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13
espressif/esp-idf
72cf05893c020459c9ff00156874fc3eb494507d
fix(tcp_transport): Fix out-of-bounds read on short WebSocket CLOSE
components\tcp_transport\transport_ws.c
esp_transport_ws_handle_control_frames
Buffer Overflow
[]
static int esp_transport_ws_handle_control_frames(esp_transport_handle_t t, char *buffer, int len, int timeout_ms, bool client_closed) { transport_ws_t *ws = esp_transport_get_context_data(t); // If no new header reception in progress, or not a control frame // just pass 0 -> no need to handle control fram...
static int esp_transport_ws_handle_control_frames(esp_transport_handle_t t, char *buffer, int len, int timeout_ms, bool client_closed) { transport_ws_t *ws = esp_transport_get_context_data(t); // If no new header reception in progress, or not a control frame // just pass 0 -> no need to handle control fram...
https://github.com/espressif/esp-idf/commit/72cf05893c020459c9ff00156874fc3eb494507d
2026-09-22T10:48:05
6
3
C
19,172
Apache-2.0
44d8b98c86c04d7e0cb585f13b90aa3ddcb365a850d7359c53d3cfd8a25b9c2f
null
null
[]
espressif/esp-idf
23bd88f3924fbf1020d0133fd89505549d7739da
fix(protocomm): guard NULL pc->sec in protocomm_get_sec_version protocomm_get_sec_version() validated pc, sec_ver and sec_patch_ver but dereferenced pc->sec unconditionally. pc->sec remains NULL until protocomm_set_security() runs, so calling this API before security is configured dereferences a NULL pointer and crash...
components\protocomm\src\common\protocomm.c
protocomm_get_sec_version
Null Pointer Dereference
[]
esp_err_t protocomm_get_sec_version(protocomm_t *pc, int *sec_ver, uint8_t *sec_patch_ver) { if (pc == NULL || sec_ver == NULL || sec_patch_ver == NULL) { return ESP_ERR_INVALID_ARG; } *sec_ver = pc->sec->ver; *sec_patch_ver = pc->sec->patch_ver; return ESP_OK; }
esp_err_t protocomm_get_sec_version(protocomm_t *pc, int *sec_ver, uint8_t *sec_patch_ver) { if (pc == NULL || sec_ver == NULL || sec_patch_ver == NULL) { return ESP_ERR_INVALID_ARG; } if (pc->sec == NULL) { return ESP_ERR_INVALID_STATE; } *sec_ver = pc->sec->ver; *sec_patch_ve...
https://github.com/espressif/esp-idf/commit/23bd88f3924fbf1020d0133fd89505549d7739da
2026-09-21T06:11:57
4
0
C
19,172
Apache-2.0
c6cd974ecdb347fc259f03699d9464ac16885303f685db6806ce4b0b46331a21
null
null
[]
espressif/esp-idf
046e69d92538a3c8ef89acf47cab4b18b99314f8
fix(ble_mesh): index last_param by inst_type, not controller inst_id last_param[] is sized by BLE_MESH_ADV_INST_TYPES_NUM (the number of mesh advertising instance types) but was indexed by inst_id, the controller advertising instance id (Kconfig range 0-3). With multi-adv disabled the type count is 1, so any non-zero ...
components\bt\esp_ble_mesh\core\bluedroid_host\adapter.c
bt_le_ext_adv_start
Buffer Overflow
[]
int bt_le_ext_adv_start(const uint8_t inst_id, const struct bt_mesh_adv_param *param, const struct bt_mesh_adv_data *ad, size_t ad_len, const struct bt_mesh_adv_data *sd, size_t sd_len) { tBTA_DM_BLE_GAP_EXT_ADV_PARAMS ext_adv_params = {0}; ...
int bt_le_ext_adv_start(const uint8_t inst_id, const struct bt_mesh_adv_param *param, const struct bt_mesh_adv_data *ad, size_t ad_len, const struct bt_mesh_adv_data *sd, size_t sd_len) { tBTA_DM_BLE_GAP_EXT_ADV_PARAMS ext_adv_params = {0}; ...
https://github.com/espressif/esp-idf/commit/046e69d92538a3c8ef89acf47cab4b18b99314f8
2026-09-11T04:05:21
11
4
C
19,172
Apache-2.0
b4c731b2313ba40becac02062ad0b152ddf20570af1d29177170cb958775d4d8
null
null
[]
espressif/esp-idf
046e69d92538a3c8ef89acf47cab4b18b99314f8
fix(ble_mesh): index last_param by inst_type, not controller inst_id last_param[] is sized by BLE_MESH_ADV_INST_TYPES_NUM (the number of mesh advertising instance types) but was indexed by inst_id, the controller advertising instance id (Kconfig range 0-3). With multi-adv disabled the type count is 1, so any non-zero ...
components\bt\esp_ble_mesh\core\nimble_host\adapter.c
bt_le_ext_adv_start
Buffer Overflow
[]
int bt_le_ext_adv_start(const uint8_t inst_id, const struct bt_mesh_adv_param *param, const struct bt_mesh_adv_data *ad, size_t ad_len, const struct bt_mesh_adv_data *sd, size_t sd_len) { struct ble_gap_ext_adv_params adv_params = {0}; stru...
int bt_le_ext_adv_start(const uint8_t inst_id, const struct bt_mesh_adv_param *param, const struct bt_mesh_adv_data *ad, size_t ad_len, const struct bt_mesh_adv_data *sd, size_t sd_len) { struct ble_gap_ext_adv_params adv_params = {0}; stru...
https://github.com/espressif/esp-idf/commit/046e69d92538a3c8ef89acf47cab4b18b99314f8
2026-09-11T04:05:21
11
4
C
19,172
Apache-2.0
9e2610ed00e0a53a9480870f8f4d18947fbbcc2d7fb0d9aca19036e0fb9d167e
null
null
[]
espressif/esp-idf
6f6e2aa93c14abf4e43f0ea6dc13a451ae765017
fix(mbedtls): Fix mbedtls testapps false memory leaks by lazy mutex creation
components\mbedtls\test_apps\persistent_storage_format\main\app_main.c
setUp
General Vulnerability
[]
void setUp(void) { test_utils_record_free_mem(); test_utils_set_leak_level(CONFIG_UNITY_CRITICAL_LEAK_LEVEL_GENERAL, ESP_LEAK_TYPE_CRITICAL, ESP_COMP_LEAK_GENERAL); test_utils_set_leak_level(CONFIG_UNITY_WARN_LEAK_LEVEL_GENERAL, ESP_LEAK_TYPE_WARNI...
void setUp(void) { prime_psa_its(ESP_PERSISTENT_FIXTURE_DS_KEY_ID); prime_psa_its(ESP_PERSISTENT_FIXTURE_HMAC_KEY_ID); prime_psa_its(ESP_PERSISTENT_FIXTURE_ECDSA_KEY_ID); test_utils_record_free_mem(); test_utils_set_leak_level(CONFIG_UNITY_CRITICAL_LEAK_LEVEL_GENERAL, ...
https://github.com/espressif/esp-idf/commit/6f6e2aa93c14abf4e43f0ea6dc13a451ae765017
2026-09-08T08:33:50
4
0
C
19,172
Apache-2.0
43f40ca03cab5f0360ecc73e4544d56678283bc55ee9b2fc275732a47b2ebc6c
null
null
[]
espressif/esp-idf
ed7153ef41bba1d01b1fb437a40ff1bbefdbe734
fix(mbedtls): validate cert header extent before reading it in bundle check esp_crt_check_bundle() read the 4-byte certificate header (name_len, key_len) via esp_crt_get_len() after only checking that the cert's start offset lies inside the bundle, so a crafted bundle whose first or last certificate starts within the ...
