data/test/groups.csv

name,TTP
A Patchwork .dll that contains BADNEWS is loaded and executed using DLL side-loading.,T1574.001
A Threat Group-3390 tool can spawn `svchost.exe` and inject the payload into that process.,T1055.012
A dropper used by Putter Panda installs itself into the ASEP Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run with a value named McUpdate.,T1547.001
APT-C-36 has used VPNs in their operational infrastructure.,T1133
APT-C-36 has used WMI to execute PowerShell.,T1047
"APT-C-36 has used geolocation filtering in malware delivery to redirect traffic not coming from a targeted region or country, such as Ecuador or Colombia, to legitimate sites.",T1480
"APT1 used the commands net localgroup,net user, and net group to find accounts on the system.",T1087.001
APT19 used -W Hidden to conceal PowerShell windows by setting the WindowStyle parameter to hidden.,T1564.003
APT28 compromised Ubiquiti network devices to act as collection devices for credentials compromised via phishing webpages.,T1584.008
"APT28 has cleared event logs, including by using the commands wevtutil cl System and wevtutil cl Security.",T1685.005
APT28 has deployed LAMEHUG which can can query an LLM to generate and return commands for post compromise activity on targeted systems.,T1588.007
"APT28 has exploited CVE-2014-4076, CVE-2015-2387, CVE-2015-1701, CVE-2017-0263, and CVE-2022-38028 to escalate privileges.",T1068
APT28 has exploited open Wi-Fi access points for initial access to target devices using the network.,T1669
APT29 has gained access to a global administrator account in Azure AD and has used `Service Principal` credentials in Exchange.,T1078.004
APT29 has used a compromised global administrator account in Azure AD to backdoor a service principal with `ApplicationImpersonation` rights to start collecting emails from targeted mailboxes; APT29 has also used compromised accounts holding `ApplicationImpersonation` rights in Exchange to collect emails.,T1098.002
APT29 used large size files to avoid detection by security solutions with hardcoded size limits.,T1027.001
APT32 collected the victim's username and executed the whoami command on the victim's machine. APT32 executed shellcode to collect the username on the victim's machine.,T1033

"APT32 used the net view command to show all shares available, including the administrative shares such as C$ and ADMIN$.",T1135

