| name,TTP
|
| "A JHUHUGIT variant takes screenshots by simulating the user pressing the ""Take Screenshot"" key (VK_SCREENSHOT), accessing the screenshot saved in the clipboard, and converting it to a JPG image.",T1113
|
| A gh0st RAT variant has used DLL side-loading.,T1574.001
|
| "A variant of HOPLIGHT hooks lsass.exe, and lsass.exe then checks the Registry for the data value 'rdpproto' under the key SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa Name.",T1012
|
| AADInternals can collect files from a user's OneDrive.,T1530
|
| AADInternals can directly download cloud user data such as OneDrive files.,T1048
|
| AADInternals can execute commands on Azure virtual machines using the VM agent.,T1651
|
| "AADInternals can send ""consent phishing"" emails containing malicious links designed to steal users' access tokens.",T1566.002
|
| ANDROMEDA can establish persistence by dropping a sample of itself to `C:\ProgramData\Local Settings\Temp\mskmde.com` and adding a Registry run key to execute every time a user logs on.,T1547.001
|
| ANDROMEDA can inject into the `wuauclt.exe` process to perform C2 actions.,T1055
|
| ANDROMEDA has been delivered through a LNK file disguised as a folder.,T1036.008
|
| ANDROMEDA has been installed to `C:\Temp\TrustedInstaller.exe` to mimic a legitimate Windows installer service.,T1036.005
|
| ANDROMEDA has been spread via infected USB keys.,T1091
|
| ANELLDR can call `ZwSetInformationThread` with the second argument set to `ThreadHideFromDebugger (0x11)` to evade being debugged.,T1622
|
| ANELLDR can decrypt encrypted payload data using AES-256-CBC and subsequently execute the payload in memory.,T1140
|
| ANELLDR can enumerate files in the current directory to search for encrypted payload files.,T1083
|
| ANELLDR can use DLL sideloading from a legitimate application to initiate execution.,T1574.001
|
| ANELLDR can use junk code for payload obfuscation.,T1027.016
|
| ANELLDR can use the `ZwSetInformationThread` to enable debugger evasion.,T1106
|
| ANELLDR code implements anti-analysis techniques including control flow flattening and Mixed Boolean Arithmetic (MBA).,T1027
|
| "AcidPour can identify specific files and directories within the Linux operating system corresponding with storage devices for follow-on wiping activity, similar to AcidRain.",T1083
|
| AcidPour can identify various system locations and mapped devices on Linux systems as a precursor to wiping activity.,T1082
|
| "AcidPour can perform an in-depth wipe of victim filesystems and attached storage devices through either data overwrite or calling various IOCTLS to erase them, similar to AcidRain.",T1485
|
| AcidPour includes a self-delete function where the malware deletes itself from disk after execution and program load into memory.,T1070.004
|
| AcidPour includes functionality to identify MMC and SD cards connected to the victim device.,T1120
|
| AcidPour includes functionality to overwrite victim devices with the content of a buffer to wipe disk content.,T1561.001
|
| AcidRain reboots the target system once the various wiping processes are complete.,T1529
|
| "After encryption, Diavol will capture the desktop background window, set the background color to black, and change the desktop wallpaper to a newly created bitmap image with the text ""All your files are encrypted! For more information see ""README-FOR-DECRYPT.txt"".",T1491.001
|
| "After escalating privileges, MegaCortex calls TerminateProcess(), CreateRemoteThread, and other Win32 APIs.",T1106
|
| "After initial execution, BPFDoor forks itself and runs the fork with the `--init` flag, which allows it to execute secondary clean up operations. The parent process terminates leaving the forked process to be inherited by the legitimate process init.",T1036.009
|
| "After initial setup, BPFDoor's original execution process deletes the dropped binary and exits.",T1070.004
|
| Agent Tesla can collect names and passwords of all Wi-Fi networks to which a device has previously connected.,T1016.002
|
| Agent Tesla has the ability to perform anti-sandboxing and anti-virtualization checks.,T1497
|
| Agent Tesla has used ProcessWindowStyle.Hidden to hide windows.,T1564.003
|
| Akira _v2 can create a child process for encryption.,T1543
|
| Akira _v2 can stop running virtual machines.,T1489
|
| Akira _v2 will fail to execute if the targeted `/vmfs/volumes/` path does not exist or is not defined.,T1480
|
| Akira can encrypt victim filesystems for financial extortion purposes including through the use of the ChaCha20 and ChaCha8 stream ciphers.,T1486
|
| Akira can identify remote file shares for encryption.,T1135
|
| Akira examines files prior to encryption to determine if they meet requirements for encryption and can be encrypted by the ransomware. These checks are performed through native Windows functions such as GetFileAttributesW.,T1083
|
| Akira executes native Windows functions such as GetFileAttributesW and `GetSystemInfo`.,T1106
|
| Akira uses the GetSystemInfo Windows function to determine the number of processors on a victim machine.,T1082
|
| Akira verifies the deletion of volume shadow copies by checking for the existence of the process ID related to the process created to delete these items.,T1057
|
| Akira will execute PowerShell commands to delete system volume shadow copies.,T1059.001
|
| Akira will leverage COM objects accessed through WMI during execution to evade detection.,T1047
|
| Apostle compiled code is obfuscated in an unspecified fashion prior to delivery to victims.,T1140
|
| "Apostle creates new, encrypted versions of files then deletes the originals, with the new filenames consisting of a random GUID and "".lock"" for an extension.",T1486
|
| "Apostle retrieves a list of all running processes on a victim host, and stops all services containing the string ""sql,"" likely to propagate ransomware activity to database files.",T1057
|
| Apostle searches for files on available drives based on a list of extensions hard-coded into the sample for follow-on wipe activity.,T1561.001
|
| Apostle will attempt to delete all event logs on a victim machine following file wipe activity.,T1685.005
|
| "Apostle's ransomware variant requires that a base64-encoded argument is passed when executed, that is used as the Public Key for subsequent encryption operations. If Apostle is executed without this argument, it automatically runs a self-delete function.",T1480
|
| "AppleJeus has added a leading . to plist filenames, unlisting them from the Finder app and default Terminal directory listings.",T1564.001
|
| AppleJeus has placed a plist file within the LaunchDaemons folder and launched it manually.,T1543.004
|
| AppleSeed can gain system level privilege by passing SeDebugPrivilege to the AdjustTokenPrivilege API.,T1134
|
| Aria-body has the ability to identify disk information on a compromised host.,T1680
|
| Aria-body has the ability to launch files using ShellExecute.,T1106
|
| AshTag can check geolocation on targeted systems.,T1614
|
| AshTag can download malicious payloads from file sharing services.,T1102
|
| AshTag can set persistence using scheduled tasks.,T1053.005
|
| AshTag can use JSON files to deliver payloads and configuration files.,T1059.007
|
| AshTag can use `volumeserialnumber` to enumerate volumes.,T1680
|
| AshTag can use a .NET program to execute WMI queries and send unique victim IDs to C2.,T1047
|
| AshTag can use a set sleep time to delay C2 beaconing.,T1678
|
| AshTag has been executed through victims downloading and opening malicious RAR archive files.,T1204.002
|
| AshTag has enabled execution via DLL sideloading using a legitimate executable paired with a malicious DLL named wtsapi32.,T1574.001
|
| AshTag has masqueraded as a legitimate VisualServer utility.,T1036.005
|
| Astaroth checks for the presence of Avast antivirus in the C:\Program\Files\ folder.,T1518.001
|
| Astaroth has used an XOR-based algorithm to encrypt payloads twice with different keys.,T1027.013
|
| "Astaroth loads its module with the XSL script parameter vShow set to zero, which opens the application with a hidden window.",T1564.003
|
| AsyncRAT can be configured to use dynamic DNS.,T1568
|
| AsyncRAT can be deployed via batch script.,T1059.003
|
| AsyncRAT can check whether the current system hour and day of the week are within operating hours defined it its configuration.,T1124
|
| AsyncRAT can create a scheduled task to maintain persistence on system start-up.,T1053.005
|
| "AsyncRAT can identify strings such as Virtual, vmware, or VirtualBox to detect virtualized environments.",T1497.001
|
| AsyncRAT can proxy C2 through a Tor client.,T1090.003
|
| AsyncRAT has been delivered via malicious email attachments.,T1566.001
|
| AsyncRAT has been executed through victims opening malicious file attachments.,T1204.002
|
| AsyncRAT has the ability to download files including over SFTP.,T1105
|
| AsyncRAT has the ability to view the screen on compromised hosts.,T1113
|
| "Attor's dispatcher can establish persistence via adding a Registry key with a logon script HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Environment ""UserInitMprLogonScript"" .",T1037.001
|
| Avaddon looks for and attempts to stop anti-malware solutions.,T1685
|
| Avenger has the ability to identify the OS architecture on a compromised host.,T1082
|
| AvosLocker has been disguised as a .jpg file.,T1036.008
|
| AvosLocker has been executed via the `RunOnce` Registry key to run itself on safe mode.,T1547.001
|
| AvosLocker has checked the system time before and after encryption.,T1124
|
| AvosLocker has deobfuscated XOR-encoded strings.,T1140
|
| AvosLocker has discovered system processes by calling `RmGetList`.,T1057
|
| "AvosLocker has encrypted files and network resources using AES-256 and added an `.avos`, `.avos2`, or `.AvosLinux` extension to filenames.",T1486
|
| AvosLocker has searched for files and directories on a compromised network.,T1083
|
| AvosLocker has terminated specific processes before encryption.,T1489
|
| AvosLocker has used XOR-encoded strings.,T1027
|
| AvosLocker has used obfuscated API calls that are retrieved by their checksums.,T1027.007
|
| BADHATCH can be compressed with the ApLib algorithm.,T1027.015
|
| BADHATCH can check a user's access to the C$ share on a compromised machine.,T1135
|
| BADHATCH can copy a large byte array of 64-bit shellcode into process memory and execute it with a call to `CreateThread`.,T1620
|
| BADHATCH can emulate an FTP server to connect to actor-controlled C2 servers.,T1071.002
|
| BADHATCH can execute `netstat.exe -f` on a compromised machine.,T1049
|
| BADHATCH can exfiltrate data over the C2 channel.,T1041
|
| BADHATCH can impersonate a `lsass.exe` or `vmtoolsd.exe` token.,T1134.001
|
| BADHATCH can inject itself into a new `svchost.exe -k netsvcs` process using the asynchronous procedure call (APC) queue.,T1055.004
|
| "BADHATCH can obtain current system information from a compromised machine such as the `SHELL PID`, `PSVERSION`, `HOSTNAME`, `LOGONSERVER`, `LASTBOOTUP`, OS type/version, bitness, and hostname.",T1082
|
| BADHATCH can obtain logged user information from a compromised machine and can execute the command `whoami.exe`.,T1033
|
| BADHATCH can obtain the `DATETIME` and `UPTIME` from a compromised machine.,T1124
|
| BADHATCH can perform pass the hash on compromised machines with x64 versions.,T1550.002
|
| BADHATCH can retrieve a list of running processes from a compromised machine.,T1057
|
| BADHATCH can use HTTP and HTTPS over port 443 to communicate with actor-controlled C2 servers.,T1071.001
|
| BADHATCH can use SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 proxies to connect to actor-controlled C2 servers. BADHATCH can also emulate a reverse proxy on a compromised machine to connect with actor-controlled C2 servers.,T1090
|
| BADHATCH can use `cmd.exe` to execute commands on a compromised host.,T1059.003
|
| BADHATCH can use `nltest.exe /domain_trusts` to discover domain trust relationships on a compromised machine.,T1482
|
| BADHATCH can use `schtasks.exe` to gain persistence.,T1053.005
|
| "BADHATCH can use a PowerShell object such as, `System.Net.NetworkInformation.Ping` to ping a computer.",T1018
|
| "BADHATCH can utilize Native API functions such as, `ToolHelp32` and `Rt1AdjustPrivilege` to enable `SeDebugPrivilege` on a compromised machine.",T1106
|
| "BADHATCH can utilize WMI to collect system information, create new processes, and run malicious PowerShell scripts on a compromised machine.",T1047
|
| BADHATCH can utilize the CMSTPLUA COM interface and the SilentCleanup task to bypass UAC.,T1548.002
|
| BADHATCH has an embedded second stage DLL payload within the first stage of the malware.,T1027.009
|
| BADHATCH has the ability to delete PowerShell scripts from a compromised machine.,T1070.004
|
| BADHATCH has the ability to execute a malicious DLL by injecting into `explorer.exe` on a compromised machine.,T1055.001
|
| BADHATCH has the ability to load a second stage malicious DLL file onto a compromised machine.,T1105
|
| BADHATCH malicious PowerShell commands can be encoded with base64.,T1027.010
|
| BADNEWS copies documents under 15MB found on the victim system to is the user's %temp%\SMB\ folder. It also copies files from USB devices to a predefined directory.,T1074.001
|
| BADNEWS copies files with certain extensions from USB devices to a predefined directory.,T1025
|
| BADNEWS typically loads its DLL file into a legitimate signed Java or VMware executable.,T1574.001
|
| BBSRAT has been loaded through DLL side-loading of a legitimate Citrix executable that is set to persist through the Registry Run key location HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ssonsvr.exe.,T1547.001
|
| BBSRAT has been seen persisting via COM hijacking through replacement of the COM object for MruPidlList {42aedc87-2188-41fd-b9a3-0c966feabec1} or Microsoft WBEM New Event Subsystem {F3130CDB-AA52-4C3A-AB32-85FFC23AF9C1} depending on the system's CPU architecture.,T1546.015
|
| BFG Agonizer retrieves a device handle to \\\\.\\PhysicalDrive0 to wipe the boot sector of a given disk.,T1561.002
|
| BFG Agonizer uses DLL unhooking to remove user mode inline hooks that security solutions often implement. BFG Agonizer also uses IAT unhooking to remove user-mode IAT hooks that security solutions also use.,T1554
|
| BISCUIT has a command to collect the system `UPTIME`.,T1124
|
| "BLINDINGCAN has attempted to hide its payload by using legitimate file names such as ""iconcache.db"".",T1036.005
|
| "BLINDINGCAN has collected disk information, including type and free space available.",T1680
|
| "BLINDINGCAN has collected from a victim machine the system name, processor information, and OS version.",T1082
|
| BOLDMOVE can disable the Fortinet daemons `moglogd` and `syslogd` to evade detection and logging.,T1685
|
| BOLDMOVE can free all resources and terminate itself on victim machines.,T1543
|
| BOLDMOVE can list information of all files in the system recursively from the root directory or from a specified directory.,T1083
|
| BOLDMOVE can remove files on victim systems.,T1070.004
|
| "BOLDMOVE contains a watchdog-like feature that monitors a particular file for modification. If modification is detected, the legitimate file is backed up and replaced with a trojanized file to allow for persistence through likely system upgrades.",T1554
|
| BOLDMOVE enumerates network interfaces on the infected host.,T1016
|
| BOLDMOVE is associated with exploitation of CVE-2022-49475 in FortiOS.,T1190
|
| BOLDMOVE is capable of relaying traffic from command and control servers to follow-on systems.,T1090.003
|
| BOLDMOVE is capable of spawning a remote command shell.,T1059.004
|
| BOLDMOVE performs system survey actions following initial execution.,T1082
|
| BOLDMOVE uses the WolfSSL library to implement SSL encryption for command and control communication.,T1573.002
|
| BOLDMOVE verifies it is executing from a specific path during execution.,T1480
|
| BOOKWORM has communicated with its C2 via HTTP POST requests.,T1071.001
|
| BOOKWORM has created services that attempt to resemble legitimate services to include a service named `Microsoft Windows DeviceSync Service`.,T1036.004
|
| BOOKWORM has modified HTTP POST requests to resemble legitimate communications.,T1001.003
|
| BOOKWORM has modified Registry key values as part of its created service `DeviceSync`.,T1112
|
| BOOKWORM has modified file timestamps from the export address table (EAT) to make it difficult to discern when the module was created.,T1070.006
|
| "BOOKWORM has used DLL side-loading to execute the malicious payload. BOOKWORM has also side-loaded DLL components into a legitimate process, including Microsoft Malware Protection `MsMpEng.exe` and Kaspersky Anti-Virus `ushata.exe`.",T1574.001
|
| "BOOKWORM has used encryption and compression algorithms to obfuscate the traffic between the system and C2 server, methods observed included RC4, AES, XOR with 0x5a, and LZO.",T1573.001
|
| BOOKWORM has used its KBLogger.dll module to capture keystrokes and stored them in a folder.,T1056.001
|
| BOOKWORM has used its KBLogger.dll module to steal data saved to the clipboard.,T1115
|
| BOOKWORM has used valid legitimate digital signatures and certificates to evade detection.,T1553.002
|
| BPFDoor can create a reverse shell and supports vt100 emulator formatting.,T1059.004
|
| BPFDoor can require a password to activate the backdoor and uses RC4 encryption or static library encryption `libtomcrypt`.,T1027
|
| BPFDoor clears the file location `/proc//environ` removing all environment variables for the process.,T1070
|
| BPFDoor creates a zero byte PID file at `/var/run/haldrund.pid`. BPFDoor uses this file to determine if it is already running on a system to ensure only one instance is executing at a time.,T1480
|
| "BPFDoor overwrites the `argv0` value used by the Linux `/proc` filesystem to determine the command line and command name to display for each process. BPFDoor selects a name from 10 hardcoded names that resemble Linux system daemons, such as; `/sbin/udevd -d`, `dbus-daemon --system`, `avahi-daemon: chroot helper`, `/sbin/auditd -n`, and `/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-journald`.",T1036.011
|
| "BPFDoor sets its process to ignore the following signals; `SIGHUP`, `SIGINT`, `SIGQUIT`, `SIGPIPE`, `SIGCHLD`, `SIGTTIN`, and `SIGTTOU`.",T1564.011
|
| BPFDoor sets the `MYSQL_HISTFILE` and `HISTFILE` to `/dev/null` preventing the shell and MySQL from logging history in `/proc//environ`.,T1690
|
| BRICKSTORM has appeared to resemble legitimate processes to include the vCenter process `vami-http`. BRICKSTORM has also leveraged legitimate names of VMware vSphere platform such as `vmsrc` or `vmware-sphere`.,T1036.005
|
| BRICKSTORM has checked hard-coded paths of `/etc/sysconfig/` or `/etc/sysconfig/network` prior to execution and loading file contents from that path.,T1574.007
|
| "BRICKSTORM has commands that allow the actor download files from the compromised host to the C2 server, and to also download specific sections of a file.",T1005
|
| BRICKSTORM has communicated to hardcoded C2 through WebSockets (WSS) to include domains associated with Cloudflare Workers. BRICKSTORM has also leveraged Gorilla mux library to serve its HTTP API calls.,T1071.001
|
| BRICKSTORM has copied itself to the `usr/sbin/` folder.,T1070.010
|
| BRICKSTORM has executed shell commands using `/bin/sh`.,T1059.004
|
| BRICKSTORM has impaired command logging through the use of `dev/null` which prevents generating output from the command and does not wait for input.,T1690
|
| BRICKSTORM has leveraged DNS web services to resolve C2 IP addresses including sslip.io and nip.io. BRICKSTORM has also utilized Cloudflare Workers for C2 communications.,T1102
|
| BRICKSTORM has leveraged SOCKS Proxy to pivot into victim networks in attempts to resemble legitimate administrative traffic.,T1090.001
|
| BRICKSTORM has terminated an existing process to ensure that its own new process can execute.,T1489
|
| BRICKSTORM has the ability to check if it is running as an active child process through the detection of a specific environment variable.,T1057
|
| BRICKSTORM has the ability to download files from the Adversaries C2 server to the compromised system.,T1105
|
| BRICKSTORM has uploaded files from the victim system to C2 servers.,T1041
|
| BRICKSTORM has used DNS over HTTPS to resolve C2 infrastructure and obscure DNS traffic from inspection.,T1071.004
|
| BRICKSTORM has utilized DNS services sslip.io and nip.io to resolve C2 IP addresses.,T1568
|
| BRICKSTORM has utilized Go libraries to include Garble to obfuscate code.,T1027
|
| "BRICKSTORM has utilized a SOCKS proxy to tunnel access within the victim network and exfiltrate files from internal shares, code repositories, and other endpoints. BRICKSTORM has also leveraged Yamux for combining multiple concurrent logical streams over a single a socket.",T1572
|
| BRUSHFIRE has decrypted XOR strings prior to execution.,T1140
|
| BRUSHFIRE has executed its commands within memory and is not saved on disk.,T1620
|
| BRUSHFIRE has monitored inbound VPN traffic to compromised appliances until specific inbound packets contain a specific magic string/pattern instead of external beaconing.,T1205
|
| BRUSHFIRE has the ability to exfiltrate data on-demand through executing commands obtained via monitoring for specially crafted packets and sending output back in an embedded SSL response.,T1048.002
|
| BUSHWALK can Base64 decode and RC4 decrypt malicious payloads sent through a web request's command parameter.,T1140
|
| BUSHWALK can embed into the legitimate `querymanifest.cgi` file on compromised Ivanti Connect Secure VPNs.,T1554
|
| BUSHWALK can encrypt the resulting data generated from C2 commands with RC4.,T1027
|
| BUSHWALK is a web shell that has the ability to execute arbitrary commands or write files.,T1505.003
|
| Babuk can stop anti-virus services on a compromised host.,T1685
|
| BabyShark has executed the ipconfig /all command.,T1016
|
| BabyShark has executed the reg query command for HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Default.,T1012
|
| BabyShark has executed the tasklist command.,T1057
|
| BabyShark has executed the ver command.,T1082
|
| BabyShark has executed the whoami command.,T1033
|
| "BabyShark has used dir to search for ""programfiles"" and ""appdata"".",T1083
|
| BackConfig can leverage API functions such as ShellExecuteA and HttpOpenRequestA in the process of downloading and executing files.,T1106
|
| Bad Rabbit drops a file named infpub.datinto the Windows directory and is executed through SCManager and rundll.exe.,T1569.002
|
| Bad Rabbit has used rundll32 to launch a malicious DLL as C:Windowsinfpub.dat.,T1218.011
|
| Bad Rabbit spread through watering holes on popular sites by injecting JavaScript into the HTML body or a .js file.,T1189
|
| Bad Rabbit's infpub.dat file creates a scheduled task to launch a malicious executable.,T1053.005
|
| Bad Rabbit's infpub.dat file uses NTLM login credentials to brute force Windows machines.,T1110.003
|
| Bankshot gathers disk type and disk free space.,T1680
|
| "Bankshot gathers system information, network addresses, and the operation system version.",T1082
|
| Bankshot writes data into the Registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Pniumj.,T1112
|
| Bazar can attempt to overload sandbox analysis by sending 1550 calls to printf.,T1497
|
| Bazar can enumerate remote systems using Net View.,T1018
|
| Bazar can inject code through calling VirtualAllocExNuma.,T1055
|
| Bazar can query Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall for installed applications.,T1012
|
| Bazar has manually loaded ntdll from disk in order to identity and remove API hooks set by security products.,T1685
|
| BeaverTail has added junk data or a dummy character prepended to a string to hamper decoding attempts.,T1001.001
|
| BeaverTail has been hosted on code repositories and disseminated to victims through NPM packages.,T1195.001
|
| BeaverTail has been known to collect basic system information. BeaverTail has also collected data to include hostname and current timestamp prior to uploading data to the API endpoint `/uploads` on the C2 server.,T1082
|
| BeaverTail has collected keys associated with macOS within `/Library/Keychains/login.keychain`.,T1555.001
|
| BeaverTail has collected keys stored for Solana stored in `.config/solana/id.json` and other login details associated with macOS within `/Library/Keychains/login.keychain` or for Linux within `/.local/share/keyrings`.,T1555
|
| BeaverTail has communicated with C2 IP addresses over ports 1224 or 1244.,T1571
|
| BeaverTail has deleted files from a compromised host after they were exfiltrated.,T1070.004
|
| BeaverTail has executed malicious JavaScript code. BeaverTail has also been compiled with the Qt framework to execute in both Windows and macOS.,T1059.007
|
| BeaverTail has exfiltrated data collected from victim devices to C2 servers.,T1041
|
| BeaverTail has obtained and sent the current timestamp associated with the victim device to C2.,T1124
|
| BeaverTail has searched the victim device for browser extensions commonly associated with cryptocurrency wallets.,T1657
|
| BeaverTail has searched the victim device for browser extensions including those commonly associated with cryptocurrency wallets.,T1217
|
| BeaverTail has staged collected data to the system's temporary directory.,T1074.001
|
| "BeaverTail has stolen passwords saved in web browsers. BeaverTail has also been known to collect login data from Firefox within key3.db, key4.db and logins.json from `/.mozilla/firefox/` for exfiltration.",T1555.003
|
| BeaverTail has used HTTP GET request to download malicious payloads to include InvisibleFerret and HTTP POST to exfiltrate data to C2 infrastructure.,T1071.001
|
| BendyBear can check for analysis environments and signs of debugging using the Windows API kernel32!GetTickCountKernel32 call.,T1497.003
|
| BendyBear changes its runtime footprint during code execution to evade signature-based defenses.,T1027.014
|
| Bisonal can execute ipconfig on the victim's machine.,T1016
|
| "Bisonal has used rundll32.exe to execute as part of the Registry Run key it adds: HKEY_CURRENT_USER \Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\""vert"" = ""rundll32.exe c:\windows\temp\pvcu.dll , Qszdez"".",T1218.011
|
| BitPaymer attempts to remove the backup shadow files from the host using vssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /All /Quiet.,T1490
|
| BitPaymer can search for network shares on the domain or workgroup using net view .,T1135
|
| "BitPaymer can suppress UAC prompts by setting the HKCU\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command registry key on Windows 10 or HKCU\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command on Windows 7 and launching the eventvwr.msc process, which launches BitPaymer with elevated privileges.",T1548.002
|
| BitPaymer can use net view to discover remote systems.,T1018
|
| BitPaymer has set the run key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run for persistence.,T1547.001
|
| "BitPaymer has used dynamic API resolution to avoid identifiable strings within the binary, including RegEnumKeyW.",T1106
|
| "Black Basta can check system flags and libraries, process timing, and API's to detect code emulation or sandboxing.",T1497.001
|
| Black Basta can check whether the service name `FAX` is present.,T1007
|
| Black Basta can collect system boot configuration and CPU information.,T1082
|
| Black Basta can create a new service to establish persistence.,T1543.003
|
| Black Basta can delete shadow copies using vssadmin.exe.,T1490
|
| "Black Basta can encrypt files with the ChaCha20 cypher and using a multithreaded process to increase speed. Black Basta has also encrypted files while the victim system is in safe mode, appending `.basta` upon completion.",T1486
|
| Black Basta can enumerate specific files for encryption.,T1083
|
| Black Basta can enumerate volumes.,T1680
|
| Black Basta can reboot victim machines in safe mode with networking via `bcdedit /set safeboot network`.,T1688
|
| Black Basta can use LDAP queries to connect to AD and iterate over connected workstations.,T1018
|
| Black Basta can use `cmd.exe` to enable shadow copy deletion.,T1059.003
|
| Black Basta had added data prior to the Portable Executable (PE) header to prevent automatic scanners from identifying the payload.,T1027.001
|
| Black Basta has established persistence by creating a new service named `FAX` after deleting the legitimate service by the same name.,T1036.004
|
| "Black Basta has modified the Registry to enable itself to run in safe mode, to change the icons and file extensions for encrypted files, and to add the malware path for persistence.",T1112
|
| Black Basta has the ability to use native APIs for numerous functions including discovery and defense evasion.,T1106
|
| Black Basta has used PowerShell scripts for discovery and to execute files over the network.,T1059.001
|
| Black Basta has used WMI to execute files over the network.,T1047
|
| Black Basta has used `ShellExecuteA` to shut down and restart the victim system.,T1529
|
| Black Basta will check for the presence of a hard-coded mutex `dsajdhas.0` before executing.,T1480.002
|
| BlackByte 2.0 Ransomware can terminate running services.,T1489
|
| BlackByte 2.0 Ransomware can timestomp files for defense evasion and anti-forensics purposes.,T1070.006
|
| BlackByte 2.0 Ransomware injects into a newly-created `svchost.exe` process prior to device encryption.,T1055
|
| BlackByte 2.0 Ransomware is a ransomware variant associated with BlackByte operations.,T1486
|
| BlackByte 2.0 Ransomware modifies the Windows firewall during execution.,T1686.003
|
| BlackByte 2.0 Ransomware modifies the victim Registry to allow for elevated execution.,T1112
|
| BlackByte 2.0 Ransomware modifies volume shadow copies during execution in a way that destroys them on the victim machine.,T1490
|
| BlackByte Ransomware adds .JS and .EXE extensions to the Microsoft Defender exclusion list. BlackByte Ransomware terminates and removes the Raccine anti-ransomware utility.,T1685
|
| BlackByte Ransomware can identify network shares connected to the victim machine.,T1135
|
| BlackByte Ransomware checks for files related to known sandboxes.,T1497.001
|
| "BlackByte Ransomware creates a mutex value with a hard-coded name, and terminates if that mutex already exists on the victim system. BlackByte Ransomware checks the system language to see if it matches one of a list of hard-coded values; if a match is found, the malware will terminate.",T1480
|
| BlackByte Ransomware creates a schedule task to execute remotely deployed ransomware payloads.,T1053.005
|
| BlackByte Ransomware deletes all volume shadow copies and restore points among other actions to inhibit system recovery following ransomware deployment.,T1490
|
| BlackByte Ransomware enables SMBv1 during execution.,T1689
|
| "BlackByte Ransomware enumerates the Registry, specifically the `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options` key.",T1012
|
| BlackByte Ransomware gathers victim system information to generate a unique victim identifier.,T1082
|
| BlackByte Ransomware identifies remote systems via active directory queries for hostnames prior to launching remote ransomware payloads.,T1046
|
| BlackByte Ransomware identifies the language on the victim system.,T1614.001
|
| BlackByte Ransomware is distributed as a JavaScript launcher file.,T1059.007
|
| BlackByte Ransomware is distributed as an encrypted payload.,T1027.013
|
| BlackByte Ransomware is ransomware using a shared key across victims for encryption.,T1486
|
| BlackByte Ransomware looks for security software products prior to full execution.,T1518.001
|
| BlackByte Ransomware modifies the victim Registry to prevent system recovery.,T1112
|
| BlackByte Ransomware uses mapped shared folders to transfer ransomware payloads via SMB.,T1021.002
|
| BlackByte Ransomware uses the `SetThreadExecutionState` API to prevent the victim system from entering sleep.,T1106
|
| "BlackByte Ransomware uses the `mountvol.exe` command to mount volume names and leverages the Microsoft Discretionary Access Control List tool, `icacls.exe`, to grant the group to ""Everyone"" full access to the root of the drive.",T1222.001
|
| BlackCat can clear Windows event logs using `wevtutil.exe`.,T1685.005
|
| BlackCat can delete shadow copies using `vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet` and `wmic.exe Shadowcopy Delete`; it can also modify the boot loader using `bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled No`.,T1490
|
| BlackCat can determine if a user on a compromised host has domain admin privileges.,T1069.002
|
| BlackCat can enumerate files for encryption.,T1083
|
| BlackCat can enumerate local drives.,T1680
|
| BlackCat can execute commands on a compromised network with the use of `cmd.exe`.,T1059.003
|
| BlackCat can replicate itself across connected servers via `psexec`.,T1570
|
| BlackCat can use Windows commands such as `fsutil behavior set SymLinkEvaluation R2L:1` to redirect file system access to a different location after gaining access into compromised networks.,T1222.001
|
| BlackCat can utilize `net use` commands to discover the user name on a compromised host.,T1033
|
| BlackCat can utilize `net use` commands to identify domain users.,T1087.002
|
| BlackCat has the ability to add the following registry key on compromised networks to maintain persistence: `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services \LanmanServer\Paramenters`,T1112
|
| BlackCat has the ability to discover network shares on compromised networks.,T1135
|
| "BlackCat has the ability to encrypt Windows devices, Linux devices, and VMWare instances.",T1486
|
| BlackCat has the ability to stop VM services on compromised networks.,T1489
|
| BlackCat has the ability to wipe VM snapshots on compromised networks.,T1561.001
|
| "BlackEnergy 2 contains a ""Destroy"" plug-in that destroys data stored on victim hard drives by overwriting file contents.",T1485
|
| BlackEnergy has removed the watermark associated with enabling the TESTSIGNING boot configuration option by removing the relevant strings in the user32.dll.mui of the system.,T1070
|
| Bonadan can use the ps command to discover other cryptocurrency miners active on the system.,T1057
|
| BoomBox can establish persistence by writing the Registry value MicroNativeCacheSvc to HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run.,T1547.001
|
| BoxCaon can collect the victim's MAC address by using the GetAdaptersInfo API.,T1016
|
| BoxCaon established persistence by setting the HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\load registry key to point to its executable.,T1547
|
| "BoxCaon used the ""StackStrings"" obfuscation technique to hide malicious functionalities.",T1027
|
| Brave Prince terminates antimalware processes.,T1685
|
| Brute Ratel C4 can call `NtDelayExecution` to pause execution.,T1497.003
|
| Brute Ratel C4 can call and dynamically resolve hashed APIs.,T1027.007
|
| "Brute Ratel C4 can call multiple Windows APIs for execution, to share memory, and defense evasion.",T1106
|
| Brute Ratel C4 can conduct port scanning against targeted systems.,T1046
|
| Brute Ratel C4 can create Windows system services for execution.,T1569.002
|
| Brute Ratel C4 can decode Kerberos 5 tickets and convert it to hashcat format for subsequent cracking.,T1558.003
|
| Brute Ratel C4 can detect EDR userland hooks.,T1518.001
|
| Brute Ratel C4 can enumerate all processes and locate specific process IDs (PIDs).,T1057
|
| Brute Ratel C4 can take screenshots on compromised hosts.,T1113
|
| Brute Ratel C4 can use LDAP queries and `nltest /domain_trusts` for domain trust discovery.,T1482
|
| "Brute Ratel C4 can use LDAP queries, `net group ""Domain Admins"" /domain` and `net user /domain` for discovery.",T1087.002
|
| Brute Ratel C4 can use WMI to move laterally.,T1047
|
| Brute Ratel C4 can use `net group` for discovery on targeted domains.,T1069.002
|
| Brute Ratel C4 can use cmd.exe for execution.,T1059.003
|
| "Brute Ratel C4 can use legitimate websites for external C2 channels including Slack, Discord, and MS Teams.",T1102
|
| Brute Ratel C4 has injected Latrodectus into the Explorer.exe process on comrpomised hosts.,T1055.002
|
| Brute Ratel C4 has the ability to deobfuscate its payload prior to execution.,T1140
|
| Brute Ratel C4 has the ability to hide memory artifacts and to patch Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) and the Anti Malware Scan Interface (AMSI).,T1685
|
| Brute Ratel C4 has the ability to use RPC for lateral movement.,T1021
|
| Brute Ratel C4 has the ability to use SMB to pivot in compromised networks.,T1021.002
|
| Brute Ratel C4 has used a payload file named OneDrive.update to appear benign.,T1036.005
|
| Brute Ratel C4 has used encrypted payload files and maintains an encrypted configuration structure in memory.,T1027
|
| Brute Ratel C4 has used search order hijacking to load a malicious payload DLL as a dependency to a benign application packaged in the same ISO. Brute Ratel C4 has loaded a malicious DLL by spoofing the name of the legitimate Version.DLL and placing it in the same folder as the digitally-signed Microsoft binary OneDriveUpdater.exe.,T1574.001
|
| "Bumblebee has named component DLLs ""RapportGP.dll"" to match those used by the security company Trusteer.",T1036.005
|
| Bundlore changes the permissions of a payload using the command chmod -R 755.,T1222.002
|
| Bundlore creates a new key pair with ssh-keygen and drops the newly created user key in authorized_keys to enable remote login.,T1098.004
|
| Bundlore has used openssl to decrypt AES encrypted payload data. Bundlore has also used base64 and RC4 with a hardcoded key to deobfuscate data.,T1140
|
| Bundlore has used the ps command to list processes.,T1057
|
| Bundlore uses the curl -s -L -o command to exfiltrate archived data to a URL.,T1048
|
| "Bundlore uses the mktemp utility to make unique file and directory names for payloads, such as TMP_DIR=`mktemp -d -t x.",T1564
|
| Bundlore will enumerate the macOS version to determine which follow-on behaviors to execute using /usr/bin/sw_vers -productVersion.,T1082
|
| CANONSTAGER has created a new window with a height and width of zero to remain hidden on the screen.,T1564.003
|
| "CANONSTAGER has leveraged Native API calls to execute code within the victim's system including `GetCurrentDirectoryW`, `RegisterClassW` and `CreateWindowExW`. CANONSTAGER also created a new overlapped window that initiates callback functions to a windows procedure that processes Windows messages until a designated message type of 0x0018 WM_SHOWWINDOW is observed which then initiates the deployment of a subsequent malicious payload.",T1106
|
| CANONSTAGER has leveraged naming conventions of its malicious DLL to match legitimate services to include cnmpaui.dll which matches the legitimate executable cnmpaui.exe that is aligned with a Canon Ink Jet Printer Assistant Tool.,T1036.005
|
| CANONSTAGER has utilized custom API hashing to obfuscate the Windows APIs being used.,T1027.007
|
| CANONSTAGER uses the Thread Local Storage (TLS) array data structure to store function addresses resolved by its custom API hashing algorithm. The function addresses are later called throughout the binary from offsets into the TLS array.,T1055.005
|
| CARROTBAT has the ability to download a base64 encoded payload.,T1027.013
|
| CARROTBAT has the ability to execute obfuscated commands on the infected host.,T1027.010
|
| CASTLETAP can filter and deobfuscate an XOR encrypted activation string in the payload of an ICMP echo request.,T1140
|
| CASTLETAP can listen for a specialized ICMP packet for activation on compromised network devices.,T1205.002
|
| CASTLETAP can receive a 9-byte XOR encrypted activation string in the payload of an ICMP echo request packet.,T1573.001
|
| CASTLETAP has the ability to create a raw promiscuous socket to sniff network traffic.,T1040
|
| CHIMNEYSWEEP can capture content from the clipboard.,T1115
|
| CHIMNEYSWEEP can collect files from compromised hosts.,T1005
|
| CHIMNEYSWEEP can download additional files from C2.,T1105
|
| "CHIMNEYSWEEP can execute a task which leads to execution if it finds a process name containing ""creensaver.""",T1480
|
| CHIMNEYSWEEP can extract RC4 encrypted embedded payloads for privilege escalation.,T1027.009
|
| "CHIMNEYSWEEP can invoke the PowerShell command `Reflection.Assembly::LoadFile(\""%s\"")\n$i=\""\""\n$r=%s::%s(\""%s\"",ref $i)\necho $r,$i\n` to execute secondary payloads.",T1059.001
|
| CHIMNEYSWEEP can make use of the Windows `SilentCleanup` scheduled task to execute its payload with elevated privileges.,T1548.002
|
| CHIMNEYSWEEP can monitor for removable drives.,T1120
|
| CHIMNEYSWEEP can reboot or shutdown the targeted system or logoff the current user.,T1529
|
| CHIMNEYSWEEP can send `HTTP GET` requests to C2.,T1071.001
|
| CHIMNEYSWEEP can store captured screenshots to disk including to a covert store named `APPX.%x%x%x%x%x.tmp` where `%x` is a random value.,T1074.001
|
| CHIMNEYSWEEP can upload collected files to the command-and-control server.,T1041
|
| CHIMNEYSWEEP can use Windows APIs including `LoadLibrary` and `GetProcAddress`.,T1106
|
| CHIMNEYSWEEP can use `LoadLibrary` and `GetProcAddress` to resolve Windows API function strings at run time.,T1027.007
|
| CHIMNEYSWEEP can use an embedded RC4 key to decrypt Windows API function strings.,T1140
|
| CHIMNEYSWEEP can use the Windows Registry Environment key to change the `%windir%` variable to point to `c:\Windows` to enable payload execution.,T1112
|
| CHIMNEYSWEEP can use the Windows `SilentCleanup` scheduled task to enable payload execution.,T1053.005
|
| CHIMNEYSWEEP has executed a script named cln.vbs on compromised hosts.,T1059.005
|
| CHIMNEYSWEEP has included the victim's computer name and username in C2 messages sent to actor-owned infrastructure.,T1033
|
| CHIMNEYSWEEP has the ability to enumerate directories for files that match a set list.,T1083
|
| CHIMNEYSWEEP has the ability to support keylogging.,T1056.001
|
| "CHIMNEYSWEEP has the ability to use use Telegram channels to return a list of commands to be executed, to download additional payloads, or to create a reverse shell.",T1102
|
| CHIMNEYSWEEP is capable of checking whether a compromised device is running DeepFreeze by Faronics.,T1518.001
|
| CLAIMLOADER has added Registry Run keys to achieve persistence using `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run`.,T1547.001
|
| CLAIMLOADER has created hardcoded mutex to ensure only a single instance of the malware is running.,T1480.002
|
| CLAIMLOADER has decoded its payload prior to execution.,T1140
|
| CLAIMLOADER has modified file attributes to remain hidden to a standard user.,T1564.001
|
| CLAIMLOADER has used a legitimately signed executable to execute a malicious payload within a DLL file.,T1574.001
|
| CLAIMLOADER has used tailored decoy documents as part of the installation routine to entice users to open attachments.,T1204.002
|
| "CLAIMLOADER has used various Windows API calls during execution, when establishing persistence and defense evasion. CLAIMLOADER has also leveraged the legitimate API functions to run its shellcode through the callback function, including `GetDC()` and `EnumFontsW()`. CLAIMLOADER established persistence by utilizing the API `SHSetValue()`. CLAIMLOADER has utilized APIs with callback functions such as `EnumpropsExW`, `EnumSystemLanguageGroupsA`, and `EnumCalendarInfoExW`.",T1106
|