components\mbedtls\esp_crt_bundle\esp_crt_bundle.c
esp_crt_check_bundle
Buffer Overflow
[]
static bool esp_crt_check_bundle(const uint8_t* const x509_bundle, const size_t bundle_size) { if (unlikely(x509_bundle == NULL || bundle_size <= (sizeof(uint32_t) + CRT_HEADER_SIZE))) { // Bundle is too small for even one offset and one certificate return false; } // The bundle base may be...
static bool esp_crt_check_bundle(const uint8_t* const x509_bundle, const size_t bundle_size) { if (unlikely(x509_bundle == NULL || bundle_size <= (sizeof(uint32_t) + CRT_HEADER_SIZE))) { // Bundle is too small for even one offset and one certificate return false; } // The bundle base may be...
https://github.com/espressif/esp-idf/commit/ed7153ef41bba1d01b1fb437a40ff1bbefdbe734
2026-08-31T05:31:36
4
1
C
19,172
Apache-2.0
86b8122f2a1a58413bf3ae5623e17265c2fe8d676ea4f5474b6b3bb571574785
null
null
[]
espressif/esp-idf
a7ac00b812707d8ce683d2fc23b2f19353c08a3e
fix(jpeg): validate encoder buffer sizes before header/DMA access Bound JPEG header emission by outbuf capacity and reject undersized input buffers before programming TX DMA to avoid heap corruption and out-of-bounds DMA reads.
components\esp_driver_jpeg\jpeg_emit_marker.c
emit_dqt_marker
Buffer Overflow
[]
esp_err_t emit_dqt_marker(jpeg_enc_header_info_t *header_info) { compute_quant_table(header_info->m_quantization_tables[0], luminance_quantization_table, header_info->quality); compute_quant_table(header_info->m_quantization_tables[1], chrominance_quantization_table, header_info->quality); for (int i = 0; i...
esp_err_t emit_dqt_marker(jpeg_enc_header_info_t *header_info) { compute_quant_table(header_info->m_quantization_tables[0], luminance_quantization_table, header_info->quality); compute_quant_table(header_info->m_quantization_tables[1], chrominance_quantization_table, header_info->quality); for (int i = 0; i...
https://github.com/espressif/esp-idf/commit/a7ac00b812707d8ce683d2fc23b2f19353c08a3e
2026-08-25T08:29:16
1
1
C
19,172
Apache-2.0
88709b4dbbc6d380cd373b0026a87b736a9ea31e9f8e57cc1104d9dea88f07e3
null
null
[]
espressif/esp-idf
a7ac00b812707d8ce683d2fc23b2f19353c08a3e
fix(jpeg): validate encoder buffer sizes before header/DMA access Bound JPEG header emission by outbuf capacity and reject undersized input buffers before programming TX DMA to avoid heap corruption and out-of-bounds DMA reads.
components\esp_driver_jpeg\jpeg_emit_marker.c
emit_soi_marker
Buffer Overflow
[]
esp_err_t emit_soi_marker(jpeg_enc_header_info_t *header_info) { emit_marker(header_info, JPEG_M_SOI & 0xff); return ESP_OK; }
esp_err_t emit_soi_marker(jpeg_enc_header_info_t *header_info) { emit_marker(header_info, JPEG_M_SOI & 0xff); return emit_check(header_info); }
https://github.com/espressif/esp-idf/commit/a7ac00b812707d8ce683d2fc23b2f19353c08a3e
2026-08-25T08:29:16
1
1
C
19,172
Apache-2.0
81cdde5ecad815db7f8d577029133bcbd3064c73514cf2776cf688eb4443ec8e
null
null
[]
espressif/esp-idf
a7ac00b812707d8ce683d2fc23b2f19353c08a3e
fix(jpeg): validate encoder buffer sizes before header/DMA access Bound JPEG header emission by outbuf capacity and reject undersized input buffers before programming TX DMA to avoid heap corruption and out-of-bounds DMA reads.
components\esp_driver_jpeg\jpeg_emit_marker.c
emit_com_marker
Buffer Overflow
[]
esp_err_t emit_com_marker(jpeg_enc_header_info_t *header_info) { // Calculate how many bytes should be compensate to make it byte aligned. size_t cache_align = 0; esp_cache_get_alignment(MALLOC_CAP_SPIRAM, &cache_align); // compensate_size = aligned_size - SOS marker size(2 * header_info->num_components...
esp_err_t emit_com_marker(jpeg_enc_header_info_t *header_info) { // Calculate how many bytes should be compensate to make it byte aligned. size_t cache_align = 0; esp_cache_get_alignment(MALLOC_CAP_SPIRAM, &cache_align); // compensate_size = aligned_size - SOS marker size(2 * header_info->num_components...
https://github.com/espressif/esp-idf/commit/a7ac00b812707d8ce683d2fc23b2f19353c08a3e
2026-08-25T08:29:16
1
1
C
19,172
Apache-2.0
b8da4675ba8cd3a2c5729ab43025118a4aa921af52c899cd0f1d7ce14fd32df2
null
null
[]
espressif/esp-idf
a7ac00b812707d8ce683d2fc23b2f19353c08a3e
fix(jpeg): validate encoder buffer sizes before header/DMA access Bound JPEG header emission by outbuf capacity and reject undersized input buffers before programming TX DMA to avoid heap corruption and out-of-bounds DMA reads.
components\esp_driver_jpeg\jpeg_emit_marker.c
emit_sof_marker
Buffer Overflow
[]
esp_err_t emit_sof_marker(jpeg_enc_header_info_t *header_info) { uint8_t comp_h_samp[3] = {0}; uint8_t comp_v_samp[3] = {0}; switch (header_info->sub_sample) { case JPEG_DOWN_SAMPLING_YUV444: { comp_h_samp[0] = 1; comp_v_samp[0] = 1; comp_h_samp[1] = 1; comp_v_samp[1] = 1...
esp_err_t emit_sof_marker(jpeg_enc_header_info_t *header_info) { uint8_t comp_h_samp[3] = {0}; uint8_t comp_v_samp[3] = {0}; switch (header_info->sub_sample) { case JPEG_DOWN_SAMPLING_YUV444: { comp_h_samp[0] = 1; comp_v_samp[0] = 1; comp_h_samp[1] = 1; comp_v_samp[1] = 1...
https://github.com/espressif/esp-idf/commit/a7ac00b812707d8ce683d2fc23b2f19353c08a3e
2026-08-25T08:29:16
1
1
C
19,172
Apache-2.0
8db3a95c0c8322b9656d34f88502793c59b7d1c2cca20f51d404a11d1ba21676
null
null
[]
espressif/esp-idf
a7ac00b812707d8ce683d2fc23b2f19353c08a3e
fix(jpeg): validate encoder buffer sizes before header/DMA access Bound JPEG header emission by outbuf capacity and reject undersized input buffers before programming TX DMA to avoid heap corruption and out-of-bounds DMA reads.
components\esp_driver_jpeg\jpeg_emit_marker.c
emit_app0_marker
Buffer Overflow
[]
esp_err_t emit_app0_marker(jpeg_enc_header_info_t *header_info) { emit_marker(header_info, JPEG_M_APP0 & 0xff); emit_word(header_info, 2 + 4 + 1 + 2 + 1 + 2 + 2 + 1 + 1); // 0x4A46494600 for JIF0 emit_byte(header_info, 0x4A); emit_byte(header_info, 0x46); emit_byte(header_info, 0x49); emit_b...