APT32 used the netstat -anpo tcp command to display TCP connections on the victim's machine.,T1049
APT38 clears Window Event logs and Sysmon logs from the system.,T1685.005
APT39 has utilized AutoIt malware scripts embedded in Microsoft Office documents or malicious links.,T1059.010
APT41 attempted to remove evidence of some of its activity by clearing Windows security and system events.,T1685.005
"APT41 has obtained information about accounts, lists of employees, and plaintext and hashed passwords from databases.",T1555
APT41 used cmd.exe /c to execute commands on remote machines. APT41 used a batch file to install persistence for the Cobalt Strike BEACON loader.,T1059.003
"APT41 used BrowserGhost, a tool designed to obtain credentials from browsers, to retrieve information from password stores.",T1555.003
"APT41 used WMI in several ways, including for execution of commands via WMIEXEC as well as for persistence via PowerSploit. APT41 has executed files through Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI).",T1047
APT42 has cleared Chrome browser history.,T1070
APT42 has collected data from Microsoft 365 environments.,T1530
APT42 has deleted login notification emails and has cleared the Sent folder to cover their tracks.,T1070.008
APT42 has modified the Registry to maintain persistence.,T1547
APT42 has sent spearphishing emails containing malicious links.,T1566.002
APT42 has used the PowerShell-based POWERPOST script to collect local account names from the victim machine.,T1087.001
APT5 has created Local Administrator accounts to maintain access to systems with short-cycle credential rotation.,T1136.001
APT5 has used Windows-based utilities to carry out tasks including tasklist.exe.,T1057
APT5 has used the Task Manager process to target LSASS process memory in order to obtain NTLM password hashes. APT5 has also dumped clear text passwords and hashes from memory using Mimikatz hosted through an RDP mapped drive.,T1003.001
"After compromising user accounts, Scattered Spider registers their own MFA tokens.",T1556.006
Agrius attempted to acquire valid credentials for victim environments through various means to enable follow-on lateral movement.,T1078.002
"Agrius gathered data from database and other critical servers in victim environments, then used wiping mechanisms as an anti-analysis and anti-forensics mechanism.",T1005
Agrius has deployed base64-encoded variants of ASPXSpy to evade detection.,T1140
"Agrius typically uses commercial VPN services for anonymizing last-hop traffic to victim networks, such as ProtonVPN.",T1583
Agrius used the open-source port scanner WinEggDrop to perform detailed scans of hosts of interest in victim networks.,T1046
Akira has used legitimate names and locations for files to evade defenses.,T1036.005
Akira uses compromised VPN accounts for initial access to victim networks.,T1133
"An APT3 downloader uses the Windows command ""cmd.exe"" /C whoami to verify that it is running with the elevated privileges of ""System.""",T1033
Aquatic Panda gathers information on recently logged-in users on victim devices.,T1033
Aquatic Panda has attempted and failed to run Bash commands on a Windows host by passing them to cmd /C.,T1059.003
Aquatic Panda has encoded PowerShell commands in Base64.,T1027.010
"Aquatic Panda used a registry edit to enable a Windows feature called RestrictedAdmin in victim environments. This change allowed Aquatic Panda to leverage ""pass the hash"" mechanisms as the alteration allows for RDP connections with a valid account name and hash only, without possessing a cleartext password value.",T1550.002
BRONZE BUTLER typically use ping and Net to enumerate systems.,T1018
BlackByte has used ASPX web shells following exploitation of vulnerabilities in services such as Microsoft Exchange.,T1505.003
CURIUM has leveraged PowerShell scripts for initial process execution and data gathering in victim environments.,T1059.001
CURIUM has used phishing with malicious attachments for initial access to victim environments.,T1566.001
CURIUM has used strategic website compromise to infect victims with malware such as IMAPLoader.,T1189
CURIUM used malicious links to adversary-controlled resources for credential harvesting.,T1598.003
CURIUM used strategic website compromise to fingerprint then target victims.,T1608.004
Chimera has used net user for account discovery.,T1087.001
Chimera has used side loading to place malicious DLLs in memory.,T1574.001
Chimera has used the get -b -e -p command for network scanning as well as a custom Python tool packed into a Windows executable named Get.exe to scan IP ranges for HTTP.,T1046
Cinnamon Tempest has executed ransomware using batch scripts deployed via GPO.,T1059.003
"Cinnamon Tempest has exploited multiple unpatched vulnerabilities for initial access including vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange, Manage Engine AdSelfService Plus, Confluence, and Log4j.",T1190
"Cinnamon Tempest has used PowerShell to communicate with C2, download files, and execute reconnaissance commands.",T1059.001
Contagious Interview has conducted key word searches within files and directories on a compromised hosts to identify files for exfiltration.,T1083
Contagious Interview has configured malware to remove archives used in collection activities following successful exfiltration.,T1070.004
Contagious Interview has hosted malicious payloads on code repositories used as lures for victims to download.,T1608.001
Contagious Interview has leveraged Astrill VPN for C2.,T1090
Contagious Interview has leveraged JavaScript in the execution of their downloader malware targeting Windows devices using a NodeJS script titled nvidia.js.,T1059.007
Contagious Interview has stolen cryptocurrency wallet credentials and credit card information utilizing BeaverTail and InvisibleFerret malware.,T1657
"Contagious Interview has used hexadecimal string encoding to hide critical JavaScript module names, function names, and C2 URLs, which are decoded dynamically at runtime.",T1027.013
Daggerfly has used PowerShell and BITSAdmin to retrieve follow-on payloads from external locations for execution on victim machines.,T1105
Daggerfly has used strategic website compromise for initial access against victims.,T1189
Daggerfly proxied execution of malicious DLLs through a renamed rundll32.exe binary.,T1218.011
Daggerfly used PowerShell to download and execute remote-hosted files on victim systems.,T1059.001
Daggerfly used Reg to dump the Security Account Manager (SAM) hive from victim machines for follow-on credential extraction.,T1003.002
Daggerfly utilizes victim machine operating system information to create custom User Agent strings for subsequent command and control communication.,T1082
"Earth Lusca modified the registry using the command reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Environment"" /v UserInitMprLogonScript /t REG_SZ /d ""file path"" for persistence.",T1112
Ember Bear acquires victim credentials by extracting registry hives such as the Security Account Manager through commands such as reg save.,T1003.002
"Ember Bear conducted destructive operations against victims, including disk structure wiping, via the WhisperGate malware in Ukraine.",T1561.002
"Ember Bear gains initial access to victim environments by exploiting external-facing services. Examples include exploitation of CVE-2021-26084 in Confluence servers; CVE-2022-41040, ProxyShell, and other vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange; and multiple vulnerabilities in open-source platforms such as content management systems.",T1190
Ember Bear has created accounts on dark web forums to obtain various tools and malware.,T1585
"Ember Bear has used exploits for vulnerabilities such as MS17-010, also known as `Eternal Blue`, during operations.",T1210
Ember Bear has used frameworks such as Impacket to dump LSA secrets for credential capture.,T1003.004
Ember Bear retrieves follow-on payloads direct from adversary-owned infrastructure for deployment on compromised hosts.,T1570
Ember Bear used the `su-bruteforce` tool to brute force specific users using the `su` command.,T1110
"Ember Bear uses services such as IVPN, SurfShark, and Tor to add anonymization to operations.",T1583
FIN13 has enumerated all users and their roles from a victim's main treasury system.,T1087

