Datasets:
| name,TTP | |
| "For the discovery phase, the Carbanak and FIN7 campaigns gain more knowledge about the system by gathering listings of various information: open application windows, running processes, IP addresses and other network identifiers in remote systems, detailed hardware and system information, system network configuration and settings, and system owners and users.",T1033 | T1016 | T1057 | T1082 | T1590.005 | T1590 | T1049 | |
| The packed executable stores the LV ransomware binary as an RC4-encrypted data within a section named “enc.”,T1486 | |
| "As shown below in Figure 4, the DLL was saved to the victim’s home directory at C:\Users\[username]\tru.dll. It ran using regsvr32.exe.",T1218.010 | |
| "To steal information from the Windows Vault, it appears that the Agent Tesla authors converted a PowerSploit script into C# to build a .NET assembly.",T1059.001 | T1587.001 | T1588.001 | |
| "Threat actors behind Cring used weaponized tools in their attacks. One of these tools is Mimikatz, which was used to steal account credentials of users who had previously logged into the system.",T1528 | |
| "After loading the Cobalt Strike DLL, there was an almost instant injection by the process into the Werfault process.",T1055.001 | T1055.011 | T1055.002 | |
| "In this incident, CARBON SPIDER also used the KillACK PS backdoor, executing the malware using both PowerShell and PowerShell ISE. KillACK sends host information to a C2 server (in this case, againcome[.]com or besaintegration[.]com) and executes provided PS script blocks. Multiple KillACK modules have been observed by CrowdStrike Intelligence, including modules for conducting self-propagation and AMSI hot-patching, as well as for executing Cobalt Strike stagers and enumerating network information.",T1546.013 | T1059.001 | |
| "A threat actor with knowledge of the machineKey can construct a malicious ViewState and then generate a new and valid MAC that the server accepts. With a valid MAC, the server will then deserialize the malicious ViewState, resulting in the execution of code on the server. Publicly available tools such as YSoSerial.NET exist to construct these malicious ViewStates. This is precisely how APT41 initiated their campaign in May 2021. ",T1037.002 | |
| "Similar to SPRITE SPIDER, CARBON SPIDER has gained access to ESXi servers using valid credentials. The adversary has typically accessed these systems via the vCenter web interface, using legitimate credentials, but has also logged in over SSH using the Plink utility to drop Darkside.",T1505.003 | |
| "What is peculiar about this file is it is a variant of the open-source MicroBackdoor, a backdoor allowing an attacker to browse the file system, upload and download files, execute commands and remove itself from the system (Figure 13). As the threat actor would normally have a foothold into the network prior to ransomware deployment, it raises the question of why this backdoor is part of the ransomware execution. One possibility is that it is used to monitor ransomed systems for blue team and incident response (IR) activity, though even in that case it is unusual to see offensive tools dropped at this point in the infection.",T1588.001 | |
| "The first artefacts we found relating to MATA were used around April 2018. After that, the actor behind this advanced malware framework used it aggressively to infiltrate corporate entities around the world. We identified several victims from our telemetry and figured out the purpose of this malware framework.",T1588.001 | T1587.001 | |
| Another example of a Trojan with the same functionality is Backdoor.Win32.ZAccess (ZeroAccess). Its most favored targets are users in the US (27.7%) and Germany (11%).,T1588.001 | T1587.001 | |
| "Mandiant Threat Intelligence discovered a new backdoor uploaded by a U.S.-based entity to a public malware repository in August 2020 that we have named SUNSHUTTLE. SUNSHUTTLE is written in GO, and reads an embedded or local configuration file, communicates with a hard-coded command and control (C2) server over HTTPS, and supports commands including remotely uploading its configuration, file upload and download, and arbitrary command execution. Notably, SUNSHUTTLE uses cookie headers to pass values to the C2, and if configured, can select referrers from a list of popular website URLs to help such network traffic “blend in.” .",T1588.001 | T1583.002 | |
| "We also observed another malware distribution method of Roaming Mantis which is linked to prezi.com. Prezi is a popular computer application and online service to create dynamic presentations. The criminals used this service to spread their scam. When a user visits a page crafted by the attackers, a link is shown offering free content such as adult video, a game, a comic, music and so on, like pirate editions.",T1566.002 | T1204.001 | T1598.003 | |