| CLAIMLOADER has utilized XOR-encrypted API names and native APIs of `LdrLoadDll()` and `LderGetProcedureAddress()` to resolve imports dynamically.,T1027.007
|
| COATHANGER can store obfuscated configuration information in the last 56 bytes of the file `/date/.bd.key/preload.so`.,T1027
|
| COATHANGER connects to command and control infrastructure using SSL.,T1573.002
|
| COATHANGER creates and installs itself to a hidden installation directory.,T1564.001
|
| COATHANGER hooks or replaces multiple legitimate processes and other functions on victim devices.,T1014
|
| COATHANGER includes a binary labeled `authd` that can inject a library into a running process and then hook an existing function within that process with a new function from that library.,T1055
|
| COATHANGER is installed following exploitation of a vulnerable FortiGate device.,T1190
|
| COATHANGER removes files from victim environments following use in multiple instances.,T1070.004
|
| COATHANGER uses ICMP for transmitting configuration information to and from its command and control server.,T1095
|
| COATHANGER will create a daemon for timed check-ins with command and control infrastructure.,T1543.004
|
| COATHANGER will query running process information to determine subsequent program execution flow.,T1057
|
| COATHANGER will set the GID of `httpsd` to 90 when infected.,T1222.002
|
| COATHANGER will survey the contents of system files during installation.,T1083
|
| CORESHELL collects hostname and OS version data from the victim and sends the information to its C2 server.,T1082
|
| CORESHELL collects the volume serial number from the victim and sends the information to its C2 server.,T1680
|
| "CORESHELL is installed via execution of rundll32 with an export named ""init"" or ""InitW.""",T1218.011
|
| CSPY Downloader can write to the Registry under the %windir% variable to execute tasks.,T1112
|
| Calisto has the capability to use rm -rf to remove folders and files from the victim's machine.,T1070.004
|
| Calisto runs the ifconfig command to obtain the IP address from the victim's machine.,T1016
|
| Caminho can deobfuscate downloaded files prior to execution.,T1140
|
| Caminho can use junk code for obfuscation.,T1027.001
|
| Caminho has launched and hollowed out MSBuild.exe to host malicious code.,T1055.012
|
| Caminho has the ability to download files onto compromised hosts.,T1105
|
| Cannon adds the Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon to establish persistence.,T1547.004
|
| Cannon can gather drive information from the victim's machine.,T1680
|
| "Cannon can gather system information from the victim's machine such as the OS version, and machine name.",T1082
|
| Carbanak checks the Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings for proxy configurations information.,T1012
|
| "Carberp has masqueraded as Windows system file names, as well as ""chkntfs.exe"" and ""syscron.exe"".",T1036.005
|
| "Carberp has searched the Image File Execution Options registry key for ""Debugger"" within every subkey.",T1012
|
| "Carbon can collect the IP address of the victims and other computers on the network using the commands: ipconfig -all nbtstat -n, and nbtstat -s.",T1016
|
| Carbon uses the net group command.,T1069
|
| Carbon uses the netstat -r and netstat -an commands.,T1049
|
| Cardinal RAT sets HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\Load to point to its executable.,T1112
|
| "Caterpillar WebShell has a module to gather information from the compromised asset, including the computer version, computer name, IIS version, and more.",T1082
|
| ChChes can alter the victim's proxy configuration.,T1685
|
| Chaes can modify Registry values to stored information and establish persistence.,T1112
|
| CharmPower has the ability to use ipconfig to enumerate system network settings.,T1016
|
| Cheerscrypt can encrypt data on victim machines using a Sosemanuk stream cipher with an Elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) generated key.,T1486
|
| "Cheerscrypt can search for log and VMware-related files with .log, .vmdk, .vmem, .vswp, and .vmsn extensions.",T1083
|
| Cheerscrypt has leveraged `esxcli vm process list` in order to gather a list of running virtual machines to terminate them.,T1673
|
| Cheerscrypt has the ability to terminate VM processes on compromised hosts through execution of `esxcli vm process kill`.,T1489
|
| Chrommme has the ability to list drives.,T1680
|
| Clop can delete the shadow volumes with vssadmin Delete Shadows /all /quiet and can use bcdedit to disable recovery options.,T1490
|
| "Clop can encrypt files using AES, RSA, and RC4 and will add the "".clop"" extension to encrypted files.",T1486
|
| Clop has checked the keyboard language using the GetKeyboardLayout() function to avoid installation on Russian-language or other Commonwealth of Independent States-language machines; it will also check the GetTextCharset function.,T1614.001
|
| Clop has used the sleep command to avoid sandbox detection.,T1497.003
|
| "Cobalt Strike can download a hosted ""beacon"" payload using BITSAdmin.",T1197
|
| "Cobalt Strike can leverage the HTTP protocol for C2 communication, while hiding the actual data in either an HTTP header, URI parameter, the transaction body, or appending it to the URI. Cobalt Strike has also added Host: ocsp.verisign.com to HTTP headers to mimic Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) traffic.",T1001.003
|
| Cobalt Strike can modify Registry values within HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\\Excel\Security\AccessVBOM\ to enable the execution of additional code.,T1112
|
| Cobalt Strike can use net localgroup to list local groups on a system.,T1069.001
|
| Cobalt Strike can use sudo to run a command.,T1548.003
|
| Cobalt Strike has the ability to use Smart Applet attacks to disable the Java SecurityManager sandbox.,T1685
|
| Cobalt Strike's execute-assembly command can run a .NET executable within the memory of a sacrificial process by loading the CLR.,T1620
|
| "Cobalt Strike's Beacon payload is capable of running shell commands without cmd.exe and PowerShell commands without powershell.exe Cobalt Strike can also use `CreateThreadpoolWait`, `SetThreadpoolWait`, and `MessageBoxA` for sandbox evasion and execution of embedded payloads in memory.",T1106
|
| CoinTicker creates user launch agents named .espl.plist and com.apple.random string.plist to establish persistence.,T1543.001
|
| ComRAT can check the default browser by querying HKCR\http\shell\open\command.,T1012
|
| ComRAT has modified Registry values to store encrypted orchestrator code and payloads.,T1112
|
| ComRAT has stored encrypted orchestrator code and payloads in the Registry.,T1027.011
|
| ComRAT has used encryption and base64 to obfuscate its orchestrator code in the Registry. ComRAT has also used encoded PowerShell scripts.,T1027.010
|
| ComRAT samples have been seen which hijack COM objects for persistence by replacing the path to shell32.dll in registry location HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID\{42aedc87-2188-41fd-b9a3-0c966feabec1}\InprocServer32.,T1546.015
|
| Commands such as net group /domain can be used in Net to gather information about and manipulate groups.,T1069.002
|
| Commands such as net group and net localgroup can be used in Net to gather information about and manipulate groups.,T1069.001
|
| Commands such as net use and net session can be used in Net to gather information about network connections from a particular host.,T1049
|
| Commands such as net view can be used in Net to gather information about available remote systems.,T1018
|
| Commands under net user can be used in Net to gather information about and manipulate user accounts.,T1087.001
|
| Comnie executes the netstat -ano command.,T1049
|
| Comnie runs the command: net start >> %TEMP%\info.dat on a victim.,T1007
|
| Comnie uses ipconfig /all and route PRINT to identify network adapter and interface information.,T1016
|
| Comnie uses the net user command.,T1087.001
|
| Conficker adds keys to the Registry at HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services and various other Registry locations.,T1112
|
| Conti can delete Windows Volume Shadow Copies using vssadmin.,T1490
|
| "Conti can stop up to 146 Windows services related to security, backup, database, and email solutions through the use of net stop.",T1489
|
| "Conti can use CreateIoCompletionPort(), PostQueuedCompletionStatus(), and GetQueuedCompletionPort() to rapidly encrypt files, excluding those with the extensions of .exe, .dll, and .lnk. It has used a different AES-256 encryption key per file with a bundled RAS-4096 public encryption key that is unique for each victim. Conti can use ""Windows Restart Manager"" to ensure files are unlocked and open for encryption.",T1486
|
| CookieMiner has used the curl --upload-file command to exfiltrate data over HTTP.,T1048.003
|
| CorKLOG has captured keystrokes.,T1056.001
|
| CorKLOG has created a service to establish persistence.,T1543.003
|
| CorKLOG has decoded XOR encrypted strings.,T1140
|
| CorKLOG has leveraged legitimate binaries to conduct DLL side-loading.,T1574.001
|
| CorKLOG has used legitimate signed binaries such as lcommute.exe for follow-on execution of malicious DLLs through DLL side-loading.,T1553.002
|
| "CosmicDuke uses Windows services typically named ""javamtsup"" for persistence.",T1543.003
|
| "CosmicDuke uses scheduled tasks typically named ""Watchmon Service"" for persistence.",T1053.005
|
| Covenant can create SCT files for installation via `Regsvr32` to deploy new Grunt listeners.,T1218.010
|
| Covenant can utilize WMI to install new Grunt listeners through XSL files or command one-liners.,T1047
|
| Covenant implants can gather basic information on infected systems.,T1082
|
| Covenant listeners and controllers can be configured to use non-standard ports.,T1571
|
| Covenant provides access to a Command Shell in Windows environments for follow-on command execution and tasking.,T1059.003
|
| Crimson contains a command to collect disk drive information.,T1680
|
| Crimson contains a command to collect the victim PC name and operating system.,T1082
|
| Crocodilus has stolen cryptocurrency wallet details from victim devices.,T1657
|
| CrossRAT can use an XDG Autostart to establish persistence.,T1547.013
|
| CrossRAT uses run keys for persistence on Windows.,T1547.001
|
| Crutch has staged stolen files in the C:\AMD\Temp directory.,T1074.001
|
| Cuba can check if Russian language is installed on the infected machine by using the function GetKeyboardLayoutList.,T1614.001
|
| Cuba can discover shared resources using the NetShareEnum API call.,T1135
|
| Cuba can query service status using QueryServiceStatusEx function.,T1007
|
| Cuba can use the command cmd.exe /c del to delete its artifacts from the system.,T1070.004
|
| Cuba can use the function GetIpNetTable to recover the last connections to the victim's machine.,T1049
|
| Cuckoo Stealer can achieve persistence by creating launch agents to repeatedly execute malicious payloads.,T1543.001
|
| Cuckoo Stealer can capture files from a targeted user's keychain directory.,T1555.001
|
| "Cuckoo Stealer can check the systems `LANG` environmental variable to prevent infecting devices from Armenia (`hy_AM`), Belarus (`be_BY`), Kazakhstan (`kk_KZ`), Russia (`ru_RU`), and Ukraine (`uk_UA`).",T1614.001
|
| Cuckoo Stealer can create and populate property list (plist) files to enable execution.,T1647
|
| Cuckoo Stealer can determine the geographical location of a victim host by checking the language.,T1614
|
| Cuckoo Stealer can gather information about the OS version and hardware on compromised hosts.,T1082
|
| Cuckoo Stealer can run `screencapture` to collect screenshots from compromised hosts.,T1113
|
| Cuckoo Stealer can spawn a bash shell to enable execution on compromised hosts.,T1059.004
|
| Cuckoo Stealer can use `ps aux` to enumerate running processes.,T1057
|
| Cuckoo Stealer can use `xattr -d com.apple.quarantine` to remove the quarantine flag attribute.,T1553.001
|
| "Cuckoo Stealer can use osascript to generate a password-stealing prompt, duplicate files and folders, and set environmental variables.",T1059.002
|
| Cuckoo Stealer can use the curl API for C2 communications.,T1071.001
|
| "Cuckoo Stealer has captured passwords by prompting victims with a ""macOS needs to access System Settings"" GUI window.",T1056.002
|
| Cuckoo Stealer has copied and renamed itself to DumpMediaSpotifyMusicConverter.,T1036.005
|
| "Cuckoo Stealer has staged collected application data from Safari, Notes, and Keychain to `/var/folder`.",T1074.001
|
| Cuckoo Stealer has the ability to search systems for installed applications.,T1518
|
| Cuckoo Stealer is a stripped binary payload.,T1027.008
|
| Cyclops Blink can rename its running process to kworker:0/1 to masquerade as a Linux kernel thread. Cyclops Blink has also named RC scripts used for persistence after WatchGuard artifacts.,T1036.005
|
| DCRAT can log keystrokes on targeted systems.,T1056.001
|
| DCRAT can patch Microsoft's Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) to evade detection.,T1685
|
| DEADEYE can discover the DNS domain name of a targeted system.,T1016
|
| "DEADEYE can ensure it executes only on intended systems by identifying the victim's volume serial number, hostname, and/or DNS domain.",T1480
|
| DEADEYE can run `cmd /c copy /y /b C:\Users\public\syslog_6-.dat C:\Users\public\syslog.dll` to combine separated sections of code into a single DLL prior to execution.,T1059.003
|
| DEADEYE can use `msiexec.exe` for execution of malicious DLL.,T1218.007
|
| DEADEYE can use `rundll32.exe` for execution of living off the land binaries (lolbin) such as `SHELL32.DLL`.,T1218.011
|
| DEADEYE has the ability to combine multiple sections of a binary which were broken up to evade detection into a single .dll prior to execution.,T1140
|
| "DEADWOOD XORs some strings within the binary using the value 0xD5, and deobfuscates these items at runtime.",T1140
|
| "DEADWOOD can be executed as a service using various names, such as ScDeviceEnums.",T1569.002
|
| "DEADWOOD changes the password for local and domain users via net.exe to a random 32 character string to prevent these accounts from logging on. Additionally, DEADWOOD will terminate the winlogon.exe process to prevent attempts to log on to the infected system.",T1531
|
| "DEADWOOD contains an embedded, AES-encrypted payload labeled METADATA that provides configuration information for follow-on execution.",T1027.009
|
| "DEADWOOD contains an embedded, AES-encrypted resource named METADATA that contains configuration information for follow-on execution.",T1027.013
|
| "DEADWOOD opens and writes zeroes to the first 512 bytes of each drive, deleting the MBR. DEADWOOD then sends the control code IOCTL_DISK_DELETE_DRIVE_LAYOUT to ensure the MBR is removed from the drive.",T1561.002
|
| DEADWOOD overwrites files on victim systems with random data to effectively destroy them.,T1485
|
| DEADWOOD will attempt to masquerade its service execution using benign-looking names such as ScDeviceEnums.,T1036.004
|
| DOWNIISSA can create an instance of msiexec.exe and inject LODEINFO shellcode into the memory of the process.,T1218.007
|
| DOWNIISSA can delete files after download.,T1070.004
|
| DOWNIISSA can download files to the compromised host.,T1105
|
| DOWNIISSA can inject shellcode directly into process memory including WINWORD.exe and msiexec.exe.,T1055
|
| DOWNIISSA can use the `URLDownloadToFileA()` API to download from remote resources.,T1106
|
| DOWNIISSA code is base64 encoded and XOR encrypted.,T1027.013
|
| DRATzarus can use the `GetTickCount` and `GetSystemTimeAsFileTime` API calls to measure function timing. DRATzarus can also remotely shut down into sleep mode under specific conditions to evade detection.,T1497.003
|
| DRYHOOK has captured user credentials and passwords in plaintext and has encrypted them in a stored file on the network device.,T1056.001
|
| DRYHOOK has intercepted and logged user credentials by modifying the Perl module in Ivanti Connect Secure VPN edge-devices located within `/home/perl/DSAuth.pm`.,T1556
|
| DRYHOOK has killed all instances of the `cgi-server` process in order for the modified Perl module to be activated.,T1685
|
| "DRYHOOK has modified the Ivanti Connect Secure VPN authentication Perl module `DSAuth.pm` by reading its contents in the buffer, then finding and replacing select lines of code.",T1601
|
| DRYHOOK has patched victim appliances authentication routines to capture credentials in plaintext as users log in.,T1556.004
|
| "DRYHOOK has stored stolen credentials for future use in the temp folder of a victimized Ivanti Connect Secure VPN device, specifically in the file location `/tmp/cmmmap.kumMW`.",T1074.001
|
| DRYHOOK has terminated all instances of the `cgi-server` process before activating the modified DSAuth.pm file.,T1489
|
| DRYHOOK has the ability to interact with Ivanti Connect Secure environments and to modify system components.,T1059.008
|
| DRYHOOK is a Python-based script that executes within the victim environment.,T1059.006
|
| DUSTPAN can persist as a Windows Service in operations.,T1543.003
|
| DUSTPAN decodes and decrypts embedded payloads.,T1140
|
| DUSTPAN decrypts an embedded payload.,T1027.013
|
| DUSTTRAP begins with an initial launcher that decrypts an AES-128-CFB encrypted file on disk and executes it in memory.,T1027.013
|
| DUSTTRAP can delete infected system log information.,T1685.005
|
| DUSTTRAP can enumerate Registry items.,T1012
|
| DUSTTRAP can enumerate files and directories.,T1083
|
| DUSTTRAP can enumerate infected system network information.,T1016
|
| DUSTTRAP can enumerate local user accounts.,T1087.001
|
| DUSTTRAP can enumerate running processes.,T1057
|
| DUSTTRAP can execute commands via `cmd.exe`.,T1059.003
|
| DUSTTRAP can exfiltrate collected data over C2 channels.,T1041
|
| DUSTTRAP can gather data from infected systems.,T1005
|
| DUSTTRAP can identify Active Directory information and related items.,T1482
|
| DUSTTRAP can identify and enumerate victim system network shares.,T1135
|
| DUSTTRAP can identify infected system log information.,T1654
|
| DUSTTRAP can identify security software.,T1518.001
|
| DUSTTRAP can remove network shares from infected systems.,T1070.005
|
| DUSTTRAP can retrieve and load additional payloads.,T1105
|
| DUSTTRAP can use `ping` to identify remote hosts within the victim network.,T1018
|
| DUSTTRAP compromises the `.text` section of a legitimate system DLL in `%windir%` to hold the contents of retrieved plug-ins.,T1055
|
| DUSTTRAP contains additional embedded DLLs and configuration files that are loaded into memory during execution.,T1027.009
|
| DUSTTRAP decryption relies on the infected machine's `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography\MachineGUID` value.,T1497.001
|
| DUSTTRAP reads the infected system's current time and writes it to a log file during execution.,T1124
|
| DUSTTRAP reads the value of the infected system's `HKLM\SYSTEM\Microsoft\Cryptography\MachineGUID` value.,T1082
|
| "DarkGate attempts to steal Opera cookies, if present, after terminating the related process.",T1539
|
| DarkGate can be distributed through emails with malicious attachments from a spoofed email address.,T1566.001
|
| DarkGate can cloak command and control traffic in DNS records from legitimate services to avoid reputation-based detection techniques.,T1071.004
|
| DarkGate can deploy follow-on ransomware payloads.,T1486
|
| DarkGate can deploy payloads capable of capturing credentials related to cryptocurrency wallets.,T1657
|
| DarkGate can masquerade as pirated media content for initial delivery to victims.,T1036
|
| DarkGate command and control includes hard-coded domains in the malware chosen to masquerade as legitimate services such as Akamai CDN or Amazon Web Services.,T1583.001
|
| "DarkGate creates a local user account, SafeMode, via net user commands.",T1136.001
|
| "DarkGate drops an encrypted PE file, pe.bin, and decrypts it during installation. DarkGate also uses custom base64 encoding schemas in later variations to obfuscate payloads.",T1027.013
|
| DarkGate has deleted all files in the Mozilla directory using the following command: `/c del /q /f /s C:\Users\User\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\firefox`.,T1561.001
|
| DarkGate has deleted its staging directories.,T1070.004
|
| DarkGate has used PowerShell to create a remote shell.,T1059.001
|
| DarkGate initial infection mechanisms include masquerading as pirated media that launches malicious VBScript on the victim.,T1059.005
|
| "DarkGate initial installation involves dropping several files to a hidden directory named after the victim machine name. Additionally, DarkGate uses attrib to hide a directory in the following command: ` C:\Windows\system32\attrib.exe"" +h C:/rjtu/`.",T1564.001
|
| "DarkGate installation includes binary code stored in a file located in a hidden directory, such as shell.txt, that is decrypted then executed. DarkGate uses hexadecimal-encoded shellcode payloads during installation that are called via Windows API CallWindowProc() to decode and then execute.",T1140
|
| DarkGate is distributed in phishing emails containing links to distribute malicious VBS or MSI files. DarkGate uses applications such as Microsoft Teams for distributing links to payloads.,T1566.002
|
| "DarkGate leverages process hollowing techniques to evade detection, such as decrypting the content of an encrypted PE file and injecting it into the process vbc.exe.",T1055.012
|
| "DarkGate looks for various security products by process name using hard-coded values in the malware. DarkGate will not execute its keylogging thread if a process name associated with Trend Micro anti-virus is identified, or if runtime checks identify the presence of Kaspersky anti-virus. DarkGate will initiate a new thread if certain security products are identified on the victim, and recreate any malicious files associated with it if it determines they were removed by security software in a new system location.",T1518.001
|
| "DarkGate overrides the %windir% environment variable by setting a Registry key, HKEY_CURRENT_User\Environment\windir, to an alternate command to execute a malicious AutoIt script. This allows DarkGate to run every time the scheduled task DiskCleanup is executed as this uses the path value %windir%\system32\cleanmgr.exe for execution.",T1574.007
|
| "DarkGate relies on parent PID spoofing as part of its ""rootkit-like"" functionality to evade detection via Task Manager or Process Explorer.",T1134.004
|
| DarkGate retrieves cryptocurrency mining payloads and commands in encrypted traffic from its command and control server. DarkGate uses Windows Batch scripts executing the curl command to retrieve follow-on payloads. DarkGate has stolen `sitemanager.xml` and `recentservers.xml` from `%APPDATA%\FileZilla\` if present.,T1105
|
| DarkGate starts a thread on execution that captures clipboard data and logs it to a predefined log file.,T1115
|
| "DarkGate tries to elevate privileges to SYSTEM using PsExec to locally execute as a service, such as cmd /c c:\temp\PsExec.exe -accepteula -j -d -s Target Binary.",T1569.002
|
| DarkGate uses NirSoft tools to steal user credentials from the infected machine. NirSoft tools are executed via process hollowing in a newly-created instance of vbc.exe or regasm.exe.,T1552
|
| "DarkGate uses a hard-coded string as a seed, along with the victim machine hardware identifier and input text, to generate a unique string used as an internal mutex value to evade static detection based on mutexes.",T1027
|
| DarkGate uses a malicious Windows Batch script to run the Windows code utility to retrieve follow-on script payloads. DarkGate has also used `cmd.exe` to create a remote shell.,T1059.003
|
| DarkGate uses existing command and control channels to retrieve captured cryptocurrency wallet credentials.,T1041
|
| "DarkGate uses per-victim links for hosting malicious archives, such as ZIP files, in services such as SharePoint to prevent other entities from retrieving them.",T1480
|
| DarkGate uses the Delphi methods Sysutils::DiskSize and GlobalMemoryStatusEx to collect disk size and physical memory as part of the malware's anti-analysis checks for running in a virtualized environment.,T1680
|
| "DarkGate uses the native Windows API CallWindowProc() to decode and launch encoded shellcode payloads during execution. DarkGate can call kernel mode functions directly to hide the use of process hollowing methods during execution. DarkGate has also used the `CreateToolhelp32Snapshot`, `GetFileAttributesA` and `CreateProcessA` functions to obtain a list of running processes, to check for security products and to execute its malware.",T1106
|
| DarkGate uses two distinct User Account Control (UAC) bypass techniques to escalate privileges.,T1548.002
|
| "DarkGate will gather various system information such as domain, display adapter description, operating system type and version, processor type, and RAM amount.",T1082
|
| DarkGate will retrieved encrypted commands from its command and control server for follow-on actions such as cryptocurrency mining.,T1001
|
| DarkGate will search for cryptocurrency wallets by examining application window names for specific strings. DarkGate extracts information collected via NirSoft tools from the hosting process's memory by first identifying the window through the FindWindow API function.,T1010
|
| DarkGate will spawn a thread on execution to capture all keyboard events and write them to a predefined log file.,T1056.001
|
| DarkGate will terminate processes associated with several security software products if identified during execution.,T1685
|
| DarkTortilla can check for internet connectivity by issuing HTTP GET requests.,T1016.001
|
| DarkTortilla can check for the Kaspersky Anti-Virus suite.,T1518.001
|
| DarkTortilla can decrypt its payload and associated configuration elements using the Rijndael cipher.,T1140
|
| DarkTortilla can detect debuggers by using functions such as `DebuggerIsAttached` and `DebuggerIsLogging`. DarkTortilla can also detect profilers by verifying the `COR_ENABLE_PROFILING` environment variable is present and active.,T1622
|
| DarkTortilla can detect profilers by verifying the `COR_ENABLE_PROFILING` environment variable is present and active.,T1574.012
|
| DarkTortilla can download a keylogging module.,T1056.001
|
| "DarkTortilla can download additional packages for keylogging, cryptocurrency mining, and other capabilities; it can also retrieve malicious payloads such as Agent Tesla, AsyncRat, NanoCore, RedLine, Cobalt Strike, and Metasploit.",T1105
|
| DarkTortilla can enumerate a list of running processes on a compromised system.,T1057
|
| "DarkTortilla can obtain system information by querying the `Win32_ComputerSystem`, `Win32_BIOS`, `Win32_MotherboardDevice`, `Win32_PnPEntity`, and `Win32_DiskDrive` WMI objects.",T1082
|
| DarkTortilla can retrieve its primary payload from public sites such as Pastebin and Textbin.,T1102
|
| DarkTortilla can use WMI queries to obtain system information.,T1047
|
| DarkTortilla can use a .NET-based DLL named `RunPe6` for process injection.,T1055.001
|
| DarkTortilla can use a variety of API calls for persistence and defense evasion.,T1106
|
| "DarkTortilla has been distributed via spearphishing emails containing archive attachments, with file types such as .iso, .zip, .img, .dmg, and .tar, as well as through malicious documents.",T1566.001
|
| DarkTortilla has been obfuscated with the DeepSea .NET and ConfuserEx code obfuscators.,T1027
|
| DarkTortilla has modified registry keys for persistence.,T1112
|
| DarkTortilla has relied on a user to open a malicious document or archived file delivered via email for initial execution.,T1204.002
|
| DarkTortilla has used `%HiddenReg%` and `%HiddenKey%` as part of its persistence via the Windows registry.,T1564
|
| "DarkWatchman can collect the OS version, system architecture, and computer name.",T1082
|
| DarkWatchman can collect time zone information and system `UPTIME`.,T1124
|
| DarkWatchman can delete shadow volumes using vssadmin.exe.,T1490
|
| "DarkWatchman can modify Registry values to store configuration strings, keylogger, and output of components.",T1112
|
| Denis exploits a security vulnerability to load a fake DLL and execute its code.,T1574.001
|
| Denis has encoded its PowerShell commands in Base64.,T1027.010
|
| Denis obfuscates its code and encrypts the API names.,T1027
|
| "Denis replaces the nonexistent Windows DLL ""msfte.dll"" with its own malicious version, which is loaded by the SearchIndexer.exe and SearchProtocolHost.exe.",T1574
|
| "Depending on the Linux distribution and when executing with root permissions, RotaJakiro may install persistence using a `.conf` file in the `/etc/init/` folder.",T1037
|
| "Depending on the Linux distribution and when executing with root permissions, RotaJakiro may install persistence using a `.service` file under the `/lib/systemd/system/` folder.",T1543.002
|
| "Depending on the Linux distribution, RotaJakiro executes a set of commands to collect device information and sends the collected information to the C2 server.",T1119
|
| Diavol can attempt to stop security software.,T1685
|
| Disco can create a scheduled task to run every minute for persistence.,T1053.005
|
| Disco can download files to targeted systems via SMB.,T1105
|
| Disco can use SMB to transfer files.,T1071.002
|
| "Disco has achieved initial access and execution through content injection into DNS, HTTP, and SMB replies to targeted hosts that redirect them to download malicious files.",T1659
|
| Disco has been executed through inducing user interaction with malicious .zip and .msi files.,T1204.002
|
| Diskpart can be used to delete a partition or a volume. Diskpart can also be used to remove all partitions or volume formatting from the selected disk.,T1561.002
|
| "Diskpart can be used to display, set, or clear attributes of a disk or volume.",T1222.001
|
| "Diskpart can execute a disk partition script file, which attempts to mount a virtual hard disk. Diskpart can also assign and mount virtual disks.",T1059.003
|
| "Diskpart can show information about the selected disk, partition, volume, or virtual hard disk (VHD).",T1082
|
| Dok adds admin ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL to the /etc/sudoers file.,T1548.003
|
| Dok exfiltrates logs of its execution stored in the /tmp folder over FTP using the curl command.,T1048.003
|
| Dok installs two LaunchAgents to redirect all network traffic with a randomly generated name for each plist file maintaining the format com.random.name.plist.,T1543.001
|
| Dok uses AppleScript to install a login Item by sending Apple events to the System Events process.,T1547.015
|
| "Donut can patch Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI), Windows Lockdown Policy (WLDP), as well as exit-related Native API functions to avoid process termination.",T1685
|
| Donut includes a subproject DonutTest to inject shellcode into a target process.,T1055
|
| Dridex can abuse legitimate Windows executables to side-load malicious DLL files.,T1574.001
|
| "Dridex can maintain persistence via the creation of scheduled tasks within system directories such as `windows\system32\`, `windows\syswow64,` `winnt\system32`, and `winnt\syswow64`.",T1053.005
|
| Dridex has used the OutputDebugStringW function to avoid malware analysis as part of its anti-debugging technique.,T1106
|
| Dtrack can collect the host's IP addresses using the ipconfig command.,T1016
|
| Dtrack has used cmd.exe to add a persistent service.,T1059.003
|
| Dtrack has used process hollowing shellcode to target a predefined list of processes from %SYSTEM32%.,T1055.012
|
| "During the initial Pikabot command and control check-in, Pikabot will transmit collected system information encrypted using RC4.",T1041
|
| "DynoWiper has been named after well-known files schtask.exe, schtask2.exe, and _update.exe.",T1036
|
| DynoWiper has enumerated and overwritten files on all removeable and fixed drives.,T1120
|
| "DynoWiper has recursively enumerated directories with the exception of the following: System32, Windows, Program Files, Program Files(x86), Temp, Recycle.Bin, $Recycle.Bin, Boot, PerfLogs, AppData, Documents and Settings.",T1679
|
| DynoWiper has used the Microsoft Windows native `ExitWindowsEx()` function to log off the interactive user and shutdown the system.,T1529
|
| DynoWiper has used the Microsoft Windows native `GetLogicalDrives()` and `GetDriveType()` functions to enumerate all the drives visible to the system.,T1680
|
| "DynoWiper has utilized a five-second delay using `Sleep(5000)` between two of the three phases of the attack that involves file overwriting, file deletion, and system reboot.",T1678
|
| ECCENTRICBANDWAGON can delete log files generated from the malware stored at C:\windows\temp\tmp0207.,T1070.004
|
| EKANS has been disguised as update.exe to appear as a valid executable.,T1036.005
|
| "EVILNUM has a function called ""DeleteLeftovers"" to remove certain artifacts of the attack.",T1070
|
| Ebury acts as a user land rootkit using the SSH service.,T1014
|
| Ebury can disable SELinux Role-Based Access Control and deactivate PAM modules.,T1685
|
| Ebury can use the commands `Xcsh` or `Xcls` to open a shell with Ebury level permissions and `Xxsh` to open a shell with root level.,T1059.004
|
| "Ebury disables OpenSSH, system (`systemd`), and audit logs (`/sbin/auditd`) when the backdoor is active.",T1685.004
|
| Ebury exfiltrates a list of outbound and inbound SSH sessions using OpenSSH's `known_host` files and `wtmp` records. Ebury can exfiltrate SSH credentials through custom DNS queries or use the command `Xcat` to send the process's ssh session's credentials to the C2 server.,T1041
|
| Egregor has used DLL side-loading to execute its payload.,T1574.001
|
| Elise enumerates processes via the tasklist command.,T1057
|
| Elise executes net start after initial communication is made to the remote server.,T1007
|
| "Embargo has been leveraged in double-extortion ransomware, exfiltrating files then encrypting them, to prompt victims to pay a ransom.",T1657
|
| Embargo has cleared files from the recycle bin by invoking `SHEmptyRecycleBinW()` and disabled Windows recovery through `C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe /q /c bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled no`.,T1490
|
| Embargo has created a service named irnagentd that executed the MDeployer loader after the system is rebooted in Safe Mode.,T1569.002
|
| Embargo has created persistence through the DLL variant of the MDeployer toolkit by creating a service called irnagentd that launches after the system is rebooted in Safe Mode.,T1543.003
|
| Embargo has encrypted both MDeployer and MS4 Killer payloads with RC4.,T1027.013
|
| "Embargo has leveraged MDeployer to terminate the MS4Killer process, delete the decrypted payload files and a driver file dropped by MS4killer, and reboot the system.",T1070.004
|
| Embargo has leveraged Windows Native API functions to execute its operations.,T1106
|
| Embargo has modified the Windows Registry to start a custom service named irnagentd in Safe Mode.,T1547.001
|
| Embargo has obtained active services running on the victim's system through the functions `OpenSCManagerW()` and `EnumServicesStatusExW()`.,T1007
|
| "Embargo has obtained persistence of the loader MDeployer by creating a scheduled task named ""Perf_sys.""",T1053.005
|
| "Embargo has searched for folders, subfolders and other networked or mounted drives for follow-on encryption actions.",T1135
|
| "Embargo has the ability to encrypt files with the ChaCha20 and Curve25519 cryptographic algorithms. Embargo also has the ability to encrypt system data and add a random six-letter extension consisting of hexadecimal characters such as "".b58eeb"" or "".3d828a"" to encrypted files.",T1486
|
| Embargo has used a DLL variant of MDeployer to disable security solutions through Safe Mode.,T1688
|
| Embargo has utilized MS4Killer to detect running processes on the victim device. Embargo has also captured a snapshot of active running processes using the Windows API `CreateToolHelp32Snapshot()`.,T1057
|
| Emissary has the capability to execute gpresult.,T1615
|
| Emissary has the capability to execute the command ipconfig /all.,T1016
|
| Emissary has the capability to execute the command net localgroup administrators.,T1069.001
|
| Emissary has the capability to execute the command net start to interact with services.,T1007
|
| Emotet can download follow-on payloads and items via malicious `url` parameters in obfuscated PowerShell code.,T1105
|
| Emotet can extract names of all locally reachable Wi-Fi networks and then perform a brute-force attack to spread to new networks.,T1016.002
|
| "Emotet has dropped an embedded executable at `%Temp%\setup.exe`. Additionally, Emotet may embed entire code into other files.",T1027.009
|
| Emotet has enumerated all users connected to network shares.,T1033
|
| Emotet has installed itself as a new service with the service name `Windows Defender System Service` and display name `WinDefService`.,T1036.004
|
| "Emotet has leveraged the Admin$, C$, and IPC$ shares for lateral movement.",T1021.002
|
| "Emotet has maintained persistence through a scheduled task, e.g. though a .dll file in the Registry.",T1053.005
|
| Emotet has reflectively loaded payloads into memory.,T1620
|
| "Emotet has the ability to duplicate the user's token. For example, Emotet may use a variant of Google's ProtoBuf to send messages that specify how code will be executed.",T1134.001
|
| Emotet has used HTTP for command and control.,T1071.001
|
| "Emotet has used HTTP over ports such as 20, 22, 443, 7080, and 50000, in addition to using ports commonly associated with HTTP/S.",T1571
|
| Emotet has used `CreateProcess` to create a new process to run its executable and `WNetEnumResourceW` to enumerate non-hidden shares.,T1106
|
| Emotet uses RegSvr32 to execute the DLL payload.,T1218.010
|
| Emotet uses obfuscated URLs to download a ZIP file.,T1027.013
|
| Empire can enumerate Security Support Providers (SSPs) as well as utilize PowerSploit's Install-SSP and Invoke-Mimikatz to install malicious SSPs and log authentication events.,T1547.005
|
| Empire can modify the registry run keys HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run and HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run for persistence.,T1547.001
|
| Empire can use Invoke-RunAs to make tokens.,T1134.002
|
| Empire can use modules like Invoke-SessionGopher to extract private key and session information.,T1552.004
|
| Empire can utilize Invoke-DCOM to leverage remote COM execution for lateral movement.,T1021.003
|
| "Empire contains multiple modules for injecting into processes, such as Invoke-PSInject.",T1055
|
| Empire has the ability to obfuscate commands using Invoke-Obfuscation.,T1027.010
|
| Empire leverages PowerShell for the majority of its client-side agent tasks. Empire also contains the ability to conduct PowerShell remoting with the Invoke-PSRemoting module.,T1059.001
|
| Empire uses PowerSploit's Invoke-Kerberoast to request service tickets and return crackable ticket hashes.,T1558.003
|
| "EnvyScout can call window.location.pathname to ensure that embedded files are being executed from the C: drive, and will terminate if they are not.",T1480
|
| Epic collects disk space information.,T1680
|
| Epic uses the nbtstat -n and nbtstat -s commands on the victim's machine.,T1016
|
| Epic uses the net time command to get the system time from the machine and collect the current date and time zone information.,T1124
|
| "Epic uses the net use, net session, and netstat commands to gather information on network connections.",T1049
|
| Epic uses the net view command on the victim's machine.,T1018
|
| Epic uses the rem reg query command to obtain values from Registry keys.,T1012
|
| Epic uses the tasklist /v command to obtain a list of processes.,T1057
|
| Exaramel for Linux can run whoami to identify the system owner.,T1033
|
| Exbyte calls `ShellExecuteW` with the `IpOperation` parameter `RunAs` to launch `explorer.exe` with elevated privileges.,T1106
|
| Exbyte checks for the presence of a configuration file before completing execution.,T1480
|
| Exbyte checks for the presence of various security software products during execution.,T1518.001
|
| Exbyte checks whether the process is running with privileged local access during execution.,T1069.001
|
| "Exbyte enumerates all document files on an infected machine, then creates a summary of these items including filename and directory location prior to exfiltration to cloud hosting services.",T1083
|
| Exbyte performs various checks to determine if it is running in a sandboxed environment to prevent analysis.,T1497.001
|
| Exbyte will self-delete if a hard-coded configuration file is not found.,T1070.004
|
| FALLCHILL can collect information about installed disks from the victim.,T1680
|
| "FALLCHILL can collect operating system (OS) version information, processor information, and system name from the victim.",T1082
|
| FELIXROOT collects the victim's volume serial number.,T1680
|
| FELIXROOT deletes the Registry key HKCU\Software\Classes\Applications\rundll32.exe\shell\open.,T1112
|
| FRAMESTING can send and receive zlib compressed data within `POST` requests.,T1001
|
| FRAMESTING is a Python web shell that can embed in the Ivanti Connect Secure CAV Python package.,T1059.006
|
| FRAMESTING is a web shell capable of enabling arbitrary command execution on compromised Ivanti Connect Secure VPNs.,T1505.003
|
| FRAMESTING uses a cookie named `DSID` to mimic the name of a cookie used by Ivanti Connect Secure appliances for maintaining VPN sessions.,T1001.003
|
| FRP can be configured to only accept TLS connections.,T1573.002
|
| "FRP can communicate over TCP, TCP stream multiplexing, KERN Communications Protocol (KCP), QUIC, and UDP.",T1095
|
| FRP can proxy communications through a server in public IP space to local servers located behind a NAT or firewall.,T1090
|
| FRP can tunnel SSH and Unix Domain Socket communications over TCP between external nodes and exposed resources behind firewalls or NAT.,T1572
|
| FRP can use STCP (Secret TCP) with a preshared key to encrypt services exposed to public networks.,T1573.001
|
| FRP can use a dashboard and U/I to display the status of connections from the FRP client and server.,T1049
|
| FRP has the ability to use HTTP and HTTPS to enable the forwarding of requests for internal services via domain name.,T1071.001
|
| FYAnti can search the C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\ directory for files of a specified size.,T1083
|
| FatDuke can get user agent strings for the default browser from HKCU\Software\Classes\http\shell\open\command.,T1012
|
| FatDuke has used HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\CurrentVersion\Run to establish persistence.,T1547.001
|
| "Ferocious can run anti-sandbox checks using the Microsoft Excel 4.0 function GET.WORKSPACE to determine the OS version, if there is a mouse present, and if the host is capable of playing sounds.",T1497.001
|
| Ferocious can use GET.WORKSPACE in Microsoft Excel to determine the OS version of the compromised host.,T1082
|
| FinFisher clears the system event logs using OpenEventLog/ClearEventLog APIs .,T1685.005
|
| FinFisher establishes persistence by creating the Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Run.,T1547.001
|
| Flagpro has been used to execute net view on a targeted system.,T1018
|
| Flagpro has been used to execute netstat -ano on a compromised host.,T1049
|