FIN13 has gained access to compromised environments via remote access services such as the corporate virtual private network (VPN).,T1133

FIN13 has leveraged default credentials for authenticating myWebMethods (WMS) and QLogic web management interface to gain initial access.,T1078.001

FIN13 has masqueraded staged data by using the Windows certutil utility to generate fake Base64 encoded certificates with the input file.,T1036

FIN13 has remotely accessed compromised environments via secure shell (SSH) for lateral movement.,T1021.004

"FIN13 has used Windows Registry run keys such as, `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\hosts` to maintain persistence.",T1547.001

FIN13 has used `nslookup` and `ipconfig` for network reconnaissance efforts. FIN13 has also utilized a compromised Symantec Altiris console and LanDesk account to retrieve network information.,T1016

FIN13 has utilized `WMI` to execute commands and move laterally on compromised Windows machines.,T1047

FIN13 has utilized a proxy tool to communicate between compromised assets.,T1090.001

FIN13 has utilized web shells and Java tools for tunneling capabilities to and from compromised assets.,T1572

FIN5 has cleared event logs from victims.,T1685.005

FIN7 has created a fake link that redirected to an adversary-controlled Dropbox that downloaded the malicious executable.,T1608.005

FIN7 has started the SSH service by executing `sc start sshd`.,T1569.002

"FIN7 has used port-protocol mismatches on ports such as 53, 80, 443, and 8080 during C2. FIN7 has used TCP ports 59999 and 9898 for firewall rules.",T1571

FIN7 has utilized the remote management tool Atera to download malware to a compromised system.,T1219

GALLIUM used ipconfig /all to obtain information about the victim network configuration. The group also ran a modified version of NBTscan to identify available NetBIOS name servers.,T1016

Gamaredon Group has attempted to get users to click on a link pointing to a malicious HTML file leading to follow-on malicious content.,T1204.001

"Gamaredon Group has checked existing conditions, such as geographic location, device type, or system specification, before the victim is sent a malicious Word document.",T1497.001

Gamaredon Group has compiled the source code for a downloader directly on the infected system using the built-in Microsoft.CSharp.CSharpCodeProvider class.,T1027.004

Gamaredon Group has delivered macros which can tamper with Microsoft Office security settings.,T1685

Gamaredon Group has delivered malicious payloads within compressed archives and zip files.,T1027.015

"Gamaredon Group has downloaded additional malware and tools onto a compromised host. For example, Gamaredon Group uses a backdoor script to retrieve and decode additional payloads once in victim environments.",T1105

Gamaredon Group has injected Remcos into explorer.exe.,T1055

Gamaredon Group has used Telegram Messenger content to discover the IP address for C2 communications.,T1102.003

Gamaredon Group has used Tor for C2 traffic.,T1090.003

Gamaredon Group has used port 6856 for C2 communications.,T1571

Gamaredon Group malware can insert malicious macros into documents using a Microsoft.Office.Interop object.,T1559.001

HAFNIUM has collected data and files from a compromised machine.,T1005

HAFNIUM has created domain accounts.,T1136.002

"HAFNIUM has used MSGraph to exfiltrate data from email, OneDrive, and SharePoint.",T1119

"HAFNIUM has used stolen API keys and credentials associated with privilege access management (PAM), cloud app providers, and cloud data management companies to access downstream customer environments.",T1199

Higaisa used ipconfig to gather network configuration information.,T1016

"INC Ransom has run a file encryption executable via `Service Control Manager/7045;winupd,%SystemRoot%\winupd.exe,user mode service,demand start,LocalSystem`.",T1569.002

INC Ransom has used RDP to move laterally.,T1021.001

Indrik Spider has accessed and exported passwords from password managers.,T1555.005

Indrik Spider has searched files to obtain and exfiltrate credentials.,T1552.001

Indrik Spider has used RDP for lateral movement.,T1021.001

Ke3chang backdoor RoyalDNS established persistence through adding a service called Nwsapagent.,T1543.003

Ke3chang performs service discovery using net start commands.,T1007

Kimsuky has added accounts to specific groups with net localgroup.,T1098.007

Kimsuky has captured browser screenshots using TRANSLATEXT. Kimsuky has also obtained screen captures with custom malware.,T1113

Kimsuky has collected credentials from a fake Google account login page.,T1056.003

"Kimsuky has collected sensitive browser data using the function `GetBrowserData()` to include login credentials, bookmarks, cookies, and encryption keys.",T1217

Kimsuky has collected valid email addresses including personal accounts that were subsequently used for spearphishing and other forms of social engineering.,T1589.002