esp_err_t emit_app0_marker(jpeg_enc_header_info_t *header_info) { emit_marker(header_info, JPEG_M_APP0 & 0xff); emit_word(header_info, 2 + 4 + 1 + 2 + 1 + 2 + 2 + 1 + 1); // 0x4A46494600 for JIF0 emit_byte(header_info, 0x4A); emit_byte(header_info, 0x46); emit_byte(header_info, 0x49); emit_b...
https://github.com/espressif/esp-idf/commit/a7ac00b812707d8ce683d2fc23b2f19353c08a3e
2026-08-25T08:29:16
1
1
C
19,172
Apache-2.0
7d01aba60a94cbf4e3238850653c7f8ddf8dad66316223f469ded950f9d3ab6b
null
null
[]
espressif/esp-idf
a7ac00b812707d8ce683d2fc23b2f19353c08a3e
fix(jpeg): validate encoder buffer sizes before header/DMA access Bound JPEG header emission by outbuf capacity and reject undersized input buffers before programming TX DMA to avoid heap corruption and out-of-bounds DMA reads.
components\esp_driver_jpeg\jpeg_emit_marker.c
emit_sos_marker
Buffer Overflow
[]
esp_err_t emit_sos_marker(jpeg_enc_header_info_t *header_info) { emit_marker(header_info, JPEG_M_SOS & 0xff); emit_word(header_info, 2 * header_info->num_components + 2 + 1 + 3); emit_byte(header_info, header_info->num_components); for (int i = 0; i < header_info->num_components; i++) { emit_by...
esp_err_t emit_sos_marker(jpeg_enc_header_info_t *header_info) { emit_marker(header_info, JPEG_M_SOS & 0xff); emit_word(header_info, 2 * header_info->num_components + 2 + 1 + 3); emit_byte(header_info, header_info->num_components); for (int i = 0; i < header_info->num_components; i++) { emit_by...
https://github.com/espressif/esp-idf/commit/a7ac00b812707d8ce683d2fc23b2f19353c08a3e
2026-08-25T08:29:16
1
1
C
19,172
Apache-2.0
e7de52606d8c3804064fdb55c6e3b558faa217c8e1d094885519c5c2bd8cba7c
null
null
[]
espressif/esp-idf
a7ac00b812707d8ce683d2fc23b2f19353c08a3e
fix(jpeg): validate encoder buffer sizes before header/DMA access Bound JPEG header emission by outbuf capacity and reject undersized input buffers before programming TX DMA to avoid heap corruption and out-of-bounds DMA reads.
components\esp_driver_jpeg\jpeg_emit_marker.c
emit_byte
Buffer Overflow
[]
static void emit_byte(jpeg_enc_header_info_t *header_info, uint8_t i) { header_info->header_buf[header_info->header_len] = i; header_info->header_len = header_info->header_len + 1; }
static void emit_byte(jpeg_enc_header_info_t *header_info, uint8_t i) { if (header_info->header_len >= header_info->header_buf_size) { header_info->header_buf_overflow = true; return; } header_info->header_buf[header_info->header_len] = i; header_info->header_len = header_info->header_le...
https://github.com/espressif/esp-idf/commit/a7ac00b812707d8ce683d2fc23b2f19353c08a3e
2026-08-25T08:29:16
4
0
C
19,172
Apache-2.0
b4cd17cda3ab4766522afd04a4ea9c94e2e68340630aae6d7ff1e07631cdd98e
null
null
[]
espressif/esp-idf
a7ac00b812707d8ce683d2fc23b2f19353c08a3e
fix(jpeg): validate encoder buffer sizes before header/DMA access Bound JPEG header emission by outbuf capacity and reject undersized input buffers before programming TX DMA to avoid heap corruption and out-of-bounds DMA reads.
components\esp_driver_jpeg\jpeg_emit_marker.c
emit_dht_marker
Buffer Overflow
[]
esp_err_t emit_dht_marker(jpeg_enc_header_info_t *header_info) { uint8_t m_huff_bits[2][2][JPEG_HUFFMAN_BITS_LEN_TABLE_LEN] = {0}; uint8_t m_huff_val[2][2][JPEG_HUFFMAN_AC_VALUE_TABLE_LEN] = {0}; memcpy(m_huff_bits[0][0], luminance_dc_coefficients, JPEG_HUFFMAN_DC_VALUE_TABLE_LEN); memcpy(m_huff_val[0][...
esp_err_t emit_dht_marker(jpeg_enc_header_info_t *header_info) { uint8_t m_huff_bits[2][2][JPEG_HUFFMAN_BITS_LEN_TABLE_LEN] = {0}; uint8_t m_huff_val[2][2][JPEG_HUFFMAN_AC_VALUE_TABLE_LEN] = {0}; memcpy(m_huff_bits[0][0], luminance_dc_coefficients, JPEG_HUFFMAN_DC_VALUE_TABLE_LEN); memcpy(m_huff_val[0][...
https://github.com/espressif/esp-idf/commit/a7ac00b812707d8ce683d2fc23b2f19353c08a3e
2026-08-25T08:29:16
1
1
C
19,172
Apache-2.0
79aead60331d1f8b8727a502a95b818d50f0fe5352397d127a06524b0437b056
null
null
[]
espressif/esp-idf
a7ac00b812707d8ce683d2fc23b2f19353c08a3e
fix(jpeg): validate encoder buffer sizes before header/DMA access Bound JPEG header emission by outbuf capacity and reject undersized input buffers before programming TX DMA to avoid heap corruption and out-of-bounds DMA reads.
components\esp_driver_jpeg\jpeg_encode.c
jpeg_encoder_process
Buffer Overflow
[]
esp_err_t jpeg_encoder_process(jpeg_encoder_handle_t encoder_engine, const jpeg_encode_cfg_t *encode_cfg, const uint8_t *encode_inbuf, uint32_t inbuf_size, uint8_t *bit_stream, uint32_t outbuf_size, uint32_t *out_size) { ESP_RETURN_ON_FALSE(encoder_engine, ESP_ERR_INVALID_ARG, TAG, "jpeg encode handle is null"); ...
esp_err_t jpeg_encoder_process(jpeg_encoder_handle_t encoder_engine, const jpeg_encode_cfg_t *encode_cfg, const uint8_t *encode_inbuf, uint32_t inbuf_size, uint8_t *bit_stream, uint32_t outbuf_size, uint32_t *out_size) { ESP_RETURN_ON_FALSE(encoder_engine, ESP_ERR_INVALID_ARG, TAG, "jpeg encode handle is null"); ...
https://github.com/espressif/esp-idf/commit/a7ac00b812707d8ce683d2fc23b2f19353c08a3e
2026-08-25T08:29:16
6
0
C
19,172
Apache-2.0
af927eb11875cd11192d241e61d87d689e9b0291e1655efcf83ab6839f49198a
null
null
[]
espressif/esp-idf
a7ac00b812707d8ce683d2fc23b2f19353c08a3e
fix(jpeg): validate encoder buffer sizes before header/DMA access Bound JPEG header emission by outbuf capacity and reject undersized input buffers before programming TX DMA to avoid heap corruption and out-of-bounds DMA reads.
components\esp_driver_jpeg\jpeg_encode.c
jpeg_new_encoder_engine
Buffer Overflow
[]
esp_err_t jpeg_new_encoder_engine(const jpeg_encode_engine_cfg_t *enc_eng_cfg, jpeg_encoder_handle_t *ret_encoder) { #if CONFIG_JPEG_ENABLE_DEBUG_LOG esp_log_level_set(TAG, ESP_LOG_DEBUG); #endif esp_err_t ret = ESP_OK; jpeg_encoder_handle_t encoder_engine = NULL; ESP_RETURN_ON_FALSE(enc_eng_cfg, ESP_ER...
esp_err_t jpeg_new_encoder_engine(const jpeg_encode_engine_cfg_t *enc_eng_cfg, jpeg_encoder_handle_t *ret_encoder) { #if CONFIG_JPEG_ENABLE_DEBUG_LOG esp_log_level_set(TAG, ESP_LOG_DEBUG); #endif esp_err_t ret = ESP_OK; jpeg_encoder_handle_t encoder_engine = NULL; ESP_RETURN_ON_FALSE(enc_eng_cfg, ESP_ER...
