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MTech Thesis & Journal Paper Plan (v4, after literature review and data audit steps 01-04)

Source Confounding and Valid Evaluation Protocols for Multi-Class NIDS on BigFlow-NIDS-V2

v4 supersedes v3. v3 came from the literature review (slr/SLR_REPORT.md, slr/NOVELTY_RECHECK.md). v4 adds what the first four implementation steps showed (impl/artifacts/step01..04): 27 of 32 classes occur in exactly one source dataset, so class identity is confounded with source, a 31-class leave-one-source-out (LOSO) is impossible, and a source-wide time split leaves most attacks without train or test data. The thesis is therefore reframed around quantifying that confounding and defining the evaluation protocols that remain valid, then benchmarking on them. Positioning remains a benchmark / re-evaluation study, not a new method.


1. Context and positioning

Dataset. BigFlow-NIDS-V2 (Uddin, Arefin, Hussain, Data in Brief 65, 2026): 66,935,021 flows, 55 attributes, 32 labels = Benign + 31 attack classes, merged from NF-UNSW-NB15-v3, NF-ToN-IoT-v3, NF-BoT-IoT-v3, NF-CSE-CIC-IDS2018-v3. Verified facts:

  • The 55 features include IPs, ports and absolute timestamps (leakage-prone). The dataset paper has no model results (only load times), so there is no baseline to reproduce. Its prose disagrees with its Table 2; the data matches Table 2 exactly (step 02).
  • Row order is interleaved, not four sequential blocks. Source is attributed by capture date (2015 = UNSW, 2019 = ToN-IoT, Feb-Mar 2018 = CSE-CIC-2018, May-Jun 2018 = BoT-IoT) and validated against testbed IP plans: 0 unassigned flows (step 03).
  • Source sizes and benign share: ToN-IoT 27.52M (61.0% benign), CSE-CIC-2018 20.12M (87.1%), BoT-IoT 16.93M (0.31%), UNSW 2.37M (94.6%).
  • Only 238 of 225,446 distinct IPs appear in more than one source: IPs are near-perfect source fingerprints.
  • Class-by-source (step 04): 27 of 32 classes are single-source; only Benign (4 sources), DoS (3), DDoS (2), Reconnaissance (2), Backdoor (2) are shared. Source alone gives 79.8% binary and 66.6% 32-class accuracy (majority class: 54.7%); NMI(source, class) = 0.426.
  • Duplicates (step 05): 3.67% exact duplicates on feature set A (2.46M rows; only 880 rows with conflicting labels; "no cross-source duplicates" is tautological because A contains the timestamps that define the source). On feature set B (no IPs/ports/timestamps) 66.6% of rows are duplicates, 23.0% of rows share their B-features with a different label, and 11.2% share them across sources; FTP-BruteForce and DoS_attacks-SlowHTTPTest collapse to a single distinct B vector (100% label-conflicting) and Brute_Force_-XSS to 66.
  • Source identifiability (step 06): a LightGBM identifies the source with 99.91% accuracy on feature set B (47 features without IPs, ports and timestamps; 100% on A is tautological because A includes the timestamps that define the source). Within one class it still reaches 99.78% (Benign), 99.98% (DoS) and 100.0% (DDoS). No single feature exceeds 83% (best: OUT_BYTES), so feature set C = B by the pre-stated rule. Ablation: removing the 20 most informative features leaves 99.47%; with only 7 features left it is still 95.2%. One 70/30 split per probe (no repeats).
  • Protocol evaluability (step 07 v2, population 64,475,595 unique flow-label pairs; feature set A / B in brackets): P1 31 / 26 of 32 labels, P2 30 / 26, P3 3 / 3 (attacks come from very few source IPs, e.g. DoS 19, DDoS 14, Reconnaissance 12, most other classes 4 or fewer, so source-IP group splits cannot be evaluated for almost any attack class; only Benign, Brute_Force_-Web and Infilteration have >= 5 train and >= 5 test IPs), P4 4/4/4/1 (UNSW/ToN/BoT/CSE; CSE has only Benign and is flagged degenerate, not scored), P5 family LOSO (taxonomy v1) 5/6/3/5 of 12 (v0: 4/6/4/6 of 9). Under B, Brute_Force_-XSS, DoS_attacks-SlowHTTPTest, FTP-BruteForce, SQL_Injection, Theft and Worms drop out of P1/P2 because their clean test rows or distinct training vectors fall below the thresholds. The extreme tail named in the plan (Worms 158, SQL_Injection 440, Brute_Force_XSS 480) cannot be scored under valid B protocols. Test rows with B-hash occurring in train (same label = leakage; other label = conflict): P1 6.50M + 0.01M of 9.67M, P2 3.00M + 0.08M of 8.90M, P3 1.69M + 0.02M of 8.40M, and for the binary LOSO on ToN-IoT 5.38M + 1.02M of 25.7M (identical flows across sources).
  • Two numeric columns contain inf/empty from divide-by-zero on zero-duration flows (SRC/DST_TO_SRC_SECOND_BYTES, up to 1.75%); missingness is class-informative (Reconnaissance 41%, Generic 76%, Benign 0.3%).