"Kimsuky has executed a variety of PowerShell scripts including Invoke-Mimikatz. Kimsuky has also utilized PowerShell scripts for execution, persistence, and defense evasion. Kimsuky has leveraged PowerShell's cmdlet `Expand-Archive` to extract contents of zip files into the same directory. Kimsuky has employed ClickFix type tactics enticing victims to copy and paste malicious PowerShell commands and scripts, where the scripts ultimately led to QuasarRAT.",T1059.001

Kimsuky has exfiltrated data to C2 servers using an automated script that executes every 10 minutes and after successful checks for the presence of pre-designated staged filenames.,T1020

"Kimsuky has registered domains to spoof targeted organizations and trusted third parties including search engines, web platforms, and cryptocurrency exchanges.",T1583.001

Kimsuky has renamed malware to legitimate names such as ESTCommon.dll or patch.dll. Kimsuky has also disguised payloads using legitimate file names including a PowerShell payload named chrome.ps1. Kimsuky has also used a malicious QR code that masqueraded as a legitimate package delivery service.,T1036.005

Kimsuky has run reg add 'HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccounts\UserList' /v to hide a newly created user.,T1564.002

Kimsuky has stolen a valid certificate that is used to sign the malware and the dropper.,T1588.003

"Kimsuky has used Dynamic DNS (DDNS) services, such as FreeDNS or No-IP DDNS, to include servers located in South Korea.",T1568

"Kimsuky has used LLMs to identify think tanks, government organizations, and experts to inform targeting for spearphishing campaigns.",T1682

"Kimsuky has used modified versions of open source PHP web shells to maintain access, often adding ""Dinosaur"" references within the code.",T1505.003

"Kimsuky has used spearphishing attachments to entice victims into opening malicious files, including LNK files disguised with tailored filenames and fake extensions. Kimsuky has also delivered malicious payloads within archive files (e.g., ZIP), which display decoy documents upon execution while running malicious code in the background.",T1204.002

Kimsuky has used the Invoke-Mimikatz PowerShell script to reflectively load a Mimikatz credential stealing DLL into memory. Kimsuky has also used reflective loading through .NET assembly using `System.Reflection.Assembly::Load`.,T1620

LAPSUS$ has called victims' help desk and impersonated legitimate users with previously gathered information in order to gain access to privileged accounts.,T1684.001

LAPSUS$ has shut down virtual machines from within a victim's on-premise VMware ESXi infrastructure.,T1489

Lazarus Group has hosted malicious downloads on Github.,T1583.006

Lazarus Group has renamed system utilities such as wscript.exe and mshta.exe.,T1036.003

Lazarus Group keylogger KiloAlfa obtains user tokens from interactive sessions to execute itself with API call CreateProcessAsUserA under that user's context.,T1134.002

"Lazarus Group malware can use a common function to identify target files by their extension, and some also enumerate files and directories, including a Destover-like variant that lists files and gathers information for all drives.",T1083

LuminousMoth has used a valid digital certificate for some of their malware.,T1588.004

LuminousMoth has used legitimate executables such as `winword.exe` and `igfxem.exe` to side-load their malware.,T1574.001

LuminousMoth has used malware that exfiltrates stolen data to its C2 server.,T1041

LuminousMoth has used malware to store malicious binaries in hidden directories on victim's USB drives.,T1564.001

"Magic Hound has exploited the Log4j utility (CVE-2021-44228), on-premises MS Exchange servers via ""ProxyShell"" (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207), and Fortios SSL VPNs (CVE-2018-13379).",T1190

Magic Hound has exported emails from compromised Exchange servers including through use of the cmdlet `New-MailboxExportRequest.`,T1114.002

Magic Hound has used HTTP for C2.,T1071.001

Magic Hound has used Ping for discovery on targeted networks.,T1018

Magic Hound has used Remote Desktop Services to copy tools on targeted systems.,T1021.001

Malteiro has obtained credentials from mail clients via NirSoft MailPassView.,T1555

Malteiro has relied on users to execute .zip file attachments containing malicious URLs.,T1204.002

Malteiro has utilized a dropper containing malicious VBS scripts.,T1059.005

Medusa Group has leveraged Microsoft Management Console (MMC) to facilitate lateral movement and to interact locally or remotely with victim devices using the command `mmc.exe compmgmt.msc /computer:{hostname/ip}`.,T1218.014

Medusa Group has leveraged Mimikatz to dump LSASS to harvest credentials.,T1003.001

Medusa Group has leveraged `cmd.exe` to identify system info `cmd.exe /c systeminfo`.,T1082

"Medusa Group has obtained and leveraged numerous RMM services, along with publicly available tools used for scanning. Medusa Group has utilized tools such as Advanced IP Scanner and SoftPerfect Network scanner for user, system and network discovery. Medusa Group has also acquired tools for command and control and defense evasion which include tunneling tools Ligolo and Cloudflared.",T1588.002

Medusa Group has removed PowerShell command history through the use of the PSReadLine module by running the PowerShell command `Remove-Item (Get-PSReadlineOption).HistorySavePath`.,T1690