https://github.com/espressif/esp-idf/commit/a7ac00b812707d8ce683d2fc23b2f19353c08a3e
2026-08-25T08:29:16
1
1
C
19,172
Apache-2.0
60a614e2debdebe90fa363434f70266b668f6c3181d9e044e3a6f6075d9ea68f
null
null
[]
espressif/esp-idf
a7ac00b812707d8ce683d2fc23b2f19353c08a3e
fix(jpeg): validate encoder buffer sizes before header/DMA access Bound JPEG header emission by outbuf capacity and reject undersized input buffers before programming TX DMA to avoid heap corruption and out-of-bounds DMA reads.
components\esp_driver_jpeg\jpeg_encode.c
s_jpeg_set_header_info
Buffer Overflow
[]
static esp_err_t s_jpeg_set_header_info(jpeg_encoder_handle_t encoder_engine) { encoder_engine->header_info->header_len = 0; ESP_RETURN_ON_ERROR(emit_soi_marker(encoder_engine->header_info), TAG, "marker emit failed"); ESP_RETURN_ON_ERROR(emit_app0_marker(encoder_engine->header_info), TAG, "marker emit fail...
static esp_err_t s_jpeg_set_header_info(jpeg_encoder_handle_t encoder_engine) { encoder_engine->header_info->header_len = 0; encoder_engine->header_info->header_buf_overflow = false; ESP_RETURN_ON_ERROR(emit_soi_marker(encoder_engine->header_info), TAG, "marker emit failed"); ESP_RETURN_ON_ERROR(emit_ap...
https://github.com/espressif/esp-idf/commit/a7ac00b812707d8ce683d2fc23b2f19353c08a3e
2026-08-25T08:29:16
1
0
C
19,172
Apache-2.0
c71d34c955e5325ed12dbfe2c2221552997ea3067386e55595b83488467f8e76
null
null
[]
espressif/esp-idf
a7ac00b812707d8ce683d2fc23b2f19353c08a3e
fix(jpeg): validate encoder buffer sizes before header/DMA access Bound JPEG header emission by outbuf capacity and reject undersized input buffers before programming TX DMA to avoid heap corruption and out-of-bounds DMA reads.
components\esp_driver_jpeg\test_apps\jpeg_test_apps\main\test_jpeg_encode.c
TEST_CASE
Buffer Overflow
[]
TEST_CASE("jpeg initialize twice test", "[jpeg]") { jpeg_encoder_handle_t encoder_handle = NULL; jpeg_encode_engine_cfg_t encode_eng_cfg = { .intr_priority = 0, .timeout_ms = 40, }; TEST_ESP_OK(jpeg_new_encoder_engine(&encode_eng_cfg, &encoder_handle)); assert(encoder_handle != NUL...
TEST_CASE("JPEG encode rejects undersized input/output buffers", "[jpeg]") { jpeg_encoder_handle_t jpeg_handle = NULL; jpeg_encode_engine_cfg_t encode_eng_cfg = { .timeout_ms = 40, }; jpeg_encode_cfg_t enc_config = { .src_type = JPEG_ENCODE_IN_FORMAT_RGB888, .sub_sample = JPEG_DO...
https://github.com/espressif/esp-idf/commit/a7ac00b812707d8ce683d2fc23b2f19353c08a3e
2026-08-25T08:29:16
56
0
C
19,172
Apache-2.0
c6061f6aeecdb9a2c1a556dca8345d74384ba7d1da91f0662f1aabcfd6c8653d
null
null
[]
espressif/esp-idf
f864615d7d91ed2360c7093d15ff3fcfeb6c94d8
fix(ble/bluedroid): harden LE bond handling across encryption Keep the existing bond until the new pairing is encrypted, and on encryption failure drop the link instead of clearing keys. Recovering from a peer that really deleted the bond is opt-in through BT_BLE_SMP_UNBOND_ON_KEY_MISSING. Closes BLERP (NDSS 2026) V5...
components\bt\host\bluedroid\stack\btm\btm_sec.c
btm_sec_encrypt_change
General Vulnerability
[]
void btm_sec_encrypt_change (UINT16 handle, UINT8 status, UINT8 encr_enable) { tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC *p_dev_rec = btm_find_dev_by_handle (handle); #if BLE_INCLUDED == TRUE && SMP_INCLUDED == TRUE tACL_CONN *p_acl = NULL; #endif BTM_TRACE_EVENT ("Security Manager: encrypt_change status:%d State:%d, encr_en...
void btm_sec_encrypt_change (UINT16 handle, UINT8 status, UINT8 encr_enable) { tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC *p_dev_rec = btm_find_dev_by_handle (handle); #if BLE_INCLUDED == TRUE && SMP_INCLUDED == TRUE tACL_CONN *p_acl = NULL; #endif BTM_TRACE_EVENT ("Security Manager: encrypt_change status:%d State:%d, encr_en...
https://github.com/espressif/esp-idf/commit/f864615d7d91ed2360c7093d15ff3fcfeb6c94d8
2026-08-21T11:17:48
28
4
C
19,172
Apache-2.0
fee82394016abb2ba269df7ad1ce9fddbfca0315eaf99437ca9045656475f7da
null
null
[]
espressif/esp-idf
f864615d7d91ed2360c7093d15ff3fcfeb6c94d8
fix(ble/bluedroid): harden LE bond handling across encryption Keep the existing bond until the new pairing is encrypted, and on encryption failure drop the link instead of clearing keys. Recovering from a peer that really deleted the bond is opt-in through BT_BLE_SMP_UNBOND_ON_KEY_MISSING. Closes BLERP (NDSS 2026) V5...
components\bt\host\bluedroid\stack\smp\smp_act.c
smp_proc_pair_cmd
General Vulnerability
[]
void smp_proc_pair_cmd(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) { UINT8 *p = (UINT8 *)p_data; UINT8 reason = SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE; tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC *p_dev_rec = btm_find_dev (p_cb->pairing_bda); SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); /* erase all keys if it is slave proc pairing req*/ if (p_dev_rec && (...
void smp_proc_pair_cmd(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) { UINT8 *p = (UINT8 *)p_data; UINT8 reason = SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE; SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); /* Any existing bond is replaced only once the new pairing is authenticated, see smp_check_auth_req(). An unauthenticated Pairing Requ...
https://github.com/espressif/esp-idf/commit/f864615d7d91ed2360c7093d15ff3fcfeb6c94d8
2026-08-21T11:17:48
4
5
C
19,172
Apache-2.0
1ed7685d5f7d58113aeeb8d1af5e331a4b5c0a98b0a4720bbd6947d40aeab1fe
null
null
[]
espressif/esp-idf
f864615d7d91ed2360c7093d15ff3fcfeb6c94d8
fix(ble/bluedroid): harden LE bond handling across encryption Keep the existing bond until the new pairing is encrypted, and on encryption failure drop the link instead of clearing keys. Recovering from a peer that really deleted the bond is opt-in through BT_BLE_SMP_UNBOND_ON_KEY_MISSING. Closes BLERP (NDSS 2026) V5...
components\bt\host\bluedroid\stack\smp\smp_act.c
smp_send_pair_req
General Vulnerability
[]