| "Sixth and seventeenth places were taken by members of the Hqwar dropper family: Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Hqwar.bb (3.36%) and Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Hqwar.gen (1.57%), respectively. These packers most often contain banking Trojans, including Asacub.",T1588.001 | T1587.001 | |
| "These downloaders maintained PDB strings with “PuppetLoader” filepaths. These PuppetLoader strings pretty clearly connected the multistage loaders with past PuppetLoader downloaders, only this time, redesigned and rewritten in C#. Past PuppetLoaders, written in C++, maintain explicit strings:",T1588.002 | |
| "Like many other stealers its main purpose is to steal credentials and information from web browsers, in addition to stealing cryptocurrency wallets, FTP credentials, various files and information about the system such as OS version, system language, processor type and clipboard data. ",T1555.003 | |
| "A new Ducktail phishing campaign is spreading a never-before-seen Windows information-stealing malware written in PHP used to steal Facebook accounts, browser data, and cryptocurrency wallets.",T1566 | |
| "We saw some cases where a separate loader – WindowsTool.exe – was used to implement persistence and execute DeepCreep with InstallUtil, a legitimate tool from the .NET Framework.",T1218.004 | |
| QAKBOT has gained execution through users accessing malicious link,T1204.001 | |
| """In 2013, Kaspersky reported on a threat actor group they named “IceFog” that had been attacking a large number of entities related to military, mass media, and technology in South Korea and Japan. This group developed their own backdoor for both Windows and OS X. And just this year, Kaspersky published a report on a group they named """"Careto/Mask"""" that utilized an open source netcat-like project designed to run on *nix and Windows systems named ‘sbd’ which they wrapped in a custom built installer for OS X.""",T1587.001 | |
| "This module propagates Trickbot via the EternalRomance exploit. It enables WDigest Authentication by modifying the UseLogonCredential value in the HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest registry key. This modification is forced to save credentials in lsass.exe memory (Local Security Authority Subsystem Service). The tabDll32 module then injects the embedded module screenLocker in explorer.exe and locks the workstation with the lock screen, forcing the user to login again. It waits for next user login and scrapes the credentials from LSASS memory utilizing Mimikatz functionality. Stolen credentials are sent back to the C2. After that tabDll32 downloads the payload from hardcoded URLs – usually the Trickbot loader (downloader) – starts up to 256 threads and uses the EternalRomance exploit to rapidly spread the downloaded payload over the network. Another embedded module, ssExecutor_x86, is used to set up persistence for the downloaded payload on exploited systems. This module also contains the main code of the shareDll32 module, and uses it to spread over the network.",T1003.001 | T1547.008 | |
| "While WannaCry ransomware has spread primarily through SMB exploitation, its operators may also use other distribution methods. Early reports suggested WannaCry was spread through malicious links in spam messages; however, FireEye has been unable to corroborate that information from any of our investigations to date.",T1566.002 | T1203 | |
| The jar that exploited CVE-2013-2423 dropped a 9002 RAT with a MD5 of d99ed31af1e0ad6fb5bf0f116063e91f. This RAT connected to a command and control server at asp[.]homesvr[.]linkpc[.]net. The jar that exploited CVE-2013-1493 dropped a 9002 RAT with a MD5 of 42bd5e7e8f74c15873ff0f4a9ce974cd. This RAT connected to a command and control server at ssl[.]homesvr[.]tk.,T1210 | |
| "On November 25, we confirmed that another malware, AzoRult, was served from the same URL previously serving Smoke Loader. AzoRult is also a commodity malware that steals credentials, cookies, and cryptocurrencies. This AzoRult accesses the following C2 address, which is a different path on the same C2 server with the Smoke Loader.",T1588.001 | |
| "Spam messages sent to users of VKontakte contained a personal address and were far more lively. These messages contained a link to a server, which redirected users to porn sites. Users were told that in order to view videos, they had to download a codec, which turned out to be Trojan.Win32.Crypt.ey, a malicious Browser Helper Object. This caused the first five results in any web search query to be malicious links. Kaspersky Lab estimates that approximately 4000 VKontakte accounts were stolen with a few hours. ",T1566.002 | |