Gap (verified with caveats, Sec. 3). No work found that uses BigFlow-NIDS-V2 beyond the dataset record, and none that quantifies class-source confounding of the merged corpus, defines which protocols are valid on it, or compares loss-level and resampling methods on its extreme tail under such protocols.

Thesis claim. On a merged multi-source flow corpus, headline accuracy mostly measures source identity. Only a restricted set of protocols is valid; stating exactly which classes each protocol can evaluate, and benchmarking models and rare-class strategies under those protocols, changes the conclusions drawn from the corpus.


2. Research questions

RQ Question Priority
RQ1 Merge audit. How strongly are class, source and shortcut features (IPs, ports, timestamps, TTL, inf missingness, zero-duration flows, duplicates) confounded in BigFlow-NIDS-V2, and how much of model accuracy do they explain? (Source-only baselines, source-predictability probes, duplicate and cross-source overlap.) Primary
RQ2 Valid protocols and benchmark. Which evaluation protocols remain valid on this corpus, what exactly can each evaluate (the evaluability matrix), and how do strong baselines perform under them: dedup'd random (reference), per-class chronological hold-out, source-IP-group hold-out, shared-class LOSO, binary LOSO and family-level LOSO? Primary
RQ3 Imbalance. Under the valid protocols, do loss-level methods (class weights, focal, class-balanced, logit adjustment) beat resampling (undersampling, SMOTE variants) on the extreme tail (Worms 158, SQL_Injection 440, Brute_Force_XSS 480)? Which gains survive confidence intervals? Primary
RQ4 Scale. How does accuracy saturate with training fraction (1-100%), and what does Spark buy in runtime? Primary
RQ5 Hierarchy (secondary). Does binary -> family -> fine-grained beat a flat model end to end and on rare classes? Secondary

3. Novelty status (literature review result, unchanged except C1/C2 wording)

Method and limits. OpenAlex (84 queries, 10 themes, 2015-2026) plus Crossref/arXiv re-checks. Scopus and Web of Science were not searched (student to run slr/search_log.csv). Screening was LLM abstract-level (recall unmeasured); 9 of 10 flagged papers were read from abstracts only; two of five novelty angles were inconclusive. Absence of evidence, not proof.

