any(
_inside(resolved, root) for root in SYSTEM_READ_ROOTS
)
if resolved in {Path("/dev/null"), Path("/dev/urandom"), Path("/dev/random")}:
readable = True
if not readable:
raise PermissionError("Analysis Python may only read workspace and runtime files.")
def deny_unsafe_runtime(event: str, args: tuple[object, ...]) -> None:
if event == "open":
_check_open(args)
elif event in BLOCKED_AUDIT_EVENTS or event.startswith(BLOCKED_AUDIT_PREFIXES):
raise PermissionError(
"Network and child-process access are disabled in analysis Python; "
"use the guarded research tools."
)
def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
args = list(sys.argv[1:] if argv is None else argv)
if not args:
raise SystemExit("restricted Python requires -c, -m, or a script path")
install_seccomp_filter()
sys.addaudithook(deny_unsafe_runtime)
if args[0] == "-c":
if len(args) < 2:
raise SystemExit("-c requires code")
sys.argv = ["-c", *args[2:]]
namespace = {"__name__": "__main__", "__file__": "<string>"}
exec(compile(args[1], "<string>", "exec"), namespace, namespace)
return 0
if args[0] == "-m":
if len(args) < 2:
raise SystemExit("-m requires a module")
sys.argv = [args[1], *args[2:]]
runpy.run_module(args[1], run_name="__main__", alter_sys=True)
return 0
sys.argv = [args[0], *args[1:]]
runpy.run_path(args[0], run_name="__main__")
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
raise SystemExit(main())