| Flagpro has been used to execute the ipconfig /all command on a victim system.,T1016
|
| Flagpro has been used to execute the net localgroup administrators command on a targeted system.,T1069.001
|
| Flagpro has been used to run the tasklist command on a compromised system.,T1057
|
| Flame can create backdoor accounts with login `HelpAssistant` on domain connected systems if appropriate rights are available.,T1036.010
|
| FoggyWeb's loader can call the load() function to load the FoggyWeb dll into an Application Domain on a compromised AD FS server.,T1129
|
| "Following the successful injection of SUNBURST, SUNSPOT deleted a temporary file it created named InventoryManager.bk after restoring the original SolarWinds Orion source code to the software library.",T1070.004
|
| Fooder has decrypted payloads using the WinCrypt API and the AES key.,T1140
|
| Fooder has reflectively loaded a payload into memory.,T1620
|
| Fooder has used a custom delay function (`delayExecution(integer)`) and Sleep API calls (`Sleep(integer)`) to slow code execution.,T1678
|
| "Fooder has used the WinCrypt API for payload decryption, `DuplicateTokenEx` to duplicate the token of a specified process, and `CreateProcessAsUserA` for payload execution.",T1106
|
| "Fooder has used the `DuplicateTokenEx` API to duplicate the token of a specified process, and `CreateProcessAsUserA` to execute its payload.",T1134.001
|
| "For C2 over HTTP, Helminth encodes data with base64 and sends it via the ""Cookie"" field of HTTP requests. For C2 over DNS, Helminth converts ASCII characters into their hexadecimal values and sends the data in cleartext.",T1132.001
|
| "For network communications, OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D loads a dynamic library (`.dylib` file) using `dlopen()` and obtains a function pointer to execute within that shared library using `dlsym()`.",T1129
|
| "For several modules, XCSSET attempts to access or list the contents of user folders such as Desktop, Downloads, and Documents. If the folder does not exist or access is denied, it enters a loop where it resets the TCC database and retries access.",T1548.006
|
| "FruitFly saves itself with a leading ""."" to make it a hidden file.",T1564.001
|
| FunnyDream can Base64 encode its C2 address stored in a template binary with the `xyz0123456789ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvw_-` or `xyz0123456789ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvw_=` character sets.,T1027.013
|
| "Fysbis has used the command ls /etc | egrep -e""fedora\|debian\|gentoo\|mandriva\|mandrake\|meego\|redhat\|lsb-\|sun-\|SUSE\|release"" to determine which Linux OS version is running.",T1082
|
| GLASSTOKEN can use PowerShell for command execution.,T1059.001
|
| GLASSTOKEN has hexadecimal and Base64 encoded C2 content.,T1132.001
|
| GLASSTOKEN has the ability to decode hexadecimal and Base64 C2 requests.,T1140
|
| GLOOXMAIL communicates to servers operated by Google using the Jabber/XMPP protocol for C2.,T1071.005
|
| GRIFFON has used sctasks for persistence.,T1053.005
|
| "Gazer can establish persistence by setting the value ""Shell"" with ""explorer.exe, %malware_pathfile%"" under the Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon.",T1547.004
|
| Gazer creates a mutex using the hard-coded value `{531511FA-190D-5D85-8A4A-279F2F592CC7}` to ensure that only one instance of itself is running.,T1480.002
|
| "Gazer versions are signed with various valid certificates; one was likely faked and issued by Comodo for ""Solid Loop Ltd,"" and another was issued for ""Ultimate Computer Support Ltd.""",T1553.002
|
| Gelsemium can drop itself in C:\Windows\System32\spool\prtprocs\x64\winprint.dll to be loaded automatically by the spoolsv Windows service.,T1547.012
|
| "Gelsemium has named malicious binaries `serv.exe`, `winprint.dll`, and `chrome_elf.dll` and has set its persistence in the Registry with the key value Chrome Update to appear legitimate.",T1036.005
|
| GlassWorm can intercept and modify transaction details associated with hardware wallet applications before signing.,T1565.002
|
| GlassWorm can modify hardware wallet applications.,T1554
|
| GlassWorm has archived collected files within a zip file prior to exfiltration to include `/tmp/out.zip`.,T1560.001
|
| "GlassWorm has collected local data from a compromised host to include desktop cryptocurrency wallet data, and documents from within Desktop, Documents, and Downloads.",T1005
|
| GlassWorm has decoded its Base64 instructions. GlassWorm has also decrypted its AES protected payloads.,T1140
|
| GlassWorm has distributed C2 using BitTorrent's Distributed Hash Table (DHT) network to harness a decentralized command capability.,T1571
|
| GlassWorm has downloaded additional payloads from C2.,T1105
|
| GlassWorm has established persistence on macOS via a LaunchAgent by writing a plist under `/library/LaunchAgents`.,T1543.001
|
| GlassWorm has gathered code repository authentication materials for NPM and GitHub. GlassWorm has collected details pertaining to the npm configuration data for `_authToken`.,T1213.003
|
| GlassWorm has harvested Safari cookies stored within `/Library/Containers/com.apple.Safari/Data/Library/Cookies/ Cookies.binarycookies`. GlassWorm has also stolen cookies within Chromium and Firefox browsers.,T1539
|
| "GlassWorm has identified the system language settings by checking for `ru_RU`, `ru-RU`, `ru`, and `Russian` to prevent execution in a Russian associated device.",T1614.001
|
| GlassWorm has leveraged AES-256-CBC encryption to obfuscate its malicious JavaScript payload. GlassWorm has also utilized Base64 encoding to obfuscate the C2 details stored in the Solana memo field.,T1027.013
|
| GlassWorm has leveraged JavaScript to execute its malicious code to include its hidden Unicode characters using the `eval` call. GlassWorm has also utilized encrypted payloads compiled in JavaScript.,T1059.007
|
| GlassWorm has leveraged blockchain-based C2 infrastructure to include Solana blockchain that contains additional C2 details within the memo field. GlassWorm has also leveraged Google Calendar to host encoded data.,T1102.001
|
| GlassWorm has leveraged geofencing logic to detect whether it is operating in a Russian associated time zone to determine whether it continues to execute.,T1614
|
| GlassWorm has leveraged peer-to-peer software to facilitate communications within the victim network to include the software WebRTC. GlassWorm has also established a SOCKS proxy to interact with victim devices that also acted as a proxy node for follow-on behaviors.,T1090.001
|
| GlassWorm has masqueraded as legitimate VSCode extensions. GlassWorm has also impersonated Github projects.,T1036
|
| "GlassWorm has searched browser data for cookies, history, login databases, and cryptocurrency wallets.",T1217
|
| GlassWorm has searched for existing wallet applications to include Ledger Live and Trezor Suite.,T1518
|
| GlassWorm has spread through Visual Studio extensions. GlassWorm has also spread through JavaScript projects hosted on Github.,T1195.001
|
| GlassWorm has staged collected data in a working directory within a temp folder to include `/tmp/ijewf`.,T1074.001
|
| GlassWorm has the ability to check the OS of the victim host. GlassWorm has checked whether the OS platform value includes `darwin` prior to execution of macOS specific scripts.,T1082
|
| GlassWorm has the ability to steal credentials for cryptocurrency wallets.,T1657
|
| GlassWorm has used HTTP for C2 and extracts data from the HTTP response headers.,T1071.001
|
| "GlassWorm has used a timeout function set to `9e5` which delays execution 900,000 milliseconds or 15 minutes to avoid detection.",T1678
|
| GlassWorm has utilized AppleScript to include `set keychainPassword to do shell script` to execute shell command that retrieves passwords from the macOS keychain.,T1059.002
|
| GlassWorm has utilized Google Calendar as backup C2.,T1008
|
| GlassWorm has utilized invisible Unicode Private Use Area (PUA) characters to obfuscate its malicious code so that it does not render in code editors.,T1027.018
|
| GlassWorm has utilized logic to avoid executing on Russian based devices.,T1480
|
| GoBear implements SOCKS5 proxy functionality.,T1090
|
| GoBear uses stolen legitimate code signing certificates for defense evasion.,T1553.002
|
| GoldMax will check if it is being run in a virtualized environment by comparing the collected MAC address to c8:27:cc:c2:37:5a.,T1497.001
|
| GoldenSpy can execute remote commands in the Windows command shell using the WinExec() API.,T1106
|
| "GoldenSpy has included a program ""ExeProtector"", which monitors for the existence of GoldenSpy on the infected system and redownloads if necessary.",T1083
|
| GoldenSpy's setup file installs initial executables under the folder %WinDir%\System32\PluginManager.,T1036.005
|
| "Gomir collects information about directory and file structures, including total number of subdirectories, total number of files, and total size of files on infected systems.",T1083
|
| "Gomir collects information on infected systems such as hostname, username, CPU, and RAM information.",T1082
|
| "Gomir collects network information on infected systems such as listing interface names, MAC and IP addresses, and IPv6 addresses.",T1016
|
| Gomir creates a systemd service named `syslogd` for persistence.,T1543.002
|
| "Gomir reads command line arguments and parses them for functionality when executed from a Linux shell, and can execute arbitrary strings passed to it as shell commands.",T1059.004
|
| Gomir uses Base64-encoded content in HTTP communications to command and control infrastructure.,T1132.001
|
| Gomir uses a custom encryption algorithm for content sent to command and control infrastructure.,T1573
|
| Gomir uses reverse proxy functionality that employs SSL to encrypt communications.,T1573.002
|
| Gomir will configure a crontab for process execution to start the backdoor on reboot if it is not initially running under group 0 privileges.,T1053.003
|
| Goopy has the ability to enumerate the infected system's user name via GetUserNameW.,T1106
|
| Gootloader can create an autorun entry for a PowerShell script to run at reboot.,T1547.001
|
| Gootloader can designate a sleep period of more than 22 seconds between stages of infection.,T1497.003
|
| Gootloader can determine if a victim's computer is running an operating system with specific language preferences.,T1614.001
|
| Gootloader can inject its Delphi executable into ImagingDevices.exe using a process hollowing technique.,T1055.012
|
| Gootloader can retrieve a Base64 encoded stager from C2.,T1132.001
|
| "Gootloader can use IP geolocation to determine if the person browsing to a compromised site is within a targeted territory such as the US, Canada, Germany, and South Korea.",T1614
|
| Gootloader can use an encoded PowerShell stager to write to the Registry for persistence.,T1059.001
|
| Gootloader has been executed through malicious links presented to users as internet search results.,T1204.001
|
| Gootloader has the ability to decode and decrypt malicious payloads prior to execution.,T1140
|
| Gootloader has used compromised legitimate domains to as a delivery network for malicious payloads.,T1584.001
|
| Grandoreiro can detect VMWare via its I/O port and Virtual PC via the vpcext instruction.,T1497.001
|
| Grandoreiro can execute through the WinExec API.,T1106
|
| Grandoreiro can modify the Registry to store its configuration at `HKCU\Software\` under frequently changing names including %USERNAME% and ToolTech-RM.,T1112
|
| "GravityRAT supports file encryption (AES with the key ""lolomycin2017"").",T1027.013
|
| "GravityRAT uses WMI to check the BIOS and manufacturer information for strings like ""VMWare"", ""Virtual"", and ""XEN"" and another WMI request to get the current temperature of the hardware to determine if it's a virtual machine environment.",T1497.001
|
| GravityRAT uses the netstat command to find open ports on the victim's machine.,T1049
|
| Green Lambert can add init.d and rc.d files in the /etc folder to establish persistence.,T1037.004
|
| "Green Lambert can create a Launch Agent with the `RunAtLoad` key-value pair set to true, ensuring the `com.apple.GrowlHelper.plist` file runs every time a user logs in.",T1543.001
|
| GrimAgent can use Native API including GetProcAddress and ShellExecuteW.,T1106
|
| "GrimAgent has used Accept-Language to identify hosts in the United Kingdom, United States, France, and Spain.",T1614.001
|
| "GrimAgent uses the last 64 bytes of the binary to compute a mutex name. If the generated name is invalid, it will default to the generic `mymutex`.",T1480.002
|
| GuLoader can delete its executable from the AppData\Local\Temp directory on the compromised host.,T1070.004
|
| "GuLoader has the ability to perform anti-VM and anti-sandbox checks using string hashing, the API call EnumWindows, and checking for Qemu guest agent.",T1497.001
|
| HAMMERTOSS has used -WindowStyle hidden to conceal PowerShell windows.,T1564.003
|
| HARDRAIN opens the Windows Firewall to modify incoming connections.,T1686.003
|
| "HARDRAIN uses the command cmd.exe /c netsh firewall add portopening TCP 443 ""adp"" and makes the victim machine function as a proxy server.",T1090
|
| HDoor kills anti-virus found on the victim.,T1685
|
| HIUPAN has abused legitimate executables to side-load malicious DLLs to include the legitimate exe UsbConfig.exe.,T1574.001
|
| HIUPAN has added Registry Run keys to achieve persistence using `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run`.,T1547.001
|
| HIUPAN has conducted process discovery to identify the PUBLOAD malware under the process WCBrowserWatcher.exe and will launch it from an install directory if it is not found.,T1057
|
| HIUPAN has lured victims into executing malicious files from USBs including the use of files such as USBconfig.exe.,T1204.002
|
| "HIUPAN has used a config file ""$.ini"" to store a sleep multiplier to execute at a set interval value prior to initiating a watcher function that checks for a specific running process, that checks for removable drives and installs itself and supporting files if one is available.",T1678
|
| HOPLIGHT can enumerate device drivers located in the registry at `HKLM\Software\WBEM\WDM`.,T1652
|
| HOPLIGHT can use WMI event subscriptions to create persistence.,T1546.003
|
| HOPLIGHT has been observed collecting victim machine information like OS version.,T1082
|
| HOPLIGHT has been observed collecting victim machine volume information.,T1680
|
| HOPLIGHT has modified the firewall using netsh.,T1686
|
| "HTTPBrowser abuses the Windows DLL load order by using a legitimate Symantec anti-virus binary, VPDN_LU.exe, to load a malicious DLL that mimics a legitimate Symantec DLL, navlu.dll. HTTPBrowser has also used DLL side-loading.",T1574.001
|
| "HTTPBrowser has established persistence by setting the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run key value for wdm to the path of the executable. It has also used the Registry entry HKEY_USERS\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run vpdn ""%ALLUSERPROFILE%\%APPDATA%\vpdn\VPDN_LU.exe"" to establish persistence.",T1547.001
|
| HTTPTroy has decoded strings encoded with Base64 and XOR prior to execution.,T1140
|
| HTTPTroy has exfiltrated encrypted data over the C2 channel using the `up ` command.,T1041
|
| "HTTPTroy has leveraged Windows Native API calls, including `GetProcAddress` to execute functions in memory.",T1106
|
| HTTPTroy has leveraged the ability to execute commands with system privileges using the `srun ` command.,T1548.002
|
| HTTPTroy has obfuscated request communications utilizing XOR encryption.,T1573.001
|
| HTTPTroy has obfuscated strings using Single Instruction Multiple Data (SIMD) instructions to hinder analysis and detection.,T1027
|
| "HTTPTroy has obtained screen captures leveraging the `screen` command which captures, encrypts and uploads the stolen image to the adversary controlled C2 server.",T1113
|
| HTTPTroy has the ability to generate a reverse shell using the command `conn `.,T1059.003
|
| HTTPTroy has utilized dynamic API resolution by reconstructing API calls during runtime using combinations of arithmetic and logical operations to complicate static analysis.,T1027.007
|
| HUI Loader can be deployed to targeted systems via legitimate programs that are vulnerable to DLL search order hijacking.,T1574.001
|
| HUI Loader can decrypt and load files containing malicious payloads.,T1140
|
| HUI Loader has the ability to disable Windows Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) and Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) functions.,T1685
|
| Hancitor has used CallWindowProc and EnumResourceTypesA to interpret and execute shellcode.,T1106
|
| Hancitor has used Base64 to encode malicious links.,T1027
|
| Hannotog can modify local firewall settings via `netsh` commands to open a listening UDP port.,T1686
|
| Hannotog can stop Windows services.,T1489
|
| Hannotog creates a new service for persistence.,T1543.003
|
| Havoc can capture screenshots.,T1113
|
| Havoc can download files from the victim's computer.,T1005
|
| Havoc can facilitate the execution of PowerShell commands.,T1059.001
|
| "Havoc can gather system information including hostname, domain, and OS details.",T1082
|
| Havoc can send an AES encrypted check-in request to the C2 server.,T1573.001
|
| Havoc can trigger exection of `whoami` on the target host to display the current user.,T1033
|
| Havoc can use `NtAllocateVirtualMemory` and `NtCreateThreadEx` to aid process injection.,T1106
|
| Havoc can use an SMB listener for C2 communication.,T1071.002
|
| Havoc features a module capable of host enumeration.,T1018
|
| Havoc has a module capable of token impersonation.,T1134.001
|
| Havoc has been distributed through ClickFix phishing campaigns.,T1566.002
|
| Havoc has been executed by victims through the use of targeted lures and crafted decoy documents.,T1204.002
|
| Havoc has itself injected into `C:\\Windows\\System32\\Werfault.exe` on targeted systems.,T1055.002
|
| Havoc has leveraged legitimate executables to side-load malicious payloads.,T1574.001
|
| Havoc has the ability to upload files to infected systems.,T1105
|
| "Havoc has utilized XOR encryption with the key ""01-01-1900"" to obfuscate command strings.",T1027.010
|
| HeartCrypt can add several hundred thousand kilobytes of null padding to payloads before saving onto the file system.,T1027.001
|
| HeartCrypt can append a BMP header to encoded malicious payloads to masquerade them as BMP files.,T1036.008
|
| HeartCrypt can decrypt payloads prior to execution.,T1140
|
| HeartCrypt can pack malicious Windows x86 and .NET payloads in order to evade detection.,T1027.002
|
| "HeartCrypt can use Windows API functions to modify the Registry and `FindResourceW`, `LoadResource`, and `LockResource` to acquire a pointer to corresponding code resources.",T1106
|
| HeartCrypt can use the `reg add` command via `cmd.exe` for Registry modification.,T1059.003
|
| HeartCrypt has the ability to use `NtQueueApcThread` as an alternate method for process injection.,T1055.004
|
| "HeartCrypt strings are encrypted via a single-byte XOR operation rotating over a hard-coded key, possibly provided by the PaaS customers.",T1027.013
|
| Helminth has checked for the domain admin group and Exchange Trusted Subsystem groups using the commands net group Exchange Trusted Subsystem /domain and net group domain admins /domain.,T1069.002
|
| HermeticWiper can enumerate physical drives on a targeted host.,T1680
|
| HermeticWizard has the ability to use `wevtutil cl system` to clear event logs.,T1685.005
|
| HexEval Loader has been used to download a malicious payload to include BeaverTail.,T1105
|
| HexEval Loader has decoded its payload prior to execution.,T1140
|
| HexEval Loader has executed malicious JavaScript code.,T1059.007
|
| HexEval Loader has exfiltrated victim data using HTTPS POST requests to its C2 servers.,T1041
|
| HexEval Loader has identified the OS and MAC address of victim device through host fingerprinting scripting.,T1082
|
| HexEval Loader has leveraged server-side client configurations to identify the public IP of the victim host.,T1016
|
| HexEval Loader has masqueraded and typosquatted as legitimate code repository packages and projects.,T1036.005
|
| HiddenFace can check for the presence of specific analysis tools and will terminate itself if they are found.,T1480
|
| HiddenFace can check running processes against a list of blocklisted applications.,T1057
|
| HiddenFace can create a mutex to ensure only one instance is running at a time.,T1480.002
|
| HiddenFace can dynamically resolve Windows APIs.,T1027.007
|
| HiddenFace can enumerate the hostname and username of the compromised system.,T1082
|
| HiddenFace can identify processes identified with security applications and tooling.,T1518.001
|
| HiddenFace can inject code directly into legitimate applications.,T1055
|
| "HiddenFace can reconfigure Windows firewalls to enable communication by adding a rule named ""Cortana"" to allow inbound connection to TCP/47000.",T1686.003
|
| HiddenFace can sleep randomly between 30 and 60 seconds to avoid behavioral analysis.,T1497.003
|
| HiddenFace can upload files from the victim machine to C2 nodes.,T1005
|
| HiddenFace can use RSA-2048 in addition to symmetric algorithms in C2.,T1573.002
|
| HiddenFace can use a custom TCP protocol over Port 443 for C2.,T1095
|
| HiddenFace can use active and passive C2 modes that use different encryption algorithms and backdoor commands.,T1008
|
| HiddenFace has encrypted its payload with AES.,T1027.013
|
| HiddenFace has the ability to decrypt its payload prior to execution.,T1140
|
| HiddenFace has used dynamic domain generation algorithms in C2.,T1568.002
|
| HiddenFace has used scheduled tasks for execution and persistence.,T1053.005
|
| HiddenFace's passive mode listens on TCP 47000.,T1571
|
| Hikit has used DLL to load oci.dll as a persistence mechanism.,T1574.001
|
| Hikit installs a self-generated certificate to the local trust store as a root CA and Trusted Publisher.,T1553.004
|
| HotCroissant can perform dynamic DLL importing and API lookups using LoadLibrary and GetProcAddress on obfuscated strings.,T1106
|
| HotCroissant can remotely open applications on the infected host with the ShellExecuteA command.,T1059.003
|
| Hydraq creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can clear all system event logs.,T1685.005
|
| "HyperBro has used a legitimate application to sideload a DLL to decrypt, decompress, and run a payload.",T1574.001
|
| HyperStack can add the name of its communication pipe to HKLM\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\lanmanserver\\parameters\NullSessionPipes.,T1112
|
| HyperStack can use Windows API's ConnectNamedPipe and WNetAddConnection2 to detect incoming connections and connect to remote shares.,T1106
|
| IMAPLoader creates scheduled tasks for persistence based on the operating system version of the victim machine.,T1053.005
|
| IMAPLoader hides the Windows Console window created by its execution by directly importing the `kernel32.dll` and `user32.dll` libraries `GetConsoleWindow` and `ShowWindow` APIs.,T1564.003
|
| IMAPLoader is a loader used to retrieve follow-on payload encoded in email messages for execution on victim systems.,T1105
|
| IMAPLoader modifies Windows tasks on the victim machine to reference a retrieved PE file through a path modification.,T1543
|
| IMAPLoader uses WMI queries to query system information on victim hosts.,T1047
|
| IMAPLoader uses the IMAP email protocol for command and control purposes.,T1071.003
|
| INC Ransomware campaigns have used spearphishing emails for initial access.,T1566
|
| INC Ransomware can delete volume shadow copy backups from victim machines.,T1490
|
| INC Ransomware can discover and mount hidden drives to encrypt them.,T1680
|
| "INC Ransomware can encrypt data on victim systems, including through the use of partial encryption and multi-threading to speed encryption.",T1486
|
| INC Ransomware can identify external USB and hard drives for encryption and printers to print ransom notes.,T1120
|
| INC Ransomware can issue a command to kill a process on compromised hosts.,T1489
|
| INC Ransomware can receive command line arguments to encrypt specific files and directories.,T1083
|
| INC Ransomware can run `CryptStringToBinaryA` to decrypt base64 content containing its ransom note.,T1140
|
| INC Ransomware can use the API `DeviceIoControl` to resize the allocated space for and cause the deletion of volume shadow copy snapshots.,T1106
|
| INC Ransomware can verify the presence of specific drivers on compromised hosts including Microsoft Print to PDF and Microsoft XPS Document Writer.,T1652
|
| INC Ransomware has the ability to change the background wallpaper image to display the ransom note.,T1491.001
|
| INC Ransomware has the ability to use wmic.exe to spread to multiple endpoints within a compromised environment.,T1047
|
| IPsec Helper can delete itself when given the appropriate command.,T1070.004
|
| IPsec Helper can delete various service traces related to persistent execution when commanded.,T1070.009
|
| IPsec Helper can run arbitrary PowerShell commands passed to it.,T1059.001
|
| IPsec Helper can run arbitrary Visual Basic scripts and commands passed to it.,T1059.005
|
| IPsec Helper connects to command and control servers via HTTP POST requests based on parameters hard-coded into the malware.,T1071.001
|
| IPsec Helper contains an embedded XML configuration file with an encrypted list of command and control servers. These are written to an external configuration file during execution.,T1027.013
|
| IPsec Helper exfiltrates specific files through its command and control framework.,T1041
|
| "IceApple can use Base64 and ""junk"" JavaScript code to obfuscate information.",T1027.010
|
| IcedID can identify AV products on an infected host using the following command: ` WMIC.exe WMIC /Node:localhost /Namespace:\\root\SecurityCenter2 Path AntiVirusProduct Get /Format:List`.,T1518.001
|
| IcedID can inject a Cobalt Strike beacon into cmd.exe via process hallowing.,T1055.012
|
| IcedID can inject itself into a suspended msiexec.exe process to send beacons to C2 while appearing as a normal msi application. IcedID has also used msiexec.exe to deploy the IcedID loader.,T1218.007
|
| IcedID can query LDAP and can use built-in `net` commands to identify additional users on the network to infect.,T1087.002
|
| "IcedID has called ZwWriteVirtualMemory, ZwProtectVirtualMemory, ZwQueueApcThread, and NtResumeThread to inject itself into a remote process.",T1106
|
| IcedID has created a scheduled task to establish persistence.,T1053.005
|
| IcedID has manipulated Keitaro Traffic Direction System to filter researcher and sandbox traffic.,T1497
|
| IcedID has modified legitimate .dll files to include malicious code.,T1036.005
|
| IcedID has used the `net view /all` command to show available shares.,T1135
|
| IcedID used Nltest during initial discovery.,T1482
|
| "If a victim meets certain criteria, T9000 uses the AppInit_DLL functionality to achieve persistence by ensuring that every user mode process that is spawned will load its malicious DLL, ResN32.dll. It does this by creating the following Registry keys: HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\AppInit_DLLs - %APPDATA%\Intel\ResN32.dll and HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\LoadAppInit_DLLs - 0x1.",T1546.010
|
| "If credentials are not collected for two weeks, Ebury encrypts the credentials using a public key and sends them via UDP to an IP address located in the DNS TXT record.",T1020
|
| "If establishing persistence by installation as a new service fails, one variant of Elise establishes persistence for the created .exe file by setting the following Registry key: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\svchost : %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Network\svchost.exe. Other variants have set the following Registry keys for persistence: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\imejp : self and HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\IAStorD.",T1547.001
|
| "If executed with elevated privileges, Diskpart can list all volumes, including virtual disks.",T1083
|
| "If running with elevated privileges, OSX/Shlayer has used the spctl command to disable Gatekeeper protection for a downloaded file. OSX/Shlayer can also leverage system links pointing to bash scripts in the downloaded DMG file to bypass Gatekeeper, a flaw patched in macOS 11.3 and later versions. OSX/Shlayer has been Notarized by Apple, resulting in successful passing of additional Gatekeeper checks.",T1553.001
|
| "If sent the command `16002`, LightSpy uses the `NSWorkspace runningApplications()` method to collect the process ID, path to the executable, bundle information, and the filename of the executable for all running applications.",T1057
|
| "If the victim is using PowerShell 3.0 or later, POWERSOURCE writes its decoded payload to an alternate data stream (ADS) named kernel32.dll that is saved in %PROGRAMDATA%\Windows\.",T1564.004
|
| "Imminent Monitor has a ""Process Watcher"" feature to monitor processes in case the client ever crashes or gets closed.",T1057
|
| "Impacket has used its `wmiexec` command, leveraging Windows Management Instrumentation, to remotely stage and execute payloads in victim networks.",T1570
|
| Impacket modules like ntlmrelayx and smbrelayx can be used in conjunction with Network Sniffing and Name Resolution Poisoning and SMB Relay to gather NetNTLM credentials for Brute Force or relay attacks that can gain code execution.,T1557.001
|
| "Impacket tools - such as getST.py or ticketer.py - can be used to steal or forge Kerberos tickets using ccache files given a password, hash, aesKey, or TGT.",T1558.005
|
| Impacket's `wmiexec` module can be used to execute commands through WMI.,T1047
|
| "In one instance, menuPass added PlugX as a service with a display name of ""Corel Writing Tools Utility.""",T1036.004
|
| Individual Uroburos implants can use multiple communication channels based on one of four available modes of operation.,T1104
|
| Industroyer has a data wiper component that enumerates keys in the Registry HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services.,T1012
|
| "Industroyer2 has the ability to cyclically enumerate running processes such as PServiceControl.exe, PService_PDD.exe, and other targets supplied through a hardcoded configuration.",T1057
|
| "InvisiMole can gather information on the OS version, computer name, DEP policy, and memory size.",T1082
|
| InvisiMole can gather information on the mapped drives and system volume serial number.,T1680
|
| "InvisiMole can use the ITaskService, ITaskDefinition and ITaskSettings COM interfaces to schedule a task.",T1559.001
|
| InvisiMole can use winapiexec tool for indirect execution of ShellExecuteW and CreateProcessA.,T1106
|
| "InvisibleFerret has collected OS type, hostname and system version through the ""pay"" module. InvisibleFerret has also queried the victim device using Python scripts to obtain the User and Hostname.",T1082
|
| "InvisibleFerret has collected data utilizing a script that contained a list of excluded files and directory names and naming patterns of interest such as environment and configuration files, documents, spreadsheets, and other files that contained the words secret, wallet, private, and password.",T1005
|
| "InvisibleFerret has collected mouse and keyboard events using ""pyWinhook"".",T1056
|
| "InvisibleFerret has collected the local IP address, and external IP.",T1016
|
| "InvisibleFerret has conducted keylogging using the Python project ""pyWinHook"" and ""Pyhook"". InvisibleFerret has also captured keylogging thread checks for changes in an active window and key presses.",T1056.001
|
| "InvisibleFerret has established a connection with the C2 server over TCP traffic. InvisibleFerret has also created a TCP reverse shell communicating via a socket connection over ports 1245, 80, 2245, 3001, and 5000.",T1095
|
| InvisibleFerret has established persistence within GNOME-based Linux environments by placing entries within `.desktop` that run on Startup.,T1547.013
|
| "InvisibleFerret has established persistence within Windows devices by creating a .bat file ""queue.bat"" within the Startup folder to run a Python script.",T1547.001
|
| InvisibleFerret has gathered installed programs and running processes.,T1518
|
| "InvisibleFerret has identified specific directories and files for exfiltration using the `ssh_upload` command which contains subcommands of `.sdira`, `sdir`, `sfile`, `sfinda`, `sfindr`, `sfind`. InvisibleFerret also has the capability to scan and upload files of interest from multiple OS systems through the use of scripts that check file names, file extensions, and avoids certain path names. InvisibleFerret has utilized the `findstr` on Windows or the macOS `find` commands to search for files of interest.",T1083
|
| InvisibleFerret has leveraged Telegram chat to upload stolen data using the Telegram API with a bot token.,T1567
|
| InvisibleFerret has staged data in consolidated folders prior to exfiltration.,T1074.001
|
| "InvisibleFerret has stolen data from the clipboard using the Python project ""pyperclip"". InvisibleFerret has also captured clipboard contents during copy and paste operations.",T1115
|
| InvisibleFerret has terminated Chrome and Brave browsers using the `taskkill` command on Windows and the `killall` command on other systems such as Linux and macOS. InvisibleFerret has also utilized it's `ssh_kill` command to terminate Chrome and Brave browser processes.,T1489
|
| "InvisibleFerret has the capability to query installed programs and running processes. InvisibleFerret has also identified running processes using the Python project ""psutil"".",T1057
|
| "InvisibleFerret has used 7zip, RAR and zip files to archive collected data for exfiltration.",T1560.001
|
| "InvisibleFerret has used HTTP communications to the ""/Uploads"" URI for file exfiltration.",T1041
|
| InvisibleFerret has used HTTP for C2 communications.,T1071.001
|
| "InvisibleFerret has utilized remote access software including AnyDesk client through the ""adc"" module. InvisibleFerret has also downloaded the AnyDesk client should it not already exist on the compromised host by searching for `C:/Program Files(x86)/AnyDesk/AnyDesk.exe`.",T1219
|
| InvisibleFerret has utilized the command `ssh_zcp` to exfiltrate data from browser extensions and password managers via Telegram and FTP.,T1555.005
|
| IronNetInjector has used a task XML file named mssch.xml to run an IronPython script when a user logs in or when specific system events are created.,T1053.005
|
| "IronWind can deobfuscate the next stage payload using Base64 and XOR operations with the key ""53"".",T1140
|
| IronWind can enumerate the username on victim's systems.,T1033
|
| IronWind can list installed software on targeted hosts.,T1518
|
| "IronWind has used Base64 encoding and XOR encryption with the key ""53"" to obfuscate command strings.",T1027.010
|
| IronWind has used the Windows command shell to execute malicious files.,T1059.003
|
| Ixeshe can achieve persistence by adding itself to the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run Registry key.,T1547.001
|
| J-magic can communicate back to send a challenge to C2 infrastructure over SSL.,T1573.002
|
| J-magic can monitor TCP traffic for packets containing one of five different predefined parameters and will spawn a reverse shell if one of the parameters and the proper response string to a subsequent challenge is received.,T1205
|
| J-magic can monitor incoming C2 communications sent over TCP to the compromised host.,T1095
|
| J-magic can overwrite previously executed command line arguments.,T1070.003
|
| "J-magic can rename itself as ""nfsiod 0"" to masquerade as the local Network File System (NFS) asynchronous I/O server.",T1036.005
|
| J-magic has a pcap listener function that can create an Extended Berkley Packet Filter (eBPF) on designated interfaces and ports.,T1040
|
| JPIN can lower security settings by changing Registry keys.,T1685
|
| JumbledPath can clear logs on all devices used along its connection path to compromised network infrastructure.,T1685.006
|
| JumbledPath can communicate over a unique series of connections to send and retrieve data from exploited devices.,T1104
|
| JumbledPath can compress and encrypt exfiltrated packet captures from targeted devices.,T1560
|
| JumbledPath can use a chain of jump hosts to communicate with compromised devices to obscure actor infrastructure.,T1665
|
| KEYMARBLE has a command to create Registry entries for storing data under HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\WABE\DataPath.,T1112
|
| KEYMARBLE has the capability to collect information on disk devices.,T1680
|
| "KEYMARBLE has the capability to collect the computer name, language settings, the OS version, CPU information, and time elapsed since system start.",T1082
|
| KEYPLUG can decode its configuration file to determine C2 protocols.,T1140
|
| KEYPLUG can obtain the current tick count of an infected computer.,T1124
|
| KEYPLUG can use TLS-encrypted WebSocket Protocol (WSS) for C2.,T1573.002
|
| KGH_SPY can perform keylogging by polling the GetAsyncKeyState() function.,T1056.001
|
| "KGH_SPY can save collected system information to a file named ""info"" before exfiltration.",T1074.001
|
| KGH_SPY has the ability to set the HKCU\Environment\UserInitMprLogonScript Registry key to execute logon scripts.,T1037.001
|
| "KONNI can gather the OS version, architecture information, hostname, and RAM size information from the victim's machine and has used cmd /c systeminfo command to get a snapshot of the current system state of the target machine.",T1082
|
| "KONNI has bypassed UAC by performing token impersonation as well as an RPC-based method, this included bypassing UAC set to ""AlwaysNotify"".",T1548.002
|
| "KONNI has created a shortcut called ""Anti virus service.lnk"" in an apparent attempt to masquerade as a legitimate file.",T1036.005
|
| KONNI has used net session on the victim's machine.,T1049
|
| KONNI has used the command cmd /c tasklist to get a snapshot of the current processes on the target machine.,T1057
|
| "KOPILUWAK can conduct basic network reconnaissance on the victim machine with `whoami`, to get user details.",T1033
|
| KOPILUWAK can discover logical drive information on compromised hosts.,T1680
|
| KOPILUWAK can gather information from compromised hosts.,T1005
|
| KOPILUWAK can use Arp to discover a target's network configuration setttings.,T1016
|
| KOPILUWAK had used Javascript to perform its core functions.,T1059.007
|
| KOPILUWAK has been delivered to victims as a malicious email attachment.,T1566.001
|
| KOPILUWAK has exfiltrated collected data to its C2 via POST requests.,T1041
|
| KOPILUWAK has gained execution through malicious attachments.,T1204.002
|
| KOPILUWAK has piped the results from executed C2 commands to `%TEMP%\result2.dat` on the local machine.,T1074.001
|
| KOPILUWAK has used HTTP POST requests to send data to C2.,T1071.001
|
| Kapeka can identify system proxy settings via `WinHttpGetIEProxyConfigForCurrentUser()` during initialization and utilize these settings for subsequent command and control operations.,T1090
|
| "Kapeka masquerades as a Microsoft Word Add-In file, with the extension `.wll`, but is a malicious DLL file.",T1036.008
|
| Kapeka utilizes JSON objects to send and receive information from command and control nodes.,T1132.001
|
| Kapeka utilizes WinAPI calls and registry queries to gather system information.,T1082
|
| Kasidet has the ability to change firewall settings to allow a plug-in to be downloaded.,T1686
|
| Kazuar obtains a list of running processes through WMI querying and the ps command.,T1057
|
| Kerrdown can use DLL side-loading to load malicious DLLs.,T1574.001
|
| Kessel has trojanized the ssh_login and user-auth_pubkey functions to steal plaintext credentials.,T1556
|
| "KeyBoy can gather extended system information, such as information about the operating system and memory.",T1082
|
| "KeyBoy issues the command reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"" to achieve persistence.",T1547.004
|
| KeyBoy uses -w Hidden to conceal a PowerShell window that downloads a payload.,T1564.003
|
| "KillDisk deletes Application, Security, Setup, and System Windows Event Logs.",T1685.005
|
| "KillDisk has attempted to get the access token of a process by calling OpenProcessToken. If KillDisk gets the access token, then it attempt to modify the token privileges with AdjustTokenPrivileges.",T1134
|
| KillDisk has called GetCurrentProcess.,T1057
|
| KillDisk retrieves the hard disk name by calling the CreateFileA to \\.\PHYSICALDRIVE0 API.,T1680
|
| Kinsing has used a script to parse files like /etc/hosts and SSH known_hosts to discover remote systems.,T1018
|
| Koadic has used the command Powershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -WindowStyle Hidden to hide its window.,T1564.003
|
| "Kobalos can modify timestamps of replaced files, such as ssh with the added credential stealer or sshd used to deploy Kobalos.",T1070.006
|
| Kobalos can write captured SSH connection credentials to a file under the /var/run directory with a .pid extension for exfiltration.,T1074
|
| "Kwampirs collects OS version information such as registered owner details, manufacturer details, processor type, available storage, installed patches, hostname, version info, system date, and other system information by using the commands systeminfo, net config workstation, hostname, ver, set, and date /t.",T1082
|
| Kwampirs collects a list of accounts with the command net users.,T1087.001
|
| Kwampirs collects a list of domain groups with the command net localgroup /domain.,T1069.002
|
| "Kwampirs collects a list of files and directories in C:\ with the command dir /s /a c:\ >> ""C:\windows\TEMP\RANDOM.tmp"".",T1083
|
| Kwampirs collects a list of network shares with the command net share.,T1135
|
| Kwampirs collects a list of running services with the command tasklist /svc.,T1007
|
| "Kwampirs collects network adapter and interface information by using the commands ipconfig /all, arp -a and route print. It also collects the system's MAC address with getmac and domain configuration with net config workstation.",T1016
|
| Kwampirs collects registered owner details by using the commands systeminfo and net config workstation.,T1033
|
| "Kwampirs establishes persistence by adding a new service with the display name ""WMI Performance Adapter Extension"" in an attempt to masquerade as a legitimate WMI service.",T1036.004
|
| LAMEHUG can decode and drop a decoy file attached to spearphishing emails.,T1140
|
| LAMEHUG can enumerate network information on compromised hosts.,T1016
|
| LAMEHUG can gather process information on targeted systems.,T1057
|
| LAMEHUG can save collected data and files of interest in `C:\ProgramData\info\` to consolidate for exfiltration.,T1074.001
|
| LAMEHUG can target directories on victim machines for file collection.,T1083
|
| LAMEHUG can use SSH to transfer information to C2.,T1573.002
|
| LAMEHUG can use `cmd.exe` to display a decoy file to spearphishing victims.,T1059.003
|
| LAMEHUG can use `whoami` to enumerate the system user.,T1033
|
| LAMEHUG can use dsquery to enumerate domain user information.,T1087.002
|
| LAMEHUG can use dsquery to gather domain group information.,T1069.002
|
| LAMEHUG has been executed through victim interaction with malicious email attachments made to look like legitimate AI applications or documents.,T1204.002
|