Contribution Closest prior art Status
C1 Merge audit (class-source confounding, shortcuts, duplicates) Source-identifiability and shortcut papers on single or paired NetFlow sources (domain AUC >= 0.996 on all four NF-v3 sets in "Is It Transfer?"; 99.96% source identifiability on two v2 sets; ToN-IoT 65.7% duplicates; CICIDS2017/2018 audits) Concept not novel. Open: quantification on the merged BigFlow corpus (class x source table, source-only baselines, IP fingerprints)
C2 Evaluability matrix and valid protocols Cross-dataset studies mostly binary, 2-3 sources, v1/v2 or non-NetFlow; NF-v3 random/temporal/source-entity splits (binary/host-window); time-based long-tail study on single v2 sets Partially novel; now a descriptive-plus-protocol contribution, not a "31-class LOSO benchmark"
C3 Imbalance strategies 42 resampling combos on NF-v1 (resampling does not reliably help); 2026 long-tail/cost-sensitive NIDS papers (unread) Partially novel; cluster-SMOTE claim dropped
C4 Spark scalability Spark MLlib on full BoT-IoT (73M, two sizes); Spark/Kafka cross-dataset ensemble Weak; only a learning-curve study differentiates
C5 Hierarchy 3-level vs flat on NSL-KDD/UNSW/CIC-DoS2017: no significant difference; HICID and others (abstract/title only) Largely done; secondary

Biggest risk: being scooped (monthly 2026 releases in this niche). Mitigations in Sec. 9.


4. Contributions (examinable)

  1. C1: quantified audit of the merged corpus: class-source confounding (27/32 single-source; source-only accuracy), IP/port/timestamp/TTL fingerprints, inf missingness, zero-duration flows, duplicates (within and cross source), with a cleaned and documented split definition.
  2. C2: an evaluability matrix (what each protocol can and cannot evaluate, per class and source) and a set of valid, frozen protocols, with baseline results under them.
  3. C3: controlled loss-level vs resampling comparison on the extreme tail, with confidence intervals, under the valid protocols.
  4. C4: learning-curve evidence on how much of the 66.9M rows is needed.
  5. C5 (secondary): test of whether "hierarchy does not help" holds on this long-tailed set.

Not claimed: a new architecture, cluster-SMOTE, "first leakage/shortcut study on NetFlow", "first Spark NIDS", or a 31-class LOSO.


5. Methodology

Pipeline (implemented as numbered, re-runnable steps in impl/src/pipeline/)

Step Content Status
01 CSV -> typed Parquet, row_id = original order done
02 Inventory: labels vs Table 2, nulls/inf, columns, timestamps done
03 Source attribution (capture date) + validation done
04 Class x source table, source-label confounding, LOSO / time-split coverage done
05 Duplicates: exact within/cross source, label-conflicting duplicates, feature-set variants done
06 Source-predictability probe, ablation curve, feature-set C rule done (C = B: rule dropped nothing)
07a ATT&CK grounding (Enterprise v20.0) and Taxonomy v1 done
07 Frozen split protocols (v2 after adversarial review), leak flags, evaluability matrix done
08 Baselines under the protocols (RQ2) done (+08b noise floor)
09 Imbalance study (RQ3) done
10 Learning curve and Spark scalability (RQ4) done (see CLAUDE.md for the f=1.0 rerun)
11 Hierarchy experiment (RQ5, secondary) done
12 Tables and figures for thesis and paper planned

Feature-set variants (used everywhere)

  • A: all 53 features (everything except Label, Attack, row_id, source), including IPs, ports, timestamps.
  • B: A minus IPv4 source/destination, L4 source/destination port, flow start/end timestamps (47 features).
  • C: B minus features that identify the source on their own (rule fixed beforehand: single-feature source accuracy >= 0.90). Result: no feature qualifies, so C = B and later steps use A and B only. Source identifiability is distributed across many features (ablation curve, step 06).
  • inf -> NaN (trees); neural nets use 0 + indicator; results reported with and without the indicator.

Phase 1: Audit (RQ1; steps 02-06)

Source-only baselines, source-predictability probes (overall and within Benign / DoS / DDoS), cross-source IP overlap, duplicates (exact on A; on B; label-conflicting), class-wise missingness shortcuts.

Phase 2: Protocols (RQ2; step 07, frozen before modelling)

Population: deduplicated on feature set A (first occurrence by row_id). For B/C experiments, test rows whose B-hash occurs in train are flagged and excluded from the test score.