Medusa Group has searched for files within the victim environment for encryption and exfiltration. Medusa Group has also identified files associated with remote management services.,T1083

Medusa Group has stolen and encrypted victims' data in order to extort victims into paying a ransom.,T1657

"Medusa Group has terminated services related to backups, security, databases, communication, filesharing and websites.",T1489

MirrorFace has abused a known Microsoft digital signature verification issues to append encrypted data to digital signatures that still appear to be validly signed.,T1553.002

MirrorFace has created and continued to develop custom strains of malware including LODEINFO.,T1587.001

MirrorFace has deployed shellcode to check for Japanese Microsoft Office settings.,T1614.001

MirrorFace has used rar.exe and the Makecab utility to archive files of interest prior to exfiltration.,T1560.001

MirrorFace has used remote template injection to retrieve malicious payloads from the C2.,T1221

MirrorFace has used the GO Simple Tunnel (GOST) proxy tool.,T1090

MirrorFace has used vssadmin to copy registry hives including SAM.,T1003.002

Moonstone Sleet has created social media accounts to interact with victims.,T1585.001

Moonstone Sleet used spearphishing messages containing items such as tracking pixels to determine if users interacted with malicious messages.,T1598.003

MoustachedBouncer has used JavaScript to deliver malware hosted on HTML pages.,T1059.007

MuddyWater has leveraged ClickFix type tactics enticing victims to copy and paste malicious PowerShell code.,T1204.004

"MuddyWater has leveraged RMM solutions including ScreenConnect, AteraAgent, SimpleHelp, Action1, Level, and PDQ to facilitate follow-on actions within compromised hosts to include data exfiltration.",T1219.002

MuddyWater has sent phishing emails to targets from the email address support@microsoftonlines.com.,T1566

MuddyWater has used cmd.exe net user /domain to enumerate domain users.,T1087.002

"MuddyWater has used NordVPN to proxy phishing emails, making them appear to originate from France.",T1090

MuddyWater has used compromised mailboxes within target organizations to send spearphishing emails.,T1534

"MuddyWater has used file sharing services including OneHub, Sync, and TeraBox to distribute tools.",T1583.006

"MuddyWater has used publicly available malware for operations, likely to blend in with other cybercriminals.",T1588.001

"MuddyWater has used support@microsoftonlines.com to send phishing emails that masqueraded as security updates from Microsoft. MuddyWater has also impersonated TMCell (Altyn Asyr CJSC), the primary mobile operator in Turkmenistan, sending phishing emails with the email domain info@tmcell.",T1684.001

MuddyWater maintains persistence on victim networks through side-loading dlls to trick legitimate programs into running malware.,T1574.001

Mustang Panda has acquired C2 domains prior to operations.,T1583.001

"Mustang Panda has created a scheduled task to execute additional malicious software, as well as maintain persistence. Mustang Panda has also created a scheduled task that creates a reverse shell.",T1053.005

Mustang Panda has deleted registry keys that store data and maintained persistence.,T1070

"Mustang Panda has executed HTA files via cmd.exe, and used batch scripts for collection. Mustang Panda has also utilized cmd.exe to execute commands on an infected host such as `cmd.exe /c ping.exe 8.8.8.8 -n 70&&""%temp%\FontEDL.exe""`.",T1059.003

Mustang Panda has gathered system information using systeminfo.,T1082

Mustang Panda has leveraged AdFind to enumerate domain groups.,T1069.002

"Mustang Panda has leveraged obfuscated Windows API function calls that were concealed as unique names, or hashes of the Windows API.",T1027.007

Mustang Panda has used open-source research to identify information about victims to use in targeting to include creating weaponized phishing lures and attachments.,T1593

Mustang Panda has used spearphishing attachments to deliver initial access payloads. Mustang Panda has also delivered archive files such as RAR and ZIP files containing legitimate EXEs and malicious DLLs.,T1566.001

Mustang Panda has used valid legitimate digital signatures and certificates to evade detection.,T1553.002

Mustang Panda has utilized LNK files to hide malicious scripts for execution. Mustang Panda has also leveraged LNK files that were programmed to display a PDF icon to entice the victim to click on the file to execute an office.exe binary.,T1027.012

"Mustard Tempest has used the filename `AutoUpdater.js` to mimic legitimate update files and has also used the Cyrillic homoglyph characters С `(0xd0a1)` and а `(0xd0b0)`, to produce the filename `Сhrome.Updаte.zip`.",T1036.005

Mustard Tempest operates a global network of compromised websites that redirect into a traffic distribution system (TDS) to select victims for a fake browser update page.,T1584.001

Naikon renamed a malicious service taskmgr to appear to be a legitimate version of Task Manager.,T1036.004

Naikon uses commands such as netsh advfirewall firewall to discover local firewall settings.,T1518.001