| LAMEHUG has the ability to execute Windows commands returned from C2 to gather system information.,T1082
|
| LAMEHUG has used the Hugging Face API to query the Qwen2.5-Coder-32B-Instruct LLM to generate one-line Windows commands for the collection of system information and documents in specific folders on compromised hosts. LAMEHUG subsequently executed the returned commands and exfiltrated the collected files and information to adversary-controlled C2 servers.,T1102.002
|
| LIGHTWIRE can RC4 decrypt and Base64 decode C2 commands.,T1140
|
| LIGHTWIRE can use HTTP for C2 communications.,T1071.001
|
| LITTLELAMB.WOOLTEA can append malicious components to the `tmp/tmpmnt/bin/samba_upgrade.tar` archive inside the factory reset partition in attempt to persist post reset.,T1554
|
| LITTLELAMB.WOOLTEA can check the type of Ivanti VPN device it is running on by executing `first_run()` to identify the first four bytes of the motherboard serial number.,T1082
|
| LITTLELAMB.WOOLTEA can communicate over SSL using the private key from the Ivanti Connect Secure web server.,T1573.002
|
| LITTLELAMB.WOOLTEA can function as a stand-alone backdoor communicating over the `/tmp/clientsDownload.sock` socket.,T1095
|
| LITTLELAMB.WOOLTEA can initialize itself as a daemon to run persistently in the background.,T1543
|
| LITTLELAMB.WOOLTEA can monitor for system upgrade events by checking for the presence of `/tmp/data/root/dev`.,T1083
|
| LITTLELAMB.WOOLTEA has the ability to function as a SOCKS proxy.,T1090
|
| LODEINFO can append C2 communication with randomly generated junk data.,T1001.001
|
| LODEINFO can capture keystrokes on targeted systems.,T1056.001
|
| "LODEINFO can disover machine information including OS architecture, the ANSI code page (ACP) identifier, and hostname.",T1082
|
| LODEINFO can encrypt C2 communication with a hardcoded (NV4HDOeOVyL) Vigenere cipher key.,T1573.001
|
| LODEINFO can enumerate the MAC address of the compromised host.,T1016
|
| LODEINFO can execute commands with WMI.,T1047
|
| "LODEINFO can halt execution if the ""en_US"" locale is identified on a victim's machine.",T1480
|
| LODEINFO can identify the associated username on targeted machines.,T1033
|
| LODEINFO can incorporate a ransom command to encrypt specified files and folders.,T1486
|
| "LODEINFO can looks for the ""en_US"" locale on the victim's machine.",T1614.001
|
| LODEINFO can upload files from infected hosts to the C2.,T1005
|
| LODEINFO can use legitimate EXE files to sideload malicious DLLs.,T1574.001
|
| LODEINFO has been executed via victims opening malicious email attachments.,T1204.002
|
| LODEINFO has inserted junk code to obstruct code analysis.,T1027.016
|
| LODEINFO has the ability to designate specific files and folders to encryption.,T1083
|
| LODEINFO has the ability to download additional files from the C2.,T1105
|
| LODEINFO has the ability to take screenshots.,T1113
|
| LODEINFO has used control flow flattening to obfuscate code.,T1027
|
| LP-Notes has decrypted strings with lengths ranging from 15 to 19 characters using the same decryption key for each string.,T1140
|
| LP-Notes has displayed a fake Windows Security dialog box to prompt for Windows credentials.,T1056.002
|
| LP-Notes has encrypted collected credentials using AES-CBC from the CNG API and the key ED15C8344B45DAED1E0578F8BC1A32411812C61F4CB45D89B107287DE0E09FFC and the initialization vector 91A4E6F6D51DAEE773A8F00279792578.,T1560
|
| LP-Notes has impersonated the security context of the taskhostw.exe process via the `ImpersonateLoggedOnUser` API.,T1134.001
|
| LP-Notes has searched for the process taskhostw.exe.,T1057
|
| LP-Notes has stored collected credentials in ` C:\Users\Public\Downloads\lp-notes.txt`.,T1074.001
|
| LP-Notes has used a custom addition-based function and a string stacking function for string encryption.,T1027.013
|
| LP-Notes has used stolen Windows credentials to log in as the users.,T1078
|
| "LP-Notes has used the `ImpersonateLoggedOnUser` API to impersonate the security context of the taskhostw.exe process. Additionally, LP-Notes has also used the `CredUIPromptForWindowsCredentialsW` API to obtain Windows credentials.",T1106
|
| LaZagne can use the `/maps` and `/mem` files to identify regex patterns to dump cleartext passwords from the browser's process memory.,T1003.007
|
| Lateral movement can be done with Net through net use commands to connect to the on remote systems.,T1021.002
|
| Latrodectus can collect desktop filenames.,T1083
|
| Latrodectus can create scheduled tasks for persistence.,T1053.005
|
| Latrodectus can delete itself while its process is still running through the use of an alternate data stream.,T1564.004
|
| "Latrodectus can determine if it is running in a virtualized environment by checking the OS version, checking the number of running processes, ensuring a 64-bit application is running on a 64-bit host, and checking if the host has a valid MAC address.",T1497.001
|
| Latrodectus can discover the IP and MAC address of a targeted host.,T1016
|
| Latrodectus can discover the username of an infected host.,T1033
|
| "Latrodectus can download and execute PEs, DLLs, and shellcode from C2.",T1105
|
| Latrodectus can gather operating system information.,T1082
|
| "Latrodectus can identify domain groups through `cmd.exe /c net group ""Domain Admins"" /domain`.",T1069.002
|
| Latrodectus can resolve Windows APIs dynamically by hash.,T1027.007
|
| "Latrodectus can run `C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe /c net group ""Domain Admins"" /domain` to identify domain administrator accounts.",T1087.002
|
| Latrodectus can run `C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe /c net view /all` to discover network shares.,T1135
|
| Latrodectus can run `C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe /c nltest /domain_trusts` to discover domain trusts.,T1482
|
| Latrodectus can send RC4 encrypted data over C2 channels.,T1573.001
|
| Latrodectus can send registration information to C2 via HTTP `POST`.,T1071.001
|
| Latrodectus can use rundll32.exe to execute downloaded DLLs.,T1218.011
|
| Latrodectus can use the Windows Component Object Model (COM) to set scheduled tasks.,T1559.001
|
| Latrodectus has Base64-encoded the message body of a HTTP request sent to C2.,T1132.001
|
| Latrodectus has been distributed through reply-chain phishing emails with malicious attachments.,T1566.001
|
| Latrodectus has been executed through malicious links distributed in email campaigns.,T1204.001
|
| Latrodectus has been obfuscated with a 129 byte sequence of junk data prepended to the file.,T1027.001
|
| "Latrodectus has been packed to appear as a component to Bitdefender's kernel-mode driver, TRUFOS.SYS.",T1036.005
|
| Latrodectus has the ability to check for the presence of debuggers.,T1622
|
| Latrodectus has the ability to restart compromised hosts.,T1529
|
| Latrodectus has used Google Firebase to download malicious installation scripts.,T1102
|
| Latrodectus has used JavaScript files as part its infection chain during malicious spam email campaigns.,T1059.007
|
| Latrodectus has used WMI in malicious email infection chains to facilitate the installation of remotely-hosted files.,T1047
|
| Latrodectus has used a pseudo random number generator (PRNG) algorithm and a rolling XOR key to obfuscate strings.,T1027.013
|
| Latrodectus has used a two-tiered C2 configuration with tier one nodes connecting to the victim and tier two nodes connecting to backend infrastructure.,T1104
|
| "Latrodectus has used multiple Windows API post exploitation including `GetAdaptersInfo`, `CreateToolhelp32Snapshot`, and `CreateProcessW`.",T1106
|
| LazyWiper can disable Microsoft Windows Defender Real-Time Monitoring with the `Set-MpPreference` cmdlet.,T1685
|
| LazyWiper can enumerate the hostname of the system to determine if it is a domain controller and exclude it from being wiped if so.,T1679
|
| "LazyWiper can specifically target multiple files by extension including: .rar, .tar.gz, .zip, .7z, .json, .bcp, .bak, .gho, .erf, .edb, .onepkg, .pst, and .ldiff.",T1083
|
| LazyWiper has used PowerShell to enable data destruction on targeted systems.,T1059.001
|
| LazyWiper is believed to have been generated by a large language model (LLM) due to the non-sensical comments in the code.,T1588.007
|
| "LightNeuron can store email data in files and directories specified in its configuration, such as C:\Windows\ServiceProfiles\NetworkService\appdata\Local\Temp\.",T1074.001
|
| LightNeuron gathers the victim computer name using the Win32 API call GetComputerName.,T1082
|
| LightSpy performs an in-memory keychain query via `SecItemCopyMatching()` then formats the retrieved data as a JSON blob for exfiltration.,T1555.001
|
| LightSpy uses Apple's built-in AVFoundation Framework library to access the user's camera and screen. It uses the `AVCaptureStillImage` to take a picture using the user's camera and the `AVCaptureScreen` to take a screenshot or record the user's screen for a specified period of time.,T1113
|
| LightSpy uses Apple's built-in AVFoundation Framework library to capture and manage audio recordings then transform them to JSON blobs for exfiltration.,T1123
|
| "LightSpy uses the `NSFileManager` to move, create and delete files. LightSpy can also use the assembly `bt` instruction to determine a file's executable permissions.",T1083
|
| "LightSpy's C2 communication is performed over WebSockets using the open source library SocketRocket with functionality such as, heartbeat, receiving commands, and updating command status.",T1071.001
|
| "LightSpy's second stage implant uses the `DeviceInformation` class to collect system information, including CPU usage, battery statistics, memory allocations, screen size, etc.",T1082
|
| Line Dancer can create and exfiltrate packet captures from compromised environments.,T1040
|
| Line Dancer can execute native commands in networking device command line interfaces.,T1059.008
|
| Line Dancer can gather system configuration information by running the native `show configuration` command.,T1082
|
| Line Dancer can modify the crash dump process on infected machines to skip crash dump generation and proceed directly to device reboot for both persistence and forensic evasion purposes.,T1653
|
| Line Dancer exfiltrates collected data via command and control channels.,T1041
|
| Line Dancer shellcode payloads are base64 encoded when transmitted to compromised devices.,T1140
|
| Line Runner is a persistent Lua-based web shell.,T1505.003
|
| Line Runner removes its initial ZIP delivery archive after processing the enclosed LUA script.,T1070.004
|
| "Line Runner used CVE-2024-20353 to trigger victim devices to reboot, in the process unzipping and installing the Line Dancer payload.",T1653
|
| Line Runner utilizes an HTTP-based Lua backdoor on victim machines.,T1071.001
|
| LiteDuke can create persistence by adding a shortcut in the CurrentVersion\Run Registry key.,T1547.001
|
| LitePower has the ability to list local drives.,T1680
|
| Lizar can collect the computer name from the machine.,T1082
|
| "Lizar has obfuscated the fingerprint of the victim system, the local IP address, and the Fowler-Noll-V 1 (FNV-1) hash of the local IP address using an XOR operation. The data is then sent to the C2 server.",T1027
|
| Lizar has used Python scripts (ps2x.py script and ps2p.py) to execute files on remote hosts using the Impacket library.,T1059.006
|
| Lizar has used a raw TCP connection to communicate with the C2 server.,T1095
|
| Lizar has used the Reflective DLL injection module from Github to inject itself into a process's memory.,T1620
|
| LoFiSe can collect all the files from the working directory every three hours and place them into a password-protected archive for further exfiltration.,T1119
|
| "LoFiSe can monitor the file system to identify files less than 6.4 MB in size with file extensions including .doc, .docx, .xls, .xlsx, .ppt, .pptx, .pdf, .rtf, .tif, .odt, .ods, .odp, .eml, and .msg.",T1083
|
| LoFiSe can save files to be evaluated for further exfiltration in the `C:\Programdata\Microsoft\` and `C:\windows\temp\` folders.,T1074.001
|
| LoFiSe has been executed as a file named DsNcDiag.dll through side-loading.,T1574.001
|
| LoJax has modified the Registry key 'HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\BootExecute' from 'autocheck autochk ' to 'autocheck autoche ' in order to execute its payload during Windows startup.,T1547.001
|
| LoJax has modified the Registry key 'HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\BootExecute' from 'autocheck autochk ' to 'autocheck autoche '.,T1112
|
| LockBit 2.0 can automatically terminate processes that may interfere with the encryption or file extraction processes.,T1489
|
| LockBit 2.0 can bypass UAC through creating the Registry key `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\ICM\Calibration`.,T1548.002
|
| LockBit 2.0 can create Registry keys to bypass UAC and for persistence.,T1112
|
| LockBit 2.0 can delete itself from disk after execution.,T1070.004
|
| LockBit 2.0 can determine if a running process has administrative privileges and terminate processes that interfere with encryption or exfiltration.,T1057
|
| LockBit 2.0 can disable firewall rules and anti-malware and monitoring software including Windows Defender.,T1685
|
| LockBit 2.0 can discover remote shares.,T1135
|
| LockBit 2.0 can enumerate local drive configuration.,T1680
|
| LockBit 2.0 can enumerate system information including hostname and domain information.,T1082
|
| LockBit 2.0 can execute command line arguments in a hidden window.,T1564.003
|
| LockBit 2.0 can use a Registry Run key to establish persistence at startup.,T1547.001
|
| LockBit 2.0 can use standard AES and elliptic-curve cryptography algorithms to encrypt victim data.,T1486
|
| LockBit 2.0 can use the PowerShell module `InvokeGPUpdate` to modify Group Policy.,T1059.001
|
| LockBit 2.0 can use the Windows command shell for multiple post-compromise actions on objective.,T1059.003
|
| LockBit 2.0 can use wmic.exe to delete volume shadow copies.,T1047
|
| LockBit 2.0 has the ability to delete volume shadow copies on targeted hosts.,T1490
|
| LockBit 2.0 has the ability to identify mounted external storage devices.,T1120
|
| LockBit 3.0 can Base64-encode C2 communication.,T1132.001
|
| LockBit 3.0 can attempt a CMSTP UAC bypass if it does not have administrative privileges.,T1218.003
|
| LockBit 3.0 can check heap memory parameters for indications of a debugger and stop the flow of events to the attached debugger in order to hinder dynamic analysis.,T1622
|
| LockBit 3.0 can delete itself from disk.,T1070.004
|
| LockBit 3.0 can disable security tools to evade detection including Windows Defender.,T1685
|
| LockBit 3.0 can enable automatic logon through the `SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon` Registry key.,T1547.004
|
| LockBit 3.0 can enable options for propogation through Group Policy Objects.,T1484.001
|
| "LockBit 3.0 can encrypt targeted data using the AES-256, ChaCha20, or RSA-2048 algorithms.",T1486
|
| LockBit 3.0 can enumerate local drive configuration.,T1680
|
| LockBit 3.0 can enumerate system hostname and domain.,T1082
|
| LockBit 3.0 can exclude files associated with core system functions from encryption.,T1083
|
| LockBit 3.0 can identify and terminate specific services.,T1057
|
| LockBit 3.0 can identify network shares on compromised systems.,T1135
|
| LockBit 3.0 can install system services for persistence.,T1543.003
|
| LockBit 3.0 can reboot the infected host into Safe Mode.,T1688
|
| "LockBit 3.0 can terminate targeted processes and services related to security, backup, database management, and other applications that could stop or interfere with encryption.",T1489
|
| LockBit 3.0 can use HTTP to send victim host information to C2.,T1071.001
|
| LockBit 3.0 can use PowerShell to apply Group Policy changes.,T1059.001
|
| LockBit 3.0 can use SMB for lateral movement.,T1021.002
|
| LockBit 3.0 can use a compromised local account for lateral movement.,T1078.003
|
| LockBit 3.0 has the ability to directly call native Windows API items during execution.,T1106
|
| LockBit 3.0 has the ability to discover external storage devices.,T1120
|
| "LockerGoga installation has been immediately preceded by a ""task kill"" command in order to disable anti-virus.",T1685
|
| Lokibot embedded the commands schtasks /Run /TN \Microsoft\Windows\DiskCleanup\SilentCleanup /I inside a batch script.,T1053.005
|
| "Lokibot has tricked recipients into enabling malicious macros by getting victims to click ""enable content"" in email attachments.",T1204.002
|
| Lokibot has used cmd /c commands embedded within batch scripts.,T1059.003
|
| "LookBack has a C2 proxy tool that masquerades as GUP.exe, which is software used by Notepad++.",T1036.005
|
| LookBack side loads its communications module as a DLL into the libcurl.dll loader.,T1574.001
|
| LoudMiner adds plist files with the naming format com.random_name.plist in the /Library/LaunchDaemons folder with the RunAtLoad and KeepAlive keys set to true.,T1543.004
|
| LoudMiner has encrypted DMG files.,T1027.013
|
| "LoudMiner has set the attributes of the VirtualBox directory and VBoxVmService parent directory to ""hidden"".",T1564.001
|
| LoudMiner launched the QEMU services in the /Library/LaunchDaemons/ folder using launchctl. It also uses launchctl to unload all Launch Daemons when updating to a newer version of LoudMiner.,T1569.001
|
| LoudMiner used the ps command to monitor the running processes on the system.,T1057
|
| Lucifer can clear and remove event logs.,T1685.005
|
| Lucifer can persist by setting Registry key values HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\QQMusic and HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\QQMusic.,T1547.001
|
| Lucifer has established persistence by creating the following scheduled task schtasks /create /sc minute /mo 1 /tn QQMusic ^ /tr C:Users\%USERPROFILE%\Downloads\spread.exe /F.,T1053.005
|
| Lumma Stealer has automated collection of various information including cryptocurrency wallet details.,T1119
|
| Lumma Stealer has been delivered through cracked software downloads.,T1195
|
| Lumma Stealer has been delivered through phishing emails with malicious attachments.,T1566.001
|
| "Lumma Stealer has checked for debugger strings by invoking `GetForegroundWindow` and looks for strings containing ""x32dbg"", ""x64dbg"", ""windbg"", ""ollydbg"", ""dnspy"", ""immunity debugger"", ""hyperdbg"", ""debug"", ""debugger"", ""cheat engine"", ""cheatengine"" and ""ida"".",T1622
|
| Lumma Stealer has configured a custom user data directory such as a folder within `%USERPROFILE%\AppData\Roaming` for staging data.,T1074.001
|
| Lumma Stealer has created registry keys to maintain persistence using `HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run`.,T1547.001
|
| Lumma Stealer has exfiltrated collected data over existing HTTP and HTTPS C2 channels.,T1041
|
| "Lumma Stealer has gained initial execution through victims opening malicious executable files embedded in zip archives, and MSI files within RAR files.",T1204.002
|
| Lumma Stealer has gathered various system information from victim machines.,T1082
|
| Lumma Stealer has harvested cookies from various browsers.,T1539
|
| Lumma Stealer has identified and gathered information from two-factor authentication extensions for multiple browsers.,T1217
|
| "Lumma Stealer has installed a malicious browser extension to target Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge, Opera and Brave browsers for the purpose of stealing data.",T1176.001
|
| Lumma Stealer has leveraged legitimate applications to then side-load malicious DLLs during execution.,T1574.001
|
| Lumma Stealer has taken screenshots of victim machines.,T1113
|
| Lumma Stealer has used AES-encrypted payloads contained within PowerShell scripts.,T1027.013
|
| Lumma Stealer has used HTTPS for command and control purposes.,T1573.002
|
| Lumma Stealer has used PowerShell for initial user execution and other fuctions.,T1059.001
|
| Lumma Stealer has used SmartAssembly to obfuscate .NET payloads.,T1027
|
| Lumma Stealer has used malicious Python scripts to execute payloads.,T1059.006
|
| Lumma Stealer has used mshta.exe to execute additional content.,T1218.005
|
| "Lumma Stealer has used process hollowing leveraging a legitimate program such as ""BitLockerToGo.exe"" to inject a malicious payload.",T1055.012
|
| Lumma Stealer has used reflective loading techniques to load content into memory during execution.,T1620
|
| Lumma Stealer has utilized AutoIt malware scripts and AutoIt executables.,T1059.010
|
| "Lumma Stealer has utilized the .NET `ProcessStartInfo` class features to prevent the process from creating a visible window through setting the `CreateNoWindow` setting to ""True,"" which allows the executed command or script to run without displaying a command prompt window.",T1564.003
|
| LunarLoader can use reflective loading to decrypt and run malicious executables in a new thread.,T1620
|
| LunarLoader can verify the targeted host's DNS name which is then used in the creation of a decyrption key.,T1016
|
| LunarLoader has the ability to use Microsoft Outlook add-ins to establish persistence.,T1137.006
|
| LunarMail can capture environmental variables on compromised hosts.,T1082
|
| LunarMail can capture screenshots from compromised hosts.,T1113
|
| LunarMail can create an arbitrary process with a specified command line and redirect its output to a staging directory.,T1543
|
| LunarMail can decrypt strings to retrieve configuration settings.,T1140
|
| LunarMail can delete the previously used staging directory and files on subsequent rounds of exfiltration and replace it with a new one.,T1070.004
|
| LunarMail can parse IDAT chunks from .png files to look for zlib-compressed and AES encrypted C2 commands.,T1001.002
|
| LunarMail can ping a specific C2 URL with the ID of a victim machine in the subdomain.,T1095
|
| LunarMail can search its staging directory for output files it has produced.,T1083
|
| LunarMail can set the `PR_DELETE_AFTER_SUBMIT` flag to delete messages sent for data exfiltration.,T1070.008
|
| LunarMail has been installed through a malicious macro in a Microsoft Word document.,T1204.002
|
| LunarMail has been installed using a VBA macro.,T1059.005
|
| LunarMail has used RC4 and AES to encrypt strings and its exfiltration configuration respectively.,T1027.013
|
| LunarWeb can capture information on group policy settings,T1615
|
| LunarWeb can collect user information from the targeted host.,T1033
|
| LunarWeb can create a ZIP archive with specified files and directories.,T1560.001
|
| LunarWeb can decrypt strings related to communication configuration using RC4 with a static key.,T1140
|
| LunarWeb can discover local group memberships.,T1069.001
|
| LunarWeb can identify shared resources in compromised environments.,T1135
|
| LunarWeb can list installed software on compromised systems.,T1518
|
| LunarWeb can pause for a number of hours before entering its C2 communication loop.,T1497.003
|
| LunarWeb can receive C2 commands hidden in the structure of .jpg and .gif images.,T1001.002
|
| LunarWeb can self-delete from a compromised host if safety checks of C2 connectivity fail.,T1070.004
|
| LunarWeb can send AES encrypted C2 commands.,T1573.001
|
| LunarWeb can use Base64 encoding to obfuscate C2 commands.,T1132.001
|
| LunarWeb can use WMI queries for discovery on the victim host.,T1047
|
| LunarWeb can use `POST` to send victim identification to C2 and `GET` to retrieve commands.,T1071.001
|
| LunarWeb can zlib-compress data prior to exfiltration.,T1560.002
|
| LunarWeb has run shell commands to obtain a list of installed security products.,T1518.001
|
| LunarWeb has the ability to retrieve directory listings.,T1083
|
| LunarWeb has the ability to run shell commands via PowerShell.,T1059.001
|
| LunarWeb has the ability to use a HTTP proxy server for C&C communications.,T1090
|
| LunarWeb has used shell commands to list running processes.,T1057
|
| MEDUSA is a rootkit with command execution and credential logging capabilities.,T1014
|
| MOPSLED can decrypt obfuscated configuration files.,T1140
|
| MOPSLED can encrypt configuration files with a custom ChaCha20 algorithm.,T1027.013
|
| MOPSLED can use a custom binary protocol over TCP for C2 communication.,T1095
|
| MOPSLED can use third-party web services such as GitHub and Google Drive for C2.,T1102
|
| MOPSLED has the ability to retrieve a C2 address from a dead drop URL.,T1102.001
|
| "MacMa can collect information about a compromised computer, including: Hardware UUID, Mac serial number, and macOS version.",T1082
|
| MacMa has been delivered using ad hoc Apple Developer code signing certificates.,T1553.002
|
| Mafalda can collect a Chrome encryption key used to protect browser cookies.,T1552.004
|
| Mafalda can collect files and information from a compromised host.,T1005
|
| Mafalda can collect the computer name of a compromised host.,T1082
|
| Mafalda can collect the username from a compromised host.,T1033
|
| Mafalda can conduct mouse event logging.,T1056
|
| "Mafalda can create a remote service, let it run once, and then delete it.",T1569.002
|
| Mafalda can delete Windows Event logs by invoking the `OpenEventLogW` and `ClearEventLogW` functions.,T1685.005
|
| Mafalda can download additional files onto the compromised host.,T1105
|
| Mafalda can encode data using Base64 prior to exfiltration.,T1132.001
|
| Mafalda can encrypt its C2 traffic with RC4.,T1573.001
|
| Mafalda can enumerate Registry keys with all subkeys and values.,T1012
|
| Mafalda can enumerate running processes on a machine.,T1057
|
| Mafalda can execute PowerShell commands on a compromised machine.,T1059.001
|
| Mafalda can execute shell commands using `cmd.exe`.,T1059.003
|
| Mafalda can manipulate the system registry on a compromised host.,T1112
|
| "Mafalda can search for a variety of security software programs, EDR systems, and malware analysis tools.",T1518.001
|
| Mafalda can search for debugging tools on a compromised host.,T1622
|
| Mafalda can search for files and directories.,T1083
|
| Mafalda can send network system data and files to its C2 server.,T1041
|
| Mafalda can take a screenshot of the target machine and save it to a file.,T1113
|
| Mafalda can use HTTP for C2.,T1071.001
|
| Mafalda can use `AdjustTokenPrivileges()` to elevate privileges.,T1134
|
| Mafalda can use a variety of API calls.,T1106
|
| Mafalda can use the GetExtendedTcpTable function to retrieve information about established TCP connections.,T1049
|
| Mafalda can use the `GetAdaptersInfo` function to retrieve information about network adapters and the `GetIpNetTable` function to retrieve the IPv4 to physical network address mapping table.,T1016
|
| Mafalda has been obfuscated and contains encrypted functions.,T1027.013
|
| MagicRAT allows for the execution of arbitrary commands on the victim system.,T1059.003
|
| "MagicRAT can delete files on victim systems, including itself.",T1070.004
|
| MagicRAT can download additional executable payloads that masquerade as GIF files.,T1036.008
|
| MagicRAT can persist using malicious LNK objects in the victim machine Startup folder.,T1547.001
|
| MagicRAT collects basic system information from victim machines.,T1082
|
| MagicRAT collects system network information using commands such as `ipconfig /all`.,T1016
|
| "MagicRAT stores base64 encoded command and contorl URLs in a configuraiton file, with each URL prefixed with the value `LR02DPt22R`.",T1027.013
|
| MagicRAT stores configuration data in files and file paths mimicking legitimate operating system resources.,T1036.005
|
| MailSniper can be used to obtain account names from Exchange and Office 365 using the Get-GlobalAddressList cmdlet.,T1087.003
|
| Mango can collect the machine name of a compromised system which is later used as part of a unique victim identifier.,T1082
|
| Mango can create a scheduled task to run every 32 seconds to communicate with C2 and execute received commands.,T1053.005
|
| Mango can enumerate the contents of current working or other specified directories.,T1083
|
| Mango can receive XOR-encrypted commands from C2.,T1573.001
|
| Mango can retrieve C2 commands sent in HTTP responses.,T1071.001
|
| Mango can use TLS to encrypt C2 communications.,T1573.002
|
| Mango can use its HTTP C2 channel for exfiltration.,T1041
|
| Mango contains an unused capability to block endpoint security solutions from loading user-mode code hooks via a DLL in a specified process by using the `UpdateProcThreadAttribute API` to set the `PROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_MITIGATION_POLICY` to `PROCESS_CREATION_MITIGATION_POLICY_BLOCK_NON_MICROSOFT_BINARIES_ALWAYS_ON` for an identified process.,T1685
|
| Mango has been executed through a Microsoft Word document with a malicious macro.,T1204.002
|
| Mango has the ability to use Native APIs.,T1106
|
| Manjusaka can execute arbitrary commands passed to it from the C2 controller via `cmd.exe /c`.,T1059.003
|
| Manjusaka can gather information about specific files on the victim system.,T1083
|
| Manjusaka can take screenshots of the victim desktop.,T1113
|
| Manjusaka data exfiltration takes place over HTTP channels.,T1041
|
| "Manjusaka extracts credentials from the Windows Registry associated with Premiumsoft Navicat, a utility used to facilitate access to various database types.",T1555
|
| Manjusaka gathers credentials from Chromium-based browsers.,T1555.003
|
| "Manjusaka gathers information about current network connections, local and remote addresses associated with them, and associated processes.",T1016
|
| Manjusaka has used HTTP for command and control communication.,T1071.001
|
| Manjusaka performs basic system profiling actions to fingerprint and register the victim system with the C2 controller.,T1082
|
| MarkiRAT can use the GetKeyboardLayout API to check if a compromised host's keyboard is set to Persian.,T1614.001
|
| "Matryoshka can establish persistence by adding a Scheduled Task named ""Microsoft Boost Kernel Optimization"".",T1053.005
|
| Maze has checked the language of the machine with function GetUserDefaultUILanguage and terminated execution if the language matches with an entry in the predefined list.,T1614.001
|
| "Maze has created a file named ""startup_vrun.bat"" in the Startup folder of a virtual machine to establish persistence.",T1547.001
|
| "Maze has created scheduled tasks using name variants such as ""Windows Update Security"", ""Windows Update Security Patches"", and ""Google Chrome Security Update"", to launch Maze at a specific time.",T1053.005
|
| "Maze has delivered components for its ransomware attacks using MSI files, some of which have been executed from the command-line using msiexec.",T1218.007
|
| "Maze has used the ""WNetOpenEnumW"", ""WNetEnumResourceW"", ""WNetCloseEnum"" and ""WNetAddConnection2W"" functions to enumerate the network resources on the infected machine.",T1049
|
| "Medusa Ransomware has avoided specified files, file extensions and folders to ensure successful execution of the payload and continued operations of the impacted device.",T1679
|
| Medusa Ransomware has created a new PowerShell process using the `CreateProcessA` API.,T1543.003
|
| Medusa Ransomware has discovered device uptime through `GetTickCount()`.,T1124
|
| "Medusa Ransomware has encrypted files using AES-256 encryption, which then appends the file extension "".medusa"" to encrypted files and leaves a ransomware note named ""!READ_ME_MEDUSA!!!.txt.""",T1486
|
| Medusa Ransomware has enumerated logical drives on infected hosts.,T1680
|
| Medusa Ransomware has launched PowerShell scripts for execution and defense evasion.,T1059.001
|
| Medusa Ransomware has leveraged Windows Native API functions to execute payloads.,T1106
|
| Medusa Ransomware has searched for files within the victim environment for encryption and exfiltration. Medusa Ransomware has also identified files associated with remote management services.,T1083
|
| Medusa Ransomware has used `cmd.exe` to execute command on an infected host.,T1059.003
|
| Medusa Ransomware has utilized XOR encrypted strings.,T1027.013
|
| Medusa Ransomware has utilized an encoded list of the processes that it detects and terminates.,T1057
|
| Medusa Ransomware has utilized the `ShowWindow` function to hide current window.,T1564.003
|
| MegaCortex can enable SeDebugPrivilege and adjust token privileges.,T1134
|
| MegaCortex can wipe deleted data from all drives using cipher.exe.,T1561.001
|
| MegaCortex has used .cmd scripts on the victim's system.,T1059.003
|
| MegaCortex has used rundll32.exe to load a DLL for file encryption.,T1218.011
|
| MegaCortex loads injecthelper.dll into a newly created rundll32.exe process.,T1055.001
|
| MegaCortex was used to kill endpoint security processes.,T1685
|
| "Megazord can encrypt files on targeted Windows hosts leaving them with a "".powerranges"" file extension.",T1486
|
| Megazord can ignore specified directories for encryption.,T1083
|
| Megazord can terminate a list of specified services and processes.,T1057
|
| "Megazord has the ability to print the trace, debug, error, info, and warning logs.",T1654
|
| "Metamorfo has a command to delete a Registry key it uses, \Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\notes.",T1070
|
| Metamorfo has a function to kill processes associated with defenses and can prevent certain processes from launching.,T1685
|
| "Metamorfo has configured persistence to the Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, Spotify =% APPDATA%\Spotify\Spotify.exe and used .LNK files in the startup folder to achieve persistence.",T1547.001
|
| "Metamorfo has embedded a ""vmdetect.exe"" executable to identify virtual machines at the beginning of execution.",T1497
|
| Metamorfo has side-loaded its malicious DLL file.,T1574.001
|
| Metamorfo has used cmd.exe /c to execute files.,T1059.003
|
| Meteor can attempt to uninstall Kaspersky Antivirus or remove the Kaspersky license; it can also add all files and folders related to the attack to the Windows Defender exclusion list.,T1685
|
| "Meteor can disconnect all network adapters on a compromised host using `powershell -Command ""Get-WmiObject -class Win32_NetworkAdapter | ForEach { If ($.NetEnabled) { $.Disable() } }"" > NUL`.",T1489
|
| "Meteor can use Wevtutil to remove Security, System and Application Event Viewer logs.",T1685.005
|
| MgBot can capture clipboard data.,T1115
|
| MgBot can capture input and output audio streams from infected devices.,T1123
|
| MgBot includes a module capable of stealing content from the Tencent QQ database storing user QQ message history on infected devices.,T1213.006
|
| "MgBot includes a module for establishing a process watchdog for itself, identifying if the MgBot process is still running.",T1057
|
| MgBot includes keylogger payloads focused on the QQ chat application.,T1056.001
|
| MgBot includes modules for collecting files from local systems based on a given set of properties and filenames.,T1005
|
| MgBot includes modules for collecting information on Active Directory domain accounts.,T1087.002
|
| MgBot includes modules for identifying local users and administrators on victim machines.,T1033
|
| MgBot includes modules for performing ARP scans of local connected systems.,T1018
|
| "MgBot includes modules for stealing credentials from various browsers and applications, including Chrome, Opera, Firefox, Foxmail, QQBrowser, FileZilla, and WinSCP.",T1555.003
|
| MgBot includes modules for stealing stored credentials from Outlook and Foxmail email client software.,T1555
|
| "MgBot includes modules that can steal cookies from Firefox, Chrome, and Edge web browsers.",T1539
|
| MimiPenguin can use the `/maps` and `/mem` file to search for regex patterns and dump the process memory.,T1003.007
|
| Mimikatz's CRYPTO::Extract module can extract keys by interacting with Windows cryptographic application programming interface (API) functions.,T1552.004
|
| Mimikatz's MISC::AddSid module can append any SID or user/group account to a user's SID-History. Mimikatz also utilizes SID-History Injection to expand the scope of other components such as generated Kerberos Golden Tickets and DCSync beyond a single domain.,T1134.005
|
| "Mimikatz's SEKURLSA::Pth module can impersonate a user, with only a password hash, to execute arbitrary commands.",T1550.002
|
| Mimikatz's LSADUMP::DCShadow module can be used to make AD updates by temporarily setting a computer to be a DC.,T1207
|
| Mimikatz's LSADUMP::DCSync and KERBEROS::PTT modules implement the three steps required to extract the krbtgt account hash and create/use Kerberos tickets.,T1550.003
|
| MirrorStealer can target Group Policy Preferences for credentials.,T1552.006
|
| MirrorStealer has stored stolen credentials on the local machine in `%TEMP%\31558.txt`.,T1074.001
|
| MirrorStealer has the ability to steal credentials from email clients.,T1555
|
| Mis-Type may create a file containing the results of the command cmd.exe /c ipconfig /all.,T1016
|
| Mis-Type may create a file containing the results of the command cmd.exe /c net user {Username}.,T1087.001
|
| Mispadu can enumerate the running processes on a compromised host.,T1057
|
| Mispadu can log keystrokes on the victim's machine.,T1056.001
|
| "Mispadu can run checks to verify if it is running within a virtualized environments including Hyper-V, VirtualBox or VMWare and will terminate execution if the computer name is ""JOHN-PC.""",T1497.001
|
| Mispadu can sends the collected financial data to the C2 server.,T1041
|
| Mispadu contains a copy of the OpenSSL library to encrypt C2 traffic.,T1573.002
|
| Mispadu decrypts its encrypted configuration files prior to execution.,T1140
|
| Mispadu has been installed via MSI installer.,T1218.007
|
| Mispadu has been spread via malicious links embedded in emails.,T1566.002
|
| Mispadu has obtained credentials from mail clients via NirSoft MailPassView.,T1555
|
| Mispadu has relied on users to execute malicious files in order to gain execution on victim machines.,T1204.002
|
| Mispadu has the ability to capture screenshots on compromised hosts.,T1113
|
| "Mispadu has used a variety of Windows API calls, including ShellExecute and WriteProcessMemory.",T1106
|
| Mispadu uses RunDLL32 for execution via its injector DLL.,T1218.011
|
| Mispadu uses a custom algorithm to obfuscate its internal strings and uses hardcoded keys. Mispadu also uses encoded configuration files and has encoded payloads using Base64.,T1027.013
|
| Mispadu utilizes malicious Google Chrome browser extensions to steal financial data.,T1176.001
|
| Mispadu's binary is injected into memory via `WriteProcessMemory`.,T1055
|
| Mivast creates the following Registry entry: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Micromedia.,T1547.001
|
| "Moneybird targets a common set of file types such as documents, certificates, and database files for encryption while avoiding executable, dynamic linked libraries, and similar items.",T1486
|
| Mongall can identify drives on compromised hosts.,T1680
|
| Mongall can retrieve the hostname via `gethostbyname`.,T1082
|
| MoonWind can obtain the number of drives on the victim machine.,T1680
|
| "MoonWind can obtain the victim hostname, Windows version, RAM amount, and screen resolution.",T1082
|
| Mori can read data from the Registry including from `HKLM\Software\NFC\IPA` and `HKLM\Software\NFC\`.,T1012
|
| Mosquito can modify Registry keys under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\dllname to store configuration values. Mosquito also modifies Registry keys under HKCR\CLSID\...\InprocServer32 with a path to the launcher.,T1112
|
| Mosquito establishes persistence under the Registry key HKCU\Software\Run auto_update.,T1547.001
|
| Mosquito stores configuration values under the Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\dllname.,T1027.011
|
| "Most Sakula samples maintain persistence by setting the Registry Run key SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ in the HKLM or HKCU hive, with the Registry value and file name varying by sample.",T1547.001
|
| MuddyViper has archived collected web browser data into a file named CacheDump.zip.,T1560
|
| MuddyViper has decrypted the embedded HackBrowserData tool prior to execution.,T1140
|
| MuddyViper has displayed a fake Windows Security dialog to gather credentials.,T1056.002
|
| MuddyViper has launched a reverse shell using a provided command line.,T1059
|
| MuddyViper has reflectively loaded the decrypted HackBrowserData tool in a new thread.,T1620
|
| MuddyViper has the ability to clear the Registry values in the Windows Startup folder that were previously set for persistence.,T1112
|
| MuddyViper has the ability to collect running processes.,T1057
|
| "MuddyViper has the ability to download files from the C2 server. Additionally, MuddyViper has the ability to download a file in chunks with sleep time between each chunk.",T1105
|
| "MuddyViper has the ability to encrypt C2 communication using AES-CBC using the CNG API, the key `0608101047106453101617106423101013101012101083109710108585106969`, and the initialization vector `0`.",T1573.001
|
| MuddyViper has the ability to establish persistence by creating a scheduled task named ManageOnDriveUpdater to launch itself during system startup.,T1053.005
|
| MuddyViper has the ability to relaunch itself using the `CreateProcessW` API.,T1106
|
| "MuddyViper has uploaded files to the C2 server. Additionally, MuddyViper has the ability to upload the specified file in chunks with sleep time between each chunk.",T1041
|
| MuddyViper has used HTTP GET requests over port 443 and with the WINHTTP_FLAG_SECURE set to SSL/TLS via the WinHTTP API.,T1071.001
|
| MuddyViper has used PowerShell.exe to launch a reverse shell.,T1059.001
|
| MuddyViper has used cmd.exe to launch a reverse shell.,T1059.003
|
| MultiLayer Wiper changes the original path information of deleted files to make recovery efforts more difficult.,T1565.001
|
| "MultiLayer Wiper changes timestamps of overwritten files to either 1601.1.1 for NTFS filesystems, or 1980.1.1 for all other filesystems.",T1070.006
|
| "MultiLayer Wiper contains two binaries in its resources section, MultiList and MultiWip. MultiLayer Wiper drops and executes each of these items when run, then deletes them after execution.",T1027.009
|
| "MultiLayer Wiper deletes files on network drives, but corrupts and overwrites with random data files stored locally.",T1485
|
| MultiLayer Wiper reboots the infected system following wiping and related tasks to prevent system recovery.,T1529
|
| MultiLayer Wiper removes the Volume Shadow Copy (VSS) service from infected devices along with all present shadow copies.,T1685
|
| "MultiLayer Wiper uses a batch file, remover.bat to delete malware artifacts and the batch file itself during execution.",T1070.004
|
| MultiLayer Wiper uses a batch script launched via a scheduled task to delete Windows Event Logs.,T1059.003
|
| MultiLayer Wiper wipes the boot sector of infected systems to inhibit system recovery.,T1490
|
| "NETEAGLE will decrypt resources it downloads with HTTP requests by using RC4 with the key ""ScoutEagle.""",T1573.001
|
| NETWIRE can modify the Registry to store its configuration information.,T1112
|
| "NETWIRE can use Native API including CreateProcess GetProcessById, and WriteProcessMemory.",T1106
|
| NETWIRE can use XDG Autostart Entries to establish persistence on Linux systems.,T1547.013
|
| NETWIRE has the ability to write collected data to a file created in the ./LOGS directory.,T1074.001
|
| NGLite has abused NKN infrastructure for its C2 communication.,T1090.003
|