Protocol Definition Valid for
P1 random (reference) stratified 70/15/15 within (source, class) comparison with literature only (inflated by design)
P2 per-class chronological within each (source, class) stream, first 70% / next 15% / last 15% by start time, with a 5-minute embargo around boundaries classes with enough flows in each window (all multi-day and long classes)
P3 source-IP group within each class, split by IPV4_SRC_ADDR group so no attacker IP crosses splits; evaluable only with >= 5 train and >= 5 test IPs and top-IP share <= 50% 3 labels only (reported as a finding: attacks originate from very few IPs)
P4 shared-class LOSO train on three sources, test on the held-out one, only classes passing MIN_TRAIN/MIN_TEST (Benign, DoS, DDoS, Reconnaissance, Backdoor; CSE-CIC-2018 supports only Benign) the shared classes only
P4b binary LOSO benign vs any attack, held-out source all four sources
P5 family LOSO Taxonomy v1 (MITRE ATT&CK grounded, step 07a) families, held-out source, families passing the thresholds; v0 kept for sensitivity (p5v0) families present in at least two sources

Thresholds: MIN_TRAIN = 100, MIN_TEST = 50 flows. Rare-class results use repeated CV (>= 5 repeats), bootstrap confidence intervals and a minimum-support rule. A source-wide time split is not used (it leaves 8 classes without a train window).

Phase 3: Baselines (RQ2; step 08)

Flat LightGBM / XGBoost (class-weighted; GPU where useful), Random Forest, MLP, one tabular-DL baseline (TabNet or FT-Transformer, sampled). Spark MLlib GBTClassifier is binary-only: use XGBoost4J-Spark / LightGBM-on-Spark, OneVsRest or RandomForest. Metrics: macro-F1, MCC, balanced accuracy, per-class P/R/F1 with CIs; accuracy is reported but not used for conclusions. Every score is reported next to the source-only baseline and the majority baseline.

Phase 4: Taxonomy (needed for P5 and RQ5; step 07a)

Taxonomy v1 is grounded in MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v20.0. Each (source, label) was mapped to techniques whose ids, names and tactics were looked up in the official STIX file; the behaviour of each attack was quoted from the dataset papers by extraction agents, and a second skeptic pass corrected 27 of 36 rows (mostly technique specificity and over-stated confidence). Rule: family = ATT&CK technique cluster of the label's primary technique (11 families: DENIAL_OF_SERVICE, RECON_DISCOVERY, CREDENTIAL_ACCESS, EXPLOIT_PUBLIC_APP, COMMAND_AND_CONTROL, LATERAL_MOVEMENT, EXECUTION, RANSOMWARE_IMPACT, EXFILTRATION, CLIENT_INITIAL_ACCESS, UNMAPPED). Confidence: 6 rows high, 14 medium, 16 low (several UNSW classes are one-line umbrellas in the papers; Generic has no ATT&CK counterpart). Differences from the provisional v0 (adjusted Rand index 0.69 over the 31 classes, 0.996 flow-weighted): Fuzzers go to DENIAL_OF_SERVICE (ATT&CK has no fuzzing technique; skeptic judged T1499.004 primary), mitm joins CREDENTIAL_ACCESS, Analysis joins EXPLOIT_PUBLIC_APP, and Worms, Shellcode, ransomware, Theft, Infilteration become singletons. Backdoor resolves to COMMAND_AND_CONTROL by an explicit override (UNSW and ToN-IoT map differently, both low confidence). Limits: ATT&CK describes adversary behaviour, not flow statistics (flow observability recorded per row); quotes were re-checked by a skeptic agent, not by a human. P5 is reported under both taxonomies; an empirical (confusion-based) grouping is still to be compared in step 12.

Phase 5: Imbalance study (RQ3; step 09)

Loss-level: inverse-frequency and effective-number weights, focal, class-balanced, logit adjustment. Data-level: undersampling, SMOTE, Borderline-SMOTE, SVM-SMOTE, KMeans-SMOTE, SMOTE-ENN (training folds only). Same models, protocols and seeds for every method; realism checks on synthetic flows.