| "Current module doesn’t create any local logs, instead all information is kept in memory, which is later compressed using Zlib 1.2.5, encrypted, encoded with Base64 algorithm and submitted to the C&C server.",T1132 | |
| "Trojan.AndroidOS.Fadeb.a could be regarded as the least successful of the malicious programs described above. Its activity also increased starting in early May, but even in the first half of July, which was its most active period, the number of users attacked did not exceed 1,000 per day.",T1587.001 | |
| . . . This timeline shows that the attackers have been busy developing a new component of the infection chain almost every month since April 2020.. . A visual timeline of the evolution is presented here:. Visual timeline of the evolution of the infection chain of CRAT.. . ,T1587.001 | |
| Patterns in certificate issuer data for Dridex HTTPS C2 traffic are somewhat unique when compared to other malware families. They can be key to identifying Dridex infections.,T1596.003 | |
| "The main worker sample contains five icon resources with valid icons named 16, 256, 4097, 8193 and 12289. The names indicate different icon resolutions, but the icons only differ in the encrypted data appended to them which can be considered as a form of steganography. This data is encrypted with a custom algorithm and additionally zlib compressed. The same method is used within the SSP DLLs. A Python script for decryption and decompression can be found in the Appendix. After decryption, the data blob has the following structure:",T1027.003 | |
| "In response, the malware receives an extended loader – a module in a format typical of ZeuS, i.e., not a standard PE file but a set of sections that are mapped to memory by the loader itself: executable code, relocation table, point of entry, exported functions, import table.",T1587.001 | |
| PLEAD’s installers are disguised as documents using the right-to-left-override (RTLO) technique to obfuscate the malware’s filename. They are mostly accompanied by decoy documents to further trick users. We’ve also seen PLEAD use exploits for these vulnerabilities:. . ,T1036.002 | |
| Attempts to check the language settings.,T1614 | T1614 | |
| "Indicators, such as logs in Windows Event Logs or malicious files, are typically removed using wevtutil, a batch script, or CCleaner.",T1070 | |
| Compromised accounts may be used to maintain access to the network.,T1078 | T1078 | |
| Affiliates use hidden windows to hide malicious activity from plain sight.,T1564.003 | T1564.003 | |
| CreepyDrive uses the OneDrive HTTP API (and the Dropbox HTTP API) to access the cloud storage.,T1530 | |
| "It can upload or download files from attacker-controlled accounts in these cloud services, and execute supplied PowerShell code",T1580 | |
| Smuggles a file’s content by hiding malicious payloads inside of seemingly benign HTML files.,T1027.006 | |
| PapaCreep is a previously undocumented custom backdoor written in C++ that can receive and execute commands from a remote server via TCP sockets.,T1071 | |
| CreepyDrive is a PowerShell backdoor that reads and executes commands from a text file stored on OneDrive or Dropbox,T1580 | |
| "On a similar note, they like to divide the code in their backdoors, distributing malicious functionality into various small DLLs, perhaps expecting that defenders or researchers will not observe the complete attack chain.",T1622 | |
| "The final stage is a Windows executable-type malware that is capable of stealing information from the victim such as file lists, user keystrokes, and stored web browser login credentials.",T1056.001 | |
| Russian state-sponsored APT actors have conducted bruteforce password guessing and password spraying campaigns.,T1110.001 | T1110.003 | |
| Russian state-sponsored APT actors have exploited Windows Netlogon vulnerability CVE-2020-1472 to obtain access to Windows Active Directory servers.,T1212 | |
| Russian state-sponsored APT actors have obtained private encryption keys from the Active Directory Federation Services (ADFS) container to decrypt corresponding SAML signing certificates.,T1552.004 | |
| Russian state-sponsored APT actors have used virtual private servers (VPSs) to route traffic to targets. The actors often use VPSs with IP addresses in the home country of the victim to hide activity among legitimate user traffic.,T1090.003 | |
| Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed using Cobalt Strike® and tools from GitHub® on victim networks.,T1588.002 | |