Naikon uses commands such as netsh interface show to discover network interface settings.,T1016

OilRig has compromised email accounts to send phishing emails.,T1586.002

OilRig has exploited CVE-2024-30088 to run arbitrary code in the context of `SYSTEM`.,T1203

"OilRig has exploited the Windows Kernel Elevation of Privilege vulnerability, CVE-2024-30088.",T1068

OilRig has hosted malware on fake websites designed to target specific audiences.,T1608.001

OilRig has leveraged compromised organizations to conduct supply chain attacks on government entities.,T1195

OilRig has made use of the publicly available tools including Plink and Mimikatz.,T1588.002

OilRig has registered a password filter DLL in order to drop malware.,T1556.002

OilRig has used netstat -an on a victim to get a listing of network connections.,T1049

OilRig has used DNS for C2 including the publicly available requestbin.net tunneling service.,T1071.004

OilRig has used VBScript macros for execution on compromised hosts.,T1059.005

"Patchwork collected the victim computer name, OS version, and architecture type and sent the information to its C2 server.",T1082

Patchwork dumped the login data database from \AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data.,T1555.003

Play demands ransom payments from victims to unencrypt filesystems and to not publish sensitive data exfiltrated from victim networks.,T1657

Play has used Base64-encoded PowerShell scripts for post exploit activities on compromised hosts.,T1027.010

Play has used WinSCP to exfiltrate data to actor-controlled accounts.,T1048

"Play has used tools including GMER, IOBit, and PowerTool to disable antivirus software.",T1685

Play has used valid local accounts to gain initial access.,T1078.003

"Prior to executing a backdoor ToddyCat has run `cmd /c start /b netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name=""SGAccessInboundRule"" dir=in protocol=udp action=allow localport=49683` to allow the targeted system to receive UDP packets on port 49683.",T1686

"RedCurl added the ""hidden"" file attribute to original files, manipulating victims to click on malicious LNK files.",T1564.001

RedCurl has collected information about email accounts.,T1087.003

RedCurl has used HTTPS for C2 communication.,T1573.002

RedCurl prompts the user for credentials through a Microsoft Outlook pop-up.,T1056.002

"Rocke downloaded a file ""libprocesshider"", which could hide files on the target system.",T1564.001

"Rocke has installed an ""init.d"" startup script to maintain persistence.",T1037

Rocke used scripts which killed processes and added firewall rules to block traffic related to other cryptominers.,T1686

"Rocke's miner, ""TermsHost.exe"", evaded defenses by injecting itself into Windows processes, including Notepad.exe.",T1055.002

Saint Bear has impersonated government and related entities in both phishing activity and developing web sites with malicious links that mimic legitimate resources.,T1684.001

Saint Bear has leveraged the Discord content delivery network to host malicious content for retrieval during initial access operations.,T1583.006

Saint Bear has leveraged vulnerabilities in client applications such as CVE-2017-11882 in Microsoft Office to enable code execution in victim environments.,T1203

Saint Bear will leverage malicious Windows batch scripts to modify registry values associated with Windows Defender functionality.,T1112

Saint Bear will modify registry entries and scheduled task objects associated with Windows Defender to disable its functionality.,T1685

"Sandworm Team exploits public-facing applications for initial access and to acquire infrastructure, such as exploitation of the EXIM mail transfer agent in Linux systems.",T1190

Sandworm Team has used Prestige ransomware to encrypt data at targeted organizations in transportation and related logistics industries in Ukraine and Poland.,T1486

Sandworm Team uses Prestige to disable and restore file system redirection by using the following functions: `Wow64DisableWow64FsRedirection()` and `Wow64RevertWow64FsRedirection()`.,T1106

Scattered Spider abused AWS Systems Manager Inventory to identify targets on the compromised network prior to lateral movement.,T1538

"Scattered Spider has obtained tools for use throughout the attack lifecycle to include remote access software, protocol tunneling and proxy tools, exploitation frameworks, and reconnaissance tools.",T1588.002

Scattered Spider has used BlackCat and DragonForce ransomware to encrypt files including on VMWare ESXi servers.,T1486

Scattered Spider has used compromised credentials for initial access.,T1078

Scattered Spider has used proxy networks to hamper detection and has installed legitimate proxy tools on VMware vCenter and adversary-controlled VMs.,T1090

Scattered Spider has used the command shell to upload and install the Teleport remote access tool to a compromised vCenter Server Appliance.,T1059.004

Sea Turtle modified DNS records at service providers to redirect traffic from legitimate resources to Sea Turtle-controlled servers to enable adversary-in-the-middle attacks for credential capture.,T1557

Sea Turtle modified Name Server (NS) items to refer to Sea Turtle-controlled DNS servers to provide responses for all DNS lookups.,T1584.002

Sea Turtle registered domains for authoritative name servers used in DNS hijacking activity and for command and control servers.,T1583.001