Phase 6: Scale study (RQ4; step 10)

Learning curves at 1/5/10/25/50/100% of training data (class floors so rare classes survive); runtime and throughput vs fraction and executors on a named cluster.

Phase 7 (secondary): Hierarchy (RQ5; step 11)

Flat vs 3-tier cascade vs family-conditional Tier 3; end-to-end metrics, error propagation, rare-class recall, hierarchical F1. No learned gating model.


6. Thesis chapter structure

Ch. Title Pages
1 Introduction: NIDS at scale, evaluation validity, gap, RQs, contributions 15
2 Literature Review (SLR-based) 28
3 BigFlow-NIDS-V2 Audit: sources, confounding, shortcuts, duplicates (RQ1) 25
4 Valid Protocols and the Evaluability Matrix; Baselines (RQ2) 28
5 Imbalance Study (RQ3) 20
6 Scalability Study (RQ4) 12
7 Hierarchy as a Secondary Experiment (RQ5) 10
8 Discussion, Limitations, Conclusion 10

Typeset with the IIT Bombay report class (thesis/); the student confirmed the format is acceptable.


7. Journal paper

Positioning

Benchmark / re-evaluation paper. Lead with the BigFlow-specific findings: class-source confounding, the evaluability matrix, and results under valid protocols.

Working title

"What Does a 66-Million-Flow Merge Hide? Source Confounding and Valid Evaluation Protocols for Multi-Class Intrusion Detection on BigFlow-NIDS-V2"

Venue options (verify indexing, scope and APC on the live Scopus/WoS lists first)

  • Institute rule (photographed notice): journals on the institute list, or any journal/conference indexed in Scopus or Web of Science.
  • Institute list, relevant: IJAISC (Inderscience), Intelligent Decision Technologies (IOS Press); listed as no-APC, verify current Scopus status.
  • Stronger fits (Scopus/WoS-indexed): Computers & Security, Journal of Network and Computer Applications, Computer Networks, Journal of Big Data, Cluster Computing, Future Generation Computer Systems, Expert Systems with Applications; fast fallback: IEEE Access.
  • Check that the venue accepts benchmark/reproducibility papers.

Timing

Submit by Month 8-9; confirm whether the institute needs "submitted", "accepted" or "published" for thesis submission.


8. Timeline (12 months)

Month Milestone
1 Steps 01-07 (data audit, protocols); retrieve paywalled papers; re-run slr/search_log.csv in Scopus and Web of Science; snowball citations; confirm cluster
2 Step 08 baselines; Ch. 2 draft from the review; Ch. 3 draft from audit results
3 Audit complete (RQ1). Gate 1: are the audit results strong enough to carry the paper? Novelty re-check #1. Consider an arXiv preprint of the audit
4 Baselines complete under all protocols; evaluability matrix final; Ch. 4 draft
5 Tabular-DL baseline; taxonomy validation
6 Imbalance study (RQ3)
7 Scale study (RQ4). Gate 2: still novel? Novelty re-check #2
8 Hierarchy experiment (time-boxed); paper draft and submission (by Month 9)
9 Ch. 5-7 drafts; paper revisions
10 Ch. 1, 8; thesis revision
11 Extra experiments requested by supervisor/reviewers; polish
12 Submission and defence preparation (buffer)

Monthly arXiv/Scholar/Crossref alerts: "BigFlow-NIDS", "NF-v3", "NetFlow cross-dataset", "NetFlow leakage".