| NGLite will initially beacon out to the NKN network via an HTTP POST over TCP 30003.,T1071.001
|
| "NGLite will use an AES encrypted channel for command and control purposes, in one case using the key WHATswrongwithUu.",T1573.001
|
| NKAbuse can take screenshots of the victim machine.,T1113
|
| NKAbuse has abused the NKN public blockchain protocol for its C2 communications.,T1090.003
|
| NKAbuse is initially installed and executed through an initial shell script.,T1059.004
|
| NKAbuse uses a Cron job to establish persistence when infecting Linux hosts.,T1053.003
|
| NOKKI can collect data from the victim and stage it in LOCALAPPDATA%\MicroSoft Updatea\uplog.tmp.,T1074.001
|
| NOKKI has established persistence by writing the payload to the Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run.,T1547.001
|
| NOOPLDR can be executed via sideloading.,T1574.001
|
| NOOPLDR can decrypt its payload prior to execution.,T1140
|
| NOOPLDR can discover the device ID and hostname from the targeted machine to use for encryption keys.,T1082
|
| NOOPLDR can hide services used to aid execution.,T1564
|
| "NOOPLDR can inject decrypted payloads into processes including wuauclt.exe., rdrleakdiag.exe, and tabcal.exe.",T1055
|
| NOOPLDR can store its payload in the Registry using a random hex string in `HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\COM3`.,T1112
|
| NOOPLDR can use control flow flattening to help hide malicious code.,T1027
|
| "NOOPLDR can use native APIs `NtProtectVirtualMemory`, `NtWriteVirtualMemory`, and `NtCreateThreadEx` to aid process injection.",T1106
|
| "NPPSPY captures credentials by recording them through an alternative network listener registered to the mpnotify.exe process, allowing for cleartext recording of logon information.",T1552
|
| NPPSPY modifies the Registry to record the malicious listener for output from the Winlogon process.,T1112
|
| NanHaiShu can change Internet Explorer settings to reduce warnings about malware activity.,T1685
|
| NanoCore can modify the victim's anti-virus.,T1685
|
| NanoCore can modify the victim's firewall.,T1686
|
| "Nebulae has created a service named ""Windows Update Agent1"" to appear legitimate.",T1036.004
|
| Nebulae has the ability to use CreateProcess to execute a process.,T1106
|
| Nebulae uses functions named StartUserModeBrowserInjection and StopUserModeBrowserInjection indicating that it's trying to imitate chrome_frame_helper.dll.,T1036.005
|
| Neo-reGeorg can be installed on compromised web servers to tunnel C2 connections.,T1505.003
|
| Neo-reGeorg can create multiple TCP connections for a single session.,T1095
|
| Neo-reGeorg can tunnel data in and out of targeted networks.,T1572
|
| Neo-reGeorg can use customized HTTP headers.,T1071.001
|
| Neo-reGeorg can use modified Base64 encoding to obfuscate communications.,T1132.002
|
| Neo-reGeorg has the ability to download files to targeted systems.,T1105
|
| Neo-reGeorg has the ability to establish a SOCKS5 proxy on a compromised web server.,T1090
|
| Neo-reGeorg is a Python-based web shell.,T1059.006
|
| Neoichor can check for Internet connectivity by contacting bing.com with the request format `bing.com?id=`.,T1016.001
|
| Net commands used with the /domain flag can be used to gather information about and manipulate user accounts on the current domain.,T1087.002
|
| Netwalker can add the following registry entry: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\{8 random characters}.,T1112
|
| Netwalker's DLL has been embedded within the PowerShell script in hex format.,T1027.009
|
| "Netwalker's PowerShell script has been obfuscated with multiple layers including base64 and hexadecimal encoding and XOR-encryption, as well as obfuscated PowerShell functions and variables.",T1027.010
|
| "New services created by RawPOS are made to appear like legitimate Windows services, with names such as ""Windows Management Help Service"", ""Microsoft Support"", and ""Windows Advanced Task Manager"".",T1036.004
|
| "NightClub can modify the Creation, Access, and Write timestamps for malicious DLLs to match those of the genuine Windows DLL user32.dll.",T1070.006
|
| "NightClub can use a file monitor to identify .lnk, .doc, .docx, .xls, .xslx, and .pdf files.",T1083
|
| NightClub can use a file monitor to steal specific files from targeted systems.,T1005
|
| NightClub can use emails for C2 communications.,T1071.003
|
| "NightClub can use multiple native APIs including `GetKeyState`, `GetForegroundWindow`, `GetWindowThreadProcessId`, and `GetKeyboardLayout`.",T1106
|
| NightClub has chosen file names to appear legitimate including EsetUpdate-0117583943.exe for its dropper.,T1036.005
|
| NightClub has created a Windows service named `WmdmPmSp` to establish persistence.,T1543.003
|
| NightClub has created a service named `WmdmPmSp` to spoof a Windows Media service.,T1036.004
|
| "NightClub has used a non-standard encoding in DNS tunneling removing any `=` from the result of base64 encoding, and replacing `/` characters with `-s` and `+` characters with `-p`.",T1132.002
|
| Nightdoor can identify the system local time information.,T1124
|
| Nightdoor can self-delete.,T1070.004
|
| Nightdoor creates a cmd.exe shell to send and receive commands from the command and control server via open pipes.,T1059.003
|
| "Nightdoor embeds code from the public `al-khaser` project, a repository that works to detect virtual machines, sandboxes, and malware analysis environments.",T1497.001
|
| Nightdoor gathers information on victim system network configuration such as MAC addresses.,T1016
|
| Nightdoor gathers information on victim system users and usernames.,T1033
|
| Nightdoor stores network configuration data in a file XOR encoded with the key value of `0x7A`.,T1140
|
| Nightdoor uses TCP and UDP communication for command and control traffic.,T1071
|
| Nightdoor uses a legitimate executable to load a malicious DLL file for installation.,T1574
|
| Ninja can XOR and AES encrypt C2 messages.,T1573.001
|
| Ninja can change or create the last access or write times.,T1070.006
|
| Ninja can configure its agent to work only in specific time frames.,T1029
|
| Ninja can encode C2 communications with a base64 algorithm using a custom alphabet.,T1132.002
|
| Ninja can enumerate processes on a targeted host.,T1057
|
| Ninja can enumerate the IP address on compromised systems.,T1016
|
| Ninja can forward TCP packets between the C2 and a remote host.,T1095
|
| Ninja can obtain the computer name and information on the OS from targeted hosts.,T1082
|
| Ninja can proxy C2 communications including to and from internal agents without internet connectivity.,T1090.001
|
| Ninja can use HTTP for C2 communications.,T1071.001
|
| Ninja can use pipes to redirect the standard input and the standard output.,T1559
|
| Ninja has compressed its data with the LZSS algorithm.,T1027.015
|
| Ninja has gained execution through victims opening malicious executable files embedded in zip archives.,T1204.002
|
| Ninja has the ability to modify headers and URL paths to hide malicious traffic in HTTP requests.,T1001
|
| Ninja has the ability to use a proxy chain with up to 255 hops when using TCP.,T1090.003
|
| Ninja has used legitimate looking filenames for its loader including update.dll and x64.dll.,T1036.005
|
| Ninja loader components can be executed through rundll32.exe.,T1218.011
|
| Ninja loaders can be side-loaded with legitimate and signed executables including the VLC.exe media player.,T1574.001
|
| "NotPetya can use PsExec, which interacts with the ADMIN$ network share to execute commands on remote systems.",T1021.002
|
| NotPetya can use valid credentials with PsExec or wmic to spread itself to remote systems.,T1078.003
|
| NotPetya uses rundll32.exe to install itself on remote systems when accessed via PsExec or wmic.,T1218.011
|
| ODAgent can Base64-decode and XOR decrypt received C2 commands.,T1140
|
| ODAgent can delete payloads and files used to pass C2 commands from remotely hosted cloud accounts.,T1070.004
|
| ODAgent can identify the current working directory.,T1083
|
| ODAgent can use an attacker-controlled OneDrive account for exfiltration.,T1567.002
|
| ODAgent can use an attacker-controlled OneDrive account to receive C2 commands and to exfiltrate files.,T1041
|
| ODAgent can use the Microsoft Graph API to access an attacker-controlled OneDrive account and retrieve payloads and backdoor commands.,T1102.002
|
| ODAgent has the ability to download and execute files on compromised systems.,T1105
|
| "OLDBAIT installs itself in %ALLUSERPROFILE%\\Application Data\Microsoft\MediaPlayer\updatewindws.exe; the directory name is missing a space and the file name is missing the letter ""o.""",T1036.005
|
| OSInfo enumerates the current network connections similar to net use .,T1049
|
| OSX/Shlayer can base64-decode and AES-decrypt downloaded payloads. Versions of OSX/Shlayer pass encrypted and password-protected code to openssl and then write the payload to the /tmp folder.,T1140
|
| "OSX/Shlayer can download payloads, and extract bytes from files. OSX/Shlayer uses the curl -fsL ""$url"" >$tmp_path command to download malicious payloads into a temporary directory.",T1105
|
| "OSX/Shlayer can use bash scripts to check the macOS version, download payloads, and extract bytes from files. OSX/Shlayer uses the command sh -c tail -c +1381... to extract bytes at an offset from a specified file. OSX/Shlayer uses the curl -fsL ""$url"" >$tmp_path command to download malicious payloads into a temporary directory.",T1059.004
|
| "OSX/Shlayer has collected the IOPlatformUUID, session UID, and the OS version using the command sw_vers -productVersion.",T1082
|
| OSX/Shlayer has used the `nohup` command to instruct executed payloads to ignore hangup signals.,T1564.011
|
| OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D can create a persistence file in the folder /Library/LaunchAgents.,T1543.001
|
| OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D can use the touch -t command to change timestamps.,T1070.006
|
| "OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D checks a number of system parameters to see if it is being run on real hardware or in a virtual machine environment, such as `sysctl hw.model` and the kernel boot time.",T1497.001
|
| OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D encrypts data sent back to the C2 using AES in CBC mode with a null initialization vector (IV) and a key sent from the server that is padded to 32 bytes.,T1573.001
|
| OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D has changed permissions of a second-stage payload to an executable via chmod.,T1222.002
|
| OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D has disguised it's true file structure as an application bundle by adding special characters to the filename and using the icon for legitimate Word documents.,T1036.008
|
| OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D has used AES in CBC mode to encrypt collected data when saving that data to disk.,T1560.003
|
| OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D uses a shell script as the main executable inside an app bundle and drops an embedded base64-encoded payload to the /tmp folder.,T1059.004
|
| Octopus achieved persistence by placing a malicious executable in the startup directory and has added the HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run key to the Registry.,T1547.001
|
| "Octopus can collect the computer name, OS version, and OS architecture information.",T1082
|
| OilBooster can Base64-decode and XOR-decrypt C2 commands taken from JSON files.,T1140
|
| OilBooster can exfiltrate files to an actor-controlled OneDrive account via the Microsoft Graph API.,T1567.002
|
| OilBooster can hide its console window upon execution through the `ShowWindow` API.,T1564.003
|
| OilBooster can identify the compromised system's username which is then used as part of a unique identifier.,T1033
|
| "OilBooster can send HTTP `GET`, `POST`, `PUT`, and `DELETE` requests to the Microsoft Graph API over port 443 for C2 communication.",T1071.001
|
| OilBooster can use an actor-controlled OneDrive account for C2 communication and exfiltration.,T1041
|
| OilBooster can use the OpenSSL library to encrypt C2 communications.,T1573.002
|
| OilBooster has the ability to execute shell commands and exfiltrate the results.,T1059.003
|
| OilBooster has used the `ShowWindow` and `CreateProcessW` APIs.,T1106
|
| "OilBooster uses the Microsoft Graph API to connect to an actor-controlled OneDrive account to download and execute files and shell commands, and to create directories to share exfiltrated data.",T1102.002
|
| OilCheck can download staged payloads from an actor-controlled infrastructure.,T1105
|
| OilCheck can upload documents from compromised hosts to a shared Microsoft Office 365 Outlook email account for exfiltration.,T1567
|
| "Older XCSSET variants use `xxd` to encode modules. Later versions pass an `xxd` or `base64` encoded blob through multiple decoding stages to reconstruct the module name, AppleScript, or shell command. For example, the initial network request uses three layers of hex decoding before executing a curl command in a shell.",T1027.013
|
| Olympic Destroyer uses the API call ChangeServiceConfigW to disable all services on the affected system.,T1489
|
| "Olympic Destroyer uses the native Windows utilities vssadmin, wbadmin, and bcdedit to delete and disable operating system recovery features such as the Windows backup catalog and Windows Automatic Repair.",T1490
|
| Olympic Destroyer will attempt to clear the System and Security event logs using wevtutil.,T1685.005
|
| "On macOS, LightSpy checks the existence of a process identification number (PID) file, `/Users/Shared/irc.pid`, to verify if LightSpy is currently running.",T1480
|
| "Once Shamoon has access to a network share, it enables the RemoteRegistry service on the target system. It will then connect to the system with RegConnectRegistryW and modify the Registry to disable UAC remote restrictions by setting SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy to 1.",T1112
|
| "Once inside a Virtual Private Cloud, Pacu can attempt to identify DirectConnect, VPN, or VPC Peering.",T1049
|
| "One TYPEFRAME variant decrypts an archive using an RC4 key, then decompresses and installs the decrypted malicious DLL module. Another variant decodes the embedded file by XORing it with the value ""0x35"".",T1140
|
| One persistence mechanism used by CozyCar is to set itself to be executed at system startup by adding a Registry value under one of the following Registry keys: HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run,T1547.001
|
| "OopsIE checks to see if the system is configured with ""Daylight"" time and checks for a specific region to be set for the timezone.",T1124
|
| OopsIE performs several anti-VM and sandbox checks on the victim's machine. One technique the group has used was to perform a WMI query SELECT FROM MSAcpi_ThermalZoneTemperature to check the temperature to see if it's running in a virtual environment.,T1497.001
|
| OutSteel attempts to download and execute Saint Bot to a statically-defined location attempting to mimic svchost: %TEMP%\\svjhost.exe.,T1036.005
|
| OutSteel can download the Saint Bot malware for follow-on execution.,T1570
|
| OutSteel was developed using the AutoIT scripting language.,T1059.010
|
| "OwaAuth captures and DES-encrypts credentials before writing the username and password to a log file, C:\log.txt.",T1056.001
|
| "OwaAuth uses the filename owaauth.dll, which is a legitimate file that normally resides in %ProgramFiles%\Microsoft\Exchange Server\ClientAccess\Owa\Auth\; the malicious file by the same name is saved in %ProgramFiles%\Microsoft\Exchange Server\ClientAccess\Owa\bin\.",T1036.005
|
| PACEMAKER can enter a loop to read `/proc/` entries every 2 seconds in order to read a target application's memory.,T1119
|
| "PACEMAKER can parse `/proc/""process_name""/cmdline` to look for the string `dswsd` within the command line.",T1083
|
| PACEMAKER can use PTRACE to attach to a targeted process to read process memory.,T1055.008
|
| PACEMAKER can use a simple bash script for execution.,T1059.004
|
| PACEMAKER has the ability to extract credentials from OS memory.,T1003.007
|
| PACEMAKER has written extracted data to `tmp/dsserver-check.statementcounters`.,T1074.001
|
| "PAKLOG has collected a timestamp to log the precise time a key was pressed, formatted as %Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S.",T1124
|
| PAKLOG has leveraged legitimate binaries to conduct DLL side-loading.,T1574.001
|
| PAKLOG has monitored and extracted clipboard contents.,T1115
|
| PAKLOG has used Windows API `SetWindowsHookExW` with `idHook` set to `WH_KEYBOARD_LL` and a custom hook procedure to support its keylogging functions.,T1106
|
| PAKLOG has used `GetForegroundWindow` to access the foreground window. PAKLOG has also captured text from the foreground windows.,T1010
|
| PAKLOG has used legitimate signed binaries such as PACLOUD.exe for follow-on execution of malicious DLLs through DLL Side-Loading.,T1553.002
|
| PAKLOG has utilized a simple encoding mechanism to encode characters in the buffer.,T1027.013
|
| PHASEJAM has blocked legitimate upgrades of Ivanti Connect Secure systems and falsely indicates a successful upgrade while operating on an older version.,T1565
|
| PHASEJAM has disabled the `cgi-server` process on Ivanti Connect Secure appliances.,T1489
|
| PHASEJAM has inserted Perl-based web shells into legitimate files that provided threat actors with remote access and code execution capabilities on the compromised network appliance.,T1505.003
|
| PHASEJAM has launched a webshell using the `MIME::Base64` module that encoded and decoded Base64 commands.,T1027.013
|
| PHASEJAM has leveraged native commands associated with the compromised network appliance to execute code.,T1059.008
|
| "PHASEJAM has modified legitimate components to enable persistence and execution, including inserting a web shell into `getComponent.cgi` and `restAuth.cgi`, modifying `DSUpgrade.pm` to block system upgrades, and overwriting `remotedebug` to execute arbitrary commands when specific parameters are provided.",T1554
|
| PHASEJAM has prevented legitimate Ivanti Connect Secure system upgrades by intercepting the upgrade command and rendering fake HTML upgrade progress bar through a function called `processUpgradeDisplay()` which allowed the compromised device to remain under the control of the adversary.,T1685.003
|
| "PHASEJAM has renamed the file `/home/bin/remotedebug` to `remotedebug.bak`, allowing the threats actors to write a malicious `/home/bin/remotedebug` shell script.",T1036.003
|
| PHASEJAM has the ability to decode Base64 commands and data.,T1140
|
| PHASEJAM has the ability to exfiltrate data from the victim appliance.,T1041
|
| PHASEJAM has the ability to upload files onto the compromised appliance.,T1105
|
| PHPsert can retrieve remote files using HTTP POST.,T1071.001
|
| PHPsert can use Base64-encoded values in C2 communications.,T1132.001
|
| "PHPsert can use multiple obfuscation techniques including XOR encoding, hexadecimal character representation, string concatenation, and randomized variable names.",T1027.013
|
| PHPsert can use the .php assert function to execute attacker-provided code and maintain persistence on targeted web servers.,T1505.003
|
| PHPsert has the ability to decode and decrypt obfuscated strings prior to execution.,T1140
|
| PHPsert has the ability to retrieve remote payloads.,T1105
|
| PITSTOP can deobfuscate base64 encoded and AES encrypted commands.,T1140
|
| "PITSTOP can listen and evaluate incoming commands on the domain socket, created by PITHOOK malware, located at `/data/runtime/cockpit/wd.fd` for a predefined magic byte sequence. PITSTOP can then duplicate the socket for further communication over TLS.",T1205.002
|
| PITSTOP can listen over the Unix domain socket located at `/data/runtime/cockpit/wd.fd`.,T1559
|
| PITSTOP has the ability to communicate over TLS.,T1573.002
|
| PITSTOP has the ability to receive shell commands over a Unix domain socket.,T1059.004
|
| PLAINTEE gains persistence by adding the Registry key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce.,T1547.001
|
| PLAINTEE performs the tasklist command to list running processes.,T1057
|
| PLAINTEE uses reg add to add a Registry Run key for persistence.,T1112
|
| PLAINTEE uses the ipconfig /all command to gather the victim's IP address.,T1016
|
| POWERSTATS can disable Microsoft Office Protected View by changing Registry keys.,T1685
|
| "POWERSTATS has created a scheduled task named ""MicrosoftEdge"" to establish persistence.",T1036.004
|
| "POWERSTATS has established persistence through a scheduled task using the command ""C:\Windows\system32\schtasks.exe"" /Create /F /SC DAILY /ST 12:00 /TN MicrosoftEdge /TR ""c:\Windows\system32\wscript.exe C:\Windows\temp\Windows.vbe"".",T1053.005
|
| POWERSTATS has used get_tasklist to discover processes on the compromised host.,T1057
|
| POWRUNER may collect active network connections by running netstat -an on a victim.,T1049
|
| POWRUNER may collect domain group information by running net group /domain or a series of other commands on a victim.,T1069.002
|
| POWRUNER may collect information about the system by running hostname and systeminfo on a victim.,T1082
|
| POWRUNER may collect process information by running tasklist on a victim.,T1057
|
| POWRUNER may collect user account information by running net user /domain or a series of other commands on a victim.,T1087.002
|
| PUBLOAD has abused legitimate executables to side-load malicious DLLs.,T1574.001
|
| PUBLOAD has acted as a stager that can download the next-stage payload from its C2 server. PUBLOAD has also delivered FDMTP as a secondary control tool and PTSOCKET for exfiltration to some infected systems.,T1105
|
| PUBLOAD has added Registry Run keys to achieve persistence using `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run`.,T1547.001
|
| PUBLOAD has been delivered as compressed files within ZIP files to victims.,T1027.015
|
| PUBLOAD has checked supported languages on the compromised system.,T1614.001
|
| PUBLOAD has collected the machine's tick count through the use of `GetTickCount`.,T1124
|
| PUBLOAD has communicated via `curl` over HTTP to identify device IP data. PUBLOAD has also utilized HTTP for a command-and-control protocol through HTTP POST. PUBLOAD has also leveraged HTTPS for C2.,T1071.001
|
| PUBLOAD has created scheduled tasks to maintain persistence with the command `schtasks.exe /F /Create /TN Microsoft_Licensing /sc minute /MO 1 /TR C:\\Users\\Public\\Libraries\...`,T1053.005
|
| PUBLOAD has decoded its payload prior to execution.,T1140
|
| PUBLOAD has identified AV products on an infected host using the following command: `WMIC /Node:localhost /Namespace:\\root\SecurityCenter2 Path AntiVirusProduct Get displayName /Format:List`.,T1518.001
|
| PUBLOAD has identified internet connectivity details through commands such as `tracert -h 5 -4 google.com` and `curl,T1016.001
|
| PUBLOAD has leveraged `tasklist` to gather running services on victim host.,T1007
|
| PUBLOAD has leveraged `wmic logicaldisk get` to map local network drives.,T1680
|
| PUBLOAD has obtained information about local networks through the `ipconfig /all` command.,T1016
|
| PUBLOAD has obtained the username from an infected host.,T1033
|
| PUBLOAD has renamed malicious files to mimic legitimate file names such as adobe_wf.exe.,T1036.005
|
| PUBLOAD has used `curl` for data exfiltration over FTP.,T1071.002
|
| PUBLOAD has used `wmic` to gather information from the victim device.,T1047
|
| PUBLOAD has used several commands executed in sequence via `cmd` in a short interval to gather software versions including querying Registry keys.,T1518
|
| PUBLOAD has used several commands executed in sequence via `cmd`.,T1059.003
|
| PUBLOAD has used utilities such as `WinRAR` to archive data prior to exfiltration.,T1560.001
|
| PUBLOAD has used valid legitimate digital signatures and certificates to evade detection.,T1553.002
|
| "PUBLOAD has used various Windows API calls during execution, when establishing persistence and defense evasion. PUBLOAD stager leveraged Windows API functions with callback including `GrayStringW`, `EnumDateFormatsA`, and `LineDDA` to bypass anti-virus monitoring. PUBLOAD has also utilized other native windows API functions with callback functions such as `EnumChildWindows` and `EnumSystemLanguageGroupsA`.",T1106
|
| "PUBLOAD has utilized environmental keying in the payload to include the victim volume serial number, computer name, username, and machine's tick count.",T1480.001
|
| PULSECHECK can check HTTP request headers for a specific backdoor key and if found will output the result of the command in the variable `HTTP_X_CMD.`,T1071.001
|
| PULSECHECK is a web shell that can enable command execution on compromised servers.,T1505.003
|
| Pacu can allowlist IP addresses in AWS GuardDuty.,T1686.001
|
| "Pacu can automatically collect data, such as CloudFormation templates, EC2 user data, AWS Inspector reports, and IAM credential reports.",T1119
|
| Pacu can create snapshots of EBS volumes and RDS instances.,T1578.001
|
| "Pacu can enumerate AWS infrastructure, such as EC2 instances.",T1580
|
| "Pacu can enumerate AWS security services, including WAF rules and GuardDuty detectors.",T1518.001
|
| "Pacu can enumerate AWS services, such as CloudTrail and CloudWatch.",T1526
|
| "Pacu can enumerate AWS storage services, such as S3 buckets and Elastic Block Store volumes.",T1619
|
| "Pacu can enumerate IAM users, roles, and groups.",T1087.004
|
| "Pacu can enumerate and download files stored in AWS storage services, such as S3 buckets.",T1530
|
| Pacu can generate SSH and API keys for AWS infrastructure and additional API keys for other IAM users.,T1098.001
|
| Pacu can retrieve secrets from the AWS Secrets Manager via the enum_secrets module.,T1555.006
|
| Pacu can run commands on EC2 instances using AWS Systems Manager Run Command.,T1651
|
| "Pacu can search for sensitive data: for example, in Code Build environment variables, EC2 user data, and Cloud Formation templates.",T1552
|
| "Pacu can set up S3 bucket notifications to trigger a malicious Lambda function when a CloudFormation template is uploaded to the bucket. It can also create Lambda functions that trigger upon the creation of users, roles, and groups.",T1546
|
| Pacu leverages the AWS CLI for its operations.,T1059.009
|
| Pacu leverages valid cloud accounts to perform most of its operations.,T1078.004
|
| Pandora can use DLL side-loading to execute malicious payloads.,T1574.001
|
| Pasam creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can retrieve information like free disk space.,T1680
|
| PcShare has been compressed with LZW algorithm.,T1027.015
|
| PcShare has been encrypted with XOR using different 32-long Base16 strings.,T1027.013
|
| Pcexter can upload files from targeted systems.,T1005
|
| Pcexter has been distributed and executed as a DLL file named Vspmsg.dll via DLL side-loading.,T1574.001
|
| Pcexter has the ability to search for files in specified directories.,T1083
|
| Penquin can execute the command code do_upload to send files to C2.,T1041
|
| Penquin can report the disk space of a compromised host to C2.,T1680
|
| Penquin can report the file system type of a compromised host to C2.,T1082
|
| "Penquin can use the command code do_vslist to send file names, size, and status to C2.",T1083
|
| "Penquin will connect to C2 only after sniffing a ""magic packet"" value in TCP or UDP packets matching specific conditions.",T1205
|
| "Pikabot can create a suspended instance of a legitimate process (e.g., ctfmon.exe), allocate memory within the suspended process corresponding to Pikabot's core module, then redirect execution flow via `SetContextThread` API so that when the thread resumes the Pikabot core module is executed.",T1055.003
|
| Pikabot can execute Windows shell commands via cmd.exe.,T1059.003
|
| "Pikabot decrypts command and control URIs using ADVobfuscator, and decrypts IP addresses and port numbers with a custom algorithm. Other versions of Pikabot decode chunks of stored stage 2 payload content in the initial payload .text section before consolidating them for further execution. Overall LunarMail is associated with multiple encoding and encryption mechanisms to obfuscate the malware's presence and avoid analysis or detection.",T1140
|
| "Pikabot further decrypts information embedded via steganography using AES-CBC with the same 32 bit key as initial XOR operations combined with the first 16 bytes of the encrypted data as an initialization vector. Other Pikabot variants include encrypted, chunked sections of the stage 2 payload in the initial loader .text section before decrypting and assembling these during execution.",T1027.009
|
| Pikabot gathers victim network information through commands such as ipconfig and ipconfig /all.,T1016
|
| Pikabot maintains persistence following system checks through the Run key in the registry.,T1547.001
|
| "Pikabot performs a variety of system checks and gathers system information, including commands such as whoami.",T1082
|
| "Pikabot performs a variety of system checks to determine if it is running in an analysis environment or sandbox, such as checking the number of processors (must be greater than two), and the amount of RAM (must be greater than 2GB).",T1497.001
|
| "Pikabot reflectively loads stored, previously encrypted components of the PE file into memory of the currently executing process to avoid writing content to disk on the executing machine.",T1620
|
| "Pikabot stops execution if the infected system language matches one of several languages, with various versions referencing: Georgian, Kazakh, Uzbek, Tajik, Russian, Ukrainian, Belarussian, and Slovenian.",T1480.001
|
| Pikabot uses base64 encoding in conjunction with symmetric encryption mechanisms to obfuscate command and control communications.,T1132.001
|
| "Pikabot uses native Windows APIs to determine if the process is being debugged and analyzed, such as `CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent`, `NtQueryInformationProcess`, `ProcessDebugPort`, and `ProcessDebugFlags`. Other Pikabot variants populate a global list of Windows API addresses from the `NTDLL` and `KERNEL32` libraries, and references these items instead of calling the API items to obfuscate execution.",T1106
|
| "Pikabot uses non-standard ports, such as 2967, 2223, and others, for HTTPS command and control communication.",T1571
|
| Pikabot will gather information concerning the Windows Domain the victim machine is a member of during execution.,T1482
|
| Pikabot will retrieve the name of the user associated with the thread under which the malware is executing.,T1087.001
|
| "Pikabot, following payload decryption, creates a process hard-coded into the dropped (e.g., WerFault.exe) and injects the decrypted core modules into it.",T1055.002
|
| Pillowmint has deleted the filepath %APPDATA%\Intel\devmonsrv.exe.,T1070.004
|
| Pillowmint has modified the Registry key HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\DRM to store a malicious payload.,T1112
|
| Pillowmint has obfuscated the AES key used for encryption.,T1027
|
| Pillowmint has stored a compressed payload in the Registry key HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\DRM.,T1027.011
|
| Pillowmint has used shellcode which reads code stored in the registry keys \REGISTRY\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\DRM using the native Windows API as well as read HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\Tcpip\Parameters\Interfaces as part of its C2.,T1012
|
| PipeMon has stored its encrypted payload in the Registry under `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Print\Components\`.,T1027.011
|
| PipeMon has used call to LoadLibrary to load its installer. PipeMon loads its modules using reflective loading or custom shellcode.,T1129
|
| PipeMon's first stage has been executed by a call to CreateProcess with the decryption password in an argument. PipeMon has used a call to LoadLibrary to load its installer.,T1106
|
| "Pisloader obfuscates files by splitting strings into smaller sub-strings and including ""garbage"" strings that are never used. The malware also uses return-oriented programming (ROP) technique and single-byte XOR to obfuscate data.",T1027
|
| "Playcrypt can avoid encrypting files with a .PLAY, .exe, .msi, .dll, .lnk, or .sys file extension.",T1083
|
| Playcrypt can use AlphaVSS to delete shadow copies.,T1490
|
| PlugX adds Run key entries in the Registry to establish persistence. PlugX has established persistence via the registry keys `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run` and `HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run`.,T1547.001
|
| PlugX can be configured to use HTTP for command and control. PlugX has also used HTTPS for C2.,T1071.001
|
| PlugX can identify removable media attached to compromised hosts.,T1120
|
| PlugX can modify the characteristics of folders to hide them from the compromised user. PlugX has also modified file attributes to hidden and system.,T1564.001
|
| PlugX decompresses and decrypts itself using the Microsoft API call RtlDecompressBuffer. PlugX has also decrypted its payloads in memory.,T1140
|
| PlugX has a module for enumerating TCP and UDP network connections and associated processes using the netstat command.,T1049
|
| PlugX has been disguised as legitimate Adobe and PotPlayer files. PlugX has also imitated legitimate software directories and file names through the creation and storage of a legitimate EXE and the malicious DLLs.,T1036.005
|
| PlugX has captured victim IP address details of the targeted machine.,T1016
|
| PlugX has collected and staged the victim's computer files for exfiltration.,T1074.001
|
| "PlugX has collected system information including OS version, processor information, RAM size, location, host name, IP, and screen size of the infected host.",T1082
|
| PlugX has copied itself to infected removable drives for propagation to other victim devices.,T1091
|
| PlugX has deleted registry keys that store data and maintained persistence.,T1070.009
|
| PlugX has exfiltrated stolen data and files to its C2 server.,T1041
|
| PlugX has identified system time through its GetSystemInfo command.,T1124
|
| PlugX has leveraged XOR encryption with the key of 123456789.,T1027.013
|
| PlugX has leveraged an initial executable disguised as a legitimate document to trick the target into opening it.,T1204.002
|
| PlugX has made calls to Windows API `CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent` and exits if it detects a debugger.,T1622
|
| "PlugX has modified local firewall rules on victim machines to enable a random, high-number listening port for subsequent access and C2 activity.",T1686
|
| PlugX has obtained the location of the victim device by leveraging `GetSystemDefaultLCID`.,T1614
|
| PlugX has the ability to execute a command on a hidden desktop.,T1564.003
|
| PlugX has the ability to gather the username from the victim's machine.,T1033
|
| PlugX has the ability to use DLL search order hijacking for installation on targeted systems. PlugX has also used DLL side-loading to evade anti-virus. PlugX has also used a legitimately signed executable to side-load a malicious payload within a DLL file.,T1574.001
|
| PlugX has the remove itself and other artifacts.,T1070.004
|
| PlugX has utilized junk code and opaque predicates in payloads to hinder analysis.,T1027.001
|
| "PoetRAT checked the size of the hard drive to determine if it was being run in a sandbox environment. In the event of sandbox detection, it would delete itself by overwriting the malware scripts with the contents of ""License.txt"" and exiting.",T1497.001
|
| PoetRAT has `pyminifier` to obfuscate scripts.,T1027.010
|
| PoetRAT has the ability to list files upon receiving the ls command from C2.,T1083
|
| "PoetRAT sent username, computer name, and the previously generated UUID in reply to a ""who"" command from C2.",T1033
|
| PolyglotDuke can store encrypted JSON configuration files in the Registry.,T1027.011
|
| PolyglotDuke can use LoadLibraryW and CreateProcess to load and execute code.,T1106
|
| Pony attachments have been delivered via compressed archive files.,T1027.015
|
| Pony has used the NetUserEnum function to enumerate local accounts.,T1087.001
|
| Pony obfuscates memory flow by adding junk instructions when executing to make analysis more difficult.,T1027.016
|
| "PoshC2 contains modules, such as Get-ComputerInfo, for enumerating common system information.",T1082
|
| "PoshC2 contains modules, such as Get-LocAdm for enumerating permission groups.",T1069.001
|
| "PoshC2 contains multiple modules for injecting into processes, such as Invoke-PSInject.",T1055
|
| PowGoop can side-load `Goopdate.dll` into `GoogleUpdate.exe`.,T1574.001
|
| PowerExchange can decode Base64-encoded files and call `WriteAllBytes` to write the files to compromised hosts.,T1105
|
| PowerExchange can decode and decrypt C2 commands received via email.,T1140
|
| PowerExchange can exfiltrate files via its email C2 channel.,T1041
|
| PowerExchange can receive and send back the results of executed C2 commands through email.,T1071.003
|
| PowerSploit has modules such as Get-NetDomainTrust and Get-NetForestTrust to enumerate domain and forest trusts.,T1482
|
| "PowerSploit has several modules that search the Windows Registry for stored credentials: Get-UnattendedInstallFile, Get-Webconfig, Get-ApplicationHost, Get-SiteListPassword, Get-CachedGPPPassword, and Get-RegistryAutoLogon.",T1552.002
|
| PowerSploit's Find-AVSignature AntivirusBypass module can be used to locate single byte anti-virus signatures.,T1027.005
|
| PowerSploit's Get-ProcessTokenGroup Privesc-PowerUp module can enumerate all SIDs associated with its current token.,T1087.001
|
| PowerSploit's Get-ProcessTokenPrivilege Privesc-PowerUp module can enumerate privileges for a given process.,T1057
|
| PowerSploit's Get-TimedScreenshot Exfiltration module can take screenshots at regular intervals.,T1113
|
| PowerSploit's Invoke-Kerberoast module can request service tickets and return crackable ticket hashes.,T1558.003
|
| PowerSploit's Invoke-TokenManipulation Exfiltration module can be used to manipulate tokens.,T1134
|
| PowerSploit's Invoke-WmiCommand CodeExecution module uses WMI to execute and retrieve the output from a PowerShell payload.,T1047
|
| PowerSploit's New-UserPersistenceOption Persistence argument can be used to establish via a Scheduled Task/Job.,T1053.005
|
| PowerSploit's New-UserPersistenceOption Persistence argument can be used to establish via the HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run Registry key.,T1547.001
|
| PowerStallion uses Microsoft OneDrive as a C2 server via a network drive mapped with net use.,T1102.002
|
| Prestige can delete the backup catalog from the target system using: `c:\Windows\System32\wbadmin.exe delete catalog -quiet` and can also delete volume shadow copies using: `\Windows\System32\vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet`.,T1490
|
| Prestige can traverse the file system to discover files to encrypt by identifying specific extensions defined in a hardcoded list.,T1083
|
| Prestige can use PowerShell for payload execution on targeted systems.,T1059.001
|
| Prestige has attempted to stop the MSSQL Windows service to ensure successful encryption using `C:\Windows\System32\net.exe stop MSSQLSERVER`.,T1489
|
| Prestige has been deployed using the Default Domain Group Policy Object from an Active Directory Domain Controller.,T1484.001
|
| Prestige has been executed on a target system through a scheduled task created by Sandworm Team using Impacket.,T1053.005
|
| Prestige has the ability to register new registry keys for a new extension handler via `HKCR\.enc` and `HKCR\enc\shell\open\command`.,T1112
|
| Prestige has used the `Wow64DisableWow64FsRedirection()` and `Wow64RevertWow64FsRedirection()` functions to disable and restore file system redirection.,T1106
|
| "Prikormka creates a directory, %USERPROFILE%\AppData\Local\SKC\, which is used to store collected log files.",T1074.001
|
| Proton kills security tools like Wireshark that are running.,T1685
|
| Proton removes logs from /var/logs and /Library/logs.,T1685.006
|
| "Proxysvc collects the OS version, country name, MAC address, computer name, and physical memory statistics.",T1082
|
| Proxysvc collects volume information for all drives on the system.,T1680
|
| "Proxysvc executes a binary on the system and logs the results into a temp file by using: cmd.exe /c "" > %temp%\PM.tmp 2>&1"".",T1059.003
|
| Proxysvc gathers product names from the Registry key: HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion ProductName and the processor description from the Registry key HKLM\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 ProcessorNameString.,T1012
|
| PsExec can leverage Windows services to escalate privileges from administrator to SYSTEM with the -s argument.,T1543.003
|
| "PsExec, a tool that has been used by adversaries, writes programs to the ADMIN$ network share to execute commands on remote systems.",T1021.002
|
| Pteranodon creates various subdirectories under %Temp%\reports\% and copies files to those subdirectories. It also creates a folder at C:\Users\\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\store to store screenshot JPEG files.,T1074.001
|
| Pupy adds itself to the startup folder or adds itself to the Registry key SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run for persistence.,T1547.001
|
| Pupy can use an XDG Autostart to establish persistence.,T1547.013
|
| "Pupy has a built-in utility command for netstat, can do net session through PowerView, and has an interactive shell which can be used to discover additional information.",T1049
|
| Pupy has a module to clear event logs with PowerShell.,T1685.005
|
| PureCrypter can decrypt downloaded resources and parse internal files to determine its settings.,T1140
|
| PureCrypter can download additional payloads for execution on the compromised host.,T1105
|
| PureCrypter can enumerate a targeted system's SerialNumber and Version.,T1082
|
| PureCrypter can enumerate processes on compromised hosts.,T1057
|
| PureCrypter can identify installed antivirus solutions.,T1518.001
|
| PureCrypter can maintain persistence with scheduled tasks.,T1053.005
|
| PureCrypter can send a TLS 1.2 encrypted infection message via Discord webhook.,T1573.002
|
| PureCrypter can set multiple Registry Run keys to establish persistence.,T1547.001
|
| PureCrypter can use AES to encrypt system information sent to the C2.,T1573.001
|
| PureCrypter has executed `Set-MpPreference -ExclusionPath` to exclude files or folders from Windows Defender scans.,T1685
|
| PureCrypter has used SmartAssembly and NET-Reactor for string encryption and control flow obfuscation.,T1027.013
|
| PyDCrypt has probed victim machines with whoami and has collected the username from the machine.,T1033
|
| QUADAGENT used the PowerShell filenames Office365DCOMCheck.ps1 and SystemDiskClean.ps1.,T1036.005
|
| QUADAGENT was likely obfuscated using `Invoke-Obfuscation`.,T1027.010
|
| QUIETCANARY can RC4 encrypt C2 communications.,T1573.001
|
| QUIETCANARY can call `System.Net.HttpWebRequest` to identify the default proxy configured on the victim computer.,T1106
|
| QUIETCANARY can execute processes in a hidden window.,T1564.003
|
| QUIETCANARY can use HTTPS for C2 communications.,T1071.001
|
| QUIETCANARY can use a custom parsing routine to decode the command codes and additional parameters from the C2 before executing them.,T1140