Sea Turtle staged collected email archives in the public web directory of a website that was accessible from the internet.,T1074.002

Sea Turtle used spear phishing to gain initial access to victims.,T1566

"Silence has used HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, and the Startup folder to establish persistence.",T1547.001

"Star Blizzard has abused email forwarding rules to monitor the activities of a victim, steal information, and maintain persistent access after compromised credentials are reset.",T1114.003

Star Blizzard has bypassed multi-factor authentication on victim email accounts by using session cookies stolen using EvilGinx.,T1550.004

Star Blizzard has established fraudulent profiles on professional networking sites to conduct reconnaissance.,T1585.001

Star Blizzard has identified ways to engage targets by researching potential victims' interests and social or professional contacts.,T1589
Star Blizzard has incorporated the open-source EvilGinx framework into their spearphishing activity.,T1588.002
Star Blizzard has sent emails with malicious .pdf files to spread malware.,T1566.001
Star Blizzard has uploaded malicious payloads to cloud storage sites.,T1608.001
Storm-0501 has discovered running processes through `tasklist.exe`.,T1057
Storm-0501 has elevated their access to Azure resources using `Microsoft.Authorization/elevateAccess/action` and `Microsoft.Authorization/roleAssignments/write` operations to gain User Access Administrator and Owner Azure roles over the victims' Azure subscriptions.,T1098.003

Storm-0501 has used the SecretsDump module within Impacket can perform credential dumping to obtain account and password information.,T1003

Storm-0501 has utilized DCSync to extract credentials from victims.,T1003.006

"Storm-0501 has utilized their own self-signed TLS certificate ""Microsoft IT TLS CA 5"" with their infrastructure.",T1587.003

Storm-1811 XOR encodes a Cobalt Strike installation payload in a DLL file that is decoded with a hardcoded key when called by a legitimate 7zip installation process.,T1027.013

"Storm-1811 has abused multiple types of legitimate remote access software and tools, such as ScreenConnect, NetSupport Manager, and AnyDesk.",T1219.002

Storm-1811 has attempted to move laterally in victim environments via SMB using Impacket.,T1021.002

Storm-1811 has created Windows Registry Run keys that execute various batch scripts to establish persistence on victim devices.,T1547.001

Storm-1811 has performed domain account enumeration during intrusions.,T1087.002

Storm-1811 has used Microsoft Teams to send messages and initiate voice calls to victims posing as IT support personnel.,T1566.003

TA2541 has attempted to disable built-in security protections such as Windows AMSI.,T1685

TA2541 has used `mshta` to execute scripts including VBS.,T1218.005

TA2541 has used malicious links to cloud and web services to gain execution on victim machines.,T1204.001

TA2541 has used malicious scripts and macros with the ability to download additional payloads.,T1105

TA505 has used TinyMet to enumerate members of privileged groups. TA505 has also run net group /domain.,T1069

TA505 has used base64 encoded PowerShell commands.,T1027.010

"TA578 has placed malicious links in contact forms on victim sites, often spoofing a copyright complaint, to redirect users to malicious file downloads.",T1204.001

TeamTNT has cleared command history with history -c.,T1070.003

TeamTNT has established persistence through the creation of a cryptocurrency mining system service using systemctl.,T1543.002

TeamTNT has leveraged AWS CLI to enumerate cloud environments with compromised credentials.,T1059.009

"TeamTNT has searched for system version, architecture, and hostname information.",T1082

"Threat Group-3390 has obtained stolen valid certificates, including from VMProtect and the Chinese instant messaging application Youdu, for their operations.",T1588.003

Threat Group-3390 has used the net view command.,T1018

ToddyCat has used WMI to execute scripts for post exploit document collection.,T1047

ToddyCat has used `netstat -anop tcp` to discover TCP connections to compromised hosts.,T1049

ToddyCat has used a DropBox uploader to exfiltrate stolen files.,T1567.002

Tropic Trooper used netview to scan target systems for shared resources.,T1135

Tropic Trooper used pr and an openly available tool to scan for open ports on target systems.,T1046

Turla established persistence by adding a Shell value under the Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon.,T1547.004

UNC3886 has XOR encrypted and Gzip compressed captured credentials.,T1560.003

UNC3886 has executed Windows commands on guest virtual machines through `vmtoolsd.exe`.,T1059.003

UNC3886 has staged captured credentials in `var/log/ldapd.2.gz`.,T1074.001

UNC3886 has used Python scripts to enumerate ESXi hosts and guest VMs.,T1059.006

UNC3886 has used installation scripts to collect the system time on targeted ESXi hosts.,T1124

UNC3886 has used rundll32.exe to execute MiniDump for dumping LSASS process memory.,T1218.011

UNC3886 has used scripts to enumerate ESXi hypervisors and their guest VMs.,T1673