void smp_send_pair_req(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) { SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); #if (BLE_INCLUDED == TRUE) tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC *p_dev_rec = btm_find_dev (p_cb->pairing_bda); /* erase all keys when master sends pairing req*/ if (p_dev_rec) { btm_sec_clear_ble_keys(p_dev_rec); } ...
void smp_send_pair_req(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) { SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); /* Any existing bond is replaced only once the new pairing is authenticated, see smp_check_auth_req(). */ /* do not manipulate the key, let app decide, leave out to BTM to mandate key distribution...
https://github.com/espressif/esp-idf/commit/f864615d7d91ed2360c7093d15ff3fcfeb6c94d8
2026-08-21T11:17:48
3
7
C
19,172
Apache-2.0
c80e5de2b7005d323e0cccc07508f63434c22f017762a7a03e19d1ef57734fc1
null
null
[]
espressif/esp-idf
f864615d7d91ed2360c7093d15ff3fcfeb6c94d8
fix(ble/bluedroid): harden LE bond handling across encryption Keep the existing bond until the new pairing is encrypted, and on encryption failure drop the link instead of clearing keys. Recovering from a peer that really deleted the bond is opt-in through BT_BLE_SMP_UNBOND_ON_KEY_MISSING. Closes BLERP (NDSS 2026) V5...
components\bt\host\bluedroid\stack\smp\smp_act.c
smp_check_auth_req
General Vulnerability
[]
void smp_check_auth_req(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) { UINT8 enc_enable = *(UINT8 *)p_data; UINT8 reason = enc_enable ? SMP_SUCCESS : SMP_ENC_FAIL; SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s rcvs enc_enable=%d i_keys=0x%x r_keys=0x%x " "(i-initiator r-responder)\n", __func__, enc_...
void smp_check_auth_req(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data) { UINT8 enc_enable = *(UINT8 *)p_data; UINT8 reason = enc_enable ? SMP_SUCCESS : SMP_ENC_FAIL; SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s rcvs enc_enable=%d i_keys=0x%x r_keys=0x%x " "(i-initiator r-responder)\n", __func__, enc_...
https://github.com/espressif/esp-idf/commit/f864615d7d91ed2360c7093d15ff3fcfeb6c94d8
2026-08-21T11:17:48
16
0
C
19,172
Apache-2.0
7d27287eb80c739354ffe1a5014782424bd0fe183b5bdbf89677dce6358f9c75
null
null
[]
espressif/esp-idf
babdd168c1a599cd2a271c2a5392002fd9c002e0
SAE: Fix crash due to NULL pointer dereference in H2E parsing In H2E (Hash-to-Element) mode, sae_parse_commit() parses the optional Anti-Clogging Token Container by calling sae_parse_token_container(). However, callers of sae_parse_commit() that do not require retrieving the anti-clogging token (such as PASN initiato...
components\wpa_supplicant\src\common\sae.c
sae_parse_token_container
Null Pointer Dereference
[]
static void sae_parse_token_container(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *pos, const u8 *end, const u8 **token, size_t *token_len) { wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Possible elements at the end of the frame", pos, end - pos); if (!sae_is_token_container_elem(pos,...
static void sae_parse_token_container(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *pos, const u8 *end, const u8 **token, size_t *token_len) { wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Possible elements at the end of the frame", pos, end - pos); if (!sae_is_token_container_elem(pos,...
https://github.com/espressif/esp-idf/commit/babdd168c1a599cd2a271c2a5392002fd9c002e0
2026-08-13T05:32:38
5
3
C
19,172
Apache-2.0
6a025a9ab06e87dfcfe0b620e5dd30c3ecd4e07c4665b7f6a1d33b56c4ede98a
null
null
[]
espressif/esp-idf
d9ba2da026b2c5ae62f17c2fdfdcc724c2abbbf4
fix(wifi): Prevent double free in owe failure path
components\wpa_supplicant\src\rsn_supp\wpa.c
owe_process_assoc_resp
Use-After-Free / Double Free
[]
int owe_process_assoc_resp(const u8 *rsn_ie, size_t rsn_len, const uint8_t *dh_ie, size_t dh_len) { size_t prime_len=0,hash_len=0; struct wpabuf * sh_secret = NULL, *pub = NULL, *hkey = NULL; const char *info = "OWE Key Generation"; u8 pmkid[SHA256_MAC_LEN], prk[SHA256_MAC_LEN], pmk[SHA256_MAC_LEN]; ...
int owe_process_assoc_resp(const u8 *rsn_ie, size_t rsn_len, const uint8_t *dh_ie, size_t dh_len) { size_t prime_len=0,hash_len=0; struct wpabuf * sh_secret = NULL, *pub = NULL, *hkey = NULL; const char *info = "OWE Key Generation"; u8 pmkid[SHA256_MAC_LEN], prk[SHA256_MAC_LEN], pmk[SHA256_MAC_LEN]; ...
https://github.com/espressif/esp-idf/commit/d9ba2da026b2c5ae62f17c2fdfdcc724c2abbbf4
2026-07-31T07:03:11
3
0
C
19,172
Apache-2.0
31505d883803fcf56df35a365ddd924ef5c652828f63d9b3340dead769e68ecc
null
null
[]
espressif/esp-idf
d9ba2da026b2c5ae62f17c2fdfdcc724c2abbbf4
fix(wifi): Prevent double free in owe failure path
components\wpa_supplicant\src\rsn_supp\wpa.c
owe_build_assoc_req
Use-After-Free / Double Free
[]
struct wpabuf *owe_build_assoc_req(struct wpa_sm *sm, u16 group) { struct wpabuf *pub = NULL; size_t prime_len; if (group == OWE_DH_GRP19) { prime_len = OWE_PRIME_LEN; } else { wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "OWE: Unsupported Diffie-Hellman group"); return NULL; } sm->owe_ecdh =...
struct wpabuf *owe_build_assoc_req(struct wpa_sm *sm, u16 group) { struct wpabuf *pub = NULL; size_t prime_len; if (group == OWE_DH_GRP19) { prime_len = OWE_PRIME_LEN; } else { wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "OWE: Unsupported Diffie-Hellman group"); return NULL; } sm->owe_ecdh =...
https://github.com/espressif/esp-idf/commit/d9ba2da026b2c5ae62f17c2fdfdcc724c2abbbf4
2026-07-31T07:03:11
1
0
C
19,172
Apache-2.0
dd3f5dc7de1b9ccbac77afe44ce2ab285c4b13e0826efd9741fb13bdcad7bfa3
null
null
[]
espressif/esp-idf
49fba58f081390e17cdb7f482020784d64a7dee0
fix(riscv_trace): protect shared RCC register access with PERIPH_RCC_ATOMIC riscv_trace_ll_enable_bus_clock and riscv_trace_ll_reset_register operate on shared HP_SYS_CLKRST registers and were called concurrently from both cores during SECONDARY init, creating RMW race conditions. Move the clock/reset logic out of th...
components\esp_hal_debug_assist\riscv_trace_hal.c
riscv_trace_hal_deinit
General Vulnerability
[]