|
| QUIETCANARY has the ability to retrieve information from the Registry.,T1012
|
| QUIETEXIT can attempt to connect to a second hard-coded C2 if the first hard-coded C2 address fails.,T1008
|
| QUIETEXIT can establish a TCP connection as part of its initial connection to the C2.,T1095
|
| QUIETEXIT can use an inverse negotiated SSH connection as part of its C2.,T1071
|
| "QakBot can inject itself into processes including explore.exe, Iexplore.exe, Mobsync.exe., and wermgr.exe.",T1055
|
| QakBot can modify the Registry to store its configuration information in a randomly named subkey under HKCU\Software\Microsoft.,T1112
|
| QakBot can run nltest /domain_trusts /all_trusts for domain trust discovery.,T1482
|
| QakBot can store its configuration information in a randomly named subkey under HKCU\Software\Microsoft.,T1027.011
|
| "QakBot can use net config workstation, arp -a, `nslookup`, and ipconfig /all to gather network configuration information.",T1016
|
| QakBot can use net share to identify network shares for use in lateral movement.,T1135
|
| QakBot can use netstat to enumerate current network connections.,T1049
|
| QakBot has been delivered in ZIP files via HTML smuggling.,T1027.006
|
| QakBot has hidden code within Excel spreadsheets by turning the font color to white and splitting it across multiple cells.,T1027
|
| QakBot has placed its payload in hidden subdirectories.,T1564.001
|
| QakBot has the ability to modify the Registry to add its binaries to the Windows Defender exclusion list.,T1685
|
| QakBot has the ability to use DLL side-loading for execution.,T1574.001
|
| Qilin can accept a command line argument identifying specific IPs.,T1016
|
| Qilin can attempt to log on to the local computer via `LogonUserW` and use `GetLogicalDrives()` and `EnumResourceW()` for discovery.,T1106
|
| Qilin can bypass standard user access controls by using stolen tokens to launch processes at an elevated security context.,T1548.002
|
| Qilin can check `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control SystemStartOptions` to determine if a machine is running in safe mode.,T1012
|
| Qilin can configure a Winlogon registry entry.,T1547.004
|
| Qilin can define specific processes to be terminated or left alone at execution.,T1057
|
| Qilin can delete itself from infected hosts after execution.,T1070.004
|
| "Qilin can detect virtual machine environments including ESXi hosts, datacenters, and clusters within vCenter environments.",T1673
|
| "Qilin can detect whether a system is running FreeBSD, VMkernel (ESXi), Nutanix AHV, or a standard Linux distribution to enable platform-specific encryption behaviors.",T1082
|
| Qilin can employ an embedded Mimikatz module to dump LSASS memory.,T1003.001
|
| "Qilin can employ several code obfuscation methods, including renaming functions, altering control flows, and encrypting strings.",T1027.013
|
| Qilin can enable SSH access on ESXi hosts.,T1021.004
|
| Qilin can enumerate domain-connected hosts during its discovery phase.,T1018
|
| Qilin can execute `vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet` to remove volume shadow copies and can disable High Availability (HA) and Distributed Resource Scheduler (DRS) in vCenter clusters.,T1490
|
| Qilin can identify specific services for termination or to be left running at execution.,T1007
|
| Qilin can initiate a reboot of the backup server to hinder recovery.,T1529
|
| "Qilin can inject pwndll.dll, a patched DLL from the legitimate DLL WICloader.dll, into svchost.exe for continuous execution.",T1055.001
|
| Qilin can list all local users found on a targeted system.,T1087.001
|
| Qilin can run PowerShell cmdlets to discover domain groups.,T1069.002
|
| Qilin can set the wallpaper on compromised hosts to display a ransom message in each encrypted folder.,T1491.001
|
| Qilin can terminate antivirus-related processes and services.,T1685
|
| Qilin can terminate specific services on compromised hosts.,T1489
|
| Qilin can use PowerShell cmdlets to enumerate domain users.,T1087.002
|
| Qilin can use WMIC to change the Volume Shadow Copy Service (VSS) startup type to manual.,T1047
|
| Qilin can use WinSCP for the secure file transfer of the Linux ransomware binary to a targeted system.,T1071.002
|
| Qilin can use an embedded Mimikatz module for token manipulation.,T1134
|
| Qilin can use symbolic links to redirect file paths for remote and local objects and can use `chmod +x` to make its payload binary executable.,T1222
|
| Qilin can use the Splashtop remote management service (SRManager.exe) to execute the Linux ransomware binary directly on Windows systems.,T1219.002
|
| Qilin has been delivered through exploitation of exposed applications and interfaces including Citrix and RDP.,T1190
|
| Qilin has been delivered via malicious links in spearphishing emails.,T1566.002
|
| Qilin has been deployed on VMware vCenter and ESXi servers via custom PowerShell script. Qilin has also used PowerShell for discovery in vCenter and Active Directory environments.,T1059.001
|
| Qilin has been executed by luring victims into clicking links in spearphishing emails.,T1204.001
|
| Qilin has created a RunOnce autostart entry at `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceaster = %Public%\enc.exe` pointing to a dropped copy of itself in the Public folder.,T1547.001
|
| Qilin has pushed a scheduled task via a Group Policy Object for payload execution.,T1484.001
|
| Qilin has run `cmd /C PsExec -accepteula \\IP Address -c -f -h -d -i C:\Users\xxx\.exe --password PASSWORD --spread --spread-process` to execute its encryptor to target multiple network shares.,T1059.003
|
| Qilin has the ability to clear Windows Event Logs.,T1685.005
|
| Qilin has the ability to delay execution.,T1678
|
| Qilin has the ability to list network drives.,T1135
|
| Qilin has used `GetLogicalDrives()` and `EnumResourceW()` to locate mounted drives and shares.,T1680
|
| "QuasarRAT has the ability to enumerate the Wide Area Network (WAN) IP through requests to ip-api.com, freegeoip.net, or api.ipify.org observed with user-agent string `Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; rv:48.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/48.0`.",T1016
|
| "Quick Assist allows for the remote administrator to view the interactive session of the running machine, including full screen activity.",T1125
|
| "Quick Assist communicates over TCP 443 via HTTPS to a remote session server, under which RDP traffic is transferred.",T1071.001
|
| RAPIDPULSE can transfer files to and from compromised hosts.,T1105
|
| RAPIDPULSE has the ability to RC4 encrypt and base64 encode decrypted files on compromised servers prior to writing them to stdout.,T1027.013
|
| RAPIDPULSE is a web shell that is capable of arbitrary file read on targeted web servers to exfiltrate items of interest on the victim device.,T1505.003
|
| "RAPIDPULSE listens for specific HTTP query parameters in received communications. If specific parameters match, a hard-coded RC4 key is used to decrypt the HTTP query paremter hmacTime. This decrypts to a filename that is then open, read, encrypted with the same RC4 key, base64-encoded, written to standard out, then passed as a response to the HTTP request.",T1140
|
| RATANKBA gathers the victim's IP address via the ipconfig -all command.,T1016
|
| RATANKBA runs the net view /domain and net view commands.,T1018
|
| RATANKBA runs the whoami and query user commands.,T1033
|
| RATANKBA uses tasklist /svc to display running tasks.,T1007
|
| RATANKBA uses the net user command.,T1087.001
|
| "RATANKBA uses the command reg query ""HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\InternetSettings"".",T1012
|
| RCSession can be installed via DLL side-loading.,T1574.001
|
| RCSession can store its obfuscated configuration file in the Registry under `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Plus` or `HKCU\SOFTWARE\Plus`.,T1027.011
|
| RCSession can use WinSock API for communication including WSASend and WSARecv.,T1106
|
| RDAT has executed commands using cmd.exe /c.,T1059.003
|
| REPTILE can use TLS over raw TCP for secure C2.,T1573.002
|
| REPTILE has the ability to communicate with the kernel-mode component to hide files.,T1564.001
|
| REPTILE has the ability to control compromised endpoints via port knocking.,T1205.001
|
| REPTILE has used udev for persistence.,T1546.017
|
| REvil attempts to create a mutex using a hard-coded value to ensure that no other instances of itself are running on the host.,T1480.002
|
| "REvil can check the system language using GetUserDefaultUILanguage and GetSystemDefaultUILanguage. If the language is found in the list, the process terminates.",T1614.001
|
| REvil can connect to and disable the Symantec server on the victim's network.,T1685
|
| REvil can force a reboot in safe mode with networking.,T1688
|
| REvil can identify system drive information on a compromised host.,T1680
|
| "REvil can identify the username, machine name, system language, keyboard layout, and OS version on a compromised host.",T1082
|
| REvil can modify the Registry to save encryption parameters and system information.,T1112
|
| REvil can save encryption parameters and system information in the Registry.,T1027.011
|
| RGDoor executes the whoami on the victim's machine.,T1033
|
| RIFLESPINE can collect system information after installation on infected systems.,T1082
|
| RIFLESPINE can deobfuscate encrypted files prior to execution on targeted hosts.,T1140
|
| RIFLESPINE can download and execute files.,T1105
|
| RIFLESPINE can execute commands with `/bin/sh`.,T1059.004
|
| RIFLESPINE can retrieve C2 commands from an encrypted file on Google Drive then upload the results of command execution back to Google Drive.,T1102.002
|
| RIFLESPINE can stage the output from executed C2 commands to a temporary file.,T1074.001
|
| RIFLESPINE can upload results from executed C2 commands to cloud storage.,T1567.002
|
| RIFLESPINE can use HTTP `GET` and `PUT` to upload and download files.,T1071.001
|
| ROADSWEEP can decrypt embedded scripts prior to execution.,T1140
|
| ROADSWEEP can enumerate logical drives on targeted devices.,T1680
|
| ROADSWEEP can identify removable drives attached to the victim's machine.,T1120
|
| ROADSWEEP can open cmd.exe to enable command execution.,T1059.003
|
| ROADSWEEP can pipe command output to a targeted process.,T1559
|
| ROADSWEEP can use embedded scripts to remove itself from the infected host.,T1070.004
|
| "ROADSWEEP requires four command line arguments to execute correctly, otherwise it will produce a message box and halt execution.",T1480
|
| ROAMINGHOUSE can change its execution method to create a batch file in the startup folder that executes a legitimate executable if a McAfee product is detected.,T1480
|
| ROAMINGHOUSE can check for specific mouse movements and user activity before initiating malicious activity.,T1497.002
|
| ROAMINGHOUSE can identify McAfee applications on compromised hosts and change its execution method if one is detected.,T1518.001
|
| ROAMINGHOUSE can use a legitimate EXE to sideload a malicious DLL named JSFC.dll. ROAMINGHOUSE has also used ScnCfg32.exe to sideload vsodscpl.dll to enable UPPERCUT execution.,T1574.001
|
| ROAMINGHOUSE has been distributed through phishing emails containing malicious OneDrive links.,T1566.002
|
| ROAMINGHOUSE has been executed through luring victims into clicking links to download malicious ZIP files.,T1204.001
|
| ROAMINGHOUSE has been loaded as a Word Template file when victims opened a decoy document placed in `%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Templates` alongside a ROAMINGHOUSE macro.,T1137.001
|
| ROKRAT can access the HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\mssmbios\Data\SMBiosData Registry key to obtain the System manufacturer value to identify the machine type.,T1012
|
| "RTM strings, network data, configuration, and modules are encrypted with a modified RC4 algorithm.",T1027
|
| "RTM tries to add a Registry Run key under the name ""Windows Update"" to establish persistence.",T1547.001
|
| Raccoon Stealer can remove files related to use and installation.,T1070.004
|
| Raccoon Stealer checks the privileges of running processes to determine if the running user is equivalent to `NT Authority\System`.,T1087.001
|
| Raccoon Stealer collects data from victim machines based on configuration information received from command and control nodes.,T1005
|
| Raccoon Stealer collects files and directories from victim systems based on configuration data downloaded from command and control servers.,T1119
|
| "Raccoon Stealer collects passwords, cookies, and autocomplete information from various popular web browsers.",T1555.003
|
| "Raccoon Stealer collects the `Locale Name` of the infected device via `GetUserDefaultLocaleName` to determine whether the string `ru` is included, but in analyzed samples no action is taken if present.",T1614
|
| Raccoon Stealer downloads various library files enabling interaction with various data stores and structures to facilitate follow-on information theft.,T1105
|
| Raccoon Stealer dynamically links key WinApi functions during execution.,T1027.007
|
| Raccoon Stealer gathers information from repositories associated with cryptocurrency wallets and the Telegram messaging service.,T1213
|
| Raccoon Stealer gathers information on the infected system owner and user.,T1033
|
| Raccoon Stealer identifies target files and directories for collection based on a configuration file.,T1083
|
| Raccoon Stealer is capable of identifying running software on victim machines.,T1518
|
| Raccoon Stealer queries the Windows Registry to fingerprint the infected host via the `HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography\MachineGuid` key.,T1012
|
| "Raccoon Stealer uses HTTP, and particularly HTTP POST requests, for command and control actions.",T1071.001
|
| Raccoon Stealer uses RC4 encryption for strings and command and control addresses to evade static detection.,T1027.013
|
| "Raccoon Stealer uses RC4-encrypted, base64-encoded strings to obfuscate functionality and command and control servers.",T1140
|
| Raccoon Stealer will automatically collect and exfiltrate data identified in received configuration files from command and control nodes.,T1020
|
| Ragnar Locker can delete volume shadow copies using vssadmin delete shadows /all /quiet.,T1490
|
| Ragnar Locker has been delivered as an unsigned MSI package that was executed with msiexec.exe.,T1218.007
|
| RainyDay can use a file exfiltration tool to copy files to C:\ProgramData\Adobe\temp prior to exfiltration.,T1074.001
|
| RainyDay can use side-loading to run malicious executables.,T1574.001
|
| "RainyDay has named services and scheduled tasks to appear benign including ""ChromeCheck"" and ""googleupdate.""",T1036.004
|
| "Ramsay can collect Microsoft Word documents from the target's file system, as well as .txt, .doc, and .xls files from the Internet Explorer cache.",T1005
|
| Ramsay can stage data prior to exfiltration in %APPDATA%\Microsoft\UserSetting and %APPDATA%\Microsoft\UserSetting\MediaCache.,T1074.001
|
| "Ramsay can use Windows API functions such as WriteFile, CloseHandle, and GetCurrentHwProfile during its collection and file storage operations. Ramsay can execute its embedded components via CreateProcessA and ShellExecute.",T1106
|
| "RansomHub can delete events from the Security, System, and Application logs.",T1685.005
|
| RansomHub can enumerate all accessible machines from the infected system.,T1018
|
| RansomHub can reboot targeted systems into Safe Mode prior to encryption.,T1688
|
| RansomHub can retrieve information about virtual machines.,T1082
|
| RansomHub can sleep for a set number of minutes before beginning execution.,T1497.003
|
| "RansomHub can use Elliptic Curve Encryption to encrypt files on targeted systems. RansomHub can also skip content at regular intervals (ex. encrypt 1 MB, skip 3 MB) to optomize performance and enable faster encryption for large files.",T1486
|
| RansomHub can use PowerShell to delete volume shadow copies.,T1059.001
|
| RansomHub can use `cmd.exe` to execute multiple commands on infected hosts.,T1059.003
|
| RansomHub can use a provided passphrase to decrypt its configuration file.,T1140
|
| RansomHub can use a proxy to connect to remote SFTP servers.,T1090
|
| RansomHub can use credentials provided in its configuration to move laterally from the infected machine over SMBv2.,T1021.002
|
| RansomHub has placed a ransom note on comrpomised systems to warn victims and provide directions for how to retrieve data.,T1491.001
|
| RansomHub has the ability to target specific network shares for encryption.,T1135
|
| RansomHub has the ability to terminate specified services.,T1489
|
| RansomHub will terminate without proceeding to encryption if the infected machine is on a list of allowlisted machines specified in its configuration.,T1480
|
| "Raspberry Robin attempts to identify security software running on the victim machine, such as BitDefender, Avast, and Kaspersky.",T1518.001
|
| Raspberry Robin can add an exception to Microsoft Defender that excludes the entire main drive from anti-malware scanning to evade detection.,T1685
|
| Raspberry Robin can delete its initial delivery script from disk during execution.,T1070.004
|
| "Raspberry Robin can execute via LNK containing a command to run a legitimate executable, such as wmic.exe, to download a malicious Windows Installer (MSI) package.",T1047
|
| "Raspberry Robin can identify processes running on the victim machine, such as security software, during execution.",T1057
|
| "Raspberry Robin can use legitimate, signed EXE files paired with malicious DLL files to load and run malicious payloads while bypassing defenses.",T1574.001
|
| Raspberry Robin contains an embedded custom Tor network client that communicates with the primary payload via shared process memory.,T1559
|
| "Raspberry Robin contains real and fake second-stage payloads following initial execution, with the real payload only delivered if the malware determines it is not running in a virtualized environment.",T1497
|
| Raspberry Robin contains several layers of obfuscation to hide malicious code from detection and analysis.,T1140
|
| Raspberry Robin execution can rely on users directly interacting with malicious LNK files.,T1204
|
| Raspberry Robin has historically been delivered via infected USB drives containing a malicious LNK object masquerading as a legitimate folder.,T1036.008
|
| Raspberry Robin is capable of contacting the TOR network for delivering second-stage payloads.,T1071
|
| "Raspberry Robin performs a variety of system environment checks to determine if it is running in a virtualized or sandboxed environment, such as querying CPU temperature information and network card MAC address information.",T1497.001
|
| "Raspberry Robin performs several system checks as part of anti-analysis mechanisms, including querying the operating system build number, processor vendor and type, video controller, and CPU temperature.",T1082
|
| "Raspberry Robin retrieves its second stage payload in a variety of ways such as through msiexec.exe abuse, or running the curl command to download the payload to the victim's %AppData% folder.",T1105
|
| "Raspberry Robin second stage payloads can be hosted as RAR files, containing a malicious EXE and DLL, on Discord servers.",T1102
|
| "Raspberry Robin uses a RunOnce Registry key for persistence, where the key is removed after its use on reboot then re-added by the malware after it resumes execution.",T1070.009
|
| Raspberry Robin uses cmd.exe to read and execute a file stored on an infected USB device as part of initial installation.,T1059.003
|
| Raspberry Robin uses mixed-case letters for filenames and commands to evade detection.,T1027
|
| "Raspberry Robin uses rundll32 execution without any command line parameters to contact command and control infrastructure, such as IP addresses associated with Tor nodes.",T1218.011
|
| Raspberry Robin variants can be delivered via highly obfuscated Windows Script Files (WSF) for initial execution.,T1059
|
| Raspberry Robin will communicate via HTTP over port 8080 for command and control traffic.,T1571
|
| Raspberry Robin will drop a copy of itself to a subfolder in %Program Data% or %Program Data%\\Microsoft\\ to attempt privilege elevation and defense evasion if not running in Session 0.,T1574
|
| "Raspberry Robin will execute its payload prior to initializing command and control traffic by impersonating one of several legitimate program names such as dllhost.exe, regsvr32.exe, or rundll32.exe.",T1036.004
|
| "Raspberry Robin will use a Registry key to achieve persistence through reboot, setting a RunOnce key such as: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce {random value name} = ""rundll32 shell32 ShellExec_RunDLLA REGSVR /u /s ""{dropped copy path and file name}"""" .",T1547.001
|
| Raspberry Robin will use the legitimate Windows utility fodhelper.exe to run processes at elevated privileges without requiring a User Account Control prompt.,T1548.002
|
| "Reaver collects system information from the victim, including CPU speed, computer name, ANSI code page, OEM code page identifier for the OS, Microsoft Windows version, and memory information.",T1082
|
| Reaver collects volume serial number from the victim.,T1680
|
| RedLine Stealer can capture screenshots on a compromised host.,T1113
|
| RedLine Stealer can collect information about the local system.,T1082
|
| RedLine Stealer can collect information from browsers and browser extensions.,T1217
|
| RedLine Stealer can disable security software and update services.,T1685
|
| RedLine Stealer can get a list of programs on the victim device.,T1518
|
| RedLine Stealer can query the Windows Registry.,T1012
|
| RedLine Stealer has been installed via MSI Installer.,T1218.007
|
| RedLine Stealer has built in settings to not operate based on geolocation or country of the victim host.,T1480
|
| RedLine Stealer has collected data from cryptocurrency wallets and harvested credit cards details from browsers.,T1657
|
| "RedLine Stealer has collected data stored locally including chat logs and files associated with chat services such as Steam, Discord, and Telegram.",T1005
|
| RedLine Stealer has decoded its payload prior to execution.,T1140
|
| RedLine Stealer has encrypted and encoded configuration data with Base64 and XOR functions.,T1027.013
|
| "RedLine Stealer has gathered detailed information about victims' systems, such as IP addresses, and geolocation. RedLine Stealer has also checked the IP from where it was being executed and leveraged an opensource geolocation IP-lookup service.",T1614
|
| RedLine Stealer has identified installed antivirus software on the system.,T1518.001
|
| RedLine Stealer has leveraged legitimate file sharing web services to host malicious payloads.,T1102
|
| RedLine Stealer has obfuscated scripts within text files used in execution.,T1027.010
|
| "RedLine Stealer has obtained credentials from VPN services, FTP clients and Instant Messenger (IM)/Chat clients.",T1555
|
| RedLine Stealer has obtained the username from the victim's machine.,T1033
|
| RedLine Stealer has sent victim data to its C2 server or RedLine panel server.,T1041
|
| RedLine Stealer has stolen browser cookies and settings.,T1539
|
| RedLine Stealer has used both valid certificates and self-signed digital certificates to appear legitimate.,T1553.002
|
| RedLine Stealer has used obfuscation tools such as DNGuard and Boxed App to pack their code.,T1027.002
|
| RedLine Stealer has utilized HTTP for C2 communications. RedLine Stealer has also conducted C2 communications to hardcoded C2 servers over HTTPS. RedLine Stealer has leveraged SOAP protocol for C2 communications.,T1071.001
|
| RedLine Stealer malware has been executed through the download of malicious files. RedLine Stealer has also lured users to install malware with an Install Wizard interface.,T1204.002
|
| RedLine Stealer malware has leveraged Lua bytecode to perform malicious behavior.,T1059.011
|
| "RedLine Stealer malware has masqueraded as legitimate software such as ""PDF Converter Software"" which has been distributed through poisoned search engine results often resembling legitimate software lures with the combination of typo squatted domains.",T1036
|
| RegDuke can create seemingly legitimate Registry key to store its encryption key.,T1112
|
| Remcos can add itself to the Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run for persistence.,T1547.001
|
| Remcos can delete files and folders from victim machines.,T1070.004
|
| Remcos can discover running processes on compromised machines.,T1057
|
| Remcos can enumerate the username on targeted hosts.,T1033
|
| Remcos can execute VBS remotely.,T1059.005
|
| Remcos can identify the location of targeted devices.,T1614
|
| Remcos can list all windows on victim systems.,T1010
|
| Remcos can obtain Registry data from targeted systems.,T1012
|
| Remcos can serialize collected data with Protobuf.,T1132.001
|
| Remcos can set `ProcessWindowStyle.Hidden` to hide windows.,T1564.003
|
| Remcos can shutdown and restart remote devices.,T1529
|
| Remcos can use TLS to encrypt C2 communication.,T1573.002
|
| Remcos can use string encryption to hinder analysis.,T1027.013
|
| Remcos has a command to hide itself by injecting into another process.,T1055
|
| Remcos has been executed by luring victims into opening malicious email attachments including Excel files.,T1204.002
|
| Remcos has been spread through emails containing malicious documents.,T1566.001
|
| Remcos has the ability to execute JavaScript remotely.,T1059.007
|
| Remcos has used dynamic DNS domains in C2 communications.,T1568
|
| Remsec can add or remove applications or ports on the Windows firewall or disable it entirely.,T1686.003
|
| Remsec can use modules written in Lua for execution.,T1059.011
|
| Revenge RAT creates a Registry key at HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Shell to survive a system reboot.,T1547.004
|
| Revenge RAT uses the PowerShell command Reflection.Assembly to load itself into memory to aid in execution.,T1059.001
|
| "Rifdoor has added four additional bytes of data upon launching, then saved the changed version as C:\ProgramData\Initech\Initech.exe.",T1027.001
|
| Rifdoor has created a new registry entry at HKEY_CURRENT_USERS\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Graphics with a value of C:\ProgramData\Initech\Initech.exe /run.,T1547.001
|
| "Rising Sun can detect drive information, including drive type, total number of bytes on disk, total number of free bytes on disk, and name of a specified volume.",T1680
|
| Rising Sun can detect the computer name and operating system.,T1082
|
| RobbinHood disconnects all network shares from the computer with the command net use /DELETE /Y.,T1070.005
|
| RobbinHood will search for Windows services that are associated with antivirus software on the system and kill the process.,T1685
|
| "RotaJakiro executes a set of commands to collect device information, including `uname`. Another example is the `cat /etc/release | uniq` command used to collect the current OS distribution.",T1082
|
| RotaJakiro sends device and other collected data back to the C2 using the established C2 channels over TCP.,T1041
|
| RotaJakiro uses ZLIB Compression to compresses data sent to the C2 server in the `payload` section network communication packet.,T1132.001
|
| "RotaJakiro uses a custom binary protocol using a type, length, value format over TCP.",T1095
|
| RotaJakiro uses dynamically linked shared libraries (`.so` files) to execute additional functionality using `dlopen()` and `dlsym()`.,T1129
|
| "RotaJakiro uses the AES algorithm, bit shifts in a function called `rotate`, and an XOR cipher to decrypt resources required for persistence, process guarding, and file locking. It also performs this same function on encrypted stack strings and the `head` and `key` sections in the network packet structure used for C2 communications.",T1140
|
| Rover copies files from removable drives to C:\system.,T1074.001
|
| Rover persists by creating a Registry entry in HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\.,T1547.001
|
| Rover takes screenshots of the compromised system's desktop and saves them to C:\system\screenshot.bmp for exfiltration every 60 minutes.,T1113
|
| Royal can delete shadow copy backups with vssadmin.exe using the command `delete shadows /all /quiet`.,T1490
|
| Royal can enumerate IP addresses using `GetIpAddrTable`.,T1016
|
| Royal can enumerate the shared resources of a given IP addresses using the API call `NetShareEnum`.,T1135
|
| Royal can use SMB to connect to move laterally.,T1021.002
|
| Royal can use `GetCurrentProcess` to enumerate processes.,T1057
|
| Royal can use `GetLogicalDrives` to enumerate logical drives.,T1680
|
| Royal can use `GetNativeSystemInfo` to enumerate system processors.,T1082
|
| Royal can use `RmShutDown` to kill applications and services using the resources that are targeted for encryption.,T1489
|
| "Royal can use multiple APIs for discovery, communication, and execution.",T1106
|
| Rubeus can create silver tickets.,T1558.002
|
| Rubeus can forge a ticket-granting ticket.,T1558.001
|
| Rubeus can gather information about domain trusts.,T1482
|
| Rubeus can reveal the credentials of accounts that have Kerberos pre-authentication disabled through AS-REP roasting.,T1558.004
|
| Rubeus can use the `KerberosRequestorSecurityToken.GetRequest` method to request kerberoastable service tickets.,T1558.003
|
| RunningRAT adds itself to the Registry key Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run to establish persistence upon reboot.,T1547.001
|
| RunningRAT contains code to clear event logs.,T1685.005
|
| RunningRAT gathers logical drives information and volume information.,T1680
|
| RunningRAT gathers the OS version and processor information.,T1082
|
| RunningRAT kills antimalware running process.,T1685
|
| RustyWater has an obfuscated function (i.e. love_me__()) that dynamically reconstructs the string WScript.Shell using hard-coded ASCII values and the Chr() function.,T1027
|
| RustyWater has attempted to detect more than 25 antivirus and EDR tools.,T1518.001
|
| RustyWater has encoded collected data with Base64.,T1132.001
|
| RustyWater has encrypted all strings in the code using position independent XOR encryption.,T1027.013
|
| RustyWater has gathered the domain membership of the victim machine's user.,T1087.002
|
| RustyWater has gathered the victim machine's computer name.,T1082
|
| RustyWater has generated random sleep intervals between C2 communication.,T1678
|
| "RustyWater has impersonated TMCell (Altyn Asyr CJSC), the primary mobile operator in Turkmenistan, sending phishing emails with the email domain `info@tmcell`.",T1684.001
|
| "RustyWater has injected its shellcode into explorer.exe by allocating memory via `VirtualAllocEx`, then by writing the payload via `WriteProcessMemory`.",T1055.002
|
| RustyWater has registered a Vectored Exception Handler (VEH) to catch debugging efforts.,T1622
|
| "RustyWater has sent spearphishing emails with the attachment Cybersecurity.doc, which served as the primary payload for the next stage.",T1566.001
|
| "RustyWater has used `CreateObject` to instantiate a WScript.Shell Component Object Model (COM) object. Additionally, RustyWater has used `VirtualAllocEx` and `WriteProcessMemory` to inject shellcode into explorer.exe.",T1106
|
| RustyWater has used a WScript.Shell COM object to execute the CertificationKit.ini file.,T1559.001
|
| RustyWater has used the Rust request library for HTTP C2 communication.,T1071.001
|
| RustyWater has used the WriteHexToFile function to transform an embedded hex string to the payload CertificationKit.ini.,T1140
|
| Ryuk can launch icacls /grant Everyone:F /T /C /Q to delete every access-based restrictions on files and directories.,T1222.001
|
| Ryuk has attempted to adjust its token privileges to have the SeDebugPrivilege.,T1134
|
| Ryuk has called GetIpNetTable in attempt to identify all mounted drives and hosts that have Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) entries.,T1016
|
| "Ryuk has constructed legitimate appearing installation folder paths by calling GetWindowsDirectoryW and then inserting a null byte at the fourth character of the path. For Windows Vista or higher, the path would appear as C:\Users\Public.",T1036.005
|
| Ryuk has stopped services related to anti-virus.,T1685
|
| Ryuk has used vssadmin Delete Shadows /all /quiet to to delete volume shadow copies and vssadmin resize shadowstorage to force deletion of shadow copies created by third-party applications.,T1490
|
| "Ryuk has used multiple native APIs including ShellExecuteW to run executables,GetWindowsDirectoryW to create folders, and VirtualAlloc, WriteProcessMemory, and CreateRemoteThread for process injection.",T1106
|
| Ryuk has used the Windows command line to create a Registry entry under HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run to establish persistence.,T1547.001
|
| S-Type may create a .lnk file to itself that is saved in the Start menu folder. It may also create the Registry key HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ IMJPMIJ8.1{3 characters of Unique Identifier}.,T1547.001
|
| S-Type runs the command net start on a victim.,T1007
|
| SILENTTRINITY can bypass ScriptBlock logging to execute unmanaged PowerShell code from memory.,T1690
|
| "SILENTTRINITY can collect information related to a compromised host, including a list of drives.",T1680
|
| SILENTTRINITY can downgrade NTLM to capture NTLM hashes.,T1689
|
| SILENTTRINITY can insert malicious shellcode into Excel.exe using a `Microsoft.Office.Interop` object.,T1559.001
|
| SILENTTRINITY can make tokens from known credentials.,T1134.003
|
| SILENTTRINITY can run a .NET executable within the memory of a sacrificial process by loading the CLR.,T1620
|
| SILENTTRINITY's `amsiPatch.py` module can disable Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) functions.,T1685
|
| SLIGHTPULSE can base64 encode all incoming and outgoing C2 messages.,T1132.001
|
| SLIGHTPULSE can deobfuscate base64 encoded and RC4 encrypted C2 messages.,T1140
|
| SLIGHTPULSE can read files specified on the local system.,T1005
|
| SLIGHTPULSE contains functionality to execute arbitrary commands passed to it.,T1059
|
| SLIGHTPULSE has the ability to process HTTP GET requests as a normal web server and to insert logic that will read or write files or execute commands in response to HTTP POST requests.,T1071.001
|
| "SLIGHTPULSE is a web shell that can read, write, and execute files on compromised servers.",T1505.003
|
| SLOTHFULMEDIA has collected disk information from a victim machine.,T1680
|
| "SLOTHFULMEDIA has collected system name, OS version, adapter information, and memory usage from a victim machine.",T1082
|
| "SLOTHFULMEDIA has created a service on victim machines named ""TaskFrame"" to establish persistence.",T1543.003
|
| SLOWPULSE can hide malicious code in the padding regions between legitimate functions in the Pulse Secure `libdsplibs.so` file.,T1027
|
| SLOWPULSE can log credentials on compromised Pulse Secure VPNs during the `DSAuth::AceAuthServer::checkUsernamePassword`ACE-2FA authentication procedure.,T1111
|
| SLOWPULSE is applied in compromised environments through modifications to legitimate Pulse Secure files.,T1554
|
| SMOKEDHAM has added user accounts to local Admin groups.,T1098.007
|
| SMOKEDHAM has created user accounts.,T1136.001
|
| SMOKEDHAM has used net.exe user and net.exe users to enumerate local accounts on a compromised host.,T1087.001
|
| SMOKEDHAM has used reg.exe to create a Registry Run key.,T1547.001
|
| SMOKEDHAM has used whoami commands to identify system owners.,T1033
|
| SMOKEDHAM has used Powershell to download UltraVNC and ngrok from third-party file sharing sites.,T1105
|
| "SPAWNCHIMERA can persist across system upgrades by hijacking the execution flow of dspkginstall, a binary used during the system upgrade process.",T1574
|
| SPAWNCHIMERA has been compiled as a Position Independent Executable (PIE) to use a third-party library for injection.,T1574.006
|
| SPAWNCHIMERA has created SSH tunnels to facilitate C2 communications.,T1572
|
| SPAWNCHIMERA has created web shells that facilitate actions on the victim host.,T1505.003
|
| SPAWNCHIMERA has decoded a XOR encoded private key.,T1140
|
| SPAWNCHIMERA has deleted generated files and folders from victim devices.,T1070.004
|
| SPAWNCHIMERA has disabled logging and log forwarding on Ivanti devices targeting the `dslogserver` process.,T1690
|
| SPAWNCHIMERA has encoded a private key with XOR. SPAWNCHIMERA has also encrypted data to be extracted using AES encryption.,T1027.013
|
| SPAWNCHIMERA has fixed a buffer overflow vulnerability (CVE-2025-0282) by hooking the strncpy function and limiting the size to 256 to prevent other actors from leveraging the exploit. SPAWNCHIMERA has converted its process name to hexadecimal and verifies an added value which is triggered when the first byte of the source copied to the fixed strncpy function matches `0x04050203`.,T1480.002
|
| "SPAWNCHIMERA has generated RSA keys against modified files to sign the manifest file, so they appear legitimate.",T1553.002
|
| SPAWNCHIMERA has modified the Ivanti Integrity Checker Tool to evade detection.,T1685
|
| SPAWNCHIMERA has modified the boot process files within `/tmp/coreboot_fs/bin/init` to establish persistence.,T1037
|
| "SPAWNCHIMERA has monitored and filtered network traffic on compromised edge devices, allowing legitimate traffic to pass while redirecting attacker-controlled traffic to infrastructure under adversary control.",T1040
|
| SPAWNCHIMERA has searched for running processes to include web or dsmdm.,T1057
|
| SPAWNCHIMERA has searched the contents of two Python files scanner.py and scanner_legacy.py by searching for specific lines and replacing them with values that reduce their ability to track mismatches or new files.,T1059.006
|
| SPAWNCHIMERA has the ability to bind on a localhost and listen on port 8300.,T1571
|
| "SPAWNCHIMERA has used delayed execution to pause for a defined interval before performing environment discovery, repeatedly checking for specific processes, such as the `dslogserver` process, prior to continuing execution.",T1678
|
| STATICPLUGIN has leveraged naming conventions that match legitimate services to include AdobePlugins.exe.,T1036.005
|
| STATICPLUGIN has required user execution to load subsequent malicious payloads.,T1204.002
|
| STATICPLUGIN has utilized Windows COM Installer Object to download an MSI package containing files masqueraded as a BMP file.,T1559.001
|
| STEADYPULSE can URL decode key/value pairs sent over C2.,T1140
|
| STEADYPULSE can add lines to a Perl script on a targeted server to import additional Perl modules.,T1105
|
| STEADYPULSE can parse web requests made to a targeted server to determine the next stage of execution.,T1071.001
|
| STEADYPULSE can transmit URL encoded data over C2.,T1132.001
|
| STEADYPULSE is a web shell that can enable the execution of arbitrary commands on compromised web servers.,T1505.003
|
| SUNBURST collected device `UPTIME`.,T1124
|
| SUNBURST collected hostname and OS version.,T1082
|
| SUNBURST collected the registry value HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography\MachineGuid from compromised hosts.,T1012
|
| "SUNBURST had commands that allow an attacker to write or delete registry keys, and was observed stopping services by setting their HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\\service_name\\Start registry entries to value 4. It also deleted previously-created Image File Execution Options (IFEO) Debugger registry values and registry keys related to HTTP proxy to clean up traces of its activity.",T1112
|
| SUNBURST obfuscated collected system information using a FNV-1a + XOR algorithm.,T1027
|
| SUNBURST strings were compressed and encoded in Base64.,T1027.015
|
| SUNBURST used the WMI query Select From Win32_SystemDriver to retrieve a driver listing.,T1047
|
| "SUNSPOT created a copy of the SolarWinds Orion software source file with a .bk extension to backup the original content, wrote SUNBURST using the same filename but with a .tmp extension, and then moved SUNBURST using MoveFileEx to the original filename with a .cs extension so it could be compiled within Orion software.",T1565.001
|
| SUNSPOT creates a mutex using the hard-coded value ` {12d61a41-4b74-7610-a4d8-3028d2f56395}` to ensure that only one instance of itself is running.,T1480.002
|
| SUNSPOT encrypted log entries it collected with the stream cipher RC4 using a hard-coded key. It also uses AES128-CBC encrypted blobs for SUNBURST source code and data extracted from the SolarWinds Orion <MsBuild.exe process.,T1027
|
| SUNSPOT modified its security token to grants itself debugging privileges by adding SeDebugPrivilege.,T1134
|
| SUNSPOT monitored running processes for instances of MsBuild.exe by hashing the name of each running process and comparing it to the corresponding value 0x53D525. It also extracted command-line arguments and individual arguments from the running MsBuild.exe process to identify the directory path of the Orion software Visual Studio solution.,T1057
|
| SUNSPOT was identified on disk with a filename of taskhostsvc.exe and it created an encrypted log file at C:\Windows\Temp\vmware-vmdmp.log.,T1036.005
|
| SVCReady can collect a list of installed software from an infected host.,T1518
|
| SVCReady can collect data from an infected host.,T1005
|
| SVCReady can collect time zone information.,T1124
|
| SVCReady can communicate with its C2 servers via HTTP.,T1071.001
|
| SVCReady can create a scheduled task named `RecoveryExTask` to gain persistence.,T1053.005
|
| SVCReady can encrypt victim data with an RC4 cipher.,T1027
|
| SVCReady can search for the `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System` Registry key to gather system information.,T1012
|
| SVCReady can send collected data in JSON format to its C2 server.,T1041
|
| SVCReady can take a screenshot from an infected host.,T1113
|
| SVCReady can use `WMI` queries to detect the presence of a virtual machine environment.,T1047
|
| SVCReady has named a task `RecoveryExTask` as part of its persistence activity.,T1036.004
|
| SVCReady has relied on users clicking a malicious attachment delivered through spearphishing.,T1204.002
|
| "SVCReady has the ability to collect information such as computer name, computer manufacturer, BIOS, operating system, and firmware, including through the use of `systeminfo.exe`.",T1082
|
| SVCReady has the ability to download additional tools such as the RedLine Stealer to an infected host.,T1105
|
| SVCReady has used VBA macros to execute shellcode.,T1059.005
|
| SVCReady has used `rundll32.exe` for execution.,T1218.011
|
| Sagerunex can be passed a reference to an XOR-encrypted configuration file at runtime.,T1027.013
|
| "Sagerunex communicates via HTTPS, at times using a hard-coded User Agent of `Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Win32)`.",T1071.001
|
| Sagerunex finds the `explorer.exe` process after execution and uses it to change the token of its executing thread.,T1134
|
| Sagerunex gathers host information and stages it locally as a RAR file prior to exfiltration. Sagerunex stores logged data in an encrypted file located at `%TEMP%/TS_FB56.tmp` during execution.,T1074.001
|
| Sagerunex has archived collected materials in RAR format.,T1560.001
|
| Sagerunex has used VMProtect to pack and obscure itself.,T1027.002
|