UNC3886 has used the publicly available rootkits REPTILE and MEDUSA.,T1588.001

UNC3886 has used zero-day vulnerabilities CVE-2022-41328 against FortiOS and CVE-2023-20867 and CVE-2023-34048 against VMware vCenter.,T1587.004

UNC3886 modified the startup file `/etc/init.d/localnet` to execute the line `nohup /bin/support &` so the script would run when the system was rebooted.,T1564.011

"VOID MANTICORE has abused built-in remote wipe or factory reset commands to wipe devices managed within an organization's Cloud management solution impacting laptops, servers, and mobile devices.",T1651

VOID MANTICORE has leveraged backend servers within Iran.,T1583.004

"VOID MANTICORE has targeted IT and service providers in an effort to obtain credentials, relying largely on compromised VPN accounts for initial access.",T1199

VOID MANTICORE has utilized ADRecon to enumerate the active directory environment.,T1087.002

VOID MANTICORE has utilized PowerShell scripts that run without notifying the user of its execution to include `-nop -w hidden- ep bypass -enc`.,T1564.003

VOID MANTICORE has utilized credential stuffing attacks to obtain initial access to victim environments.,T1110.004

VOID MANTICORE has utilized custom-malware and wipers to include BiBi Wiper.,T1587.001

Velvet Ant initial execution included launching multiple `svchost` processes and injecting code into them.,T1055

Volt Typhoon has accessed a Local State file that contains the AES key used to encrypt passwords stored in the Chrome browser.,T1552.004

Volt Typhoon has executed the Windows-native `vssadmin` command to create volume shadow copies.,T1006

Volt Typhoon has gained initial access by exploiting privilege escalation vulnerabilities in the operating system or network services.,T1068

"Volt Typhoon has queried the Registry on compromised systems, `reg query hklm\software\`, for information on installed software including PuTTY.",T1012

Volt Typhoon has staged collected data in password-protected archives.,T1074

"Volt Typhoon has stolen files from a sensitive file server and the Active Directory database from targeted environments, and used Wevtutil to extract event log information.",T1005

Volt Typhoon has used a version of the Awen web shell that employed AES encryption and decryption for C2 communications.,T1573.001

Volt Typhoon has used compromised Cisco and NETGEAR end-of-life SOHO routers implanted with KV Botnet malware to support operations.,T1584.005

Volt Typhoon has used ntds.util to create domain controller installation media containing usernames and password hashes.,T1003.003

WIRTE has collected documents from victims' email accounts.,T1114.001

WIRTE has configured C2 servers to check location and user-agent strings for victim endpoints to prevent sending a payload to sandboxed environments.,T1497.001

WIRTE has sent targeted spearphishing emails with malicious links directing victims to malware downloads.,T1566.002

"WIRTE has used compromised emails, including one belonging to an Israel-based technology reseller, to deliver targeted spearphishing messages.",T1586.002

Winter Vivern created specially-crafted documents mimicking legitimate government or similar documents during phishing campaigns.,T1036

Winter Vivern distributed Windows batch scripts disguised as virus scanners to prompt download of malicious payloads using built-in system tools.,T1059.003

Winter Vivern executed PowerShell scripts to create scheduled tasks to retrieve remotely-hosted payloads.,T1105

"Winter Vivern has exploited known and zero-day vulnerabilities in software usch as Roundcube Webmail servers and the ""Follina"" vulnerability.",T1190

Winter Vivern passed execution from document macros to PowerShell scripts during initial access operations. Winter Vivern used batch scripts that called PowerShell commands as part of initial access and installation operations.,T1059.001

Winter Vivern used adversary-owned and -controlled servers to host web vulnerability scanning applications.,T1583.003

Winter Vivern uses HTTP and HTTPS protocols for exfiltration and command and control activity.,T1071.001

Wizard Spider has archived data into ZIP files on compromised machines.,T1560.001

Wizard Spider has exfiltrated stolen victim data to various cloud storage providers.,T1567.002

Wizard Spider has used `cmd.exe` to execute commands on a victim's machine.,T1059.003

"ZIRCONIUM has utilized an ORB (operational relay box) network - consisting compromised devices such as small office and home office (SOHO) routers, IoT devices, and leased virtual private servers (VPS) - to proxy traffic.",T1090.003

admin@338 actors used the following command after exploiting a machine with LOWBALL malware to acquire information about local networks: ipconfig /all >> %temp%\download,T1016

admin@338 actors used the following commands after exploiting a machine with LOWBALL malware to obtain information about the OS: ver >> %temp%\download systeminfo >> %temp%\download,T1082

menuPass has collected data from remote systems by mounting network shares with net use and using Robocopy to transfer data.,T1039

menuPass has used certutil in a macro to decode base64-encoded content contained in a dropper document attached to an email. The group has also used certutil -decode to decode files on the victim's machine when dropping UPPERCUT.,T1140