void riscv_trace_hal_deinit(riscv_trace_hal_context_t *ctx) { HAL_ASSERT(ctx != NULL); riscv_trace_ll_set_restart_ena(ctx->dev, false); riscv_trace_ll_trigger_off(ctx->dev); riscv_trace_ll_set_intr_ena(ctx->dev, 0); riscv_trace_ll_enable_module_clock(ctx->dev, false); }
void riscv_trace_hal_deinit(riscv_trace_hal_context_t *ctx) { HAL_ASSERT(ctx != NULL); riscv_trace_ll_set_restart_ena(ctx->dev, false); riscv_trace_ll_trigger_off(ctx->dev); riscv_trace_ll_set_intr_ena(ctx->dev, 0); }
https://github.com/espressif/esp-idf/commit/49fba58f081390e17cdb7f482020784d64a7dee0
2026-07-22T11:02:58
0
1
C
19,172
Apache-2.0
cd0edf9eb0a453e67efed7e06617c8d1375a971918b01f9668ad7ababa47fbf1
null
null
[]
espressif/esp-idf
49fba58f081390e17cdb7f482020784d64a7dee0
fix(riscv_trace): protect shared RCC register access with PERIPH_RCC_ATOMIC riscv_trace_ll_enable_bus_clock and riscv_trace_ll_reset_register operate on shared HP_SYS_CLKRST registers and were called concurrently from both cores during SECONDARY init, creating RMW race conditions. Move the clock/reset logic out of th...
components\esp_hal_debug_assist\riscv_trace_hal.c
riscv_trace_hal_init
General Vulnerability
[]
void riscv_trace_hal_init(int core_id, const riscv_trace_hal_config_t *config, riscv_trace_hal_context_t *ctx) { HAL_ASSERT(ctx != NULL && config != NULL); HAL_ASSERT(config->mem_end_addr > config->mem_start_addr); ctx->dev = riscv_trace_ll_get_hw(core_id); ctx->core_id = core_id; riscv_trace_hal_...
void riscv_trace_hal_init(int core_id, const riscv_trace_hal_config_t *config, riscv_trace_hal_context_t *ctx) { HAL_ASSERT(ctx != NULL && config != NULL); HAL_ASSERT(config->mem_end_addr > config->mem_start_addr); ctx->dev = riscv_trace_ll_get_hw(core_id); ctx->core_id = core_id; /* Memory config...
https://github.com/espressif/esp-idf/commit/49fba58f081390e17cdb7f482020784d64a7dee0
2026-07-22T11:02:58
0
2
C
19,172
Apache-2.0
38cda29de31ff01b23c6bb35af8d7d1930d3dbdf3a25cc4b1a2e723e7f777363
null
null
[]
espressif/esp-idf
49fba58f081390e17cdb7f482020784d64a7dee0
fix(riscv_trace): protect shared RCC register access with PERIPH_RCC_ATOMIC riscv_trace_ll_enable_bus_clock and riscv_trace_ll_reset_register operate on shared HP_SYS_CLKRST registers and were called concurrently from both cores during SECONDARY init, creating RMW race conditions. Move the clock/reset logic out of th...
components\esp_riscv_trace\src\esp_riscv_trace.c
ESP_SYSTEM_INIT_FN
General Vulnerability
[]
ESP_SYSTEM_INIT_FN(esp_riscv_trace_early_init, SECONDARY, ESP_SYSTEM_INIT_ALL_CORES, 160) { int core_id = esp_cpu_get_core_id(); esp_riscv_trace_config_t config = esp_riscv_trace_get_user_config(core_id); if (!is_valid_core_mask(config.core_mask)) { ESP_EARLY_LOGE(TAG, "invalid core mask"); ...
ESP_SYSTEM_INIT_FN(esp_riscv_trace_early_init, SECONDARY, ESP_SYSTEM_INIT_ALL_CORES, 160) { int core_id = esp_cpu_get_core_id(); esp_riscv_trace_config_t config = esp_riscv_trace_get_user_config(core_id); // Enable the clocks and reset the encoder core before accessing its registers. PERIPH_RCC_ATOMIC(...
https://github.com/espressif/esp-idf/commit/49fba58f081390e17cdb7f482020784d64a7dee0
2026-07-22T11:02:58
6
0
C
19,172
Apache-2.0
9f1cbd2b5ab6c593cbf03389391e13e491b1b762ae51add67bb46e19fffc0133
null
null
[]
espressif/esp-idf
62e507ab8e43446764928553a8a88311dcc3792e
fix(log): fix out-of-bounds reads in binary log for buffer log apis - Fix MAX(len,2) reading beyond buffer when len=1 - Fix buffer_len=0 ambiguity with strlen fallback - Add BUFFER_LEN_NOT_SET sentinel (-1) - Read exactly len bytes, not forced minimum Merges https://github.com/espressif/esp-idf/pull/18825
components\log\src\log_format_binary.c
output_pointer
Buffer Overflow
[]
static unsigned output_pointer(const char *ptr, pkg_info_t *pkg_info) { unsigned pkg_len = 0; uintptr_t addr = (uintptr_t)ptr; if (PRESENT_IN_ELF(addr) || addr == 0) { pkg_len = output(&addr, sizeof(addr), pkg_info); } else { int len = (pkg_info->buffer_len) ? pkg_info->buffer_len : strl...
static unsigned output_pointer(const char *ptr, pkg_info_t *pkg_info) { unsigned pkg_len = 0; uintptr_t addr = (uintptr_t)ptr; if (PRESENT_IN_ELF(addr) || addr == 0) { pkg_len = output(&addr, sizeof(addr), pkg_info); } else { int data_len = (pkg_info->buffer_len != BUFFER_LEN_NOT_SET) ? ...
https://github.com/espressif/esp-idf/commit/62e507ab8e43446764928553a8a88311dcc3792e
2026-07-21T13:47:50
8
3
C
19,172
Apache-2.0
877db6cbb46bc7e5ffe313f12a568368a952ed8ed14e61e914966c4aa8456cff
null
null
[]
espressif/esp-idf
62e507ab8e43446764928553a8a88311dcc3792e
fix(log): fix out-of-bounds reads in binary log for buffer log apis - Fix MAX(len,2) reading beyond buffer when len=1 - Fix buffer_len=0 ambiguity with strlen fallback - Add BUFFER_LEN_NOT_SET sentinel (-1) - Read exactly len bytes, not forced minimum Merges https://github.com/espressif/esp-idf/pull/18825
components\log\src\log_format_binary.c
esp_log_format_binary
Buffer Overflow
[]
void esp_log_format_binary(esp_log_msg_t *message) { assert(message != NULL); if (!message->config.opts.constrained_env) { esp_log_impl_lock(); } pkg_info_t pkg_info = { .crc = 0, .buffer_hex_log = message->format == __ESP_BUFFER_HEX_FORMAT__, .buffer_char_log = message...
void esp_log_format_binary(esp_log_msg_t *message) { assert(message != NULL); if (!message->config.opts.constrained_env) { esp_log_impl_lock(); } pkg_info_t pkg_info = { .crc = 0, .buffer_hex_log = message->format == __ESP_BUFFER_HEX_FORMAT__, .buffer_char_log = message...
https://github.com/espressif/esp-idf/commit/62e507ab8e43446764928553a8a88311dcc3792e
2026-07-21T13:47:50
1
1
C
19,172
Apache-2.0
427af6d5e63f68c1baf90e3d81ffa617d0bdfe3d0399a23f668c7bdb8874920a
null
null
[]
espressif/esp-idf
62e507ab8e43446764928553a8a88311dcc3792e
fix(log): fix out-of-bounds reads in binary log for buffer log apis - Fix MAX(len,2) reading beyond buffer when len=1 - Fix buffer_len=0 ambiguity with strlen fallback - Add BUFFER_LEN_NOT_SET sentinel (-1) - Read exactly len bytes, not forced minimum Merges https://github.com/espressif/esp-idf/pull/18825