| Sagerunex has used web services such as Twitter for command and control purposes.,T1102.003
|
| Sagerunex identifies the `explorer.exe` process on the executing system.,T1057
|
| Sagerunex uses HTTPS for command and control communication.,T1573.002
|
| "Sagerunex uses a ""servicemain"" function to verify its environment to ensure it can only be executed as a service, as well as the existence of a configuration file in a specified directory.",T1480
|
| Sagerunex uses a custom decryption routine to unpack itself during installation.,T1140
|
| Sagerunex uses several proxy configuration settings to ensure connectivity.,T1090
|
| Sagerunex will gather system information such as MAC and IP addresses.,T1016
|
| "Saint Bot has created a scheduled task named ""Maintenance"" to establish persistence.",T1053.005
|
| "Sakula uses DLL side-loading, typically using a digitally signed sample of Kaspersky Anti-Virus (AV) 6.0 for Windows Workstations or McAfee's Outlook Scan About Box to load malicious DLL files.",T1574.001
|
| SameCoin can alter the victim's background to display an image showing the name of Hamas's military wing.,T1491.001
|
| "SameCoin can attempt to connect to the Israel Home Front Command site, oref.org.il, which is only reachable from within Israel to verify the target's location.",T1614
|
| "SameCoin can avoid overwriting file names that contain ""desktop.ini"" and ""conf.conf.""",T1679
|
| SameCoin can copy its wiper executable to remote machines within the same Active Directory.,T1570
|
| "SameCoin can list all system files and can avoid wiping specific directories such as Program Files, Windows, and Users.",T1083
|
| SameCoin can overwrite designated files on targeted systems with random bytes.,T1485
|
| "SameCoin has named files to appear legitimate such as ""MicrosoftEdge.exe.""",T1036.005
|
| SameCoin has the ability to set a scheduled task for execution.,T1053.005
|
| SampleCheck5000 can call cmd.exe to execute C2 command line strings.,T1059.003
|
| SampleCheck5000 can download additional payloads to compromised hosts.,T1105
|
| SampleCheck5000 can gzip compress files uploaded to a shared mailbox used for C2 and exfiltration.,T1560.001
|
| SampleCheck5000 can use the Exchange Web Services API for C2 communication.,T1071.001
|
| SampleCheck5000 can use the Microsoft Office Exchange Web Services API to access an actor-controlled account and retrieve C2 commands and payloads placed in Draft messages.,T1102.002
|
| SampleCheck5000 can use the Microsoft Office Exchange Web Services API to access an actor-controlled account and retrieve files for exfiltration.,T1567
|
| Samurai can base64 encode data sent in C2 communications prior to its encryption.,T1132.001
|
| Samurai can compile and execute downloaded modules at runtime.,T1027.004
|
| Samurai can create a service at `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SvcHost` to trigger execution and maintain persistence.,T1543.003
|
| "Samurai can deliver its final payload as a compressed, encrypted and base64-encoded blob.",T1027.015
|
| Samurai can encrypt C2 communications with AES.,T1573.001
|
| Samurai can encrypt the names of requested APIs.,T1027
|
| Samurai can leverage an exfiltration module to download arbitrary files from compromised machines.,T1005
|
| Samurai can query `SOFTWARE\Microsoft\.NETFramework\policy\v2.0` for discovery.,T1012
|
| Samurai can use a .NET HTTPListener class to receive and handle HTTP POST requests.,T1071.001
|
| Samurai can use a remote command module for execution via the Windows command line.,T1059.003
|
| Samurai can use a specific module for file enumeration.,T1083
|
| Samurai has been used to deploy other malware including Ninja.,T1105
|
| Samurai has the ability to call Windows APIs.,T1106
|
| Samurai has the ability to proxy connections to specified remote IPs and ports through a a proxy module.,T1090
|
| Sardonic can communicate with actor-controlled C2 servers by using a custom little-endian binary protocol.,T1095
|
| Sardonic can encode client ID data in 32 uppercase hex characters and transfer to the actor-controlled C2 server.,T1132.001
|
| Sardonic can use a WMI event filter to invoke a command-line event consumer to gain persistence.,T1546.003
|
| Sardonic can use the `QueueUserAPC` API to execute shellcode on a compromised machine.,T1055.004
|
| Sardonic has a plugin system that can load specially made DLLs into memory and execute their functions.,T1620
|
| Sardonic has the ability to call Win32 API functions to determine if `powershell.exe` is running.,T1106
|
| Sardonic has the ability to collect data from a compromised machine to deliver to the attacker.,T1005
|
| Sardonic has the ability to collect the C:\ drive serial number from a compromised machine.,T1680
|
| "Sardonic has the ability to collect the computer name, and CPU manufacturer name from a compromised machine. Sardonic also has the ability to execute the `ver` and `systeminfo` commands.",T1082
|
| Sardonic has the ability to connect with actor-controlled C2 servers using a custom binary protocol over port 443.,T1571
|
| Sardonic has the ability to delete created WMI objects to evade detections.,T1070
|
| Sardonic has the ability to execute the `ipconfig` command.,T1016
|
| Sardonic has the ability to execute the `net start` command.,T1007
|
| Sardonic has the ability to run `cmd.exe` or other interactive processes on a compromised computer.,T1059.003
|
| Sardonic has the ability to send a random 64-byte RC4 key to communicate with actor-controlled C2 servers by using an RSA public key.,T1573.002
|
| Sardonic has the ability to upload additional malicious files to a compromised machine.,T1105
|
| Sardonic has the ability to use an RC4 key to encrypt communications to and from actor-controlled C2 servers.,T1573.001
|
| "Seasalt has masqueraded as a service called ""SaSaut"" with a display name of ""System Authorization Service"" in an apparent attempt to masquerade as a legitimate service.",T1036.004
|
| ServHelper contains a module for downloading and executing DLLs that leverages rundll32.exe.,T1218.011
|
| "ServHelper has added a user named ""supportaccount"" to the Remote Desktop Users and Administrators groups.",T1098.007
|
| ServHelper may attempt to establish persistence via the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ run key.,T1547.001
|
| ShadowPad has discovered system information including volume serial numbers.,T1680
|
| Shai-Hulud has also leveraged GitHub actions from stolen accounts in order to create a malicious Github workflow within `.github/workflows/discussion.yaml`.,T1677
|
| "Shai-Hulud has created a repository named `Shai-Hulud` under the compromised account that commits a JSON dump that contains system information, environment variables and collected secrets. Shai-Hulud has also posted stolen credentials to public GitHub repositories.",T1567.001
|
| Shai-Hulud has delayed execution of its larger payloads by forking itself into background process.,T1678
|
| Shai-Hulud has downloaded existing packages from code repositories and extracted data stored within them.,T1213.003
|
| Shai-Hulud has downloaded packages from code repositories. Shai-Hulud has also downloaded and executed the secrets-discovery tool TruffleHog to gather sensitive data.,T1105
|
| Shai-Hulud has gathered secrets from AWS Secrets and GCP Secret Manager. Shai-Hulud has also gathered data from Azure Key Vault.,T1555.006
|
| "Shai-Hulud has gathered sensitive data stored in the Node.JS file `process.env` to include credentials and API keys. Shai-Hulud has harvested credentials stored in config files and credential files in victim environments to include `~/.aws/credentials`, `application_default_credentials.json`, and `azureProfile.json`. Shai-Hulud has also targeted credentials and tokens stored in NPM files `.npmrc` and GitHub config files.",T1552.001
|
| Shai-Hulud has gathered victim system information.,T1082
|
| Shai-Hulud has inserted a new lifecycle hook to include `postinstall`. Shai-Hulud has also leveraged the NPM lifecycle hook `preinstall`.,T1546.016
|
| Shai-Hulud has leveraged compromised accounts to log into cloud services to access cloud hosted repositories.,T1078.004
|
| Shai-Hulud has modified GitHub account settings for private repositories and changed them to public.,T1098
|
| Shai-Hulud has published malicious gzip-compressed tarball (.tgz) following modification of packages within compromised accounts. Shai-Hulud has also modified packages within compromised accounts.,T1608.001
|
| Shai-Hulud has queried the AWS and GCP metadata endpoints for instances and service credentials.,T1552.005
|
| Shai-Hulud has replaced DNS configuration from `/tmp/resolved.conf` in order to gain control of network-level control within CI environments and has flushed iptables rules using `sudo iptables -F OUTPUT` and `sudo iptables -F DOCKER-USER`.,T1685
|
| Shai-Hulud has stolen access tokens and API tokens from with CI/CD pipeline solutions and repositories.,T1528
|
| Shai-Hulud has stopped `systemd-resolved` in order to manipulate DNS and firewalls.,T1543.002
|
| Shai-Hulud has suppressed NPM warnings by silently exiting through the use of the NPM success code that has a setting that all errors exit with `code 0`.,T1564.011
|
| "Shai-Hulud has suppressed victim NPM warnings using `process""exit'(0x0);` which results in having all errors exit with code 0.",T1553
|
| "Shai-Hulud has the ability to automatically collect host data, secrets, system information, and endpoints.",T1119
|
| Shai-Hulud has used JavaScript to create JSON file output and run scripts using node.js.,T1059.007
|
| "Shamoon can impersonate tokens using LogonUser, ImpersonateLoggedOnUser, and ImpersonateNamedPipeClient.",T1134.001
|
| "Shamoon creates a new service named ""ntssrv"" to execute the payload. Newer versions create the ""MaintenaceSrv"" and ""hdv_725x"" services.",T1543.003
|
| SharpDisco can hide windows using `ProcessWindowStyle.Hidden`.,T1564.003
|
| SharpDisco can identify recently opened files by using an LNK format parser to extract the original file path from LNK files found in either `%USERPROFILE%\Recent` (Windows XP) or `%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Recent` (newer Windows versions) .,T1083
|
| SharpDisco has been used to download a Python interpreter to `C:\Users\Public\WinTN\WinTN.exe` as well as other plugins from external sources.,T1105
|
| SharpDisco has dropped a plugin to monitor external drives to `C:\Users\Public\It3.exe`.,T1120
|
| SharpDisco has dropped a recent-files stealer plugin to `C:\Users\Public\WinSrcNT\It11.exe`.,T1005
|
| ShimRat has installed a registry based start-up key HKCU\Software\microsoft\windows\CurrentVersion\Run to maintain persistence should other methods fail.,T1547.001
|
| "ShimRatReporter spoofed itself as AlphaZawgyl_font.exe, a specialized Unicode font.",T1036.005
|
| ShrinkLocker calls Wevtutil to clear the Windows PowerShell and Microsoft-Windows-Powershell/Operational logs.,T1685.005
|
| ShrinkLocker can delete itself depending on various checks performed during execution.,T1070.004
|
| "ShrinkLocker can initiate a destructive payload depending on the operating system check through resizing and reformatting portions of the victim machine's disk, leading to system instability and potential data corruption.",T1485
|
| "ShrinkLocker can restart the victim system if it encounters an error during execution, and will forcibly shutdown the system following encryption to lock out victim users.",T1529
|
| ShrinkLocker checks whether the Bitlocker Drive Encryption Tools service is running.,T1057
|
| ShrinkLocker disables protectors used to secure the BitLocker encryption key on victim systems.,T1685
|
| ShrinkLocker has used Diskpart to format newly-created partitions.,T1561.002
|
| ShrinkLocker is a VisualBasic script (VBS) object that calls multiple other operating system functions during execution.,T1059.005
|
| ShrinkLocker modifies various registry keys associated with system logon and BitLocker functionality to effectively lock-out users following disk encryption.,T1112
|
| ShrinkLocker renames disk labels on victim hosts to the threat actor's email address to enable the victim to contact the threat actor for ransom negotiation.,T1491.001
|
| ShrinkLocker retrieves a system timestamp that is used in generating an encryption key.,T1124
|
| ShrinkLocker uses HTTP POST requests to communicate victim information back to the threat actor.,T1071.001
|
| ShrinkLocker uses PowerShell to disable protectors used to secure the BitLocker encryption key on victim machines and then delete the key from the system.,T1059.001
|
| ShrinkLocker uses WMI to query information about the victim operating system.,T1047
|
| "ShrinkLocker uses a subdomain on the legitimate Cloudflare resource ""trycloudflare.com"" to obfuscate the threat actor's actual address and to tunnel information sent from victim systems.",T1102
|
| ShrinkLocker uses the legitimate BitLocker application to encrypt victim files for ransom.,T1486
|
| Sibot has executed downloaded DLLs with rundll32.exe.,T1218.011
|
| Siloscape has decrypted the password of the C2 server with a simple byte by byte XOR. Siloscape also writes both an archive of Tor and the unzip binary to disk from data embedded within the payload using Visual Studio's Resource Manager.,T1140
|
| Siloscape maps the host's C drive to the container by creating a global symbolic link to the host through the calling of NtSetInformationSymbolicLink.,T1611
|
| Skidmap has checked for the existence of specific files including /usr/sbin/setenforce and /etc/selinux/config. It also has the ability to monitor the cryptocurrency miner file and process.,T1083
|
| Skidmap has created a fake rm binary to replace the legitimate Linux binary.,T1036.005
|
| Skidmap has the ability to add the public key of its handlers to the authorized_keys file to maintain persistence on an infected host.,T1098.004
|
| Skidmap has used pm.sh to download and install its main payload.,T1059.004
|
| Sliver can download additional content and files from the Sliver server to the client residing on the victim machine using the upload command.,T1105
|
| Sliver can exfiltrate files from the victim using the download command.,T1041
|
| Sliver can leverage multiple techniques to bypass User Account Control (UAC) on Windows systems.,T1548.002
|
| Sliver can utilize the Wireguard VPN protocol for command and control.,T1071
|
| Sliver has a built-in SOCKS5 proxying capability allowing for Sliver clients to proxy network traffic through other clients within a victim network.,T1090.001
|
| Sliver has a built-in `procdump` command allowing for retrieval of memory from processes such as `lsass.exe` for credential harvesting.,T1003.001
|
| Sliver has built-in functionality to launch a Powershell command prompt.,T1059.001
|
| Sliver includes functionality to retrieve source code and compile locally prior to execution in victim environments.,T1027.004
|
| "Sliver includes multiple methods to perform process injection to migrate the framework into other, potentially privileged processes on the victim machine.",T1055
|
| Sliver obfuscates configuration and other static files using native Go libraries such as `garble` and `gobfuscate` to inhibit configuration analysis and static detection.,T1027
|
| SnappyTCP connects to the command and control server via a TCP socket using HTTP.,T1071.001
|
| Snip3 can create a VBS file in startup to persist after system restarts.,T1547.001
|
| Snip3 can decode its second-stage PowerShell script prior to execution.,T1140
|
| Snip3 can download additional payloads from web services including Pastebin and top4top.,T1102
|
| Snip3 can download additional payloads to compromised systems.,T1105
|
| Snip3 can execute PowerShell scripts in a hidden window.,T1564.003
|
| Snip3 can gain execution through the download of visual basic files.,T1204.002
|
| Snip3 can obfuscate strings using junk Chinese characters.,T1027.001
|
| Snip3 can query the WMI class `Win32_ComputerSystem` to gather information.,T1047
|
| Snip3 can use RunPE to execute malicious payloads within a hollowed Windows process.,T1055.012
|
| Snip3 can use a PowerShell script for second-stage execution.,T1059.001
|
| Snip3 has been delivered to targets via downloads from malicious domains.,T1189
|
| Snip3 has been delivered to victims through e-mail links to malicious files.,T1566.002
|
| Snip3 has been delivered to victims through malicious e-mail attachments.,T1566.001
|
| Snip3 has been executed through luring victims into clicking malicious links.,T1204.001
|
| Snip3 has the ability to query `Win32_ComputerSystem` for system information.,T1082
|
| SocGholish can download additional malware to infected hosts.,T1105
|
| SocGholish can exfiltrate data directly to its C2 domain via HTTP.,T1048.003
|
| SocGholish can list processes on targeted hosts.,T1057
|
| SocGholish can profile compromised systems to identify domain trust relationships.,T1482
|
| SocGholish can send output from `whoami` to a local temp file using the naming convention `rad.tmp`.,T1074.001
|
| "SocGholish can use IP-based geolocation to limit infections to victims in North America, Europe, and a small number of Asian-Pacific nations.",T1614
|
| SocGholish can use `whoami` to obtain the username from a compromised host.,T1033
|
| SocGholish has been distributed through compromised websites with malicious content often masquerading as browser updates.,T1189
|
| SocGholish has lured victims into interacting with malicious links on compromised websites for execution.,T1204.001
|
| SocGholish has single or double Base-64 encoded references to its second-stage server URLs.,T1027.013
|
| SocGholish has the ability to enumerate system information including the victim computer name.,T1082
|
| "SocGholish has the ability to enumerate the domain name of a victim, as well as if the host is a member of an Active Directory domain.",T1016
|
| SodaMaster can check for the presence of the Registry key HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\Applications\\VMwareHostOpen.exe before proceeding to its main functionality.,T1497.001
|
| "SodaMaster has the ability to put itself to ""sleep"" for a specified time.",T1497.003
|
| Solar can Base64-encode and gzip compress C2 communications including command outputs.,T1132.001
|
| Solar can XOR encrypt C2 communications.,T1573.001
|
| Solar can automatically exfitrate files from compromised systems.,T1020
|
| "Solar can create scheduled tasks named Earth and Venus, which run every 30 and 40 seconds respectively, to support C2 and exfiltration.",T1053.005
|
| Solar can send basic information about the infected host to C2.,T1082
|
| Solar can send staged files to C2 for exfiltration.,T1041
|
| Solar has the ability to download and execute files.,T1105
|
| SombRAT can execute enum to enumerate files in storage on a compromised system.,T1083
|
| SombRAT can execute getinfo to discover the current time on a compromised host.,T1124
|
| SombRAT can execute getinfo to enumerate the computer name and OS version of a compromised system.,T1082
|
| SombRAT can execute getinfo to identify the username on a compromised host.,T1033
|
| "SombRAT can execute loadfromfile, loadfromstorage, and loadfrommem to inject a DLL from disk, storage, or memory respectively.",T1055.001
|
| SombRAT can use the getprocesslist command to enumerate processes on a compromised host.,T1057
|
| SombRAT has the ability to run cancel or closeanddeletestorage to remove all files from storage and delete the storage temp file on a compromised host.,T1070.004
|
| Some InnaputRAT variants establish persistence by modifying the Registry key HKU\\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run:%appdata%\NeutralApp\NeutralApp.exe.,T1547.001
|
| Some Sakula samples install themselves as services for persistence by calling WinExec with the net start argument.,T1543.003
|
| Some versions of Chaes stored its instructions (otherwise in a `instructions.ini` file) in the Registry.,T1027.011
|
| Some versions of DarkGate search for the hard-coded folder C:\Program Files\e Carte Bleue.,T1083
|
| Some versions of Pikabot build the final PE payload in memory to avoid writing contents to disk on the executing machine.,T1027.011
|
| "Some versions of UPPERCUT have used the hard-coded string ""this is the encrypt key"" for Blowfish encryption when communicating with a C2. Later versions have hard-coded keys uniquely for each C2 address. UPPERCUT has also used custom ChaCha20, XOR, and LZO algorithms for C2 communication.",T1573.001
|
| "SoreFang can collect the hostname, operating system configuration, and product ID on victim machines by executing Systeminfo.",T1082
|
| SoreFang can enumerate domain accounts via net.exe user /domain.,T1087.002
|
| "Spark has checked the results of the GetKeyboardLayoutList and the language name returned by GetLocaleInfoA to make sure they contain the word ""Arabic"" before executing.",T1614.001
|
| SpeakUp uses the arp -a command.,T1049
|
| SpeakUp uses the ifconfig -a command.,T1016
|
| SpeakUp uses the whoami command.,T1033
|
| Spica can archive collected documents for exfiltration.,T1560
|
| Spica can upload and download files to and from compromised hosts.,T1105
|
| Spica can use an obfuscated PowerShell command to create a scheduled task for persistence.,T1059.001
|
| Spica has created a scheduled task named `CalendarChecker` for persistence on compromised hosts.,T1036.004
|
| Spica has created a scheduled task named `CalendarChecker` to establish persistence.,T1053.005
|
| "Spica has the ability to steal cookies from Chrome, Firefox, Opera, and Edge browsers.",T1539
|
| SplatCloak has identified and disabled API callback features of Windows Defender and Kaspersky.,T1685
|
| "SplatCloak has identified drivers of AV solutions by searching for related filenames, keywords and signed certificates.",T1518.001
|
| SplatCloak has used Windows API to identify files associated with Windows Defender and Kaspersky.,T1083
|
| SplatCloak has used a revoked certificate to exploit Windows driver execution policy where certificates issued before a specific date could still load.,T1036.001
|
| SplatCloak has utilized Native Windows API calls dynamically through `ZwQuerySystemInformation`.,T1106
|
| SplatDropper has also utilized XOR encrypted payload.,T1027.013
|
| SplatDropper has created a service to execute a payload.,T1543.003
|
| SplatDropper has decoded XOR encrypted payload.,T1140
|
| SplatDropper has deleted its malicious payload and removed its own created service to avoid leaving traces of its presence on victim devices.,T1070.009
|
| "SplatDropper has leveraged hashed Windows API calls using a seed value of ""131313"".",T1027.007
|
| SplatDropper has used legitimate signed binaries such as BugSplatHD64.exe for follow-on execution of malicious DLLs through DLL side-loading.,T1553.002
|
| SplatDropper has utilized hashed Native Windows API calls.,T1106
|
| "StarProxy has been side-loaded by the legitimate, signed executable, IsoBurner.exe.",T1574.001
|
| StarProxy has decrypted network packets using a custom algorithm.,T1140
|
| StarProxy has leveraged two 256-byte XOR keys to encrypt and decrypt network packets using a custom algorithm.,T1573.001
|
| StarProxy has proxied traffic between infected devices and their C2 servers.,T1090.001
|
| StarProxy has used TCP for C2 communications to target IPs or domains. StarProxy contained code to support both UDP and TCP connections.,T1095
|
| StarProxy has used the command line for execution of commands.,T1059
|
| StarProxy has utilized the windows API call `GetLocalTime()` to retrieve a SystemTime structure to generate a seed value.,T1124
|
| StealBit can be configured to exfiltrate specific file types.,T1083
|
| StealBit can configure processes to not display certain Windows error messages by through use of the `NtSetInformationProcess`.,T1685
|
| StealBit can deobfuscate loaded modules prior to execution.,T1140
|
| StealBit can detect it is being run in the context of a debugger.,T1622
|
| StealBit can determine system location based on the default language setting and will not execute on systems located in former Soviet countries.,T1614.001
|
| StealBit can self-delete its executable file from the compromised system.,T1070.004
|
| StealBit can upload data and files to the LockBit victim-shaming site.,T1005
|
| StealBit can use HTTP to exfiltrate files to actor-controlled infrastructure.,T1071.001
|
| StealBit can use interprocess communication (IPC) to enable the designation of multiple files for exfiltration in a scalable manner.,T1559
|
| StealBit can use native APIs including `LoadLibraryExA` for execution and `NtSetInformationProcess` for defense evasion purposes.,T1106
|
| StealBit can use the Windows Socket networking library to communicate with attacker-controlled endpoints.,T1095
|
| StrelaStealer PE executable payloads have used uncommon but legitimate extensions such as `.com` instead of `.exe`.,T1036
|
| StrelaStealer attempts to identify and collect mail login data from Thunderbird and Outlook following execution.,T1119
|
| StrelaStealer communicates externally via HTTP POST with encrypted content.,T1071.001
|
| StrelaStealer encrypts the payload of HTTP POST communications using the same XOR key used for the malware's DLL payload.,T1001
|
| "StrelaStealer enumerates the registry key `HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Outlook\Profiles\Outlook\9375CFF0413111d3B88A00104B2A6676\` to identify the values for ""IMAP User,"" ""IMAP Server,"" and ""IMAP Password"" associated with the Outlook email application.",T1552.002
|
| StrelaStealer has been delivered via JScript files in a ZIP archive.,T1027.015
|
| StrelaStealer has been distributed as a DLL/HTML polyglot file.,T1036.008
|
| StrelaStealer has been distributed as a malicious JavaScript object.,T1059.007
|
| StrelaStealer has been distributed as a spearphishing attachment.,T1566.001
|
| "StrelaStealer has been distributed in ISO archives. StrelaStealer has been delivered in encrypted, password-protected ZIP archives.",T1027
|
| StrelaStealer has included BAT files in some instances for installation.,T1059.003
|
| "StrelaStealer has sideloaded a DLL payload using a renamed, legitimate `msinfo32.exe` executable.",T1574.001
|
| "StrelaStealer has used a renamed, legitimate `msinfo32.exe` executable to sideload the StrelaStealer payload during initial installation.",T1036.003
|
| StrelaStealer installers have used obfuscated PowerShell scripts to retrieve follow-on payloads from WebDAV servers.,T1105
|
| StrelaStealer payloads have included strings encrypted via XOR. StrelaStealer JavaScript payloads utilize Base64-encoded payloads that are decoded via certutil to create a malicious DLL file.,T1140
|
| StrelaStealer relies on user execution of a malicious file for installation.,T1204.002
|
| "StrelaStealer searches for and if found collects the contents of files such as `logins.json` and `key4.db` in the `$APPDATA%\Thunderbird\Profiles\` directory, associated with the Thunderbird email application.",T1552.001
|
| StrelaStealer uses XOR-encoded strings to obfuscate items.,T1027.013
|
| StrelaStealer utilizes a hard-coded XOR key to encrypt the content of HTTP POST requests to command and control infrastructure.,T1132.001
|
| StrelaStealer variants check system language settings via keyboard layout or similar mechanisms.,T1614.001
|
| StrelaStealer variants collect victim system information for exfiltration.,T1082
|
| StrelaStealer variants have included excessive mathematical functions padding the binary and slowing execution for anti-analysis and sandbox evasion purposes.,T1027.016
|
| StrelaStealer variants have used packers to obfuscate payloads and make analysis more difficult.,T1027.002
|
| StrelaStealer variants have used valid code signing certificates.,T1553.002
|
| StrelaStealer variants include functionality to identify and evade debuggers.,T1622
|
| StrelaStealer variants include the use of mutex values based on the victim system name to prevent reinfection.,T1480.002
|
| StrelaStealer variants only execute if the keyboard layout or language matches a set list of variables.,T1480
|
| StrongPity can add directories used by the malware to the Windows Defender exclusions list to prevent detection.,T1685
|
| StrongPity can use the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run Registry key for persistence.,T1547.001
|
| Stuxnet reduces the integrity level of objects to allow write actions.,T1685
|
| Sykipot may gather a list of running processes by running tasklist /v.,T1057
|
| "Sykipot may use net group ""domain admins"" /domain to display accounts in the ""domain admins"" permissions group and net localgroup ""administrators"" to list local system administrator group membership.",T1087.002
|
| Sykipot may use net start to display running services.,T1007
|
| Sykipot may use net view /domain to display hostnames of available systems on a network.,T1018
|
| SynAck clears event logs.,T1685.005
|
| SysUpdate can collect a list of services on a victim machine.,T1007
|
| "SysUpdate can collect a system's architecture, operating system version, and hostname.",T1082
|
| SysUpdate can collect the username from a compromised host.,T1033
|
| "SysUpdate can copy a script to the user owned `/usr/lib/systemd/system/` directory with a symlink mapped to a `root` owned directory, `/etc/ystem/system`, in the unit configuration file's `ExecStart` directive to establish persistence and elevate privileges.",T1543.002
|
| SysUpdate can load DLLs through vulnerable legitimate executables.,T1574.001
|
| SysUpdate can store its encoded configuration file within Software\Classes\scConfig in either HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE or HKEY_CURRENT_USER.,T1027.011
|
| SysUpdate can write its configuration file to Software\Classes\scConfig in either HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE or HKEY_CURRENT_USER.,T1112
|
| SysUpdate has been packed with VMProtect.,T1027.002
|
| SysUpdate has been signed with stolen digital certificates.,T1553.002
|
| SysUpdate has exfiltrated data over its C2 channel.,T1041
|
| "SysUpdate has named their unit configuration file similarly to other unit files residing in the same directory, `/usr/lib/systemd/system/`, to appear benign.",T1036.004
|
| SysUpdate has used DNS TXT requests as for its C2 communication.,T1071.004
|
| SystemBC has checked if the last characters of DNS server names end in .bit before initializing C2 communication. SystemBC has identified running processes associated with anti-virus solutions to include `a2guard.exe` to determine whether it executes or not.,T1480
|
| SystemBC has collected the Windows account username on the victim machine.,T1087.001
|
| "SystemBC has collected username , build number and serial number, then sent the information to the C2 server. SystemBC has also gathered device name, operating system, and processor type.",T1082
|
| SystemBC has downloaded additional files for execution on the victim's machine. The server component of SystemBC has the ability to send additional files to victim machines.,T1105
|
| SystemBC has encrypted its C2 traffic with RC4.,T1573.001
|
| SystemBC has executed a copy of itself as a scheduled task with the `start` command. The copy of SystemBC has random file and directory names within the ProgramData directory.,T1053.005
|
| "SystemBC has leveraged the Sleep functions before and after commands to ensure execution using the hexadecimal values within commands to include `Sleep(0x2710u)` that waits 10 seconds, and `Sleep(0xEA60u)` for 60 seconds.",T1678
|
| "SystemBC has the ability to decrypt RC4 encrypted packets and to decode obfuscated data before C2 communication. Additionally, SystemBC has decrypted its config file that was encoded with XOR and a hardcoded 40-byte key.",T1140
|
| "SystemBC has used `cmd.exe` to execute VBS scripts, BAT scripts and CMD scripts.",T1059.003
|
| "SystemBC has used multiple proxy layers, such as SOCKS5 and Tor, for C2 communication. SystemBC has also leveraged Tor for encrypting and concealing C2 traffic. The server component of SystemBC has used SOCKS5 for C2 communication.",T1090.003
|
| "SystemBC has used raw TCP on non-standard ports, such as 4044, for C2 communications and for HTTP communications, which include downloading binaries.",T1095
|
| SystemBC has utilized native Windows API functions such as `EnumWindows`and `GetVolumeInformationA` during discovery activities.,T1106
|
| TAINTEDSCRIBE can execute FileRecvWriteRand to append random bytes to the end of a file received from C2.,T1027.001
|
| TAINTEDSCRIBE can execute GetLocalTime for time discovery.,T1124
|
| TAINTEDSCRIBE can execute ProcessList for process discovery.,T1057
|
| TAINTEDSCRIBE can use DirectoryList to enumerate files in a specified directory.,T1083
|
| TAINTEDSCRIBE can use DriveList to retrieve drive information.,T1680
|
| TAMECAT has used AES to encrypt C2 traffic.,T1573.001
|
| TAMECAT has used PowerShell to download and run additional content.,T1059.001
|
| TAMECAT has used VBScript to query anti-virus products.,T1059.005
|
| TAMECAT has used Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to check for anti-virus products.,T1518.001
|
| TAMECAT has used `cmd.exe` to run the `curl` command.,T1059.003
|
| TEARDROP checked that HKU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\CTF existed before decoding its embedded payload.,T1012
|
| THINCRUST can deobfuscate RSA encrypted C2 commands received through the DEVICEID cookie.,T1140
|
| THINCRUST can process RSA encryted C2 commands.,T1573.001
|
| THINCRUST can use HTTP POST requests in C2 communications.,T1071.001
|
| THINCRUST can use Python scripts for command execution.,T1059.006
|
| TONESHELL has an exception handler that executes when ESET antivirus applications `ekrn.exe` and `egui.exe` are not found and directly injects its code into waitfor.exe using Native Windows API including `WriteProcessMemory` and `CreateRemoteThreadEx`.,T1480
|
| TONESHELL has been initiated using LNK files that were programmed to display a PDF icon to entice the victim to click on the file to execute an office.exe binary.,T1027.012
|
| TONESHELL has conducted screen capturing.,T1113
|
| TONESHELL has created a malicious service DISMsrv to maintain persistence.,T1543.003
|
| TONESHELL has created a mutex to avoid duplicate execution.,T1480.002
|
| TONESHELL has created a reverse shell using `cmd.exe`.,T1059.003
|
| TONESHELL has created scheduled tasks to maintain persistence.,T1053.005
|
| TONESHELL has decoded its payload prior to execution.,T1140
|
| TONESHELL has encoded a payload with a random 32-byte key using XOR. TONESHELL has also encoded payloads with a 256-byte key using XOR.,T1132.002
|
| TONESHELL has facilitated inter-process communication between DLL components via the use of pipes. TONESHELL has also created a reverse shell using two anonymous pipes to write data to stdin and read data from stdout and stderr.,T1559
|
| TONESHELL has generated unique GUIDs to identify victim devices. TONESHELL has leveraged environmental keying in payload delivery using the victim computer name and other configuration values. TONESHELL has also tracked IDs associated with reverse shell subprocesses to manage interactions and terminations from C2.,T1480.001
|
| TONESHELL has injected its malicious payload into a running process through Windows utility Microsoft Application Virtualization Injector `MAVInject.exe`.,T1218.013
|
| TONESHELL has leveraged `GetForegroundWindow` to detect virtualization or sandboxes by calling the API twice and comparing each window handle.,T1497.002
|
| TONESHELL has leveraged custom exception handlers to hide code flow and stop execution of a debugger.,T1622
|
| TONESHELL has masqueraded as the legitimate Windows utility service DISMsrv (Dism Images Servicing Utility Service).,T1036.004
|
| TONESHELL has renamed malicious files to mimic legitimate file names and file extensions. TONESHELL has also masqueraded as legitimate file names to include LogMeIn.dll.,T1036.005
|
| TONESHELL has retrieved the disk serial number of the device using WMI query `SELECT volumeserialnumber FROM win32_logicaldisk where Name ='C:` to identify the victim machine.,T1680
|
| TONESHELL has the ability to download additional files to the victim device.,T1105
|
| TONESHELL has the ability to retrieve the name of the infected machine.,T1082
|
| TONESHELL has used DLL injection to execute payloads received from the C2 server.,T1055.001
|
| TONESHELL has used RC4 encryption in C2 communications. TONESHELL variants used a randomly generated variable length (0x20 - 0x200 bytes) rolling XOR key to encrypt and decrypt network packets.,T1573.001
|
| TONESHELL has used `GetForegroundWindow` to detect virtualization or sandboxes by calling the API twice and comparing each window handle.,T1010
|
| TONESHELL has used regsvr32.exe to execute the windows `DLLRegisterServer` function.,T1218.010
|
| TONESHELL has used valid legitimate digital signatures and certificates to evade detection.,T1553.002
|
| TONESHELL has utilized HTTP for a C2 protocol through HTTP POST. TONESHELL has also utilized HTTPS for C2.,T1071.001
|
| TONESHELL has utilized Native Windows API functions such as `WriteProcessMemory` and `CreateRemoteThreadEx`. TONESHELL has also utilized Windows API functions for creating seed values including `CoCreateGuid` and `GetTickCount`. TONESHELL has leveraged the legitimate API function `EnumSystemLocalesA` to run its shellcode through the callback function.,T1106
|
| TONESHELL has utilized TCP-based reverse shells.,T1095
|
| TONESHELL has utilized a magic value in C2 communications and only executes in memory when response packets match specific values.,T1205
|
| TONESHELL has utilized a modified DJB2 algorithm to resolve APIs.,T1027.007
|
| TONESHELL included functionality to create sub-processes with a specific user's token.,T1134.002
|
| TONESHELL included functionality to retrieve a list of user accounts.,T1087
|
| TONESHELL used FakeTLS headers in network packets to impersonate various versions of TLS protocols to blend in with legitimate network traffic. TONESHELL variants have utilized FakeTLS headers with the bytes `0x17 0x03 0x03` to represent TLSv1.2 and `0x17 0x03 0x04` for TLSv1.3.,T1001.003
|
| TRAILBLAZE has injected a hook into an existing process to load BRUSHFIRE in the spaces allocated memory to include the Ivanti Connect Secure (ICS) web process named `web`.,T1055.012
|
| TRAILBLAZE has the ability to delete temporary files and contents in specified directories to cover its tracks.,T1070.004
|
| TRANSLATEXT has exfiltrated collected credentials to the C2 server.,T1041
|
| "TRANSLATEXT has exfiltrated updated cookies from Google, Naver, Kakao or Daum to the C2 server.",T1539
|
| "TRANSLATEXT has modified the following registry key to install itself as the value, granting permission to install specified extensions: ` HKCU\Software\Policies\Google\Chrome\ExtensionInstallForcelist`.",T1112
|
| TRANSLATEXT has stolen credentials stored in Chrome.,T1555.003
|
| "TRANSLATEXT has the ability to capture credentials, cookies, browser screenshots, etc. and to exfiltrate data.",T1176.001
|
| "TRANSLATEXT has the ability to capture screenshots of new browser tabs, based on the presence of the `Capture` flag.",T1113
|
| TRANSLATEXT has the ability to use form-grabbing and event-listening to extract data from web data forms.,T1185
|
| TRANSLATEXT has used HTTP to communicate with the C2 server.,T1071.001
|
| TRANSLATEXT has used PowerShell to collect system information and to upload the collected data to a Github repository.,T1059.001
|
| TRANSLATEXT has used a dead drop resolver to retrieve configurations and commands from a public blog site.,T1102.001
|
| "TURNEDUP is capable of injecting code into the APC queue of a created Rundll32 process as part of an ""Early Bird injection.""",T1055.004
|
| TYPEFRAME can install and store encrypted configuration data under the Registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ShellCompatibility\Applications\laxhost.dll and HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\PrintConfigs.,T1027.011
|
| TYPEFRAME can install encrypted configuration data under the Registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ShellCompatibility\Applications\laxhost.dll and HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\PrintConfigs.,T1112
|
| TYPEFRAME can open the Windows Firewall on the victim's machine to allow incoming connections.,T1686.003
|
| Taidoor can query the Registry on compromised hosts using RegQueryValueExA.,T1012
|
| Taidoor can use DeleteFileA to remove files from infected hosts.,T1070.004
|
| Taidoor can use GetCurrentProcessId for process discovery.,T1057
|
| Taidoor can use GetLocalTime and GetSystemTime to collect system time.,T1124
|
| Taidoor has the ability to modify the Registry on compromised hosts using RegDeleteValueA and RegCreateKeyExA.,T1112
|
| "Taidoor has the ability to use native APIs for execution including GetProcessHeap, GetProcAddress, and LoadLibrary.",T1106
|
| TajMahal can set the KeepPrintedJobs attribute for configured printers in SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Print\\Printers to enable document stealing.,T1112
|
| TajMahal has the ability to inject the LoadLibrary call template DLL into running processes.,T1129
|
| "Tarrask may abuse the Windows schtasks command-line tool to create ""hidden"" scheduled tasks.",T1059.003
|
| "The ""SCOUT"" variant of NETEAGLE achieves persistence by adding itself to the HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run Registry key.",T1547.001
|
| "The ""Uploader"" variant of HAMMERTOSS visits a hard-coded server over HTTP/S to download the images HAMMERTOSS uses to receive commands.",T1071.001
|
| "The ""ZJ"" variant of BACKSPACE allows ""ZJ link"" infections with Internet access to relay traffic from ""ZJ listen"" to a command server.",T1090.001
|
| "The ""ZR"" variant of BACKSPACE will check to see if known host-based firewalls are installed on the infected systems. BACKSPACE will attempt to establish a C2 channel, then will examine open windows to identify a pop-up from the firewall software and will simulate a mouse-click to allow the connection to proceed.",T1686
|
| "The ""tDiscoverer"" variant of HAMMERTOSS establishes a C2 channel by downloading resources from Web services like Twitter and GitHub. HAMMERTOSS binaries contain an algorithm that generates a different Twitter handle for the malware to check for instructions every day.",T1102.003
|
| The net accounts and net accounts /domain commands with Net can be used to obtain password policy information.,T1201
|
| The net start and net stop commands can be used in Net to execute or stop Windows services.,T1569.002
|
| The net time command can be used in Net to determine the local or remote system time.,T1124
|
| The net user username \password \domain commands in Net can be used to create a domain account.,T1136.002
|
| The net view \\remotesystem and net share commands in Net can be used to find shared drives and directories on remote and local systems respectively.,T1135
|
| The Akira _v2 encryptor targets the `/vmfs/volumes/` path by default and can use the rust-crypto 0.2.36 library crate for the encryption processes.,T1486
|
| The AshTag AshenOrchestrator component can enumerate files on victim hosts.,T1083
|
| The AshTag AshenOrchestrator component has process management functionality.,T1057
|
| The AshTag AshenOrchestrator component has the ability to take screenshots.,T1113
|
| The AshTag stager component can retrieve and execute the main payload.,T1105
|
| The Black Basta binary can use `chmod` to gain full permissions to targeted files.,T1222.002