| "Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed: Exploiting vulnerable devices immediately after conducting scans for critical zero-day or publicly disclosed vulnerabilities. The cyber actors used or modified public proof of concept code in order to exploit vulnerable systems. Targeting Microsoft Exchange offline address book (OAB) virtual directories (VDs). Exploiting Internet accessible webservers using webshell small code injections against multiple code languages, including net, asp, apsx, php, japx, and cfm.",T1133 | |
| Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have also been observed modifying group policies for password exploitation.,T1484.001 | |
| The actors staged archives of collected data on a target's OWA server.,T1074.002 | |
| The actors renamed archive files containing exfiltration data with innocuous looking names and extensions (e.g. .wav and .mp4) to resemble benign files,T1036 | |
| The actors renamed the WinRAR utility to avoid detection.,T1036.003 | |
| Actors used Impacket tools wmiexec.py and smbexec.py to leverage Windows Management Instrumentation and execute malicious commands.,T1047 | |
| "Each sample contains malicious code that writes an embedded payload to disk and launches it. However, the malicious code was inserted at different locations in each of the trojanized PuTTY samples. In the PuTTY sample discovered by Mandiant, the code resides in the connect_to_host function, which is in the source file putty-0.77\ssh\ssh.c. To trigger the code, the user must attempt an SSH connection to the host IP address provided in the Readme.txt file (Figure 1).",T1620 | |
| A bash installation script to be placed into /etc/rc.local.d/ to ensure its actions will be executed upon each bootup of ESXi. This script executes the ELF backdoor,T1547 | |
| "Reviewing the ESXi hypervisors during an active attacker event, Mandiant identified an attacker executed commands to the guest machines through the process /bin/rdt (VIRTUALPITA). The parent process /bin/rdt spawned a bash shell which called on a python script specifying the target guest machine and commands to run as seen in Figure 4.",T1202 | |
| UNC4166 deployed the payload AzureSettingSync.dll and configured its execution via a schedule task named AzureSync on at least one device. The schedule task was configured to execute AzureSync via rundll32.exe,T1218.011 | |
| """Conti ransomware uses CreateIoCompletionPort(), PostQueuedCompletionStatus(), and GetQueuedCompletionPort() to rapidly encrypt files, excluding those with the extensions of .exe, .dll, and .lnk. It has used a different AES-256 encryption key per file with a bundled RAS-4096 public encryption key that is unique for each victim. Conti ransomware can use Windows Restart Manager"""" to ensure files are unlocked and open for encryption.""""""",T1486 | |
| Conti ransomware can enumerate remote open server message block (SMB) network shares using NetShareEnum().,T1135 | |
| "In this attack, an attacker pretends to be a DC and uses the Directory Replication Service Remote Protocol in order to extract NTLM hashes of users in the domain. One of the accounts he can extract using this protocol is the KRBTGT account, allowing the attacker to create golden tickets and as a result, compromise the domain completely. To perform this attack, the attacker must have compromised an account with special rights allowing the domain replication. These permissions are granted by default to domain admins, administrators, enterprise admins and domain controllers groups. The Mimikatz command performing this attack is- lsadump::dcsync /domain:<domain name> /user:<domain user account>",T1207 | |
| "Like a typical ransomware TTP, Nefilim enumerates files before encrypting them. It uses some FileAPI functions such as FindFirstFileW, lstrcmpiW and FindNextFileW to discover files.",T1083 | |
| Nefilim operators use the MEGAsync application to exfiltrate data to cloud storage. MEGAsync application synchronizes folders between the infected computer and an adversary-controlled MEGA Cloud Drive.,T1567.002 | |
| "In their current campaign, APT32 has leveraged ActiveMime files that employ social engineering methods to entice the victim into enabling macros. Upon execution, the initialized file downloads multiple malicious payloads from remote servers.",T1586.001 | |
| "The malware changes the file Created, Modified, and Accessed times of all of its dropped copies to the Last Modified time of ntdll.dll. To bypass the “File Downloaded from the Internet” warning, the malware removes the :Zone.Identifier flag using DeleteFile API, as shown in Figure 9.",T1553.005 | |
| "Exploit code that downloads a payload (such as malicious application) will not set a quarantine attribute (or can remove it), thus will not trigger Gatekeeper",T1553.001 | |