components\log\src\log_format_binary.c
calc_pkg_len
Buffer Overflow
[]
static unsigned calc_pkg_len(esp_log_msg_t *message, pkg_info_t *pkg_info) { unsigned pkg_len = 0; pkg_info->len_calculation_stage = true; pkg_len += sizeof(control_t); pkg_len += output_pointer(message->format, pkg_info); pkg_len += output_pointer(message->tag, pkg_info); pkg_len += (message->t...
static unsigned calc_pkg_len(esp_log_msg_t *message, pkg_info_t *pkg_info) { unsigned pkg_len = 0; pkg_info->len_calculation_stage = true; pkg_len += sizeof(control_t); pkg_len += output_pointer(message->format, pkg_info); pkg_len += output_pointer(message->tag, pkg_info); pkg_len += (message->t...
https://github.com/espressif/esp-idf/commit/62e507ab8e43446764928553a8a88311dcc3792e
2026-07-21T13:47:50
1
0
C
19,172
Apache-2.0
9202a6fa8249b802a063e89b275d372a0f9dd801ec3bada43d011cde13325672
null
null
[]
espressif/esp-idf
4ab4d5b8947cb682bc86c83b291c27647f2c79fd
fix(esp_event): use recursive mutex API in handler unregister (SEC-220) 1) loop->mutex is created with xSemaphoreCreateRecursiveMutex(). FreeRTOS requires that recursive mutexes are only acquired and released with xSemaphoreTakeRecursive / xSemaphoreGiveRecursive. esp_event_handler_unregister_with_internal() used the...
components\esp_event\esp_event.c
esp_event_handler_unregister_with_internal
Use-After-Free / Double Free
[]
esp_err_t esp_event_handler_unregister_with_internal(esp_event_loop_handle_t event_loop, esp_event_base_t event_base, int32_t event_id, esp_event_handler_instance_context_t* handler_ctx, bool legacy) { assert(event_loop); assert(handler_ctx); if (event_b...
esp_err_t esp_event_handler_unregister_with_internal(esp_event_loop_handle_t event_loop, esp_event_base_t event_base, int32_t event_id, esp_event_handler_instance_context_t* handler_ctx, bool legacy) { assert(event_loop); assert(handler_ctx); if (event_b...
https://github.com/espressif/esp-idf/commit/4ab4d5b8947cb682bc86c83b291c27647f2c79fd
2026-07-21T12:25:57
18
4
C
19,172
Apache-2.0
e4b34a5e4440e4ed9ca40ae1b24df67fc9bcf5a1dae39cf759096c66c48aecdc
null
null
[]
espressif/esp-idf
694032c1b107e816503df089b631417c15cc1c1f
fix(esp_timer): avoid dump buffer overflow print_timer_info advanced the dump cursor by snprintf's return value. When a timer line was truncated, snprintf returned the full would-be length, which could move the cursor past the heap buffer and wrap the remaining size before the next write. Add a bounded append helper t...
components\esp_timer\src\esp_timer.c
print_timer_info
Buffer Overflow
[]
static void print_timer_info(esp_timer_handle_t t, char** dst, size_t* dst_size) { #if WITH_PROFILING size_t cb; // name is optional, might be missed. if (t->name) { cb = snprintf(*dst, *dst_size, "%-20.20s ", t->name); } else { cb = snprintf(*dst, *dst_size, "timer@%-10p ", t); } ...
static void print_timer_info(esp_timer_handle_t t, char** dst, size_t* dst_size) { #if WITH_PROFILING // name is optional, might be missed. if (t->name) { append_to_buffer(dst, dst_size, "%-20.20s ", t->name); } else { append_to_buffer(dst, dst_size, "timer@%-10p ", t); } append_t...
https://github.com/espressif/esp-idf/commit/694032c1b107e816503df089b631417c15cc1c1f
2026-07-13T06:45:00
6
9
C
19,172
Apache-2.0
7974c8ef9715d083a93b99ddc3920bb1df899e146c3d1aa3153f5cf54e8ea6fc
null
null
[]
espressif/esp-idf
694032c1b107e816503df089b631417c15cc1c1f
fix(esp_timer): avoid dump buffer overflow print_timer_info advanced the dump cursor by snprintf's return value. When a timer line was truncated, snprintf returned the full would-be length, which could move the cursor past the heap buffer and wrap the remaining size before the next write. Add a bounded append helper t...
components\esp_timer\src\esp_timer.c
esp_timer_dump
Buffer Overflow
[]
esp_err_t esp_timer_dump(FILE* stream) { /* Since timer lock is a critical section, we don't want to print directly * to stdout, since that may cause a deadlock if stdout is interrupt-driven * (via the UART driver). Allocate sufficiently large chunk of memory first, * print to it, then dump this memo...
esp_err_t esp_timer_dump(FILE* stream) { /* Since timer lock is a critical section, we don't want to print directly * to stdout, since that may cause a deadlock if stdout is interrupt-driven * (via the UART driver). Allocate sufficiently large chunk of memory first, * print to it, then dump this memo...
https://github.com/espressif/esp-idf/commit/694032c1b107e816503df089b631417c15cc1c1f
2026-07-13T06:45:00
1
0
C
19,172
Apache-2.0
a9f04ef5fcd51abefb7a6bb261f8cb87016c2d09e3a2d2043da18a4c5dccfa7d
null
null
[]
espressif/esp-idf
daae1fb403b36fc0f9fc57ccdfc20fad458f13e8
fix(esp_partition): prevent size_t overflow bypassing bounds checks on linux target esp_partition_write/read/erase_range/mmap in partition_linux.c (the `linux` target backend used by --preview set-target linux / host_test) validated the requested range with `offset + size > partition->size`. When `size` is close to SI...
components\esp_partition\partition_linux.c
esp_partition_write
Buffer Overflow
[]
esp_err_t esp_partition_write(const esp_partition_t *partition, size_t dst_offset, const void *src, size_t size) { assert(partition != NULL && s_spiflash_mem_file_buf != NULL && src != NULL); if (partition->readonly) { return ESP_ERR_NOT_ALLOWED; } if (partition->encrypted) { return ESP...
esp_err_t esp_partition_write(const esp_partition_t *partition, size_t dst_offset, const void *src, size_t size) { assert(partition != NULL && s_spiflash_mem_file_buf != NULL && src != NULL); if (partition->readonly) { return ESP_ERR_NOT_ALLOWED; } if (partition->encrypted) { return ESP...
https://github.com/espressif/esp-idf/commit/daae1fb403b36fc0f9fc57ccdfc20fad458f13e8
2026-07-11T19:30:37
1
1
C
19,172
Apache-2.0
156cb61dfcaf3a94de44b6294bf5cd24a9ba599a2e6b19099041b7fddc7b68c9
18,822
fix(esp_partition): prevent size_t overflow bypassing bounds checks on linux target (IDFGH-17957)
[ "Status: Done", "Resolution: Done", "PR-Sync-Merge" ]
End of preview. Expand in Data Studio