9. Risks and mitigations

Risk Mitigation
Scooped by a 2026 NF-v3 cross-source or long-tail paper Narrow to BigFlow-specific confounding and evaluability; early preprint; monthly alerts; re-check at Months 3, 7 and before submission
LOSO covers very few classes Reported as a finding (evaluability matrix); family-level and binary LOSO add coverage
Per-class chronological split still shares attacker IPs Add P3 (IP-group split) wherever feasible; report which classes are not group-evaluable
Attacks bound to 1-3 days make time splits weak Embargoed per-class chronology; say plainly that this tests within-episode generalisation only
Source attribution rule (capture date) imperfect Validated by IP plans (step 03); sensitivity check on boundary dates
Taxonomy v0 questioned Provisional label, ATT&CK grounding, empirical comparison, sensitivity analysis
Rare-class metrics unstable Repeated CV, CIs, minimum-support rule; report instability
Hierarchy does not help Report as secondary negative result
Cluster access delayed Develop on stratified samples; the learning curve justifies this
Journal not Scopus/WoS-indexed Verify in Month 1 and Month 7

10. Verification plan

  1. Parquet row count = 66,935,021; label counts match Table 2 (done, step 02).
  2. Source rule validated by independent IP plans (done, step 03); boundary-date sensitivity check.
  3. Evaluability matrix generated by code, not by hand; thresholds stated.
  4. Duplicate counts and cross-source overlap reported (step 05); test rows with train-identical features excluded from scores.
  5. Split files frozen with seeds; every protocol reports class coverage and train/test counts; no test row appears in train (asserted in code).
  6. Every model score printed beside the source-only and majority baselines.
  7. Rare-class results carry CIs and support counts; paired tests for method comparisons.
  8. Learning curve and runtime table with cluster specification.
  9. Novelty re-check recorded (date, queries, databases) at each gate.

11. Key references (verified entries are in References/INDEX.csv; the rest still to verify)

  • Uddin et al., Data in Brief 65, 2026, doi:10.1016/j.dib.2026.112530 (BigFlow-NIDS; data doi:10.17632/nv729tbdgz.2)
  • Luay et al., temporal analysis of NetFlow datasets, arXiv:2503.04404; "Time Matters" (IEEE Access 2026)
  • Sarhan et al., Mobile Networks and Applications 2022; NetFlow datasets for ML-NIDS
  • Apruzzese et al., "The Cross-Evaluation of ML-Based NIDS", IEEE TNSM 19(4), 2022
  • Layeghy et al., "Benchmarking the benchmark", JISA 2024; Flood & Aspinall, EuroS&PW 2024
  • Engelen et al. (CICIDS2017); Lanvin et al. (error prevalence); Arp et al. (Dos and Don'ts)
  • Wolf et al. (resampling on NF-v1); Dinh et al.; Uddin et al. 2025 (hierarchical vs flat, Ad Hoc Networks)
  • Imbalance: Chawla (SMOTE), Han (Borderline-SMOTE), He (ADASYN), Douzas (KMeans-SMOTE), Lin (focal), Cui (class-balanced), Menon (logit adjustment)
  • Tabular: Arik & Pfister (TabNet), Gorishniy et al. (FT-Transformer), Grinsztajn et al.
  • Big data: Huynh et al. (BigSIDS), Abushwereb et al. (Spark on BoT-IoT)
  • Metrics/stats: Kiritchenko et al. (hierarchical F1), Demsar, Chicco & Jurman (MCC)

Changes from v3

Area v3 v4
Positioning Benchmark with a 31-class LOSO Confounding audit + evaluability matrix + valid protocols; 31-class LOSO dropped as impossible
RQ1 Merge audit planned Partly answered (27/32 single-source; source-only accuracy 79.8% / 66.6%; IP fingerprints)
RQ2 Coverage-aware LOSO + source-wide time split Six defined protocols P1-P5 incl. P4b; source-wide time split dropped (8 classes lose their train window)
C2 "31-class benchmark with LOSO and time splits" Evaluability matrix and valid protocols
Feature sets A/B/C named A = 53, B = 47, C defined by a data-driven rule (step 06)
Pipeline Phases only Numbered steps 01-12 with status; 01-04 done
Taxonomy Phase 4 plan Taxonomy v0 in step 07 (provisional) enabling family-level LOSO
Paper title "...Leakage-Safe, Multi-Source Benchmark of 31-Class..." "What Does a 66-Million-Flow Merge Hide? ..." (confounding and protocols)