|
| The Black Basta dropper has mimicked an application for creating USB bootable drivers.,T1036.005
|
| The BlackEnergy component KillDisk is capable of deleting Windows Event Logs.,T1685.005
|
| The C
|
| The CHIMNEYSWEEP installer has been padded with null bytes to inflate its size.,T1027.001
|
| The DCRAT configuration file is encrypted using AES-256.,T1027.013
|
| The DEADEYE.EMBED variant of DEADEYE can embed its payload in an alternate data stream of a local file.,T1564.004
|
| The DEADEYE.EMBED variant of DEADEYE has the ability to embed payloads inside of a compiled binary.,T1027.009
|
| The FRP client can be configured to connect to the server through a proxy.,T1090.003
|
| The GoldMax Linux variant has been executed with the `nohup` command to ignore hangup signals and continue to run if the terminal session was terminated.,T1564.011
|
| The GoldMax Linux variant has used a crontab entry with a @reboot line to gain persistence.,T1053.003
|
| The Gootloader first stage script is obfuscated using random alpha numeric strings.,T1027
|
| The Havoc SMB demon can use named pipes for communication through a parent demon.,T1559
|
| The Havoc demon agent can be set to sleep for a specified time.,T1497.003
|
| The Havoc demon can check for a connection to the C2 server from the target machine.,T1016.001
|
| The Havoc infection chain has been initiated via ClickFix lures in phishing emails.,T1204.004
|
| The Havoc interface can display a file explorer view of the compromised host.,T1083
|
| The J-magic agent is executed through a command line argument which specifies an interface and listening port.,T1059.004
|
| The Komplex payload is stored in a hidden directory at /Users/Shared/.local/kextd.,T1564.001
|
| The Latrodectus command handler can use `cmdexe` to run multiple discovery commands.,T1059.003
|
| The LockBit 3.0 payload is decrypted at runtime.,T1140
|
| The LunarWeb install files have been encrypted with AES-256.,T1027.013
|
| The Mimikatz credential dumper has been extended to include Skeleton Key domain controller authentication bypass functionality. The LSADUMP::ChangeNTLM and LSADUMP::SetNTLM modules can also manipulate the password hash of an account without knowing the clear text value.,T1098
|
| "The Ninja loader can call Windows APIs for discovery, process injection, and payload decryption.",T1106
|
| The PipeMon installer has modified the Registry key HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Environments\Windows x64\Print Processors to install PipeMon as a Print Processor.,T1547.012
|
| The PowerShell script with the RogueRobin payload was obfuscated using the COMPRESS technique in `Invoke-Obfuscation`.,T1027.010
|
| The QakBot payload has been disguised as a PNG file and hidden within LNK files using a Microsoft File Explorer icon.,T1036.008
|
| "The REPTILE reverse shell component can listen for a specialized packet in TCP, UDP, or ICMP for activation.",T1205
|
| The ROADSWEEP binary contains RC4 encrypted embedded scripts.,T1027.013
|
| "The Rclone ""chunker"" overlay supports splitting large files in smaller chunks during upload to circumvent size limits.",T1030
|
| The SocGholish JavaScript payload has been delivered within a compressed ZIP archive.,T1027.015
|
| The SocGholish payload is executed as JavaScript.,T1059.007
|
| "The Uroburos Queue file contains embedded executable files along with key material, communication channels, and modes of operation.",T1027.009
|
| "The WhisperGate third stage can use the AdvancedRun.exe tool to execute commands in the context of the Windows TrustedInstaller group via `%TEMP%\AdvancedRun.exe"" /EXEFilename ""C:\Windows\System32\sc.exe"" /WindowState 0 /CommandLine ""stop WinDefend"" /StartDirectory """" /RunAs 8 /Run`.",T1134.002
|
| The `net localgroup` and `net group` commands in Net can be used to add existing users to local and domain groups.,T1098.007
|
| The file collection tool used by RainyDay can utilize native API including ReadDirectoryChangeW for folder monitoring.,T1106
|
| The first stage of COATHANGER is delivered as a packed file.,T1027.002
|
| The primary delivered mechanism for Agent Tesla is through email phishing messages.,T1566.001
|
| The server component of SystemBC has used various TCP ports for C2 communication.,T1571
|
| ThiefQuest exfiltrates targeted file extensions in the /Users/ folder to the command and control server via unencrypted HTTP. Network packets contain a string with two pieces of information: a file path and the contents of the file in a base64 encoded string.,T1041
|
| ThiefQuest hides a copy of itself in the user's ~/Library directory by using a . at the beginning of the file name followed by 9 random characters.,T1564.001
|
| ThiefQuest installs a launch item using an embedded encrypted launch agent property list template. The plist file is installed in the ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ folder and configured with the path to the persistent binary located in the ~/Library/ folder.,T1543.001
|
| "ThiefQuest invokes time call to check the system's time, executes a sleep command, invokes a second time call, and then compares the time difference between the two time calls and the amount of time the system slept to identify the sandbox.",T1497.003
|
| ThiefQuest obtains a list of running processes using the function kill_unwanted.,T1057
|
| ThiefQuest uses AppleScript's osascript -e command to launch ThiefQuest's persistence via Launch Agent and Launch Daemon.,T1059.002
|
| ThiefQuest uses a function named is_debugging to perform anti-debugging logic. The function invokes sysctl checking the returned value of P_TRACED. ThiefQuest also calls ptrace with the PTRACE_DENY_ATTACH flag to prevent debugging.,T1622
|
| ThiefQuest uses the function kill_unwanted to obtain a list of running processes and kills each process matching a list of security related processes.,T1685
|
| ThiefQuest uses various API functions such as NSCreateObjectFileImageFromMemory to load and link in-memory payloads.,T1620
|
| ThreatNeedle can modify the Registry to save its configuration data as the following RC4-encrypted Registry key: `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\GameCon`.,T1112
|
| ThreatNeedle has been compressed and obfuscated.,T1027.015
|
| TinyTurla can save its configuration parameters in the Registry.,T1027.011
|
| TinyTurla has mimicked an existing Windows service by being installed as Windows Time Service.,T1036.004
|
| "To collect data on the host's Wi-Fi connection history, LightSpy reads the `/Library/Preferences/SystemConfiguration/com.apple.airport.preferences.plist file`.It also utilizes Apple's CWWiFiClient API to scan for nearby Wi-Fi networks and obtain data on the SSID, security type, and RSSI (signal strength) values.",T1046
|
| "To establish persistence, Truvasys adds a Registry Run key with a value ""TaskMgr"" in an attempt to masquerade as the legitimate Windows Task Manager.",T1036.004
|
| "To exfiltrate data, LightSpy configures each module to send an obfuscated JSON blob to hardcoded URL endpoints or paths aligned to the module name.",T1041
|
| "Tomiris has used `SCHTASKS /CREATE /SC DAILY /TN StartDVL /TR ""path to self"" /ST 10:00` to establish persistence.",T1053.005
|
| TrickBot can disable Windows Defender.,T1685
|
| TrickBot has the ability to capture RDP credentials by capturing the CredEnumerateA API,T1056.004
|
| TrickBot has used printf and file I/O loops to delay process execution as part of API hammering.,T1497.003
|
| TrickBot uses an AES CBC (256 bits) encryption algorithm for its loader and configuration files.,T1027.013
|
| TrickBot uses non-descriptive names to hide functionality.,T1027
|
| "TrickBot uses the Windows API call, CreateProcessW(), to manage execution flow. TrickBot has also used Nt API functions to perform Process Injection.",T1106
|
| Trojan.Karagany can dump passwords and save them into \ProgramData\Mail\MailAg\pwds.txt.,T1003
|
| Troll Stealer can capture screenshots from victim machines.,T1113
|
| Troll Stealer can collect local system information.,T1082
|
| Troll Stealer can create and execute Windows batch scripts.,T1059.003
|
| Troll Stealer collects all data in victim `.ssh` folders by creating a compressed copy that is subsequently exfiltrated to command and control infrastructure. Troll Stealer also collects key information associated with the Government Public Key Infrastructure (GPKI) service for South Korean government information systems.,T1552.004
|
| "Troll Stealer collects information from Chromium-based browsers and Firefox such as cookies, history, downloads, and extensions.",T1217
|
| Troll Stealer compresses stolen data prior to exfiltration.,T1560
|
| Troll Stealer creates a mutex during installation to prevent duplicate execution.,T1480.002
|
| Troll Stealer creates and can execute a BAT script that will delete the malware.,T1070.004
|
| Troll Stealer encrypts gathered information on victim devices prior to exfiltrating it through command and control infrastructure.,T1074.001
|
| Troll Stealer exfiltrates collected information to its command and control infrastructure.,T1041
|
| Troll Stealer gathers information from infected systems such as SSH information from the victim's `.ssh` directory. Troll Stealer collects information from local FileZilla installations and Microsoft Sticky Note.,T1005
|
| "Troll Stealer gathers information from the Government Public Key Infrastructure (GPKI) folder, associated with South Korean government public key infrastructure, on infected systems.",T1213
|
| Troll Stealer has been delivered as a VMProtect-packed binary.,T1027.002
|
| Troll Stealer is dropped as a DLL file and executed via `rundll32.exe` by its installer.,T1218.011
|
| Troll Stealer is typically installed via a dropper file that masquerades as a legitimate security program installation file.,T1036.005
|
| Troll Stealer performs XOR encryption and Base64 encoding of data prior to sending to command and control infrastructure.,T1132.001
|
| Troll Stealer uses HTTP to communicate to command and control infrastructure.,T1071.001
|
| TruffleHog has can browse and scan individual files and directories.,T1083
|
| TruffleHog has gathered access tokens and API tokens from CI/CD pipeline solutions and repositories.,T1528
|
| TruffleHog has gathered data from home directories of the victim environment.,T1005
|
| TruffleHog has leveraged Cloud CLI in order to enumerate and gather credentials.,T1059.009
|
| TruffleHog has the ability to scan cloud storage services for credentials to include Amazon (AWS) S3 and Google Cloud Storage.,T1530
|
| TruffleHog has the ability to scan code repositories and CI/CD platforms.,T1526
|
| "TruffleHog has used stolen credentials to log into cloud services to access cloud hosted repositories and other cloud storage solutions to discover sensitive data to include API Keys, tokens and credentials.",T1078.004
|
| Tsundere Botnet has been distributed via an MSI installer.,T1218.007
|
| Tsundere Botnet has checked the victim machine's location by obtaining the culture name of the machine.,T1614
|
| Tsundere Botnet has checked the victim machine's location to avoid infecting in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) region.,T1480
|
| "Tsundere Botnet has collected the machine's MAC address, total memory, GPU information and other system information.",T1082
|
| Tsundere Botnet has disguised its MSI installer as a fake installer for popular games and software.,T1036.005
|
| Tsundere Botnet has obtained the C2 address from Ethereum blockchain nodes.,T1102.001
|
| Tsundere Botnet has obtained the WebSocket C2 address by making remote procedure call (RPC) APIs to Ethereum blockchain nodes.,T1071.001
|
| Tsundere Botnet's MSI installer has Base64-encoded command execution.,T1027.010
|
| Tsundere Botnet's MSI installer has used `-WindowStyle Hidden` to hide Tsundere Botnet's execution from the user.,T1564.003
|
| "Tsundere Botnet's loader component has downloaded the zip file node-v18.17.0-win-x64.zip from the official Node.js website, as well as pm2, a Node.js process management tool.",T1105
|
| "Tsundere Botnet's loader contained AES-CBC/PKCS7 encrypted blobs, which were descrypted and written to disk.",T1027.013
|
| "Tsundere Botnet's loader has decrypted obfuscated JavaScript files using the AES-256 CBC algorithm, a build-specific key, and initialization vector.",T1140
|
| Turian has the ability to use /bin/sh to execute commands.,T1059.004
|
| UBoatRAT encrypts instructions in its C2 network payloads using a simple XOR cipher.,T1573.001
|
| UPPERCUT can base64 encode C2 communications.,T1132.001
|
| UPPERCUT has been sideloaded through a legitimately signed application from the JustSystems Corporation.,T1574.001
|
| "UPPERCUT has used HTTP for C2, including sending error codes in cookie headers.",T1071.001
|
| UPSTYLE attempts to retrieve a non-existent webpage from the command and control server resulting in hidden commands sent via resulting error messages.,T1665
|
| UPSTYLE has masqueraded filenames using examples such as `update.py`.,T1036
|
| UPSTYLE has the ability to read `/proc/self/cmdline` to see if it is running as a monitored process.,T1057
|
| UPSTYLE is a Python-based application.,T1059.006
|
| UPSTYLE parses encoded commands from error logs after attempting to resolve a non-existing webpage from the command and control server.,T1102.003
|
| UPSTYLE retrieves a non-existent webpage from the command and control server then parses commands from the resulting error logs to decode commands to the web shell.,T1001.001
|
| UPSTYLE stores primary content as base64-encoded objects.,T1027.013
|
| "USBStealer registers itself under a Registry Run key with the name ""USB Disk Security.""",T1547.001
|
| USBferry can use net user to gather information about local accounts.,T1087.001
|
| USBferry can use net view to gather information about remote systems.,T1018
|
| USBferry can use tasklist to gather information about the process running on the infected system.,T1057
|
| "Unknown Logger has functionality to disable security tools, including Kaspersky, BitDefender, and MalwareBytes.",T1685
|
| Upon execution Spica can decode an embedded .pdf and write it to the desktop as a decoy document.,T1140
|
| "Uroburos can communicate through custom methodologies for UDP, ICMP, and TCP that use distinct sessions to ride over the legitimate protocols.",T1095
|
| "Uroburos can intercept the first client to server packet in the 3-way TCP handshake to determine if the packet contains the correct unique value for a specific Uroburos implant. If the value does not match, the packet and the rest of the TCP session are passed to the legitimate listening application.",T1205
|
| "Uroburos can query the Registry, typically `HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Classes\.wav\OpenWithProgIds`, to find the key and path to decrypt and load its kernel driver and kernel driver loader.",T1012
|
| Uroburos can search for specific files on a compromised system.,T1083
|
| Uroburos can store configuration information in the Registry including the initialization vector and AES key needed to find and decrypt other Uroburos components.,T1112
|
| Uroburos can use DLL injection to load embedded files and modules.,T1055.001
|
| Uroburos can use a custom HTTP-based protocol for large data communications that can blend with normal network traffic by riding on top of standard HTTP.,T1071.001
|
| Uroburos can use a custom base62 and a de-facto base32 encoding that uses digits 0-9 and lowercase letters a-z in C2 communications.,T1132.002
|
| Uroburos can use concealed storage mechanisms including an NTFS or FAT-16 filesystem encrypted with CAST-128 in CBC mode.,T1564.005
|
| "Uroburos can use custom communication methodologies that ride over common protocols including TCP, UDP, HTTP, SMTP, and DNS in order to blend with normal network traffic.",T1001.003
|
| Uroburos can use custom communications protocols that ride over SMTP.,T1071.003
|
| Uroburos can use its `Get` command to exfiltrate specified files from the compromised system.,T1005
|
| Uroburos can use its `Process List` command to enumerate processes on compromised hosts.,T1057
|
| Uroburos can use its kernel module to prevent its host components from being listed by the targeted system's OS and to mediate requests between user mode and concealed components.,T1014
|
| Uroburos can use up to 10 channels to communicate between implants.,T1008
|
| Uroburos has encoded outbound C2 communications in DNS requests consisting of character strings made to resemble standard domain names. The actual information transmitted by Uroburos is contained in the part of the character string prior to the first '.' character.,T1071.004
|
| "Uroburos has registered a service, typically named `WerFaultSvc`, to decrypt and find a kernel driver and kernel driver loader to maintain persistence.",T1543.003
|
| Uroburos has the ability to gather basic system information and run the POSIX API `gethostbyname`.,T1082
|
| "Uroburos has the ability to move data between its kernel and user mode components, generally using named pipes.",T1559
|
| Uroburos has the ability to use the command line for execution on the targeted system.,T1059.003
|
| Ursnif droppers execute base64 encoded PowerShell commands.,T1027.010
|
| Ursnif has used CreateProcessW to create child processes.,T1106
|
| Ursnif has used an XOR-based algorithm to encrypt Tor clients dropped to disk. Ursnif droppers have also been delivered as password-protected zip files that execute base64 encoded PowerShell commands.,T1027.013
|
| "Using the machine's local time, XCSSET waits 43200 seconds (12 hours) from the initial creation timestamp of a specific file, .report. After the elapsed time, XCSSET executes additional modules.",T1497.003
|
| VBShower has attempted to complicate forensic analysis by deleting all the files contained in %APPDATA%\..\Local\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Word and %APPDATA%\..\Local Settings\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Word\.,T1070.004
|
| VIRTUALPIE has created listeners on hard coded TCP port 546.,T1571
|
| VIRTUALPIE has file transfer capabilities.,T1570
|
| VIRTUALPIE is a Python-based backdoor malware.,T1059.006
|
| VIRTUALPIE is capable of command line execution on compromised ESXi servers.,T1059.012
|
| VIRTUALPITA can impair logging by setting the `HISTFILE` environmental variable to `0` and stopping the `vmsyslogd` service.,T1690
|
| VIRTUALPITA can persist as an init.d startup service on Linux vCenter systems.,T1037
|
| VIRTUALPITA can start and stop the `vmsyslogd` service.,T1489
|
| VIRTUALPITA can target specific guest virtual machines for script execution.,T1673
|
| "VIRTUALPITA has created listeners on hard coded TCP ports such as 2233, 7475, and 18098.",T1571
|
| VIRTUALPITA has utilized VMware service names and ports to masquerade as legitimate services.,T1036.004
|
| VIRTUALPITA is capable of file transfer and arbitrary command execution.,T1570
|
| "VIRTUALPITA samples have been found in `/usr/libexec/setconf/ksmd` and `/usr/bin/ksmd`, named to spoof the legitimate Kernel Same-Page Merging Daemon binary.",T1036.005
|
| VPNFilter has the capability to wipe a portion of an infected device's firmware.,T1561.001
|
| Valak can use wmic process call create in a scheduled task to launch plugins and for execution.,T1047
|
| Valak has the ability to store information regarding the C2 server and downloads in the Registry key HKCU\Software\ApplicationContainer\Appsw64.,T1027.011
|
| "Variants of WEBC2 achieve persistence by using DLL search order hijacking, usually by copying the DLL file to %SYSTEMROOT% (C:\WINDOWS\ntshrui.dll).",T1574.001
|
| VersaMem deleted files related to initial installation such as temporary files related to the PID of the main web process.,T1070.004
|
| VersaMem encrypted captured credentials with AES then Base64 encoded them before writing to local storage.,T1027.013
|
| "VersaMem hooked and overrided Versa's built-in authentication method, `setUserPassword`, to intercept plaintext credentials when submitted to the server.",T1056.004
|
| VersaMem relied on the Java Instrumentation API and Javassist to dynamically modify Java code existing in memory.,T1129
|
| VersaMem was installed through exploitation of CVE-2024-39717 in Versa Director servers.,T1203
|
| Volgmer modifies the Registry to store an encoded configuration file in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Security.,T1112
|
| Volgmer stores an encoded configuration file in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Security.,T1027.011
|
| WARPWIRE can Base64 encode captured credentials with `btoa()` prior to sending to C2.,T1132.001
|
| WARPWIRE is a credential harvester written in JavaScript.,T1059.007
|
| WIREFIRE can AES encrypt process output sent from compromised devices to C2.,T1573.001
|
| WIREFIRE can modify the `visits.py` component of Ivanti Connect Secure VPNs for file download and arbitrary command execution.,T1554
|
| WIREFIRE can respond to specific HTTP `POST` requests to `/api/v1/cav/client/visits`.,T1071.001
|
| WIREFIRE has the ability to download files to compromised devices.,T1105
|
| "WannaCry creates the service ""mssecsvc2.0"" with the display name ""Microsoft Security Center (2.0) Service.""",T1543.003
|
| WannaCry uses attrib +h and icacls . /grant Everyone:F /T /C /Q to make some of its files hidden and grant all users full access controls.,T1222.001
|
| WannaCry uses attrib +h to make some of its files hidden.,T1564.001
|
| WannaCry utilizes wmic to delete shadow copies.,T1047
|
| WarzoneRAT can disarm Windows Defender during the UAC process to evade detection.,T1685
|
| WarzoneRAT can masquerade the Process Environment Block on a compromised host to hide its attempts to elevate privileges through `IFileOperation`.,T1564
|
| WastedLocker can modify registry values within the Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap registry key.,T1112
|
| WastedLocker has a command to take ownership of a file and reset the ACL permissions using the takeown.exe /F filepath command.,T1222.001
|
| WastedLocker has copied a random file from the Windows System32 folder to the %APPDATA% location under a different hidden filename.,T1564.001
|
| Waterbear has used DLL side loading to import and load a malicious DLL loader.,T1574.001
|
| Wevtutil can be used to clear system and security event logs from the system.,T1685.005
|
| Wevtutil can be used to disable specific event logs on the system.,T1685.001
|
| "When Ebury is running as an OpenSSH server, it uses LD_PRELOAD to inject its malicious shared module in to programs launched by SSH sessions. Ebury hooks the following functions from `libc` to inject into subprocesses; `system`, `popen`, `execve`, `execvpe`, `execv`, `execvp`, and `execl`.",T1574.006
|
| "When executed, BPFDoor attempts to create and lock a runtime file, `/var/run/initd.lock`, and exits if it fails using the specified file, resulting in a makeshift mutex.",T1480.002
|
| "When executing with non-root level permissions, RotaJakiro can install persistence by adding a command to the .bashrc file that executes a binary in the `${HOME}/.gvfsd/.profile/` folder.",T1546.004
|
| "When executing with non-root permissions, RotaJakiro uses the the `shmget API` to create shared memory between other known RotaJakiro processes. This allows processes to communicate with each other and share their PID.",T1559
|
| "When executing with non-root permissions, RotaJakiro uses the the `shmget` API to create shared memory between other known RotaJakiro processes. RotaJakiro also uses the `execvp` API to help its dead process ""resurrect"".",T1106
|
| "When running with root privileges after a Launch Agent is installed, ThiefQuest installs a plist file to the /Library/LaunchDaemons/ folder with the RunAtLoad key set to true establishing persistence as a Launch Daemon.",T1543.004
|
| WhisperGate can download and execute AdvancedRun.exe to disable the Windows Defender Theat Protection service and set an exclusion path for the C:\ drive.,T1685
|
| "WindTail can invoke Apple APIs contentsOfDirectoryAtPath, pathExtension, and (string) compare.",T1106
|
| WindTail can use the open command to execute an application.,T1059.004
|
| "Wingbird side loads a malicious file, sspisrv.dll, in part of a spoofed lssas.exe service.",T1574.001
|
| Winnti for Windows can add a service named wind0ws to the Registry to achieve persistence after reboot.,T1547.001
|
| "Woody RAT can collect .NET, PowerShell, and Python information from an infected host.",T1518
|
| Woody RAT can collect information from a compromised host.,T1005
|
| Woody RAT can create a suspended notepad process and write shellcode to delete a file into the suspended process using `NtWriteVirtualMemory`.,T1055.012
|
| Woody RAT can deobfuscate Base64-encoded strings and scripts.,T1140
|
| "Woody RAT can detect Avast Software, Doctor Web, Kaspersky, AVG, ESET, and Sophos antivirus programs.",T1518.001
|
| "Woody RAT can execute PowerShell commands and scripts with the use of .NET DLL, `WoodyPowerSession`.",T1059.001
|
| Woody RAT can execute commands using `cmd.exe`.,T1059.003
|
| Woody RAT can exfiltrate files from an infected machine to its C2 server.,T1041
|
| Woody RAT can identify administrator accounts on an infected machine.,T1087
|
| Woody RAT can inject code into a targeted process by writing to the remote memory of an infected system and then create a remote thread.,T1055
|
| Woody RAT can retrieve a list of user accounts and usernames from an infected machine.,T1033
|
| Woody RAT can retrieve information about storage drives from an infected machine.,T1680
|
| Woody RAT can retrieve network interface and proxy information.,T1016
|
| Woody RAT can search registry keys to identify antivirus programs on an compromised host.,T1012
|
| Woody RAT can use AES-CBC to encrypt data sent to its C2 server.,T1573.001
|
| "Woody RAT can use multiple native APIs, including `WriteProcessMemory`, `CreateProcess`, and `CreateRemoteThread` for process injection.",T1106
|
| Woody RAT has been delivered via malicious Word documents and archive files.,T1566.001
|
| Woody RAT has relied on CVE-2022-30190 (Follina) for execution during delivery.,T1203
|
| Woody RAT has relied on users opening a malicious email attachment for execution.,T1204.002
|
| Woody RAT has suppressed all error reporting by calling `SetErrorMode` with 0x8007 as a parameter.,T1685
|
| Woody RAT has the ability to delete itself from disk by creating a suspended notepad process and writing shellcode to delete a file into the suspended process using `NtWriteVirtualMemory`.,T1070.004
|
| Woody RAT has the ability to take a screenshot of the infected host desktop using Windows GDI+.,T1113
|
| XAgentOSX contains the readFiles function to return a detailed listing (sometimes recursive) of a specified directory. XAgentOSX contains the showBackupIosFolder function to check for IOS device backups by running ls -la ~/Library/Application\ Support/MobileSync/Backup/.,T1083
|
| XCSSET adds malicious code to a host's Xcode projects by enumerating CocoaPods target_integrator.rb files under the /Library/Ruby/Gems folder or enumerates all .xcodeproj folders under a given directory. XCSSET then downloads a script and Mach-O file into the Xcode project folder.,T1195.001
|
| XCSSET adds malicious file paths to the DYLD_FRAMEWORK_PATH and DYLD_LIBRARY_PATH environment variables to execute malicious code.,T1574.006
|
| "XCSSET downloads browser specific AppleScript modules using a constructed URL with the curl command, & domain & ""/agent/scripts/"" & moduleName & "".applescript.",T1105
|
| XCSSET has used `mdfind` to enumerate a list of apps known to grant screen sharing permissions and leverages a module to run the command `ls -la ~/Desktop`.,T1083
|
| "XCSSET installs malicious application bundles that mimic native macOS apps, such as Safari, by using the legitimate app's icon and customizing the `Info.plist` to match expected metadata.",T1036
|
| XCSSET loads a system level launchdaemon using the launchctl load -w command from /System/Librarby/LaunchDaemons/ssh.plist.,T1569.001
|
| "XCSSET performs AES-CBC encryption on files under ~/Documents, ~/Downloads, and ~/Desktop with a fixed key and renames files to give them a .enc extension. Only files with sizes less than 500MB are encrypted.",T1486
|
| XCSSET saves a screen capture of the victim's system with a numbered filename and .jpg extension. Screen captures are taken at specified intervals based on the system.,T1113
|
| XCSSET searches firewall configuration files located in /Library/Preferences/ and uses csrutil status to determine if System Integrity Protection is enabled.,T1518.001
|
| XCSSET uses ps aux with the grep command to enumerate common browsers and system processes potentially impacting XCSSET's exfiltration capabilities.,T1518
|
| XCSSET uses AppleScript to check the host's language and location with the command user locale of (get system info).,T1614.001
|
| XCSSET uses the chmod +x command to grant executable permissions to the malicious file.,T1222.002
|
| "XCSSET will compress entire ~/Desktop folders excluding all .git folders, but only if the total data size is under 200MB.",T1560
|
| XCSSET will create an ssh key if necessary with the ssh-keygen -t rsa -f $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa -P command. XCSSET will upload a private key file to the server to remotely access the host without a password.,T1098.004
|
| "XCSSET's `dfhsebxzod` module searches for `.xcodeproj` directories within the user's home folder and subdirectories. For each match, it locates the corresponding `project.pbxproj` file and embeds an encoded payload into a build rule, target configuration, or project setting. The payload is later executed during the build process.",T1546
|
| XLoader can capture keystrokes from the victim machine.,T1056.001
|
| XLoader can capture screenshots on compromised hosts.,T1113
|
| XLoader can capture web session cookies and session information from victim browsers.,T1539
|
| XLoader can collect credentials stored in email clients.,T1555
|
| XLoader can collect data stored in the victim's clipboard.,T1115
|
| XLoader can collect system information and supported language information from the victim machine.,T1082
|
| XLoader can delete malicious executables from compromised machines.,T1070.004
|
| XLoader can gather credentials from several web browsers.,T1555.003
|
| XLoader can identify the username from a victim machine.,T1033
|
| XLoader can initiate a system reboot or shutdown.,T1529
|
| "XLoader can use an AutoIT script to decrypt a payload file, load it into victim memory, then execute it on the victim machine.",T1059.010
|
| XLoader can utilize decoy command and control domains within the malware configuration to circumvent sandbox analysis.,T1497
|
| XLoader can utilize hardcoded command and control domain configurations created by the XLoader authors. These are designed to mimic domain registrars and hosting service providers such as Hostinger and Namecheap.,T1583.001
|
| XLoader has exploited Office vulnerabilities during local execution such as CVE-2017-11882 and CVE-2018-0798.,T1203
|
| XLoader performs timing checks using the Read-Time Stamp Counter (RDTSC) instruction on the victim CPU.,T1497.001
|
| XLoader uses HTTP and HTTPS for command and control communication.,T1071.001
|
| XLoader uses XOR and RC4 algorithms to decrypt payloads and functions. XLoader can be distributed as a self-extracting RAR archive that launches an AutoIT loader.,T1140
|
| "XLoader uses anti-debugging mechanisms such as calling `NtQueryInformationProcess` with `InfoClass=7`, referencing `ProcessDebugPort`, to determine if it is being analyzed.",T1622
|
| "XLoader uses the native Windows API for functionality, including defense evasion.",T1106
|
| "XLoader uses various packers, including CyaX, to obfuscate malicious executables.",T1027.002
|
| XORIndex Loader can decode its payload prior to execution.,T1140
|
| XORIndex Loader can identify the geographical location of a victim host.,T1614
|
| XORIndex Loader has been used to download a malicious payload to include BeaverTail.,T1105
|
| XORIndex Loader has collected the username from the victim host.,T1033
|
| XORIndex Loader has encoded module names and C2 URLs as hexadecimal strings in attempts to evade analysis.,T1027.013
|
| XORIndex Loader has executed malicious JavaScript code.,T1059.007
|
| XORIndex Loader has exfiltrated victim data using HTTPS POST requests to its C2 servers.,T1041
|
| XORIndex Loader has leveraged legitimate package names to mimic frequently utilized tools to entice victims to download and execute malicious payloads.,T1036.005
|
| XORIndex Loader has leveraged webservices to identify the public IP of the victim host.,T1016
|
| XORIndex Loader has obfuscated strings using ASCII buffers and TextDecoder.,T1027.010
|
| "XORIndex Loader has the ability to collect the hostname, OS Username, Geolocation, and OS version of an infected host.",T1082
|
| XORIndex Loader has used HTTPS POST to communicate with C2.,T1071.001
|
| ZIPLINE can add itself to the exclusion list for the Ivanti Connect Secure Integrity Checker Tool if the `--exclude` parameter is passed by the `tar` process.,T1685
|
| ZIPLINE can communicate with C2 using a custom binary protocol.,T1095
|
| ZIPLINE can create a proxy server on compromised hosts.,T1090
|
| ZIPLINE can download files to be saved on the compromised system.,T1105
|
| ZIPLINE can find and append specific files on Ivanti Connect Secure VPNs based upon received commands.,T1083
|
| "ZIPLINE can identify a specific string in intercepted network traffic, `SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_0.3xx.`, to trigger its command functionality.",T1205
|
| ZIPLINE can use AES-128-CBC to encrypt data for both upload and download.,T1573.001
|
| ZIPLINE can use `/bin/sh` to create a reverse shell and execute commands.,T1059.004
|
| Zebrocy collects the OS version and computer name. Zebrocy also runs the systeminfo command to gather system information.,T1082
|
| Zebrocy executes the reg query command to obtain information in the Registry.,T1012
|
| Zebrocy performs persistence with a logon script via adding to the Registry key HKCU\Environment\UserInitMprLogonScript.,T1037.001
|
| Zebrocy runs the ipconfig /all command.,T1016
|
| "Zebrocy searches for files that are 60mb and less and contain the following extensions: .doc, .docx, .xls, .xlsx, .ppt, .pptx, .exe, .zip, and .rar. Zebrocy also runs the echo %APPDATA% command to list the contents of the directory. Zebrocy can obtain the current execution path as well as perform drive enumeration.",T1083
|
| Zebrocy uses netstat -aon to gather network connection information.,T1049
|
| ZeroCleare can call the `GetSystemDirectoryW` API to locate the system directory.,T1106
|
| ZeroCleare can corrupt the file system and wipe the system drive on targeted hosts.,T1561.002
|
| "ZeroCleare can deploy a vulnerable, signed driver on a compromised host to bypass operating system safeguards.",T1553.002
|
| ZeroCleare can receive command line arguments from an operator to corrupt the file system using the RawDisk driver.,T1059
|
| "ZeroCleare can use the `IOCTL_DISK_GET_DRIVE_GEOMETRY_EX`, `IOCTL_DISK_GET_DRIVE_GEOMETRY`, and `IOCTL_DISK_GET_LENGTH_INFO` system calls to compute disk size.",T1680
|
| ZeroCleare has the ability to uninstall the RawDisk driver and delete the `rwdsk` file on disk.,T1070.004
|
| ZeroCleare has used a vulnerable signed VBoxDrv driver to bypass Microsoft Driver Signature Enforcement (DSE) protections and subsequently load the unsigned RawDisk driver.,T1068
|
| ZeroT has used DLL side-loading to load malicious payloads.,T1574.001
|
| Zeus Panda encrypts strings with XOR. Zeus Panda also encrypts all configuration and settings in AES and RC4.,T1027.013
|
| Zeus Panda modifies several Registry keys under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\ PhishingFilter\ to disable phishing filters.,T1112
|
| Zeus Panda obfuscates the macro commands in its initial payload.,T1027.010
|
| ZxShell can disable the firewall by modifying the registry key HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SharedAccess\Parameters\FirewallPolicy\StandardProfile.,T1686
|
| ZxShell can kill AV products' processes.,T1685
|
| ZxShell can leverage native API including RegisterServiceCtrlHandler to register a service.RegisterServiceCtrlHandler,T1106
|
| ZxShell has a command to clear system event logs.,T1685.005
|
| attrib can be used to make files or directories hidden.,T1564.001
|
| "build_downer has added itself to the Registry Run key as ""NVIDIA"" to appear legitimate.",T1036.004
|
| build_downer has the ability to use the WinExec API to execute malware on a compromised host.,T1106
|
| cd00r can discover the IP for the network interface on the compromised device.,T1016
|
| "cd00r can monitor for a single TCP-SYN packet to be sent in series to a configurable set of ports (200, 80, 22, 53 and 3 in the original code) before opening a port for communication.",T1205.001
|
| cd00r can monitor incoming C2 communications sent over TCP to the compromised host.,T1095
|
| cd00r can use the libpcap library to monitor captured packets for specifc sequences.,T1040
|
| cmd can be used to find files and directories with native functionality such as dir commands.,T1083
|
| "dsquery can be used to gather information on domain trusts with dsquery -filter ""(objectClass=trustedDomain)"" -attr .",T1482
|
| "dsquery has the ability to enumerate various information, such as the operating system and host name, for systems within a domain.",T1082
|
| esentutl can copy `ntds.dit` using the Volume Shadow Copy service.,T1003.003
|
| esentutl can use the Volume Shadow Copy service to copy locked files such as `ntds.dit`.,T1006
|
| evilginx2 can capture information from each session with a victim including the public IP used to access the server and the user agent.,T1016
|
| evilginx2 can collect information on each session with a victim including the session cookie.,T1539
|
| evilginx2 can inject JavaScript code into HTML content to customize phishing attacks.,T1059.007
|
| "evilginx2 can inject custom POST arguments into requests to silently enable ""Remember Me"" options during authentication to stay logged in across browser sessions.",T1185
|
| evilginx2 can intercept authentication tokens to enable bypass of non-phishing resistant forms of MFA.,T1111
|
| evilginx2 can modify the Origin and Referrer fields in HTTPS headers it relays between intended victims and legitimate websites to comply with cross-origin resource sharing (CORS) restrictions.,T1001
|
| evilginx2 can proxy HTTPS connections between victims and destination websites.,T1071.001
|
| evilginx2 can reject requests to phishing URLs if the User-Agent of the visitor doesn't match the allowlist REGEX filter for a specific lure.,T1480
|
| evilginx2 can route traffic via SOCKS5 and HTTP(S) proxies between an intended phishing victim's machine and legitimate websites.,T1090.002
|
| evilginx2 has obtained a valid SSL/TLS certificate from LetsEncrypt to provide responses to Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME) challenges.,T1553.004
|
| "evilginx2 has the ability to act as an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) relay between a legitimate website and a phished user to capture all transmitted data including usernames, passwords, authentication tokens, and session cookies and tokens.",T1557
|
| evilginx2 has the ability to hide phishing lures for a set time to avoid scanning by sandboxes.,T1497.003
|
| gh0st RAT is able to wipe event logs.,T1685.005
|
| macOS.OSAMiner can gather the device serial number.,T1082
|
| macOS.OSAMiner has checked to ensure there is enough disk space using the Unix utility `df`.,T1680
|
| "macOS.OSAMiner has searched for the Activity Monitor process in the System Events process list and kills the process if running. macOS.OSAMiner also searches the operating system's `install.log` for apps matching its hardcoded list, killing all matching process names.",T1685
|
| "metaMain can change the `CreationTime`, `LastAccessTime`, and `LastWriteTime` file time attributes when executed with `SYSTEM` privileges.",T1070.006
|
| metaMain can collect files and system information from a compromised host.,T1005
|
| metaMain can collect the computer name from a compromised host.,T1082
|
| metaMain can decrypt and load other modules.,T1140
|
| metaMain can download files onto compromised systems.,T1105
|
| metaMain can encrypt the data that it sends and receives from the C2 server using an RC4 encryption algorithm.,T1573.001
|
| metaMain can enumerate the processes that run on the platform.,T1057
|
| "metaMain can inject the loader file, Speech02.db, into a process.",T1055
|
| metaMain can log mouse events.,T1056
|
| metaMain can recursively enumerate files in an operator-provided directory.,T1083
|
| metaMain can take and save screenshots.,T1113
|
| metaMain can upload collected files and data to its C2 server.,T1041
|
| metaMain can write the process ID of a target process into the `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\DDE\tpid` Registry value as part of its reflective loading activity.,T1112
|
| metaMain has delayed execution for five to six minutes during its persistence establishment process.,T1497.003
|
| metaMain has deleted collected items after uploading the content to its C2 server.,T1070.004
|
| metaMain has stored the collected system files in a working directory.,T1074.001
|
| metaMain has the ability to log keyboard events.,T1056.001
|
| metaMain's module file has been encrypted via XOR.,T1027.013
|
| netsh can be used to disable local firewall settings.,T1686
|
| ngrok can be used to proxy connections to machines located behind NAT or firewalls.,T1090
|
| ngrok can provide DGA for C2 servers through the use of random URL strings that change every 12 hours.,T1568.002
|
| ngrok can tunnel RDP and other services securely over internet connections.,T1572
|
| ngrok has been used by threat actors to configure servers for data exfiltration.,T1567
|
| njRAT can download files to the victim's machine. APT-C-36 has used modified versions of njRAT to enable the download of .NET assemblies.,T1105
|
| njRAT has added persistence via the Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\CurrentVersion\Run\ and dropped a shortcut in %STARTUP%.,T1547.001
|
| njRAT has used C2 infrastructure to receive stolen information from the infected machine including screenshots and other system information.,T1041
|
| reGeorg can communicate using SSH through an HTTP tunnel.,T1021.004
|
| reGeorg can establish an HTTP or SOCKS proxy to tunnel data in and out of a network.,T1090
|
| reGeorg can tunnel TCP sessions into targeted networks.,T1095
|
| reGeorg can use HTTP to tunnel connections in and out of targeted networks.,T1071.001
|
| reGeorg has the ability to download files to targeted systems.,T1105
|
| reGeorg has the ability to tunnel SMB sessions.,T1021.002
|
| reGeorg is a Python-based web shell.,T1059.006
|
| xCaon has added persistence via the Registry key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\load which causes the malware to run each time any user logs in.,T1547
|
| "yty establishes persistence by creating a scheduled task with the command SchTasks /Create /SC DAILY /TN BigData /TR "" + path_file + ""/ST 09:30"".",T1053.005
|
| yty runs ipconfig /all and collects the domain name.,T1016
|
| yty uses the net view command for discovery.,T1018
|
|
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