C/C++ Security Vulnerability & Automated Patch Dataset for llms fine tuning

A large-scale corpus of 23,826 function-level vulnerability repair pairs ($Vulnerable \rightarrow Fixed$) mined from 64 major C/C++ open-source projects spanning 12,130 unique commits identified by the security-focused mining pipeline.

This dataset is specifically structured for Automated Program Repair (APR), Vulnerability Assessment, and Instruction Fine-Tuning of Code LLMs (e.g., Qwen2.5-Coder, DeepSeek-Coder, CodeLlama).


Dataset Summary

  • Total Samples: 23,826 function pairs
  • Source Repositories: 64 curated open-source C/C++ codebases
  • Unique Commits: 12,130 identified by the security-focused mining pipeline
  • Median Patch Size: +3 lines added, -1 line deleted
  • Exact Duplicate Pairs: 0 according to pair_hash (23,790 unique vulnerable functions, 23,810 unique fixed functions)
  • Token Distribution (BPE - Qwen2.5-Coder):
    • Vulnerable Code: Median 363 tokens (P95: 1,993)
    • Fixed Code: Median 379 tokens (P95: 2,026)
    • Full SFT Training Prompt: Median 846 tokens (P95: 4,116; 94.95% fit in $\le 4,096$)

Mining Methodology

The dataset was mined using an automated git-mining and static AST function extraction pipeline:

  1. Repository Selection: 64 active, mission-critical C/C++ codebases across systems programming, cryptography, operating systems, embedded firmware, networking, virtualization, and parsers.
  2. Commit Filtering: Commits were identified using security-focused regex patterns in commit messages (e.g., CVE IDs, memory corruption taxonomy terms, security advisories).
  3. Function Extraction: For each modified .c, .cpp, .cc, or .h file in a security commit, the pipeline used AST/heuristic function parsing to extract the exact enclosing function before (vulnerable_code) and after (fixed_code) the commit.
  4. Structural Validation: Multi-file diffs and refactorings were isolated to function boundaries. Function pairs where syntax was unextractable or unchanged were discarded.

Dataset Schema & Field Descriptions

Each row in dataset_vuln_pairs.jsonl is a JSON object with the following fields:

Field Name Type Description
pair_hash string Unique SHA-256 hash computed over normalized code: hashlib.sha256(f"{vulnerable_code.strip()}|||{fixed_code.strip()}".encode("utf-8")).hexdigest().
repo_name string GitHub repository identifier (e.g., openssl/openssl, torvalds/linux, redis/redis).
commit_hash string Full Git commit SHA where the patch was applied.
commit_message string Complete commit message from the developer explaining the patch.
commit_date string ISO 8601 timestamp of the commit.
file_path string Relative path to the modified file within the repository.
function_name string Name of the extracted C/C++ function.
vulnerable_code string Complete source code of the function before the security fix.
fixed_code string Complete source code of the function after the security fix.
vuln_category string Primary vulnerability taxonomy classified from commit semantics (e.g., Buffer Overflow, Memory Leak, Use After Free, Null Pointer Dereference).
cve_ids list[string] List of explicit Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures IDs mentioned in the commit (e.g., ["CVE-2023-0286"]).
source_url string Direct permalink to the commit on GitHub.

Known Limitations & Usage Recommendations

  1. Mined Signals vs. Ground Truth: Vulnerability categories and security designations are derived from developer commit messages and metadata (weak supervision). While indicative of security-relevant code modifications, they have not undergone manual line-by-line verification by security researchers.
  2. Backport & Sibling Repository Clusters: Sibling projects and forks (e.g., openssl $\leftrightarrow$ boringssl $\leftrightarrow$ libressl, or tcpdump $\leftrightarrow$ libpcap) share commit histories and backported patches. Users should perform group-aware / cluster-aware splits to ensure all sibling repositories reside together in either the train or test partition.
  3. Commit Co-Occurrence: 32.3% of commits modified more than one function. When creating train/val/test splits, always split by Commit SHA or Repository, never by individual row indices.
  4. Token Truncation: For models with a 4,096 token context window, 94.95% of pairs fit without truncation. For ~99.85% coverage, use an 8,192-token context window (only 36 outliers exceed 8k).

Quickstart Usage

import json

def load_dataset(filepath="dataset_vuln_pairs.jsonl"):
    with open(filepath, "r", encoding="utf-8") as f:
        for line in f:
            yield json.loads(line)

# Example: Inspect Gold-Tier CVE samples
for sample in load_dataset():
    if sample["cve_ids"]:
        print(f"[{sample['repo_name']}] {sample['cve_ids']} - {sample['function_name']}")
        print(f"Commit: {sample['commit_message'].splitlines()[0]}")
        break

Provenance & License

  • Dataset Aggregation & Tooling License: MIT License. The MIT license covers the dataset packaging, schemas, mining tooling, and documentation.
  • Source Code Snippet Provenance: The underlying C/C++ function snippets originate from public open-source projects hosted on GitHub and remain subject to their respective upstream licenses (e.g., GPL-2.0, Apache-2.0, MIT, BSD, MPL). The dataset aggregation license does not alter or supersede the upstream license terms of individual code snippets. Users must adhere to upstream licenses when using these code snippets.
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